Case Information

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.U., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER No. EDA 2016

: Appeal from the Order Entered September 27, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001453-2016, FID: 51 -FN -001560-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.U., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER No. EDA 2016

: Appeal from the Order Entered September 27, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001451-2016, FID: 51 -FN -001560-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.U., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER No. EDA 2016

: Appeal from the Order Entered September 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001452-2016,

FID: 51 -FN -001560-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.U., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER No. EDA 2016

: Appeal from the Order Entered September 27, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001450-2016,

FID: 51 -FN -001560-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J. FILED MAY 08, 2017

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: Appellant T.C. ("Mother") appeals from orders entered September 27, 2016, which continued the suspension of visits with her children, J.U. (born 2001), H.U. (born 2003), S.U. (born 2008), and A.U. (born 2013) (collectively "Children"), pending future hearing.' We affirm.

We adopt the facts set forth by trial court: On June 6, 2016, the Department Human Services ("DHS") received Child Protective Services ("CPS") report alleging was raped stepfather, D.G. On June 7, 2016, D.G. arrested charged with rape by forcible compulsion, inter a/ia. D.G. currently incarcerated at Curran- Fromhold Correctional Facility ("CFCF"). Thereafter, Mother began working with Philadelphia Housing Authority ("PHA") ' "All orders dealing with custody or visitation, the exception of enforcement or contempt proceedings, final when entered." In re H.S.W.C.-B., 836 A.2d (Pa. 2003) (citation omitted).

to obtain a different apartment and Mother obtained a Protection from Abuse ("PFA") order against D.G. On June 27, 2016, DHS visited the Mother's home, where the Children were determined (Statement of Facts: Petition to Determine to be safe. Dependency RE J.U.)

On July 13, 2016, DHS received a General Protective Services ("GPS") report which alleged Mother was not cooperating with the criminal investigation against D.G.; Mother would not allow J.U. to testify against D.G.; Mother planned to reside with D.G. if he was released from incarceration; and that a bench warrant was issued against Mother for contempt of court connection with her lack of cooperation D.G.'s criminal matter. When Mother was arrested July 13, pursuant to bench warrant, police officers discovered correspondence between Mother and D.G.; J.U. was anxious to testify against D.G.; and Mother forced to speak with D.G. on phones; and Mother brought the Children to visit D.G. in prison. On July 13, 2016, DHS obtained an OPC [(Order of Protective Custody)] for the Children and the Children were placed a foster home through Jewish Family and Children Services ("JFCS"). (Statement of Facts: Petition to Determine Dependency RE J.U.). On July 25, 2016, dependency hearing was heard before the Honorable Judge Vincent Furlong and Children were adjudicated dependent and the Mother was ordered not speak the Children about the ongoing criminal investigation regarding D.G. and future between and Children were be therapeutic and supervised. (Statement Facts: Petition to Determine Dependency RE J.U.) On September 2016, the Court held permanency review hearing determine if T.C. ("Mother") should be allowed resume supervised visitation with the Children. Prior to said hearing, CUA [(Community Umbrella Agency)], Child Advocate had entered into an agreement to suspend visitation between Mother and [of] the Children because Mother's violation Court Order which stipulated her visits with supervised. Mother was present and represented counsel during said hearing. After full hearing merits, the Court found clear convincing evidence between the Mother Children remain suspended because sufficient evidence been presented Mother's moral deficiency. The Court found Mother posed a the Children during after prior visitations and Mother had violated prior court orders to not visit the Children without supervision. The Court found Mother continued to send text messages to and continued to interfere with the criminal investigation D.G. despite Court Orders not to cause interference. The Court also found Mother met Children secret without supervision and Mother had encouraged the Children to lie to their Foster Parent and Therapists. Mother is mute.

Trial Ct. Op., 12/9/16, at 2-4.

The orders entered September 27, 2016, as result of the hearing, stated Mother's are to remain suspended "until further order of the court"; the Children shall remain foster care and the legal custody DHS; the Children may be placed outside of the county; continue mental health treatment parenting classes; and is ordered stay away from Children their schools. The orders also stated the permanency goals for are to return parent or guardian, the next permanency hearing was held on December

On her appeal from those orders, Mother raises the following issues: 1. Did court err when suspending Mother's visitations, a legislatively protected interest, when there was no competent evidence presented as Mother's mental or moral deficiency? 2. Did court err when suspending Mother's visitations, a legislatively protected interest, when there was no competent evidence presented Mother's posing great threats children during after visitations?

3. Did court err when suspending Mother's visitations, a legislatively protected interest, when there competent evidence presented as DHS['] inability provide Mother with practicable solution for visitations? Mother's Brief at 2.

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported record, but does require the appellate court to accept lower court's inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831, (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoted citation omitted). "In dependency proceedings our scope of review is broad. . . [W]e must . exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the court's determination, as opposed to its findings of fact, must order whatever right justice dictate." In re C.B., A.2d (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoted citation omitted), appeal denied, 871 A.2d 187 (Pa. 2005).

We summarize Mother's arguments support of her issues. First, Mother argues trial court's conclusion has mental or moral deficiency which poses is speculative, because it based Mother's past actions. Mother's Brief at 7-8. Mother claims she "can cease her actions based the results of the ongoing investigations. She can also cease her actions help of counseling therapy mandated dependency proceeding." Mother asserts communications with younger children are harmless, because they not involved pending criminal case. Id. Similarly, Mother contends that, "since there evidence any clear present danger of physical harms to the Children during the visitations, the burden is on DHS prove that the Mother's visitations left the Children serious emotional or psychological harms after the visitations." Id. at 9- 10.

Next, Mother argues that In Re B.G., 774 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. 2001), this Court held that children around the age of required "police themselves" some extent, despite poor lapses of judgment made their parents, that suspension of can cause more psychological harms child than placing some responsibility self -regulate child. Mother's Brief at 10-12 (citing B.G., 774 A.2d at 764). Mother suggests fact became uncooperative with their caseworker is only typical manifestation of separation from parents, that "courts do abrogate the parental rights account of these changes." Id. at (citing B.G., 774 A.2d at 764).

Finally, Mother argues court erred suspending visitation because DHS did not prove there is practicable means of allowing visitations without violation its orders. Mother's Brief at 14-16 (citing In re Rhine, A.2d (Pa. Super. 1983)). According to Mother, court should have found Mother contempt court for violating its order, rather than suspending visitations. Id. at 14-15. Mother argues because she mute, DHS should able to devise way to have visitations occur while still protecting the children.

Regarding our review of visitation restrictions, we have stated - Where, as here, reunification still remains the goal of the family service plan, visitation will not be denied or reduced unless it poses a grave threat. . . .

The "grave threat" standard is met when the evidence clearly shows a parent is unfit to associate his or her children; the parent can then be denied the right see them. This standard is satisfied when the parent demonstrates a severe mental or moral deficiency constitutes a grave threat child.

L.V., 127 A.3d at 839 (citations omitted). "[P]arents whose visitation is opposed by the state constitute a grave threat their child only where there practicable visitation options permit visitation protect child." Rhine, 456 A.2d at 614. "Unless the state demonstrates with clear convincing evidence even supervised visitation would severely endanger the child, the court must deny the complete foreclosure of parental being contrary Act's goal family preservation." Id.; accord In re Mary Kathryn T., 629 A.2d (Pa. Super. 1993), appeal denied, A.2d (Pa. 1994).

The "grave threat" standard is met only where parent poses a physical threat child, but when the child danger emotional abuse. See, e.g., C.B., 861 A.2d at 294 (where father's visits his son were suspended based father's heinous sexual abuse of son's half-sister his son's presence, affirming "clearly established moral depravity" poses grave threat, justifying suspension of visitation rights). Moral deficiency constituting can also based a parent's failure protect a child from previous abuse by the other parent, or a parent's continued association with an abusive parent. L.V., 127 A.3d at 840. In L.V., for example, we affirmed the termination of visits with an infant's mother where it was shown the infant suffered physical abuse at the hands of his father, the mother either knew or should have known of abuse, mother continued to associate father even after abuse had been discovered father imprisoned. 833-36,

However, prior poor judgment by a parent, when not indicative a child's danger of future harm, does not constitute grave threat. See B.G., 774 A.2d at 762-63 (Mother did pose grave threat where she exercised poor judgment during two by supplying her 14 -year -old daughter with cigarettes and by telling the location of her prior abuser, where there was no evidence of physical or emotional ill effects resulting from the visits); Mary Kathryn T., 629 A.2d at 991-96, (trial court's conclusion parents posed grave not supported the evidence, where testimony established both parents engaged therapy improve their parenting skills).

"In rare instances, we have approved restricting or temporarily suspending even though there has been showing severe mental or moral deficiencies the parent would constitute threat the child's welfare." In re Damon B., A.2d (Pa. Super. 1983) (emphasis in original). In Damon B., we affirmed a reduction in visitation, based on the mother's moral deficiency, but because of the psychological ill-effects the caused to her son. Id. We stressed, however, that "[o]ur decision in this case influenced by the fact that this is temporary reduction visits rather than a long-term cessation of visits. In the latter case, course, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, visitation poses grave the child." Damon B., 460 A.2d at 1198 n.1 (emphasis original). In Damon B., the trial court was scheduled to review the determination within the next seven months. Id. at

In the case at hand, the trial court concluded that "the testimony of the DHS worker and the documentation presented the Court provided clear convincing evidence Mother's continued visitation with Children constituted threat" "continued by caused significant emotional effects Children." Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7 (unpaginated). The trial court based its conclusion both the actions by effects the Children. The court found Mother violated the court's order not to communicate with the Children regarding all criminal investigation D.G. and court's order communications visitations supervised; Mother did this meeting without the knowledge of DHS, providing cell phone, and secretly texting Children. 5-6. Moreover, text messages, Mother encouraged the Children lie their foster parent and therapists in order to interfere with both the placement of the Children and prosecution of D.G. Id. The court also found these secret and interactions emotional effects on the Children: they unsupervised caused J.U. to have suicidal ideations and in mental placed healthcare facility, and led all of the Children become secretive and defensive in their interactions with DHS. Id. The trial court based most its factual findings testimony of the DHS case manager, which, the court stated, "was deemed credible and accorded great weight." at 6.2

We find trial court's conclusions are well -supported record. Before the Children were put into placement, Mother continued associate D.G.; prevented J.U. from testifying against D.G. at the preliminary hearing on his rape charges; made speak to D.G., her alleged rapist, the telephone. After the Children were put placement ordered to have supervised only, Mother did just violate the court's order by seeing the Children communicating via secret text messages, but Mother actually told lie court,3 The case manager who testified at the hearing works for CUA placement center used by DHS. N.T., 9/27/16, at 4. asked Children act "dramatic, crying, begging" their

interactions with District Attorney. N.T.

- - to DHS,4 to foster parent,5 to their therapists.6 Evidence these conversations introduced through screen shots of the text messages from Mother found one of the Children's cell phones. Additionally, Mother provided expired sleeping pills to her daughter, unbeknownst to her caretakers. at 21. The immediate results of Mother's words actions were oldest daughter, J.U., was placed mental healthcare Mother asked to lie if anyone asked whether former foster mother assisted one of Mother's unsupervised visits. N.T. at asked J.U. lie about whether visited her at school. N.T. at 21-23. Mother's text messages to instructed:

[W]hen you start therapy, dominate every session. All you want talk about seeing your mom going home your brothers. Make them listen. Let them know I did not make you talk [D.G.] so we could communicate. It's habit for you answer my phone when it rings. And that's what you did. I would hang up, but [D.G.] would call back. And you felt like that's your dad calling to answer. Play these people how they try play you. . . . You are far too intelligent let these people get you got. You can dominate this entire situation. You your mother's child. little me. So, I know you're capable. If you can You're a manipulate them instead of them doing it you, we can be back together before Christmas if we work this together. N.T. 27-28.

facility due to suicidal ideations, Id. at 7, 10,7 and other Children became secretive and uncooperative with their caseworker. at 29-30.

We therefore find, contrary Mother's assertions in her first two issues, clear and convincing evidence was presented has moral deficiencies these deficiencies pose a threat to her Children. Like mother in L.V., 127 A.3d at 833-36, 840, Mother does not pose direct physical to her Children, but continually exercises judgment that puts in harm's way through such things as continued interactions with D.G., encouraging the Children to deceive their caretakers regarding whereabouts, providing secret (and expired) medication. Mother's actions are not the minor lapses in judgment exhibited by the Mother B.G., 774 A.2d at 762-63, but exhibit persistent intent to interfere with the Children's ability to engage honest communication with their therapists caretakers.

We troubled great lengths to which has gone an attempt influence daughter's testimony, despite being ordered not do so. The record substantiates interference from parent is bound place undue stress child, we agree with the trial court under these circumstances, suspension of the most appropriate response. And, while most of Mother's actions have thus far

J.U.'s mental state attributed to stress regarding Mother getting into trouble for communicating with her. N.T.

- - been directed at her two older children,8 have caused the most tangible harm to eldest child, the trial court understandably concerned by the impact that Mother's moral deficiencies would have during with her younger children well.

Moreover, like Damon B., 460 A.2d at 1198 n.1, this case involves only temporary restriction visitation. The child advocate requested that visits suspended until Mother completed parenting classes therapy. N.T. at 34, 40. The trial court ordered an early relisting of the case, inviting to present evidence she completed parenting classes no longer posed danger to her Children. N.T. at 41. The court scheduled next hearing take place before three months passed. The trial court did abuse its discretion ordering temporary cessation of its attempt protect from Mother. Cf. Damon B., A.2d at 1198 (holding abuse discretion where the court was scheduled review the determination within the next seven months).

Mother's arguments fail recognize almost all predictions of future behavior based past behavior, trial court properly took into consideration Mother's ability to change by short -listing hearing review its determination. Further, with respect Mother's contention that The record reflects Mother sent text messages to J.U. and H.U., and text messages between Mother and H.U. had been deleted before the Children's caseworker could see them. N.T. 8-9,

- - her communications with H.U. were harmless, we acknowledge that nothing record has established whether H.U. will asked to testify at D.G.'s trial. But, as have stated, suspension of visitation appropriate merely protect the criminal case against D.G. from tampering, but protect Children from the stress moral dilemma they may face as result from Mother's attempts to interfere with that criminal case. Mother's insistence that there was evidence of serious psychological harms misses the point: the trial court properly evaluated whether poses grave threat such harm. The same evidence demonstrates the harm already done to Mother's eldest daughter evinces the grave threat of harm also poses younger children, whom she continues to manipulate. Mother's suggestion J.U. was required "police" herself prevent Mother's poor lapses judgment does not excuse the trial court's finding Mother's unsupervised unauthorized actions have caused significant psychological harm warrant medical intervention, and pose the Children's emotional stability.

Under the facts of this case, trial court's temporary suspension of Mother's rights appropriate. Mother's visitation was not suspended merely because she disobeyed the court, but because unsupervised communications she had with the Children exhibited wonton moral deficiency already begun to cause harm

- - to her Children. The record does not establish any practicable viable alternatives other than temporary suspension.

Having discerned abuse discretion, we affirm order below. See L.V. , 127 A.3d at 834.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

J seph D. Seletyn,

Prothonotary

Date: 5/8/2017

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