DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: After careful review, I believe the more prudent approach this case remand for determination or clarification by trial court counsel abandoned -sentencing direct -appeal process, rather than immediately reinstating Appellant's direct rights. Accordingly, respectfully dissent.

We have often expressed right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment United States Constitution by Article I, Section Nine of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Floyd, 2007). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure addresses of counsel provides, in relevant part, follows:

Rule Appointment of Counsel

(B) When counsel is appointed,

* * * the shall be effective until final (2) judgment, including any proceedings upon direct appeal.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 122. In addition, the comment to Rule 122 provides the following, pertinent part:

Pursuant to paragraph (B)(2), counsel retains his or appointment until final judgment, which includes all avenues appeal through the Supreme Court Pennsylvania. In making the decision to file a petition for allowance of appeal, counsel must (1) consult with or her client, (2) review the standards set forth Pa.R.A.P. 1114 (Considerations Governing Allowance of Appeal) note If decision is made to file petition, following rule. decision. counsel must carry through with See Commonwealth v. Liebe!, 573 Pa. 375, 825 A.2d 630 (2003). Concerning counsel's obligations appointed counsel, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 See also (1983). Commonwealth v. Padden, 783 A.2d 299 2001).

See Alberta,601 Pa. 974 A.2d 1158 (2009), which the Court stated that "[a]ppointed counsel who has complied with Anders [v. California, U.S. 738 (1967),] and is permitted to withdraw discharges the direct obligations of counsel. Once counsel is granted leave to withdraw per Anders, necessary consequence of decision that right end." Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 cmt. (emphasis added) (brackets original). addition, we have strongly stated the following:

We remind admonish all counsel, both privately retained court appointed, that, once appearance is attorney diligently entered, responsible is competently represent client until or her is

- - withdrawn. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 and 1.3. This responsibility includes filing appeal when client so requests. Counsel is also reminded that appearance may be withdrawn only by leave of court. Pa.R.Crim.P. 120. Librizzi, 692, 2002).

My review of the certified record reflects that, at his preliminary hearing on March 5, 2013, Appellant was represented by Attorney Taylor Dunn. Subsequently, on May 3, 2013, Attorney Marc J. DaFermo of the Delaware County Public Defender's Officer entered his appearance on behalf of Appellant, he represented Appellant at suppression hearing held on August On October 8, 2013, Attorney Dawn Sutphin, also of the Delaware County Public Defender's Officer, entered on behalf of Appellant. The record reflects Attorney Sutphin represented Appellant guilty plea hearing sentencing on February 2014. Moreover, Attorney Sutphin assisted Appellant in completing detailed written guilty plea colloquy. Included with written colloquy is an extensive statement of post -sentence rights, which was appropriately initialed signed by both Attorney Sutphin. As Majority correctly states:

there nothing record indicating plea counsel consulted with [Appellant] regarding -sentence or appellate rights, other than what stated the standard language of the written guilty plea colloquy. See Guilty Plea Statement, Statement Post -Sentence Rights, 2/4/14 ("I represent the Defendant above -captioned case. have explained the Post -Sentence Rights contained this document [Appellant,] and I am satisfied [Appellant] understands these rights."). McRea, Majority Memorandum at 4.

The trial court docket reflects no further action occurred this matter until three months later, when, on May 8, 2014, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition and requested the of counsel. In PCRA petition, Appellant made a bald allegation of "ineffective counsel." PCRA Petition, 5/8/14, On May 19, 2014, the PCRA court appointed Attorney Henry DiBenedetto Forrest to represent Appellant for purposes of PCRA petition instructed counsel to file an amended PCRA petition within sixty days. However, on September 25, 2014, Attorney Forrest filed an application to withdraw no -merit letter. no - merit letter, Attorney Forrest addressed various allegations plea counsel's ineffective assistance but did not address whether Attorney Sutphin abandoned Appellant following sentencing. On September 2014, the PCRA court entered an order granting counsel permission to withdraw also entered order giving Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent dismiss the PCRA petition without hearing. Ultimately, on April 2015, court entered order dismissing the PCRA petition, this timely pro se followed.

While it appears Attorney Sutphin may not have fulfilled duty throughout direct appeal, it obvious she did not request withdraw from representation, believe the lack evidence the certified record pertaining to counsel's action, or inaction, poses problem because we are not a fact-finding court. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734 (Pa. 2002) (noting that appellate courts do not act fact finders); Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 2003) (appellate court does not first instance make findings of fact) (citation quotation marks omitted). Indeed, this issue was not articulated Appellant's pro se PCRA petition or Attorney Forrest's no -merit letter so court could adequately address the concern of abandonment. Hence, I would remand this matter PCRA court for determination abandoned Appellant -sentencing direct appeal process. See Librizzi, at (remanding of pro se for determination of the appellant's representation).