Case Information

SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S.M.B., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: A.R.D., MOTHER No. EDA 2016 :

Appeal from the Decree June 21, 2016 the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000634-2015, CP-51-DP-0001913-2012, FID# 51 -FN -002204-2012 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S.M.B., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: A.R.D., MOTHER No. EDA 2016 :

Appeal from the Decree June 21, 2016 the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000635-2015, CP-51-DP-0001381-2012, FID# 51 -FN -002204-2012 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.D., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: A.R.D., MOTHER No. EDA 2016 :

Appeal from the Decree June 21, 2016 the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000636-2015, CP-51-DP-0001906-2014, FID# 51 -FN -002204-2012 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.L.L.D., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: A.R.D., MOTHER No. EDA 2016 :

Appeal from the Decree June 21, 2016 the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000637-2015, CP-51-DP-0001563-2013, FID# 51 -FN -002204-2012 BEFORE: MOULTON, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD*, JJ. FILED APRIL 06, 2017

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: Appellant, A.R.D. ("Mother"), appeals from decrees entered June 2016, Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which involuntarily terminated parental rights to her minor children, A.S.M.B.1, * Former Justice specially assigned the Superior Court.

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a female born November 2008; A.S.M.B.2, a male born in February 2012; A.L.L.D., a male born May 2013; A.M.D., a female born July 2014 (collectively, "the Children").1 In addition, Mother appeals from the orders entered same day, which changed the Children's permanency goals to adoption. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. instant matter a lengthy procedural history commencing on

August 3, 2012, when Philadelphia Department Human Services ("DHS") obtained an Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") respect A.S.M.B.2, based on allegations he suffered a skull fracture and rib fractures could not explain. DHS filed dependency petition on August 9, 2012, A.S.M.B.2 was adjudicated dependent order entered August 14, 2012. A.S.M.B.2 returned care on August 19, 2012, after an additional medical evaluation did not produce evidence Mother committed child abuse. However, A.S.M.B.2 remained dependent.

DHS obtained orders of protective custody with respect to A.S.M.B.1 A.S.M.B.2 on October 2012, based on allegations Mother failed to bring A.S.M.B.2 his medical appointments, "being held at Vision Quest delinquent petition it is unknown when she'll be On May 18, 2016, the entered separate decrees terminating parental rights of M.B., father of A.S.M.B.2, A.L.L.D., A.M.D. The also entered decree terminating the parental rights of the unknown father of A.S.M.B.1. Neither M.B., nor any unknown father, appealed his parental rights.

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released." Application Order of Protective Custody (A.S.M.B.1), 10/18/2012, 1. DHS filed a dependency petition with respect A.S.M.B.1 on October 24, 2012, she was adjudicated dependent by order entered October 25, 2012.

DHS filed a dependency petition with respect to A.L.L.D. approximately two months after his birth on July 22, 2013. In its petition, DHS alleged that Mother was participating in unsupervised day visits with A.S.M.B.1 and A.S.M.B.2., left A.S.M.B.1, A.S.M.B.2., A.L.L.D. at home of M.B. Mother then returned to M.B.'s home an effort retrieve three children, which, reasons not detailed petition, resulted in Mother being arrested charged with variety of criminal offenses, including burglary. A.L.L.D. adjudicated dependent order entered August 8, 2013, but remained Mother's care. DHS obtained an order protective custody with respect to A.L.L.D. on November 6, 2013, due to lack of appropriate housing. Finally, DHS filed dependency petition respect to A.M.D. about month after birth on August 12, DHS obtained an OPC respect to A.M.D. on September 23, 2014, based on allegations threatened kill both A.M.D. herself. DHS filed an amended dependency petition on September 26, 2014, A.M.D. was adjudicated dependent October 8, 2014.

On September 2015, DHS filed petitions involuntary terminate Mother's parental rights the Children, petitions to change Children's permanency goals to adoption. conducted a goal change hearing on May 18, 2016, June 21, 2016. the hearing, on June 21, 2016, the court entered decrees Following terminating Mother's parental rights, permanency review orders changing the Children's permanency goals.2 Mother timely filed notices appeal on July 20, 2016, along concise statements errors complained of on appeal. now raises five questions for our review.

1. Did the Court below erroneously find that [Mother] had abandoned [C]hildren? the Court below erroneously find that there were

2. Did dependency issues which had not been resolved or which could be resolved within reasonable period of time? 3. Did the Court below erroneously find that witnesses who opposed goal of adoption were only partially credible? 4. Did the Court erroneously find that adoption the [C]hildren's best interests?

[2] We observe trial court entered permanency review orders on May 18, 2016, stating each of the Children that "the new permanent placement goal [is] hereby determined be Adoption." See, e.g., Permanency Review Order (A.S.M.B.1), 5/18/2016, at 1. However, its June 21, permanency review orders, the indicated Children's permanency goals remained "return parent or guardian," again stated that "the new permanent placement goal [is] hereby Adoption." See, e.g., Permanency Review Order determined It appears the court did not intend to (A.S.M.B.1), 6/21/2016, 1. change the Children's permanency goals until June 21, 2016, given said nothing about changing the goals at the conclusion of testimony on May 18, 2016, first indicated it would issue goal change orders June See N.T., 6/21/2016, ("So we're a position to now move the goal to adoption all four of these children.").

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available to meet the [C]hildren's special needs in the county where [Mother] resided in/had moved to? brief 3 (trial court answers omitted).3

We address Mother's claims mindful of our well -settled standard review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported If the factual findings are supported, appellate by the record. courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill -will. trial court's decision, however, should reversed merely because record would support different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to courts often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations quotation marks omitted).

[3] While Mother stated her notices of appeal intended to appeal both the parental rights goal changes to adoption, Mother fails to develop any argument brief erred or abused its discretion changing the Children's permanency goals. Mother fails to cite any authority relating goal change orders. also Accordingly, Mother failed to preserve any challenge these orders for our review. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, (Pa. Super. 2010)) ("[W]here an appellate brief fails provide any discussion of claim with citation relevant authority or fails develop the issue any other meaningful fashion capable review, claim is waived."').

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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party termination must prove clear convincing seeking evidence the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines the parent's conduct warrants of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs welfare analysis concerns the nature status of the emotional bond between parent child, close attention paid to the effect on child permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b). We need only agree as any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), order affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court's decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) (b), which provides follows.

(a) General rule. --The rights parent regard child may be terminated after petition filed any of the following grounds:

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(2) repeated continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent caused child without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary his physical or mental well-being the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

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(b) Other considerations. --The court terminating the rights of parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical emotional needs welfare of the child. rights of parent shall not be terminated solely on basis environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), shall not consider any efforts the parent remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent giving of notice of the filing of the petition. Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether abused its discretion by terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order terminate parental rights pursuant Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary his physical or mental well-being; (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation "The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that omitted)). cannot remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To contrary, those grounds may include acts refusal well as incapacity perform parental duties." In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

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Instantly, the trial court found that Mother failed to complete her reunification objectives, that remains incapable of caring the Children. Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/2016, at 35. In its opinion, the court directs our attention to its comments concerning Mother's lack of parental capacity at the conclusion of the hearing on June 21, 2016. Id. at 37-38. There, the court emphasized that Mother continues suffer from depression, despite her testimony the contrary. Id. at 37-38 (quoting N.T., 6/21/2016, at 58-60). The court further emphasized that this case began in August 2012, that failed to advance beyond limited visitation with the Children. at 37 (quoting N.T., 6/21/2016, at 58-59). court concluded that while Mother participated in services, her efforts have "not resulted in anything concrete in [terms of] demonstrating an (quoting N.T., 6/21/2016, at ability parent these Children." 60).

In response, Mother presents several interrelated challenges trial court's findings, which we address together.4 Mother argues that she We observe that the third fifth issues listed in Mother's statement question involved are not included in the argument section brief, the argument section of Mother's brief includes an issue listed her statement of questions involved. Specifically, Mother makes no effort argue brief "erroneously [found] witnesses who opposed goal of adoption were only partially credible," or trial court "erroneously [found] there lack services available to meet the [C]hildren's special needs county where [Mother] resided in/had moved to[.]" brief Instead, detailed below, Mother argues placed too much weight parenting capacity (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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completed, or was completing, all her reunification objectives at the time the court terminated her parental rights. Mother's brief at 13-18. Mother contends that she completed parenting, anger management, domestic violence programs; participated in mental health treatment; maintained Id. Mother further income housing; complied with visitation. argues that in making its findings relied too heavily on parenting capacity evaluation prepared by psychologist, William Russell, Ph.D. Id. at 18-19. Mother contends that made significant progress since being evaluated by Dr. Russell, that the evaluation "stale" since termination hearing did not occur until over year after it was completed. at 18-19. Mother insists Dr. Russell's opinions were subjective or speculative. 19.

Our review of the record supports the court's findings. During hearing, on May 2016, DHS presented the testimony (Footnote Continued) It appears third fifth issues listed in Mother's

evaluation. statement of questions involved were included mistake, as these issues do not appear to related to this case. Further, Mother's concise statements include Mother's claim trial court placed too much weight on the parenting capacity evaluation, but do not include the third fifth issues listed statement of questions involved. "We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has been set forth or suggested by an appellate brief's statement of questions involved[.]" Krebs v. United Refining Co. Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, because Mother preserved her claim trial placed too much weight the parenting capacity evaluation her concise statements, because it appears this issue was omitted from statement of questions involved the result of minor typographical error, we decline find waived this issue our review. Community Umbrella Agency ("CUA") case manager, Devon Jacques. Mr. Jacques testified that CUA established a single case plan to assist Mother achieving reunification with the Children. N.T., 5/18/2016, at 23. reunification objectives included maintaining stable housing, gaining employment, completing classes at the Achieving Reunification Center, completing a parent capacity evaluation, stabilizing her mental health, attending supervised visits. Id.

Regarding Mother's compliance these objectives, Mr. Jacques testified that Mother maintains stable housing, is able to support herself using Supplemental Security Income assistance from her family. Id. at 30-31, 65. Mr. Jacques further testified Mother completed parenting anger management classes at the Achieving Reunification Center. Id. at 31. While Mother completed parenting capacity evaluation with Dr. Mother comply with Russell, Mr. Jacques reported failed recommendations contained evaluation, which included obtaining a Id. at psychiatric evaluation participating therapy with A.S.M.B.1. 24-25, 28-29, 40. With respect mental health, Mother participated in individual therapy throughout life of this case, but her attendance at 28. Mr. Jacques stated, "Mother was been inconsistent. scheduled go twice month. Mother could go once month. Mother could go all. Or [M]other could go." Finally, Mr. Jacques explained attends visits with the Children consistently, but visits have remained supervised due CUA's concern that Mother would not be able to manage all of Children at one time. Id. at 33. Mother was pregnant with fifth child at the time of the hearing, Mr. Jacques believed that the addition of a newborn would be a destabilizing factor in terms of Mother's ability to care the Children. Id. at 53, 89.

DHS also presented the testimony Dr. Russell. Dr. Russell's testimony focused the numerous traumas Mother experienced throughout life. Mother reported Dr. Russell she grew up in an environment where she was exposed to both physical sexual abuse. Id. at 97. Mother reported being placed foster care, experiencing multiple inpatient psychiatric placements. Id. at 98. Mother was a victim rape at the age of sixteen, resulting the birth of A.S.M.B.1, further victim of domestic violence. Id. Dr. Russell explained Mother has been diagnosed with various mental health issues, including post - traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder.5 at Dr. Russell believed also suffers from "an adjustment disorder with disturbances conduct emotions." Id.

Dr. Russell further testified Mother appears denial with 100-101. Dr. regard to the many traumas experienced. Russell stated, "that's real problem someone who's been exposed to Mother testified she was diagnosed depression child, but that she does currently suffer from depression. N.T., 6/21/2016, 29, 48. this much emotional turmoil. There to be some level of awareness that all of these things happened to me had to impact how I function." Id. also appeared to be in denial with respect the Children's placement foster care. Mother minimized any responsibility she had for the Children's placement. Id.

Dr. Russell expressed concern regarding Mother's failure obtain consistent mental health treatment, as Mother's mental issues impair her ability to care the Children. 98-99, 103-04. Dr. Russell explained,

When you're facing serious mental health issues it impacts It then It impacts how you think. your day-to-day function. impacts how you deal with your children. Because if you're suffering from mental health issues impact[s] how you sleep, how you go and function during day, how you react different things, how [you] interact with different milieus your children's lives [if] you don't address issues, then it's going to trickle down your children's behavior.

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Until [Mother] develops an understanding of the impact of significant trauma she's experienced her life, until she can develop an understanding of how all instability, all that chronic trauma, all chaotic developmental history, until she can match up with things she's experienced an older adolescent young adult I don't believe there can any change because the denial so prevalent terms of, "I don't I'm just sad my child's not here." The have any problems. naivety came through . . when she was presented . question, "Well, your children have been out of your care now quite while, what if we were return the children, what problems do you anticipate?" And the only problem could come up was, "Oh, I might have to adjust their sleep schedule." 104, 112-13. Ultimately, Dr. Russell opined lacked

capacity to parent the Children at the time he evaluated her. 106.

Thus, record confirms Mother's repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused the Children to without essential parental care, control, or subsistence, and Mother cannot, or will not, remedy the conditions causes this incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal. While Mother made progress respect to several of her reunification objectives, failed to consistently address her ongoing mental health issues. Critically, Mother failed to obtain consistent mental health treatment despite years of opportunities during the Children's placement foster care. As this Court stated, "a child's life cannot be held abeyance while parent attempts attain maturity necessary assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot will not subordinate indefinitely child's need permanence stability parent's claims of progress hope future." In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d (Pa. Super. 2006).

Further, we reject Mother's claim placed too much emphasis the parenting capacity evaluation prepared Dr. Russell. Dr. Russell thoroughly explained the conclusions contained his evaluation during the hearing, counsel cross-examined Dr. Russell at length concerning these conclusions. free weigh the parenting capacity evaluation it saw fit, we discern no basis upon conclude Dr. Russell's conclusions were subjective or which speculative as Mother contends. We also discern no basis upon which to conclude Dr. Russell's evaluation "stale" by the time of the hearing. In her brief, Mother argues the evaluation was light of "significant achievements [she] made since time, stale in including additional parenting education, anger management, domestic violence training, and continued stabilization of housing." brief at Tellingly, does not suggest did anything new to resolve unstable mental health, such as participating the psychiatric in evaluation recommended by Dr. Russell.

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses whether termination parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, emotional needs welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does explicitly require a bonding analysis the term 'bond' is not defined the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent child is a factor considered as part of our analysis. While parent's emotional bond his or child is major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best - interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one many factors be considered the when determining what is the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition bond examination, trial court

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, should also consider the intangibles, such

love, comfort, security, stability child might have foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated should consider importance of continuity of relationships whether

any existing parent -child bond can be severed

without detrimental effects the child. In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re N.A.M., A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks citations omitted).

Here, found that Mother is incapable of parenting the Children, and that she will not able to remedy this parental incapacity in near future. Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/2016, at 36. The further found that the Children share bond Mother, but that it is a parent/child bond, the Children will not suffer irreparable harm if at 37-38 (quoting N.T., Mother's parental rights are terminated. 6/21/2016, at 60).

Mother argues the Children view her their mother are bonded to her. brief at 18. According to Mother, the Children reciprocated the love affection she displayed during visits, she was able to address the Children's physical emotional needs. Id.

We again discern no abuse discretion. During termination hearing, Mr. Jacques testified regarding the relationship each of the Children Mother. With respect A.S.M.B.1, Mr. Jacques testified calls first name, relationship with Mother resembles "almost friendship times or sister relationship." N.T., 5/18/2016, Mr. Jacques did not believe terminating Mother's parental rights would cause irreparable harm A.S.M.B.1. at 36. He explained, "[A.S.M.B.1] knows that that is mother. She knows that's siblings['] mother, but [A.S.M.B.1] is more so incline[d] be her siblings and has adapted to pre -adoptive family." Id. at 36-37.

With respect A.S.M.B.2, Mr. Jacques testified he "enjoys being . They interact with each other." Id. at 35. However, around his mother. . . A.S.M.B.2 does ask Mother outside of her Thursday visitation, Mr. Jacques opined A.S.M.B.2 would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights are terminated. Id. at 35-36. Mr. Jacques stated, "[A.S.M.B.2] knows that that is his biological mother. There's no doubt about that. [A.S.M.B.2] also know[s] he visits with his mother only on Thursdays. Any other day of the week . . he's daily operation mode as . what his pre -adoptive family has him doing[.]" Id.

With respect to A.L.L.D., Mr. Jacques testified, "[A.L.L.D.] knows who his biological mother is. He calls her mommy when he's at the visit. They Id. at 41. Nonetheless, Mr. Jacques have an appropriate relationship." again did not believe A.L.L.D. would suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights are terminated, because he "was placed at young age and . been same caregiver up until today, that's who child . . knows his pre -adoptive parent terms who consistently takes care him provides care him." at 42-43. Similarly, with respect A.M.D., Mr. Jacques opined she would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights are terminated. Mr. Jacques explained, "[A.M.D.] came young age. Again, has an attachment with her mother, recognizes that that is mother during the visits, but is bonded with the foster parents." Id.

Thus, it is clear that the Children know Mother have a relationship her. However, the record supports the court's conclusion that the Children do not share parent/child bond, the Children will not suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights are terminated. Given the Children's lack parent/child bond Mother, given the fact Mother will not capable caring for the Children at any point the foreseeable future, it was proper court to conclude terminating Mother's parental rights would best serve the Children's needs welfare.6

Based on the foregoing, we conclude trial court did abuse its discretion involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights Children. In addition, we conclude Mother waived any challenge orders changing the Children's permanency goals to adoption. We therefore affirm termination decrees goal change orders.

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed. Children were removed from their pre -adoptive foster home following first day of the hearing due to abuse allegations. N.T. 6/21/2016, Counsel DHS indicated the Children were placed in respite foster home which is also pre -adoptive. 7. Judgment Entered. ._,eph D. Seletyn, Es .

J Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2017