We.are'-.in, receipt'.of your ietter'.of July .18, 199’. &wherein you request sour'opin$on'as $o:whether the Sarah ~B. Niiroy.Hospital. is hxempti 'from thepayment of texes to.the Brenham&dependent Sdhool D.i&.l?ict'npon its properties; YUnder.the.facts.which you submi,t to. usj:'the Sarah D. Piilroy Hospital .Is:a'Texas~.cor*poration with capit&.~stock having a' p!ar.value' a'nd'.~rganize,d.f?.r' private p*of$&. ’ .,

Art&le Fi, Section 2 of the ,State Constitution provides'&& "the Legislature~may by.general laws exempt from taxation.......... institutions'-of'urely public charity; and all laws exempting property from taxation other than the above mentioned shall be null :and. void.".

Section 7 of Article 7150, Revised Civil Statutes,.was enacted in pursuance~to the above constitutional provision, and the first sentence-thereof reads as .follows:

"Public charities. All buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity, together with:the,:l,ands!belonging to and occupied by such institutions not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, unless such rents and-profits and all moneys and credits are appropriated by such institutions solely to sustain such institutions and for the benefit of the sick and disabled members and their familiesand the..:' burial of the same, or for th.e maintenance of persons when unable to provide for themselves, whether such persons are members of such institutions or not....." The fact that the institution in question does some charitable work is not sufficient to bring it within the exemption. Our courts have held that the work *purely" as used in Article 6, Section 2, of the Constitution, is intended to modify the word "charity" and not the word "public"~. Therefore, for an institu-

Hon. T. M. Trimble, Page 2 o-u.43

tion to be one of "purely public charity," it must be:~one yhose T property is used wholly and exclusively for charitableplrposes. B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 151 vs. City of Houston, 44 S.W. (2d) 488; City of Houston vs. Scottish Rite Benevolent Association, 230 S.d. 978. As stated in Santa Rosa Infirmary vs. City of San Antonio, 259 S.b+i. 926, by the Commission of Appeals, Section 2 of Article 8 of the Constituion expresslymakes null and void all exemptions attempted thereunder by the Legislature unless authorized by the constitutional provision ,itself.. :It.is not. made mandatory that the Legislature shall extend the exemption but the constitutional provision is only an authorization to do so. As shown in the aoove quotation, the statute does not attempt to extend the exemption to buildings and land belonging to an institution where ~.the same is used with a view to profit. This precludes fromthe exemption the property of a corporation where distributable earnings in the shape of dividends upon the,stock of the corporation are to accr.ue. See Santa Rosa ,I.nf.irmaryvs. City of San Antonio,: supra. Exemptions from taxation are uot favored and. in order for a.perso.n'to receive,'the oenefit.s of such exemption~the burden, is upon him.to show that~his.property clearly comets with,in the same. B;:. Pi 'O?'E. Lodge ,No..l51 vs.

City ofHouston, supra.; .Santa Rosa Infirmary vs. City of San Antonio; 'supra. Under the facts submitted to us, the property of the Sarah B. Milroy Hospital is not exempt from the payment of the school taxes.

Yo& ye+y truly ATTORNEY GENBRAL OF-TEXAS BY GlennR. Lewis Assistant GRL:N

APPROVEU &JL:31,~1939;

W..F. MOORE‘

FIRST ASSISTANT

ATTORNEY GENERAL-