Case Information
*1 The Attorney General of Texas June 21. 1984 JIM MATTOX
Attorney General Supreme Cowl Building Honorable Froy Salinas Opinion No. JM-177 P. 0. BOX 12546 Chairman Austin. TX. 76711. 2546 State, Federal and International Re: Scope of "conditions of 5121475-2501 work" with regard to public Relations Conrmittee Telex 9101674.1367 Texas Rouse of Representatives employees' presentation of Telecopier 512!475.0266
P. 0. Box 2910 grievances Austin, Texas 78769 714 Jackson, Suite 700
Dallas, TX. 75202-4506 Dear Representative Salinas: 2141742.6944
You have asked whether
4624 Alberta Ave., Suite 160 El Paso, TX. 799052793 a state agency [may] ~restrict. limit, narrow or 915/5333464 exclude certain areas of wages, hours, or
conditions of work from the definition of a -1 Texas, Suite 700 grievance. ~ston. TX. 77002-3111
713/223-5666 Your question refers to a statute~which directs that [t]he provisions of this Act shall not impair the 606 Broadway. Suite 312 Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479 existing right of public employees to present 8061747.5236 grievances concerning their wages. hours of work,
or conditions of work individually or through a representative that does not claim the right to 4309 N. Tenth, Suite B strike. (Emphasis added). McAllen. TX. 76501~1665 512,882-4547 V.T.C.S. art. 5154~. 06. You advise that some agencies do not recognize an employee's right to file grievances individually or 200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 . through a representative concerning such matters as assignment and San Antonio. TX. 76205-2797 reassignment of employees, salary schedules, contents of personnel 512/225-4191
evaluations, terminations, and other such job-related matters. An Equal Opportunity/ We conclude that the key statutory language, "conditions of Affirmative Action Employer work," may not be construed to "restrict, limit, narrow or exclude"
any aspect of the employment relationship from the grievance process. The Supreme Court of Texas has given a very broad construction to the term "conditions of work" in article 5154~. section 6. In the leading csse of Corpus Christi American Federation Teachers v. Corpus Christ1 Independent School District, 572 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1978) (per r curiam), [hereinafter Corpus Christi AFT] the court concluded that the
*2 membership and agenda of a faculty advisory committee involved a "condition of work" within the meaning of the statute, despite the [1] Honorable Froy Salinas - Page 2 (JM-177)
? fact that discussion by the coannittee was limited to educational policy and that consideration of topics such as salaries and fringe benefits was excluded. The court based its opinion on the grounds that the committee served "to provide a direct line of communication to the [school] management," and that, even with the exclusion of some work-related topics, discussion of many other topics related to "conditions of work" could possibly have arisen and, indeed, could not have been precluded in view of the committee's function of communicating with management. 572 S.W.2d at 664. Though the court found it unnecessary to define "conditions of work" precisely, it is plain that its meaning was intended to be very broad.
Thus in Corpus Christ1 AFT the court reasoned that the simple possibility that some unspecified work-related matters might arise in labor-management discussion necessarily involved "conditions of work." You, in contrast, present the case of definite and undisputed con- ditions of work which have actually arisen in such discussion or which are normally considered subjects for labor-management communication.
Thus it is unnecessary to go to the full limits of the supreme court's broad but indefinite construction of that term to declare that the matters pre~sented in your letter are indisputably "conditions of work" for which a grievant may invoke article 5154~. section 6. --Y
This broad construction of the term "conditions of work" is complemented and supported, moreover, by accepted usage inthe afield of labor law, and is thus further consistent with the court approved maxim that terms of art should be construed in their technical sense in the absence of contrary legislative intent. See, e.g., Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Company v. State, 541 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (construing "uncombined water"). In construing article 5154c, the basic statute governing labor-management relations in state employment, Texas courts have in fact turned to the usage of analogous federal labor laws to construe terms in the state statute. See, e.g., Lunsford v. City of Bryan, 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 ITex. 1957) (usine federal labor law to construe "membershiu" in art. ~~,.~ - 5154~. $4); Dallas Independent School District v. American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local Union No. 1442, 330 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (using federal labor law to construe "representative" in art. 5154c, §6). In Lunsford the court implicitly found that this constructional technique was consistent with the intent of the legislature in enacting article 5154~. Lunsford, supra, at 117.
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter 29 U.S.C. 9158(d), requires unions and management to meet and N=w, confer with respect to "terms and conditions of employment." Section 8(d) is analogous to article 5154~. section 6, because both address the subject matter of mandatory employer-employee discussion, whether in collective bargaining or grievance procedures, respectively. Both the federal courts and the-National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter NLRB] have interpreted this provision in the BLRA to include virtually s subject which "is an aspect of the relations between [an employer] and its own employees," Ford Motor Company v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488. 501 (1979); see also Allied Chemical A Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Company Chemical Division, 404 U.S. 157, 178-79 (1971), or which involves "a departure from previously established operating practices, or . . . a significant impairment of job tenure, employment security, or reasonably Westinghouse Electric anticipated work opportunities . . . .u Corporation, 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1576 (1965). Nor is it relevant that the employer considers the issue "too trivial" so long as the employees consider the matter substantial. Ford Motor Company, supra, at 501. It 1s~ therefore plain that the expression "terms and conditions of employment" found in section 8(d) of the NLRA includes the public employees' activities as set forth in your letter, and when section 8(d) is used as an aid in construction of the state statute.
this approach also confirms that these activities are "conditions of work" within the meaning of article 5154~. section 6.
SUMMARY Under both state decisional law and accepted usage in the field of labor law, a state agency may not unduly and unjustly restrict the scope of matters included in "conditions of work" as a means to limit the protections of article 5154~.
section 6, V.T.C.S., offered to state employees presenting grievances. Instead, the term "con- ditions of work" should be construed broadly to include any ares of wages, hours or conditions of employment, and any other matter which is appropriate for communications from employees to employer concerning an aspect of their relation- ship.
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. RICPARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Colin Carl
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVD:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Rick Gilpin, Chairman
Colin Carl
Susan Garrison
Nancy Sutton