Case Information
*1 The Attorney General of Texas July 10. 1986 JIM MATTOX
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building Honorable Mark W. S~:iles Opinion No. JM-514 P. 0. Box 12548 Chairman Austin. TX. 78711. 2548 State Affairs Commi:tee Ret Whether a city may require a 512,4752501 Texas House of Representatives school district to apply for a Telex 91018761367 P. 0. Box 2910 special building use permit in Telecopier 5121475.0268
Austin, Texas 787159 order to convert a school facility to an administrative facility 714 Jackson, Suite 700 Dallas, TX. 752024506 Dear Representative Stiles: 2141742.8944 4824 Alberta Ave., Suite 160 [91515333484] El Paso, TX. 79905-2793 Beaumont. In June, 1985, however, the board of trustees voted to convert that facility to a central administrative office building for operated an element:ary school in a residential area of the city of You inform us that the Beaumont Independent School District has the school distric,t. In order to obtain the requisite building -1 Texas, Suite 700 permits for the conrersion, the city required that the school district ,uston, TX. 77002-3111 comply with city z,,ning ordinances requiring it to make application 713,223-W for a specific use ,?ermit. Although the school board complied with all city fire and
808 Broadway, Suite 312 Lubbock. TX. 79401-3479 building codes, it a,bjected to the city's requirements on the ground 8061747-5238 that the city has no authority to require the school district to follow the specific use application process. The city has, in fact, granted the required permit, but asserts that it has the authority to 4309 N. Tenth, Suite B require the school district to comply with the permit procedures and McAllen, TX. 78501-1885 512/582-4547 conditions. In that regard you ask whether a municipality may require
a school district to comply with city zoning ordinances requiring the 200 Main Plaza, Suite 400 San Antonio. TX. 78205-2797 [51212254191] school district to apply for a specific use permit in order to convert a school facility t) an administrative facility.
The issue as presented is governed by the principles of Port Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.Zd?% An Equal Opportunityi (Tex. 19641, and Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset Affirmative Action Employer Valley, 502 S.W.2rg70 (Tex. 1973); see also Attorney General Opinion
JM-180 (1984). In Groves, supra, the issue was whether a school district had to c:omply with the city's building regulations in constructing a school facility on school property located within the boundaries of a t,ome rule city. The school district in Groves contended that the city could not exercise its police power against the school district because a school district is an independent political subdivision of the state. State property is exempt from *2 Honorable Mark W. Stiles - Page 2 (JM-514)
municipal zoning. Attorne:r General~Opinion JM-117 (1983). The Texas Supreme Court rejected the school district's contention because a school district.'s property should not be classified as state property.
376 S.W.2d at 333. The court held that school buildings of an independent schooi district are subject to reasonable ordinances of the city. 376 S.W.2d at 334. The Texas Supreme Court in Sunset Valley consideied whether t'he city could, through its zoning regula- tions, wholly_ prohibit the location of school facilities within its boundaries. 502 S.W.2d at 671. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of the scIioc1 district's action was not before.it. 502 S.W.2d at 672. Relying on well-established principles of zoning law, the court held that the c:.ty could not totally exclude schools from areas zoned residential.~ Id. In both Groves and Sunset Valley, the proposed buildings were sdool facilities, not administrative offices.
School facilities traditicnally receive special treatment in zoning law. See 502 S.W.2d at 67i. -
At issue here is the t:ransformation of a school facility into an administrative office bulLding. The court of appeals in City of Addison v. Dallas Indepen(.ent School District, 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.
Civ..App~. - Dallas 1982, w;it ref'd n.r.e.), held that a city cannot declare a legitimate school district action to be a nuisance per ;e and thereby prohibit the action. At issue was the school district s use of its property for a b,us:parking facility. The court left open the possibility that the activity could become a nuisance by reason of its locality, surroundings, or manner of operation. 632 S.W.2d at 774. In essence, the cm.rt held that the city could not totally foreclose this use of the property simply by declaring the use to be a nuisance per se. Although the case is not directly applicable because it turned on nuisance law rather than on zoning law, we believe that. when it is read with Groves and Sunset Valley, it stands for the proposition that the city cannot exclude the school district's administrative offices.
As indicated, however,, the city has not totally excluded the school district's administrative facility. The city has, in fact, granted the specific use permit. The city's permit procedure and conditions are designed to :provide a reasonable means to assure that the health, safety, property and welfare of the people affected by the proposed land use are prote,cted. The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Groves makes it clear that a school district's facilities are subject to reasonable tit], ordinances. 376 S.W.2d at 334. As the court stated: "To hold smherwise would be to leave a hiatus in regulation necessary to th6: health and safety of the community." Id.
Accordingly, so long as a city's specific use permit procedures and conditions do not attempt to totally exclude a school district's facilities and are reasonably related to the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the cmmunity. the school district must comply with those procedures and conditions.
Honorable Mark W. Stiles - P.sge 3 (JM-514)
S U.MM.ARY The Beaumont Independent School District must comply with reasonable city of Beaumont's zoning ordinances in order to convert a classroom facility to an administrative facility. The city may not, howe.rer, use its zoning powers Very ruly your s /ka% unreasonably to prohibit the conversion. A;,
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas JACK HIGHTOWER
First Assistant Attorney General
MARY KELLER
Executive Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Tony Guillory and
Jennifer Riggs
Assistant Attorneys General