Case Information
*1 Decenher 2$, 1987 Honorable Charles D. Penick Opinion No. .Jk-837 Criminal District Attorney
Bastrop County Courthouse Re: Whether artificial or tube feeding constitutes a Bastrop, Texas 78602
life-sustaining procedure for purposes article 4590h, V.T.C.S. (RQ-1036) Dear Mr. Penick:
In your inquiry you ask the following question:
If a patient cf a nursing home who meets the definitions of a Declarant and qualified patient of article ~4590h, V.T.C.S., the Natural Death Act, is unable to,feed him or herself and it becomes necessary to tube must feed or artificially feed that person, the hospital feed that patient artificially or does the procedure for artificially feeding 'or tube feeding fall under the definition of a life sustaining procedure as defined in section 2, subsection 4, of article 4590h? makes it possible for any
Article 4590h, V.T.C.S., at any time, to execute competent adult person, directive for the withholding withdrawal life-sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition. Provisions of the act relating execution of such a document provide as follows:
Sec. 2. In this Act: .(I) 'Attending physician' means physician who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient. 'Declarant' means a oerson who has (2)
executed or issued a directive under this &&. *
p. *2 LTI+837) (3) 'Directive' means: (A) a document voluntarily executed by the declarant as prescribed by Section 3(a) of this Act:
(B) a nonwritten directive issued by the declarant as prescribed by Section 3(b) of this Act: or
(c) a document executed as prescribed by Section 4D of this Act.
(4) 'Life-sustaining procedure' means a medical procedure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only artificially prolong the moment of death and where, in the judgment of the attending physician, noted in the qualified patient's medical records, death is imminent whether or not such procedures are utilized. ? 'Life-sustaining procedure' shall not include the administration of medication the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort or care or alleviate pain.
(5) 'Physician' means a physician and surgeon licensed by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners or a properly credentialed physician holding commission the uniformed services of the United States who is serving on active duty in this state. 'Oualified oatient' means a natient (6)
diaanosed and certified in writina to be afflicted with a terminal condition bv two phvsicians, whom shall be the one of attending physician, who have personally examined the patient. (7) 'Terminal condition' means an ?
incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless application life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical 'judgment, produce death, and where ?
p. *3 application of life-sustaining procedures serves only to postpone the moment of death of the patient.
Directive for withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in event of terminal condition Sec. 3. (a) Any competent adult person for may, at any time, execute a directive the withholding or withdrawal of life- sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition. The directive shall be signed by the declarant in the presence two witnesses not related to the declarant by blood or marriage and who would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant on his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto or by operation of law. In addition, a witness to a directive shall not be the attending physician, an employee of the attending physician or a health facility in which the declarant is a patient, a patient in a health care facility in which the declarant is a patient, or any person who has a claim against any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease at the time the execution of the directive. The two witnesses to the declarant's signature shall sign the directive.
(b) A competent qualified patient who is an adult may issue a directive by nonwritten means of communication. The declarant must issue the directive in the presence of the attending physician and two witnesses. The witnesses must possess the same qualifications as are required by Subsection (a) of this section. The physician shall make the fact of existence of the directive a part of the declarant's'medical record and the witnesses shall sign said entry in the declarant's medical record. declarant shall notify (0) A
attending physician of the existence of a written directive. If the declarant is incompetent, or otherwise mentally comatose,
p. *4 or physically incapable of communication, another person may notify the physician the existence of a written directive. The physician shall make the directive a part of the declarant's medical record.
[subsection (d) sets forth a form that w be used by a declarant]
(e) The directive may include other directions, including a designation
another person to make a treatment decisiorl in accordance with Section 4A of this Act for the declarant if the declarant is incompe=ent, or otherwise mentally comatose, or physically incapable of communication.
(Emphasis added.) A sommon thread running throughout the act is the expression of the legislature's intent that the desire o_f a aualified declarant shall b~follow~. The followiho oraJisions of the act reflect the paramount importancs Oi the declarcnt's wishes and provide for penal sanctions for any person who takes any action to defeat the desire cf ? the dcclarant. The following sections oi the act reflect su.2h legislative intent, as .follows:
Sec. 4. (a) A directive mav be rev- at anv time bv the d~eclarant. without reaard -mental state or comvetengy .~ . . .
. . . . Sec. 4A. The desireof s.1 at all times patient who is comvetent directive. If an m adult qualified patient is comatose, in;,om- petent, or otherwise physically mentally or incapable of communication and has issued a directive under this Act without designating a person to make a treatment decision, tile attending physician shall comply with the directive unless the Dhvsician believes that the direct=does not reflect the wresent desire of the natient.
. . . . Sec. 4C. (a) If an adult qualified patient is comatose, incompetent,
p. 4029 *5 otherwise mentally or physically incapable of communication, and the person has not issued a directive under this Act, the attending physician and the legal guardian of the patient may make a treatment decision that may, based on knowledae of what the patient would desire, if known, include a decision to withhold or withdraw life- sustaining procedures from the patient.
(b) If the patient does not have a legal guardian, the attending physician and at least two, if available, of the following categories of persons, in the following priority, may make a treatment decision that may, based on knowledae of what the oatient would desire, if known . . . .
. . . . Sec. 4D. (a) The following persons may execute a directive on behalf of a qualified patient who is under 18 years of age:
,P, (1) the patient's spouse, if the spouse
is an adult:
(2) the patient's parents; or (3) the patient's legal guardian.
(b) The desire of a oualified natient who is under 18 vears of aae and who * comnetent shall at all times suversede tit: effect of a directive executed in accordance with this section.
. . . . Sec. 7. (a) .Before withholding withdrawing life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient under this Act, the attending physician shall determine that all steps proposed to be undertaken are in r accord with the provisions of this Act and
the existina desires of the aualified patient.
. . . .
p. *6 (JM-837) Sec. 8. (c) No nhvsician. health facilitv. or other health nrovider, and no health care service vlan. or insurer issuina a- . insurance, mav reoulre anv nerson to execute
a directive as a condition for being insured for, or receiving, health care services nor may the execution or failure to execute a directive be considered in any way in establishing the premiums for insurance.~
Sec. 9. A person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, obliterates, or damages the directive of another without such declarant's consent shall be guilty of a s Class A misdemeanor. A person who falsifies or forges the directive of another, willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a revocation as provided Section 4 of this Act, with the intent to cause a withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures contrar v to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby,.because of any such directly causes~ life-sustaining act, procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death' to thereby be hastened, shall be subject to prosecution for criminal homicide under the provisions of the Penal Code.
(Emphasis added.) The question you pose is limited to the issue of whether artificially feeding or tube feeding is a life- sustaining procedure as~those items are defined in the act. You assume that the patient is a "declarant@' and a "aualified watient" as those terms are defined in section 2 of article 4590h. Senator Ray ,Farabee, sponsor in the Texas Senate of the "Natural Death Act" (Acts 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 398, at 1085), writing in 41 Texas Bar J. 241 (1978), noted that it was impossible to establish criteria in determining when a person is in a "terminal condition" or what will constitute a "life-sustaining procedure." We believe the following observations by Senator Farabee be pertinent to your inquiry.
The law does not attempt to establish criteria to determine when a person is to be deemed 'terminal' for the purposes implementing such a directive. It does outline general statement
circumstances in which it will be legally effective. Restrictive criteria would
p.
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P
render the law almost immediately obsolete in the face of emerging medical advances.
Only the medical profession can determine when a patient's prognosis is hopeless and the death process irreversible.
Similarlv. the statute does not itemize what Drocedures are to be reaarded as 'life-sustainins' and senarate from standard medical treatment which mav be aiven reaardless of a natient's condition. Such distinctions must be made bv medical nracti- tioners accordins accewted medical For instance, standards. many physicians maintain that therapy, such as the use of antibiotics, qualifies as 'extraordinary' when the patient is a cancerous, comatose go-year old. On the other hand, adminis- tration of pain-killing drugs falls in a separate category. (Emphasis supplied).
Turning to other jurisdictions, in Corbett D'Alessandro, 487 So.Zd 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Ap;: 1986), the matter of what constitutes a "life-sustaining procedure11 was addressed as follows:
Judge Hersey, in his opinion for the fourth district in Kennedv v. Bludworth, 432 So.2d at 619, in a statement not commented upon but apparently approved by our supreme court in Kennedv v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 291, wrote: 'Life sustaining procedures are medical procedures which utilize mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore or supplant a vital function, which serve only or primarily to prolong moment of death, and where, in the judgment.
of the attending and consulting physicians, as reflected medical the patient's records, death is imminent if such procedures are not utilized.'
Although artificial or tube feeding may constitute life-maintaining procedure within the meaning of article whether it will serve to artificially 4590h, V.T.C.S., prolong the moment of death is a question which depends upon the expertise of the medical profession for its resolution in each individual case. While the resolution of this question is for the medical profession, legislature has made it plain that care should be taken
p. 4032 *8 (JM-837) , that a oualified declarant's wishes be observed withdrawing life-sustaining procedures when there is a terminal condition.
SUMMARY Although artificial or tube feeding may constitute life-maintaining procedure meaning article 459013, within the whether it will serve V.T.C.S., artificially prolong the moment of death is a question which depends upon the expertise of the medical profession for its resolution in each individual case. The article 4399, V.T.C.S., opinion process was not intended to resolve factual disputes.
Jzh MATTOX Attorney General of Texas MARYKKLLKR
Executive Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Tom G. Davis
Assistant Attorney General
p. 4033