Case Information
*1 THE A~TORXEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
September 18, 1990 Honorable Ernestive V. Glossbrenner Opinion No. ~~-1225 Chairperson Use of a "paging
House Public Education Committee Re: P. 0. Box 2910 device" on school prop- Capitol Bldg., Room 302D erty or at a school Austin, Texas 78768-2910 function (RQ-1942) Dear Representative Glossbrenner:
You ask whether a car telephone is a "paging device" for purposes of section 21.309 of the Education Code, which provides as follows:
(a) A student in a public school may not possess a paging device while on school pro- perty or while attending a school-sponsored on or off school or school-related activity property, unless the student is in attendance in the capacity of an active member of a volunteer firefighting organization volunteer emergency medical services 0rganLzation.
(b) The board of trustees of each school district shall include the prohibition in Subsection (a) of this section in district's written standards student violates conduct. student who prohibition is subject to discipline as provided by board policy, consistent with this subchapter.
(c) A person who discovers a student in possession of a paging device in violation of this section shall report the violation the appropriate school administrator, determined by school policy, who shall ordEE a peace officer or appropriate employee to confiscate the device, which is forfeited to the school district.
(d) In this section, 'naaina device' means a telecommunications device that emits an audible sianal. vibrates. disDlavs a messaaec or delivers otherwise summons communication to the oossessor.
The components of the definition of "paging device" are (1) that it be a telecommunications device and (2) that it, by some means, summon or deliver a communication possessor. A car telephone is a telecommunications device.
See Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (1984) (defining at a distance as by "telecommunication*' as "communication The remaining question telephone or television").
whether a car telephone summons or delivers a communication "to the possessor.11
We note that the requirement is that the device actually summon or deliver a communication to its possessor, not merely that it have the capacity to do so. A car telephone would be able to summon its possessor only if its possessor were able to hear or otherwise perceive its signal. Consequently, a student who parked on school property would be on school property and subject to the summons of a car phone upon arrival at and departure from school or a school activity.1 Although that would be sufficient to bring the student within the literal language of the prohibition set out in section 21.309, legislative history indicates that the legislature did not intend that the prohibition be applied so broadly.2
The bill analysis prepared in regard to section 21.309 of the Education Code sets out the following background information:
1. We assume that a student would "possess" a car telephone for purposes of section 21.309 if it were in his custody during the school day or during a school activity.
See ae nerallv ValCarCel v. State, 710 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. APP. - Amarillo 1986, no pet.) (defining llpossession'* for purposes of crime of possession of contraband).
2. If the definition of "paging device" is taken from absolutely literally, it would prohibit students possessing car radios on school property since car radios are telecommunications devices that emit an audible signal and deliver a message to their possessor.
P. 6504 *3 Honorable Ernestive V. Glossbrenner - page 3 (JM-1225) ,-
The presence of paging devices on campuses of the large, urban districts increasing. Teachers and administrators report that this presence is disruptive to the educational process when these devices are activated in an educational setting. In addition, there is concern that these devices are being used to facilitate the dealing of illegal drugs.
Bill Analysis, S.B. 424, 71st Leg. (1989). Unless students attending classes or school activities could perceive signal emitted by a car telephone, it seems unlikely that a car telephone would be disruptive educational process. Also, if access'to car telephones is limited to time of arrival and time of departure, car phones would do no more to .facilitate drug transactions than any other telephone in the vicinity of the school.
If a particular district finds that car telephones are in fact disruptive, it has the authority adopt reasonable rules regulating their presence on school property. See Texarkana Inden. School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1971, no writ); Educ. .-
Code §§ 23.26, 21.301.
SUMMARY Section 21.301 of the Education Code does not prohibit the presence car telephones in cars parked on school property. Individual school districts have authority to very ruly adopt disciplinary regarding car rules telephones.
s A Y , JIM MATTOX Attorney General of Texas WARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Pm 6505 *4 JUDGE ZOLLIE STKAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Sarah Woelk
Assistant Attorney General
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