Jeremy Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment following a jury verdict in favor of defendant in Jones’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging *2 retaliation and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s evidentiary rulings and reverse only when an erroneous evidentiary ruling is prejudicial. Gribben v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 528 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court excluded the document that Jones sought to use only for impeachment on the basis that it had not been disclosed previously. However, “impeachment evidence does not have to be revealed in pretrial disclosures.” Id. ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring disclosure of documents used to support claims or defenses, unless use would be solely for impeachment). Nevertheless, the erroneous evidentiary ruling does not warrant reversal because the jury’s verdict on each of Jones’s claims was supported by evidence other than defendant’s unimpeached testimony. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles , 533 F.3d 1010, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversal requires an abuse of discretion and prejudice); Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc. , 244 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (prejudice requires conclusion that “more probably than not,” the error tainted the verdict).

AFFIRMED.

2 15-16653

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

[***] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Jones’s request for oral argument, set forth in his opening and reply briefs, is denied.