PER CURIAM: ^[*]

Mario Alberto Amaya-Guerrero pleaded guilty to illegal reentry by a previously deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court sentenced Amaya- Guerrero to 30 months of imprisonment−a sentence at the top of the recommended guideline imprisonment range. On appeal, Amaya- Guerrero challenges the 8-level “aggravated felony” enhancement he received under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) based on his prior state conviction for injury to *2 Case: 14-41385 Document: 00513795752 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/13/2016

No. 14-41385

a child in violation of T EX . P ENAL C ODE § 22.04. He argues that the definition of “aggravated felony,” which includes a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), is void for vagueness.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, urging that Amaya-Guerrero’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria , 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), pet. for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). The Government is correct that Gonzalez-Longoria forecloses Amaya-Guerrero’s facial vagueness challenge to § 16(b), ^[1] see id. , and Amaya-Guerrero does not make a separate as-applied challenge to § 16(b)’s application to his prior Texas offense for injury to a child. Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

[1] Although the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the question of whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, see Lynch v. Dimaya , 2016 WL 3232911 (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15-1498), this court is bound by its own precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the Supreme Court, see Wicker v. McCotter , 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1986). 2