This 16 th day of November 2016, after careful consideration of the opening brief, motion to affirm, and record below, we find it manifest that the Superior Court’s order, dated August 10, 2016, should be affirmed. The Superior Court did not err in dismissing Fred T. Caldwell’s fifth motion for postconviction relief because the motion failed to plead with particularity a claim that: (i) new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that Caldwell is actually innocent; or (ii) a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review renders his convictions invalid. ^[1] We note that this is the second time Caldwell has unsuccessfully argued that his 2002 police interviews constituted a two-stage *2 interrogation under Missouri v. Seibert ^[2] and that therefore his incriminatory statements should have been suppressed. ^[3] We will not continue to invest scarce judicial resources to address untimely and repetitive claims. We encourage the appellant to be mindful of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(j). ^[4]

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.

Justice

[1] Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).

[2] 542 U.S. 600, 614-17 (2004) (holding post- Miranda confession was inadmissible where Miranda warnings were not given until the middle of the interrogation, after the defendant confessed for the first time).

[3] Caldwell v. State , 2015 WL 4975291, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2015) (affirming the summary dismissal of Caldwell’s postconviction claims, which included claim under Seibert , because Caldwell failed to plead with particularity a claim that there was new evidence creating a strong inference that he was actually innocent or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review rendered his convictions invalid). We previously held that Caldwell was not being interrogated at the time of his initial incriminating statements to the police and therefore Miranda was not implicated. Caldwell v. State , 2010 WL 376902, at *2 (Del. Jan. 29, 2010).

[4] Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(j) (“If a motion is denied, the state may move for an order requiring the movant to reimburse the state for costs and expenses paid for the movant from public funds.”). 2