Case Information

NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ^[1] IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

CHARLES RASHAWN BROWN

Appellant No. EDA 2016 Appeal from the Order December 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP- 51 -CR- 0008440 -2008

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MOULTON, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.* FILED NOVEMBER 2016

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: Appellant appeals from the order entered the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County dismissing filed pursuant Post Conviction Relief Act ( "PCRA "), §§ 9541 -46. We affirm. relevant facts procedural history are as follows:1 On October entered negotiated guilty plea charges of

aggravated assault, conspiracy, firearms not to carried license, * Former Justice specially assigned the Superior Court. The record provided this Court sparse. As court -appointed PCRA indicated the lower court, "the Quarter Sessions file was

counsel misplaced, the clerks their best to reconstruct file." PCRA Counsel's No -Merit Letter, 10/17/15, at raised no issue concerning accuracy of the record provided and has sought supplement record. and possession an instrument of crime.2 On same date, accordance with the plea agreement, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate five years ten years prison, followed by seven years of probation. did not file post- sentence motions nor a direct appeal.

On May 18, filed a pro se PCRA petition,3 the PCRA court appointed counsel. On October counsel filed motion withdraw his representation, as well as Turner /Finley4 no -merit letter. The PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to dismiss the petition, after receiving response, order entered on December 14, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition. The PCRA court also granted counsel's petition withdraw representation. This timely se appeal followed. PCRA court direct Appellant file a 1925(b) statement; however, the PCRA filed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion explaining Appellant's petition was untimely filed meeting any of the exceptions. ^[2] 18 §§ 2702, 903, 6106, 907, respectively. Although Appellant's pro petition was docketed on May prison envelope which Appellant's petition mailed bears time

stamp of May 18, 2012. Accordingly, pursuant the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem Appellant's instant to have been on May 18, v. Patterson, 710 (Pa.Super. 2007) (discussing the prisoner mailbox rule). Turner, A.2d (1988), and Finley, A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

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Preliminarily, we must determine whether Appellant's instant PCRA petition was filed. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super. 2000). "Our standard of review of the denial of PCRA relief is clear; we are limited determining whether the court's findings are supported by the record legal error." Wojtaszek, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quotation and quotation marks law makes it clear jurisdiction hear

an untimely petition. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (2003). The most recent amendments the PCRA, effective January 1996, provide petition, including second or subsequent petition, shall be within year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment deemed final "at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review the Supreme Court of the United States the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at expiration of the time for seeking review." Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). three statutory exceptions provisions PCRA

allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of petition will excused. 42 9545(b)(1). To invoke exception, a must allege petitioner must prove: failure to raise claim previously result of

(i) interference government officials with the -3-

presentation of the claim violation of the Constitution or law this Commonwealth or the Constitution or law of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown petitioner could have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized the Supreme Court of after time period provide this section and has been held by that court apply retroactively. Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)- (iii).

"We emphasize that it petitioner who bears the burden allege prove one of the timeliness exceptions applies." Commonwealth Marshall, 587, 596, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (2008) (citation In the case before us, sentenced on October 23, he neither post- sentence motion nor direct appeal. Accordingly, judgment of sentence became final on Monday, November 2008,5 upon the expiration thirty -day period for filing appeal to this Court. Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); 903(a). Accordingly, he had year from date, or until November 2009, to file timely petition. See Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). However, not file thirtieth day after sentencing, November fell on Saturday, thus extending the time for appealing to Monday, November 1908.

J-S81033-16 his petition until May 18, 2012, thus, it is patently untimely. See 9545(b)(1).

Nevertheless, suggests his sentence is illegal,6 thus, he is subject the PCRA's time restrictions. However, our Supreme Court has held specifically that, "[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject review within the PCRA, [legality of sentencing] claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or of the exceptions thereto." Fahy, 737 A.2d (1999).

In the case sub judice, not invoked any of the applicable exceptions PCRA, therefore, we agree with that Appellant's instant petition untimely filed.

Affirmed. We note Appellant's pro se brief falls well below the standards delineated in Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). "[A]lthough willing construe liberally materials filed pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers special benefit upon appellant. Accordingly, litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth Rules of Court." Lyons, 251 -52 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations Although we could quash or dismiss this appeal for Appellant's failure to conform materially requirements set forth our Rules Appellate Procedure, see we will address Appellant's argument regarding the extent we can discern it. Adams, A.2d (Pa.Super. 2005) (declining to quash appeal despite numerous substantial defects appellant's brief).

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Judgment Entered.

J seph D. Seletyn,

Prothonotary

Date: 11/8/2016