Case Information
NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.G., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : MINOR PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: S.G., MOTHER No. EDA 2016
: Appeal from the Order February 29, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court No(s): CP- 51 -AP- 0000582 -2013, CP- 51 -DP- 0000448 -2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.H., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : MINOR PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: S.G., MOTHER No. EDA 2016
: Appeal from the Order February 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): CP- 51 -AP- 0000581 -2013, CP- 51 -DP- 0000189 -2012
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.H., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : MINOR PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: S.G., MOTHER No. 910 EDA 2016
: Appeal from the Order February 29, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): CP- 51 -AP- 0000580 -2013,
CP- 51 -DP- 0000159 -2012
BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, FITZGERALD*, JJ. FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2016
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: from ( "Mother ") appeals the February 2016 decrees S.G. involuntarily terminating parental rights to her two sons, J.H. and J.G., her daughter, B.H.1 We affirm.2
B.H. was born during September 2001 to Mother Father. That relationship also produced J.H. during June was born of the relationship during February 2013, after Philadelphia Department of * Former Justice specially assigned the Superior Court. On same date, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental
rights of E.H. ( "Father "), the biological father all three children. We address Father's appeals separately. also appealed trial court order changing the children's from reunification
permanency goals adoption; however, she subsequently abandoned those claims her brief.
-2
Human Services ( "DHS ") became involved with family. J.H. suffers from cerebral palsy and is wheelchair bound. He is deaf, and, since he depends on a gastronomy tube for nourishment, he unable to feed himself.
DHS's first interaction occurred on January 8, in response to an emergency protective service report. The subsequent investigation revealed that Mother abused drugs, and that and Father were not taking J.H. to his medical appointments. DHS also learned that J.H. and B.H. were chronically truant from school, Mother had insufficient food in her home.
On February 7, 2012, the adjudicated J.H. and B.H. dependent. The children were placed in foster care on February 2012. During February 2013, DHS discovered Mother had given birth to J.G., both and J.G. had tested positive for cocaine. Upon discharge from the hospital, was placed current pre- adoptive foster care B.H. He was adjudicated dependent March 12, initial permanency goal for all of the children reunification. In furtherance goal court directed Mother participate following services: (1) attend the Achieving Reunification Center ( "ARC ") for mental health referral parenting classes; (2) complete drug and alcohol treatment; (3) complete parenting capacity evaluation; (4) attend regular visitations with J.H., B.H., J.G.; (5) accompany J.H. his medical appointments; (6) obtain appropriate housing.
-3
Mother's compliance her Family Service Plan ( "FSP ") goals was minimal. She disappeared for months a time, was uncooperative with the children's safety plan, and of J.G.'s birth, she continued to abuse cocaine. Additionally, was found noncompliant with all her FSP goals during the permanency review hearings during March June 2013. Mother was dismissed from ARC due to non -attendance, failed attend the parenting evaluation, and she neglected visit infant son after his discharge from hospital.
On October 11, 2013, DHS filed petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b). During four -day hearing, the heard testimony from the DHS caseworker, Charles Younger; the Children's Choice caseworker who supervised Mother's visitations, Jill Danhour; Community Umbrella Agency ( "CUA ") caseworker, Leticia Jones; Child Advocate social worker, James Cosby; Mother.
On February 29, 2016, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother timely filed notices of appeal concise statements errors complained appeal, which this Court consolidated sua sponte. On June 2016, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues our review: A. Whether trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights where such determination supported by clear convincing . Pa.C.S.A. 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), evidence under . . -4-
(a)(8) as [M]other made progress towards working [on] and meeting FSP goals, namely staying drug -free, working towards obtaining housing, working on parenting skills, and other goals during [J.H.'s, B.H.'s, J.G.'s] placement? B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights without giving the primary consideration the effect the termination would have on the developmental[,] physical[,] emotional needs of [J.H., B.H., J.G.] as required by ... 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Mother's brief
Our standard of review is follows: The standard of review termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported If the factual findings are supported, appellate by the record. courts review determine if the made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed an abuse discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill -will. The trial court's decision, however, should reversed merely because the record would support different result. We have previously emphasized our deference trial courts often have first -hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101 -2938, which requires bifurcated analysis.
Initially, focus the conduct of the parent. party seeking termination must prove by clear convincing evidence the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated Section 2511(a). Only if court determines the parent's conduct warrants termination or her parental rights does court engage in -5-
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
We need only agree the as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as 2511(b), in order to affirm. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we conclude the certified record supports the trial court's decision terminate under § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows.
(a) General rule. --The rights of a parent regard a child may be terminated after a petition filed any of the following grounds:
(2) The repeated continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent caused child be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary physical or mental well -being the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations. --The court terminating the rights parent shall give primary consideration to developmental, physical emotional needs welfare of the child. rights of parent shall terminated solely on basis environmental factors such inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing medical care if found be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), court shall not - consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To terminate parental rights pursuant 2511(a)(2), petitioner must produce clear convincing evidence regarding the following elements: (1) repeated continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary physical or mental well- being; (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003).
This Court explained that, "[t]he grounds for termination due to parental incapacity cannot be remedied are not limited affirmative misconduct. To contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity perform parental duties." In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted). Parents are required make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. Id. A parent's vow cooperate, after long period uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability services, may properly rejected untimely or disingenuous. Id. crux of Mother's first argument DHS did prove by clear convincing evidence that "the conditions causes of the incapacity,
-7
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). Mother asserts that she made "efforts to remain close to her children [complete] her objectives, [which] exhibited that she was eradicating any repeated [neglect] that caused them be placed in foster Further, Mother asserts that she "has care." Mother's brief at 9. demonstrated her commitment maintain sobriety which is main reason that brought the children into the custody of DHS." Id. In short, Mother argues, "DHS not proved that she could not remedy such conditions." Id. We disagree. certified record belies Mother's assertions. Charles Younger was DHS caseworker assigned to this family since March of 2012, about one
month after DHS became involved. He testified Mother missed an excessive number of medical appointments she was required attend with J.H. N.T., 8/20/14, at Mother confirmed her failures this regard during her direct examination. She indicated it had been one year since she last went medical appointment with J.H. N.T., 10/17/15, at 11. Mother's failure to care son undeniable. Indeed, Mr. Younger opined that, of the date of the hearing, J.H. could safely reunified with Mother. N.T., 8/20/14, at
With respect Mother's continued drug abuse, Mr. Younger testified that, after born with cocaine system, acknowledged needed help her drug addiction. Id. 33 -34. Although he
-8
referred Mother for dual diagnoses services at the Clinical Evaluation Unit ( "CEU "), she never attended. Id. at 35. While Mother reported being in drug alcohol treatment on two separate occasions, one inpatient other outpatient, she failed provide any documentation to verify that she completed either treatment program. Id. at 36 -37. As such, Mr. Younger concluded that Mother failed satisfy the requirement that she obtain services for her drug addiction. Id. at 37. Even after DHS initiated the termination proceedings on October 2013, Mother continued to abuse drugs. The CUA caseworker, Leticia Jones, testified during the evidentiary hearing that January 2016, Mother gave birth a fourth child who was born with symptoms of withdrawal from cocaine. N.T., 2/29/16, at 70. While child subject this appeal, the testimony gives lie to Mother's claim she addressed her drug addiction.
As it relates the remaining aspects of Mother's FSP goals, Mr. Younger testified DHS referred Mother on three occasions for a parenting capacity evaluation, but she never complied. Id. at 37 -38. Likewise, DHS referred Mother three occasions to ARC purpose of assisting her obtain employment, housing, parenting skills, mental health evaluation. N.T., 8/20/14, at 28 -31. Mother never provided documentation completed any ARC services. Id. Indeed, after DHS made second referral, ARC closed file due to Mother's nonparticipation. third referral remained open since Id. at
-9
31. As such, Mr. Younger concluded that Mother never completed ARC services. Id. at 31 -32.
With respect to housing component, Mr. Younger explained that Mother was transient throughout history of this case. Id. at 50 -51. He added he assessed Mother's most recent home, determined that it too small accommodate all three children. Id. at 51.
Mr. Younger also described Mother's abysmal record of attending the supervised visitations. DHS provided Mother two hours visitation with the children per week. Id. at 39. Since March of 2014, Mother attended only eleven out of twenty visits. This rate of approximately fifty - percent attendance represents Mother's high -water mark over the history of case. Id. at 54. Mr. Younger explained, "on several different occasions during the course of this case, I had not heard from [M]other months." Id. at 29. Mr. Younger testified he did not hear from Mother between June of 2012 September of 2012, then he did have contact with her again until the birth February of 2013. Id. at 39.
DHS also presented Jill Danhour, the caseworker from Children's Choice. Ms. Danhour supervised some of visitations between Mother and the children. She testified Mother attended 40% of the total visitations offered during the history of the case. N.T., 1/13/15, at Specifically, testified attended out 147 visitations. Id. -
Based on the foregoing evidence, we discern no abuse discretion by the in terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant § 2511(a)(2). Mother failed every component of the FSP her progress toward completion was minimal. Moreover, her repeated continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal to comply and /or complete the required services caused J.H., B.H., be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical mental well- being.
Further, we reject Mother's argument testimonial evidence is insufficient demonstrate causes of the incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not remedied. Mr. Younger testified that, "throughout course of the case . . we've had FSP goals in place and . they haven't changed or deviated much." N.T., 8/20/14, at 45. He continued that, of the date of the hearing, Mother's compliance with the required services minimal. Id. at In addition, refused to acknowledge her role the children's placement DHS. We observe Mother insists J.H. and B.H. were placed due "[a] false call . . . made to DHS" about neglect. N.T., 10/7/15, Similarly, she did not acknowledge any responsibility for the placement of J.G., which occurred at birth February of 2013 due to her cocaine abuse. In light of these facts Mother's failure comply with and /or complete any of the required services, claims regarding 2511(a)(2) are meritless.
In her second issue, Mother asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider "the emotional needs of the children because [she] continued to maintain bond with her children while was attempting complete reunification objectives. . . ." Mother's brief 14. We disagree.
With respect to 2511(b), this Court has explained that, "[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, stability are involved the inquiry into needs welfare of the child." In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court "must also discern the nature status of the parent -child bond, with utmost attention the effect on child of permanently severing bond." Id. (citation omitted). However, "[i]n cases where there is no evidence any bond between the parent child, it is reasonable infer no bond exists. extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends the circumstances of the particular case." In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 -763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
This Court explained the needs welfare analysis follows: While parent's emotional bond or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best -interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors considered by court when determining what best interest of the child. In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 -536 (Pa.Super. 2008). The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the termination parental rights. See In re T.D., A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court's decision terminate parents' parental rights affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond against parents' inability to serve needs of - child). Rather, the orphans' court must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its termination "would destroy an existing, necessary beneficial relationship." In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa.Super. 2003). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010), [I]n addition bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships whether any existing parent -child bond can severed without detrimental effects the child. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 103 (Pa.Super. 2011).
Instantly, the reasoned follows: B.H. reside in the same pre- adoptive home. They share their primary parental bond with the kinship parent. They both look to the kinship parent meet their day to day needs. B.H. has stated no longer wants visit with her biological parents. J.G. has never lived with his biological parents. J.H. resides pre- adoptive foster home. The foster mother has appropriate medical training to care the child. She is a registered nurse. J.H. is bonded to foster mother. The foster mother is very attentive J.H. and meets all his medical needs. Furthermore, the children would not suffer permanent /irreparable harm if the parental rights of the parents were terminated.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/16, unnumbered (citations to record omitted).
Our review of the certified record supports the trial court's findings. First, we highlight testimony Mr. Young Ms. Danhour confirms the meaningful bond the children share with their respective foster families. Now three -and -one -half -year old J.G. been pre - adoptive foster care since birth. Similarly, J.H. bonded pre- - adoptive foster family, who provides the necessary attention and dedication to special needs Mother neglected to deliver. With respect to B.H., who ten years old at the time of placement and fourteen years old when termination hearings occurred, the record validates the child's desire to cease contact with Mother. James Cosby, Child Advocate social worker assigned to B.H. since 2012, described how B.H. initially wanted to return to her parents but ultimately changed her mind and informed the agency that she did not want continue attending supervised visitations with her parents any longer. Id. As such, B.H. has seen more than one one -half years. Id. at Significantly, Mr. Cosby testified that B.H. has "been adamant about wanting adopted by [her foster mother]." Id.
Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude that involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights will serve the developmental, physical emotional needs welfare B.H., J.H., Therefore, we discern no abuse discretion by terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating parental rights the children the orders changing the children's permanency goals from reunification adoption.
Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed. -
Judgment Entered.
J: seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 11/8/2016 -
