Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.80 [1] [a]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, County Court properly exercised its discretion in precluding defendant from introducing expert testimony with respect to whether defendant, as the result of chemotherapy treatments, had a diminished mental capacity that prevented him from understanding what he was saying in taped conversations he had with the victim that were inculpatory in nature ( see People v Covington , 298 AD2d 930, 930, lv denied 99 NY2d 557). “As a general rule, the admissibility and limits of expert testimony lie primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court” ( People v Lee , 96 NY2d 157, 162; see People v Williams , 97 NY2d 735, 736; People v Cronin , 60 NY2d 430, 433). Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that evaluating defendant’s recorded conversations with the victim was “within the ken of the typical juror” ( Cronin , 60 NY2d at 433; see Covington , 298 AD2d at 930). Additionally, the proposed expert was unable to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that chemotherapy treatments caused defendant’s purported deficits ( see generally People v Allweiss , 48 NY2d 40, 50).

Contrary to defendant’s further contention, we conclude that the court properly prohibited defendant from cross-examining the victim with respect to her prior juvenile adjudication. It is “impermissible to use a youthful offender or juvenile delinquency adjudication as an

-2- 737 KA 12-02387 impeachment weapon, because these adjudications are not convictions of a crime” ( People v Gray , 84 NY2d 709, 712 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The extent to which a party may use the “ ‘illegal or immoral acts underlying such adjudications’ ” to impeach the credibility of a witness is a matter that is generally left to the discretion of the court ( id. ; see generally People v Sandoval , 34 NY2d 371, 375). Here, the court properly exercised its discretion in precluding cross-examination with respect to the prior bad acts underlying the victim’s juvenile adjudication inasmuch as they did not reflect on her credibility ( cf. People v Bell , 265 AD2d 813, 814, lv denied 94 NY2d 916; see generally Sandoval , 34 NY2d at 376).

Additionally, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury ( see People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 349), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495).

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the victim’s testimony was not incredible as a matter of law, and we afford “ ‘deference to the jury’s superior ability to evaluate the credibility of the People’s witnesses’ ” ( People v Baker , 30 AD3d 1102, 1103, lv denied 7 NY3d 846). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe; the three- year determinate sentence of incarceration is at the lower end of the legal sentencing range and thus indicates that the sentencing court considered defendant’s mitigating circumstances (Penal Law §§ 70.80 [4] [a] [iii]; 130.80).

Entered: June 14, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court