Case Information
*0 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/26/2015 11:20:15 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 10/21/2015 2:05:15 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE AUSTIN, TEXAS 03-15-00008-CV *1 ACCEPTED [7476585] CLERK No. 03-15-00008-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT PAUL D. SIMMONS
APPELLANT
V. TERESAA. SIMMONS APPELLEE
oN ÀPPEAL FIìOM ',l't{F' [1] 19 r'rr JUDI(),,\L DIS'|RICT COURI OF .I'OM GIì]ìI]N COUN'I'Y,1'LìXAS cAUSLì NO. It-1 3-0232-ir BRIEF OF APPELLEE Gar:re tt Clarl<son Fliglcy sBN 2404ó074
l-aw Officc of Garrctt C. Fliglcy, Pl,I-C \7. 12'ì' Strcet Austin, 'I'exas 78701 (512) s14-1940
lìax No. (512) 391-0028 G attct.t@higleyfar.ni\'law. com *2 Iìobctt ll. l,uther sllN 12704000 Law Officcs of lìol¡crt 11, Luthcr, P.C. Iùo (ltandc Àustin, -I'exas 78701 (512)477 -2323
I'ax (512)478-1824 r:bluther@lutl'rlaw. con-r Attorneys on Appeal For Appellee
No. 03-15-00008-CV IN TI-IE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT PI\UL D. SIMMONS
APPELI.ANT
V. TERESAA. SIMMONS APPELLEE
ON APPEAI, IIIIOM TFIL- [1] 9'II ,fOM G IìI]I]N COUN'I'Y,'[ìXAS I CO DIS'TRIC']' J UDICIA]- UIL| OII cÂusE NO. 1l-1 3-0232-[i BRIEF OFAPPELLEE I'O'11'I-Ì l IONOI{,,\BI.,Ij COU1ì I' OF Al .c'
^PPIr
-Appclle c 'le rcsa .4. Simmons respectfully fìle s this Ilrie f.
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Pursuant lì.ule 38,1(a) 'I'EXAS IìULES OF,APPII,LL,À'IB ì)RO()ÌDUlìlì, thc followìng infonnation is supplied to this Ilonorable Court.
Parties:
'l'rial Petìtioner ar-rd Appellee ......,...'I'crcsa À. Sìmmons
'l'dal lìcspondcnt Appellant........ ....,.....,,.........Paul I). Simmons
Counsel:
Appellce Counsel for
'I'etesa A. Sirnrnons......... Iìobcrt B. I-utl'rer
I,AW OFIìICES OII IIOBIìlLI1]. I,[JT]-ìÌìII. i].C. 1800 llio (ìranclc
Austin,'I'exas 78701 (ì arrctt Clarl<sorl Ì Iigìey l,aw (Jfficc of (ìartctt C. I-iìglcy, PLLC 508 \7, 12'r' Str:co:
-Àustiu,'I'cx¿s 78701
'l'rial Counsel for
'I'etcsa Â. Simmons......................... I(irk I-Iawl<ins
Àtlorntl¡ at ] aw
224 West I3eaur:cgar<ì, Suitc 303 San Angclo,'I'cxas 76903 ftial Counscl for: lìespondctrt/
Âppellant on Àppeal
Paul I). S1mmons..................,,,...,,.,Melvin G r:ay
Gary & Iìrigman, Pl-l-C \X/. College Àve. San -A.ngckr, Tcxas 76903 *5 'I'dal Court...... .. .. . . ... .'I-lie Honorable Ben Woodward 19'r'Judicial I)istrict Court
'I'on-r Green Couuty, I'exas *6 OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR ORÁLARGUMENT Appcllec belìeves request for oral ârgument should bc dcnied, because the facts and lcgal argumer-rts are adecluatcly presentcd ìn thc bdefs rccord, ¿nd the
dccisional proccss would not be significant\' aidcd by oral argumcnt.
DESIGNATION OF REFERENCES Record Re ferences
The Cled<'s lìecotd includcs all of thc relevant pleadings and ordcrs {ìled with thc tlial court and cletk. 'Ì'hc Clctk's lìecords contairls one volumc. Iìeferenccs in this
,{ppellee 's Btie f to the Cle rk's lìecord are by volurre and pagc numbcr, indicated as "CIì
1t-."
'l'he lìeporter's lìecord lncludes thc transcript of thc bench tr:ial held onJúy 22, 201.4. 'l'he lì.eportcr's lìccord contâins thr:ee volumes. lìcfcrcnces to the lìeportcr's
Iìecord are by volume page nurnbeL, ir-rdicated as "lì1ì _:_."
'l'he llepottcr's lìccord also includcs all pâf tics' cxhibits submitted to thc tl:ìal court and aclmittcd rnto evidcnce during the bcncl'r trial. Copics all such exhíbits
al:e included Volumc lì.eportcr's lìecor:d, lìcfctcnce 1o thc par:tics' exhil¡its
are indrcated as "Iìlì 3:IrX# " or: "lìIì 3:1ìX#
lìcfetences to the triâl couÍt's Irìndìngs Iìact atc indìcatccl as "IìIr#_ lìe ferer-rces trial court's Coflclusions Law ale indicated as "CL#
lìe fcrcnce s to Appellant's llrief atc indicatecl as ""411:_," Party References
Paul l). Stmmons, Âpltellant, shall bc tcfcrred as eitbcr "Appellant" or "Paul" hercin. 'I'cr:esa A. Simnons, Apltellee, shall be refelred as "Appcllee" ot "'I'ercsa."
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page ....5, 13 CoruþnterAssocs., Int'lu.A/tai, Inc.,91BS.\7.2c1 453,456(Tcx. 1996)...................8
l)tratt u. Garcia,224 S W.3d 309,31,3 ('liex.App.,ì11 Paso 2005, no per,).,..........,.......4
Coode u. .lhoakfe |t,943 S.\ø.2d 441 ,446 (I'ex.1997) .....,..................,..,6
ITaas u. George,71 S.\7.3d 904,912
(l-ex. App, - fcxarkana 2002,no pet).. ,. . .,...... .......,...,.....................,9
LIal u. Shell Oil Co.,986 S \7.2d 772,777
(1'cx. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied)..,.. ...............,..,..,..........8
I'lECl Expl. Co. u. Nee/,982 S.W.2cl BB1, 886 (I"cx. 1998).,... .,.., . .....8
In re T.J.L.,97 S.!7.3d 251 ,265
(I'cx.r\pp.-I{ouston [14th Dist I 2002, ûo pcr.) ............4
In Alariaga Reinauer,946 S.Sø.2d 853, B(r0
(I'ex. App. *Arrlarillo 1.997,1':tet. cleniccl) ....................6
I{PMG Peat Mawii;k u. I-Iarrison Coanfl IJoas. t*ur. Corp., 988 S.\X/.2d 746,749('1ex.1999)............... .......................7
Lid.e u. Ude,116 S.W.3d ,1,51 (I'ex.Âpp.-Bl Pasr¡ 2003, no pcr.),.,.........................5
I-nuu. ['1etn1,221 S.\X/.3c1 609,61,4 (I'ex.2007),...,.. ...............,,.,.,............6
Oliur u. Rogut',976 S,W.2d 792, 802
(llcx. App - Flouston [1" Disll 1998, pct. dcnied).........,,. ....,....,...,.....8
Statutes Page
\ 9 003(b), fex. Iramì1y Code (Vernon's 2015)............, ..................3
S 9.01 1,'I'ex. Family Code (y'ernon's 5).......,....,,.,.. ...... ........ ..9
STATEMBNT OF THE CASE Appellce accepts -{ppellant's Staternent Case.
REPLY TO ISSUE PRESENTED -I'he trìal court properly exercìsed its discrction by enforcing Reply to Issue No. 1:
an award letitement funds 'l'ercsa and denying Paul's statutc oI lim.itations defense bcc¿use 'I'eresa brought the cnforce mcnt act.ion wtthin two 1rs¿1s hcr discovering his breach fi cluciary rcsponsibility.
No. 03-15-00008-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD JUDICIAI DISTRICT PAUL D. SIMMONS APPELLANT
V. TERESAA. SIMMONS APPELLBE
ON APPEA]- I]IìOM'J]I II- 1 1 91T I JUDICIAI, DIS'IIìIC'| COUITI' OF TOM GIìEEN COUNT'Y, ]]IXAS C^USI:ì NO. B-13-0232-Ir BRIEF OF APPELLEE 'l'OTHE I-IONOIL\BLL, COUIìT OF APPLrÂI.S:
1'ìl,lìfis^ À. SIMMONS (hcreaftcr dcsignatcd ";\ppellec" or: ^PPELLII,E
"'Icresa") respectfully sul¡mrts this I'rer Appellec's Iìjcf would ash this court affìrm
tl-re fìnal orclcr cntrtled 'Judgrnent" sigîed oû September 15,201,4,, b)'the Honolal¡le Bcn
Woodward, ptesidìng jr-rdge 119'r' Juclicial I)istrict Court of ',[-om Green County,
'I'cxas.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 'l-cresa would add followng to Paul's Staten'rcnt of Facts þ\R:6]: -Ieresa Âled a Iretitìon for' Iinforcement of Order, ("Petiuon for llnforccmcr-rt"), seeking
to enfotce the Divorce Dccrec, on Âpril 3,201.4. (Clì 1:35-37; Irl#10)(;\R:Appcndix 2).
Teres¿ âsserted in 1'ret enforcernent pleading that she became âware of tl-re retirement
paymelrt in I¡te 201.2 oteatly 2013. (C1ì1:36). Paul asserted various affìrmatìvc defenses 'l'eresa's cnfotcerrrent action, including but lrot limited to, the statute [nritations.
(Clt :25-26;IrF#9) (ÂÌì:r\ppendix 2),
-I-etesa met Paul talk I'rin-r one tirnc aftet their clivorcc. (l\1124:20-24). ,,\t that meeting she mentionecl something to hrm w}rìle at an evening dinnct, and he handccl
her a (lonoco knife saying "Hete, you've -- you'vc - you've eamecl part this." (l{lì
25:10-12) 'fcrcsa tenindccl hil¡ about hcr pctccntage ¿ward letiremelrtì, aûd he sâicl
"I hnow, I know, I l<now. I won't forget". (Iìlì 25:13-15).
'lclcsa tcstifiecl that she fìrst leamecl about Paul cashing his tctirerrent from her daughter: when sl-re told -I'crcsa that Paul "tooh iris money out Colroco and paid his
home ofl" (Rlì 21:2-B).
'I'he ttial coutt found that "fl'cresa] le¿med this rctil:cment distribution sonretimc after ,August 2012 whe¡ her daughter told hcr that l)efendar-rt was mad at a
loan cornpuy paid thern with procceds frorn rctilcment distribution." (Clì 52;
lìIr#7). The trial court futthcr concludcd "'I'he earlicst ['I'elcsal lcarncd a]¡out the
retiremellt distribuuon lPauÌJ w¿s after r\r-rgust 2012." (Cl\ 53; CJ,#z). Paul clid nor
dispute uot was there any evidencc adduccd tl-rat disputed 'I'etcsa's testimoÍìy.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Teresa btought hcr cuforcer¡er1t âction agairst Paul within two years the date her clairn accrued against Paul, tl'rc d¿tc sl're teccived noticc tlìat hc had cashcd in I'ris Conoco
retitetnent, failed give l-rer a share tl're tetiLement, and brcachcd I'ris fiduciary duty.
'I'crcsa asserted in her cnforcemelrt pctìuor-r shc did not fincl out Paul hacl cashcd tn his tetiretnent until Âugust 2012, t.c., tl-rat she discovcre d he r injury August of
2012. 'I'I-Le trial court, l¡ased on undispute d facts, found that 'fcrcsa first found out
Paul h¿d receivcd tetitemellt distribution ir-r August 2012. 'I'l're trial court futther
made the lcgal conclusion thât tl-ìc cârlicst the Plaintiff ['lietcsa] leatnccl about the
rctìrcment distr:íbution to l)cfcnc{ant [Par-rll was altcl Âugust [2.
'Il-re trìal court ímpliedly founcl cashing out rhe redrement fund was inhcrent\' undiscoverablc, t,hat 'l'cresa had exercised tcasonal¡lc cliligcncc. As
sucl-r, thc trial cour:t propcdy cotrcludccl drat discovery rule tolled tl-rc appìicable
two-1rs¿¡ statute Lir¡itations found ûr 'I'cx. Iìarn. Coclc $ 9.003(b). 'lhe trìal cour:t
proPedy enfotcecl lrtovisicxr the divorcc decrce ìn tegatds division of
Paul's rctitetrent bel1cfìts.
ARGUMENT
REPLY TO ISSUE PRESENTED:
The tial court properly exercised its discretion by enforcing an award of retirement funds Teresa denying Paul's statute of limitations defense because Teresa brought enforcement action within two years of her discovering his breach fiduciary responsibility.
Standatd of Revíew A trial coutt's ruling or-r â post-divoÍce motion fot enforcement of divorcc dectee is tcviewed under an aì¡use-o f-discretion stanclatd. See Iø re T.J.I-.,97 S.\(/.3d 257,265
(fex.;\pp.-Flouston [14t1'r Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (abusc díscrcrion statrdard applicd in
lcviewing ordct ctrfotciug payment chilcl's l-realthcate expcnse s ancl unínsured me dical
cxper-rse s). In cleter:mining wl'rethel thc ttial court abused its discretiolr, thcrc al:c two
clucstiol'ìs: (1) did tlial coutt have suffìcrcnt tnformadon upon which exercisc its
disctetion; ancl (2) díd thc trial couÍt eÍr irr its application disclction? Duran u. Garcia,
2245.W.3d309,31.3 (Tex.App.-Iil Paso 2005, no pet.).
llìth respcct to thc fìrst clucslion, the tr:¿ditron¿l suffìcicncy stanclarcls apply. .lotelo u. Conqahs, S,W.3d 783,787 (l'ex.Âpp.-lìl Paso 2005, 1ro pet.). An appellant may
cl'rallcnge thc trìal court's ûndings offact fot lcgal and factual suffìcicncy ofthc evidence.
Sofe/0, 170 S.W,3d at 787. -A. legal sufficìcncy <¡r "no evidence" challengc will be sust¿ined
if t1'rc party suffcring thc ach.er;sc decision at trial shows: (1) the cornplctc absencc of a
vital fact; (2) cor-rtt is l¡ancd by tules law or evidence frorn giving weight the
ouly evidence offcted to pÍove â vital fact; (3) the cvidcnce offerecl to prove a vital fact
ís no mote than a scintilla; or (4) tl-re evidence establishcs conclusìvely the opposítc thc
vital fact, Cìb,0f Keileril. ll/ils0n,1.68 S.\7.3d 802,810 (T'cx.2005), Wrcn concluctin¡¡a legal
sufficierrcy revicw, evidcncc is r,rcwed ir-r the ligl-rt most favorable to thc judgmcnt,
creditìng favorable evidencc if a teasonable fact fìndcr coulcl, and distegarcìing colrtraÐ/
evidence unless a rcason¿blc lact fìndcr could not. id. at 822.'I'l-¡e fìnal tcst for legal
sufficieucy must alwa¡rs bc whcther the evidcncc at tÍiâl would cnablc le¿rson¿ble fair-
n'úrrdcd peoplc to lcach the verclict uude t teview. id.
ln a factual suffìciency review, al1 the er,'rdence is considcrcd, both tl-re evidencc whicl-r ter-rds to provc thc cxistcnce vital fact, as well as eviclcncc whrcl'r tcnds t<r
dìsprove its existcr.rcc. So/.e/0,1,70 S.W.3d at 787. A findirg should bc ser âside only if it
is so coutlaq' the ovcÍwhclming wei¡¡ht thc cr,rdcncc as bc clcarly wrong and
manifestly unjust. .fcr Cain u. Baitt,709 S.W.2d 17 5, 1,7 6 (I'ex.1986).
Oncc it is detcrmincd drat sufficient evicìencc exists, the court must consiclel wl-rctlrcr the ttial couft mâcle a re asonablc clecision. L'ide u. Licle , 16 S.W.3ct L47 , 151
(T'ex.Àpp.-lÌl Paso 2003, 11o pet.), In other wolds, rhc court lrrust determitlc the
ruling was netther arbitrary 11or unrcasonal¡Ie. id. Under thc sccolrd inquiry, test is not
whcthet, opinion tl-re lcvicwrng court, the facts prcscltt an a1t1tr-oprintc case fol:
tlrc trìal coutt's action. Sotelo,1,70 S.W.3d ¿t 787-88, llathcr:, the issuc is whether trial
cr¡utt actccl witìrout tefete:uce any guiding rules ol: prìnciplcs sucl'r drat its ruling wls
âÍbitrâly ot ullreasonable. See Lul u. IJenry,221 S.\7.3d 609,614 ('I'cx.2007); Goode u.
Shonkfeh,943 S.\ø.2d 441,446 (I'cx.1997). l\n abuse of clisctetiorr is shown if thc trial
couÍt drew an iucottect conclusion of law b1' misappllnng the law to the fâcts or: if thc
conttolling firrdings of fact do 11ot supllol:t a correct lcÉìal theory sufûcicnt to support tl'ìe
judgmcnt. lote/.o, 170 S.W,3c1 at 788.
The Discover|, Rule Avoids Limitations as Bat to Tercsa's Claim Âl¡sent a l¡asis to defer the lunning of the clock for purposes <¡f statutes of limitation, lìmitations generally bcgin to tun when the wrongful act causes an injuq,. -fercsa
Childs u. Hattl.recker, / ,î.V/.2¿ )/, i6 (lex. / 998). It this casc, was ìnjured when
Paul dicì uot comply wìth the tcms divorce clecree. 'l'he parties' clivorcc dccrcc
tcquirecl Paul to tcrnit to 'felcsa "[a] portron I'Iusband's retjt:ement, pensìon, thrift,
proÂt sharing ancì othct crnlrloyce bcllcfits âccluircd drtougìr llusband's crnplolnlcnt wrth
Oonoco, bc paid if, as, and when reccived by I*Iusbancl. (Cll 1;14,111ì
3:PX#5;FIr#5;FF#1)(z\ppendices 2-3). 'I'cLesa's injury occurred when Paul widrdr:ew all tl're funcls from thc letirernent account upon doing so thcn failed to irnrnediatcly
ternit 'I'e tesa's por:tio11 het. .1¿¿ In the Mariage Reinaan',94ó S.W.2d 853, 860 (I'ex.
App. -,,\rnarillo 1.997, pet. denied).
It is'I'eresa's tnain conteution tirat discovcry rulc applies avoid application Pauì's limitatious defcnsc to l¡at her claim against hir¡ for failutc to pay hct awatdcd redtcment funds. 'fhc discovery tule is lcgal pr:inciple whicìr, whcn applicablc,
ptovides lirnitations Lun ftorn the date thc plaintiff discovers or should havc
discoveled, in the exctcisc rcasonable care and diligence, the Íìature of tl're injury.
lYilli¡ a. Mauerick, 760 S.W.2d 642,644 (I'cx. 19BB).
\Xhcthcr thc discovery rulc ap¡rlics the fitst instancc depelrds ilr part upon whether thc injury is inherently undiscoveral¡le; meaning, depcndìng or tlle injury, thc
iujury is unlikely to be discovcrcd witl'rin tl're legislative\' prescribed limited per;iod cvcn
when tlre claimant has exetctscd cluc cliligence. I{/agner ù Brown, Lld. u. LIonyood, 58 (I'ex. 2001). \X4rcn it applics, thc discovery tule defers accrual of
S.W3d 732 ^t734-35
â cause action until tl-rc plainuff knew ol, cxer:cìsìng tcâso1râble diligencc, shoulcl havc
knowtr of tlrc wtcxrgfully causcd injury." I(PMG Peat Ì¡Laruick u.I:l arri¡on Connþ I7ont. .Fin.
Cor.p.,9B8 S.W.2d 746, 749(l'ex. 1999). Nor.rethelcss, tl.rc cliscovery rule is Limíted
cxcelltìon to the statutc of linritaúons applies oûl)¡ "v/hcn the n¿turc tl're plaintiffs
injury is l¡oth inhetently undiscovctable alrd objectively vcrifìablc." ILonyood,5B S.W.3d
^t734.
After decicling whet}rer dìscovery rulcs applìes, the ncxt issuc for coutt to decicle becomcs "When did 'Ì'eresa learn that Paul had not rernittecl retiternent funds
orvecl lrer?" .1¿¿ Cl:i/d.ç,974 S.W.2d at 37. Aftcr applicâtion the discovety rule,
resolving whcn'I'ercsa had actual oÍ constructive knowlcdge Paul's failur:c to rernit the
tetitemcnt funds her sl-rould rcsolve thc issuc whcthct trial couît pÍopcdy refused time bar 'l'etesa's claim.
Pau|'s Dectsion .Not Pay Teresa, a Breaclt of Fiduciary Duty, fs "fnherently
Undiscoverable" i\n injury is "inl-rcrcndy undrscoverable" if it is, by natulc, unhhcly be discovctcd wrthin the ptesctibcd lirnit¿tions pctiod despite thc plaintiffs diligence .
She// Oi/ Co. u. Ror,356 S.W.3d 924,930 (l"ex. 2001); IY/agner a. Bron,n, Ltd., u. Honuood,
58 S.W.3d 732,734-35 (Iex. 2001); ContpaterAtncl, Int'/ u. Alrd| Iilî.,918 S.W.2d 453,
456 (Tcx. 1996). \X/hcthet an injury is inl-rerently undiscoveral¡le is dctermincd
categorically - that is, by exarnining whether the palticular rypc rnjury clairnccl ìs
gcnetal dìscovcrablc through the cxctcise reasonablc diligcncc, IJECI Expl. Co. u.
Nee/, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (l'cx. 1998). 'l'he plaintiff must demonstrate only rhat it
wa,q diffìcult discover the ìnjnty, the plaintìff dc)cs not neecl to l)rovc it was
impossiblc. See S.I/. u. R. l/.,933 S.W.2cl (fcx. 1996),
An injuty is "objecuvcly vetifiable" if rnjury's cxisrcnce and defendant's wrongful act cânûot be disputed and tl-re facts on which hability is assertcd are
dcnronstr¿ted by ditect physical cvidcnce. IJal u. She /l Oi/ Co.,986 S.\ø.2d 172,771
('I'ex. App. - Cotpus Chdsu 1999, pet. denìecì). 'I-his might best be demor.rstrared by
example. An injury resulting from a brcach conttact is objectìvely vcr:ifìable by
k;olring at clefcndant's contract wìth a thírd pany. Sae Oliuer u. Rogers,976 S.W.2d
'792,802 (I'cx. ,,\pp. * Iloustor.r [1" Dist,] 1998, pet. dcnrcd), \(/hcteas, sexual abuse
by parcnt would not be objecuvcly vcriÂable because there is no scicntific colrsensus
or how to gaugc thc üue or falsity of recovered rnernc¡ries upotr which tl-re clairn
wonld be based. -1¿¿ .r.V.,933 S.W.2d at 18.
'I'hc first part oI tl're inquiry is whetl-rer 'fcresa's injury is inl-rerendy urrdiscoveral¡le. 'l-etcsa did not teceìve paymcnt of rctircment funds sl're was awarded,
aud she did not rcceive thetn because Paul teceived tl-rern fìrst did 11ot pây thcn'ì to
I'rer, but paicl bílls instc¿d. (1ìlì 1:52; lîÌì#3,4). \71'ren Paul teceived the rctircment
lunds awarded 'I'eresa, a ficluciary obligatiol'ì favor of 'I'eresa rvas creatcd, a
collsttuctlvc trust was pìaced on those fuuds for the bcnefit of 'l'eresa, and Paul owed
a ûduciary lcsponsibility to pay tl-re funds to'I'eresa. Sec. 9.011,'I'ex. lìarnily Cocle
(Veruon's 2015). Paul l¡rcachcd his fiduciary rcsponsibiLiry to'I'etesa by not paying tctitenent fi-urds he l'reld 'I'eresa.
'l'hankful\' 'l'cxas casclaw is clcar: that injurics atisurg fi:om a bl:each a fiducialy duty are considercd inhetentll' undiscovcrable 5.V.,933 S.W.2d at B;
ConþnlerA.r.roc.r, 918 S,W.2d tt 456; Tlaat u. George,71 S.\)í.3d 904,912 (I'ex. App. -
'I'exatkana 2002, no pet.). Gener:al\', party who ìs ov¡ed a fìclucìar:y cluty ìs relieved tesponsibilit.y clilìgent incluiry into fiduciar:y's conduct as long as thc
rclauonslrip exists. ,1. Z, S.W.2cl at 8; 'fre ail u. Tre ni/, 311 S.W.3cl 11,4, 123 (I'ex.
App. - Ileaumont 2010, no pct.). FIowcver, oûce ficluciary misconduct becomes
apparent, it cannot bc ignorecl, r:egalcllcss the natutc the rclatìon ship. ConpuÍer
zl¡socs.,91B S.W.2d at 45ó. 'I'hcrc can bc no othel conclusion but 'l'ercs¿ has rnet
hct first butdcn of demonstrating tl'rat hcr injuty, suffering from breacl-r of hduciar'y
dr-rty, is thc qpe of lljury that is "inhegrt\' undisc<¡verablc".
Teresa's Iniury is Obiectively Verifrable Jlvrdence at trial was unclisputecì tl'rat Paul lcceived the rctircmcnt funds ar-rd spent thc cntire arnount r:cccived pay bílls. (Clì:52, llfffi,4). (ll1ì2:5, L 9-24). 'I'he
injury can be quantrÊcd and determiucd wrtl-r cettainty, as opposed to otheÍ injurics
which can be disputcd and cannot bc dcmonstrated by dir:cct physrcal evidelrce.
Iìxarnples of the latter al:c claims ptovecl by ân cxpcrt opiniorl based on rcpressed or
tecovelcd rnernories which are trot suffìcient objectivcly verify ân injury; there was
no scicntiûc collscnsus on how to gaugc truth or falsity tcc<;vcrcd rncrnorìcs. J.lZ, S.\?.2d at 18. 'I'etesa's injury being "objectìvcly vcrifiable", the sccond prong of te st I'ras been mct, and cliscor.cС rule applics dclay application thc statutc
of limitatjons to Paul's bteach fìducìary duty.
Ewdence lVas Sufficient Teresa Exerc.ísed Due DiIlgence and Filed Claim Within Two Yeats Nottce 'I'hc evrdcnce adduceci at triâl rcgarding discovcry injury cfforts to discovcl tl're injury was tlle tcslimolry of 'I'eresa, who tcstìfìed as follows:
a Ohay, Now, when did you fìtst learn your: husband had casl'red his
tetitetnent witl-r Conoco?
l0
A, I lcarned, uhm, whcn rny daughtcr, gosh, uhfiì, vzas - just happcncd t<¡ rncnúon
when shc was tallang to me that he I'rad gotten aggravatcd ât d1e ilrsural-ìce compâlly
oï somethû1g for going up or-ì their pticcs and he just paìd his horne ofl FIc rooh his
moncy out Conoco ancl paid his hr¡rnc o ff.
a Okay. r\nd thât would Ìrave bcen I'row long ago?
Uhûr lln tl-rirrking was somewhere n 2012.
^.
a Okay.
Norv, let me tell you, I dcx-r't cliscuss witlr hrm with rny kìcìs bccause I dolr't ^ u/ant my kids to be dr:ug lrto any krncl snrff like that.
a Okay. But she just happcncd trention that?
A. Yeah.
a And then at tlìat point in time you st^rted - what did you t1-y clo then.
,\. I started colrtactillg diffctent, uhm, attomeys. I thought at the tirnc that he was
living in New Mcxrco, ar-rd so I contactccl a1l attorûc)¡ Nerv Mcxico spol<c with
lrim. Ilut hc wasn't living in New Nlcxico, he l-racì -, hc was thcn lìr'ìng -
a I'lere?
A. - herc. So then I contactcd you.
a And clid he cver tcll you that hc had câsl'ìed i1r hìs retitcmcnt with thcrn?
r\. ,{bsolutcly not.
(ì Did you know al¡out tl-rc banhnrptcl' we just found out about?
I rnay havc hcard about it slrce t1-ren, uhrn., fiom one kicls. I did not get ^. âlìy notice auy bankr:uptrcy, no.
a Okay. Âr-rd âfe )¡ou askng thc Coutt award 1'6¡ thc monc;' that I're woulcl
owc you fol your sl'rare his rctiremcot?
ll
l\ Ycs, and attorney's fccs ancl costs.
(lì1ì 2: p. 21.,L 2 to p.22, 1.9).
a Âud 1'6¡ fcel tl-rat you'rc elrdded to â portion his retiremcnt?
I absolutcly do.
^.
a Á.nd you didn't know that he was gctring â rctiremenr bcncfit unúl your
daughter told you?
.{. 'I'hat's correct. I - I havc scen hirn to talk to hirn onc time sincc wc wcre
divorced. I tl-rrr-rl<, ancl that was a few yeats beforc l-re retlrcd when thc lads wcre both
in towr. Jesse was in town atrd l<ids wantcd us to mect for dinner, tl're four us,
ancl I fìnal\' agt:ecd to it.
a We , accordir-rg to Pagc of your decrce, which rvas back i¡ 1.981 , you kncw
that a tetitement wâs âccruing ât the tìme accorcling to y6¡1 own decrec, --
A. Yeah.
a - dicl you not?
A. Yes, I did.
a Well, then w}ry did you wait another 25 years or so mahc a claim? Iìecause, uhm, 1he clivorcc dcctee orclercd that when hc retilcd I woulcl tcccivc
^. that perceutage. When wc lrret for dinncr that timc Ol<lahor¡¿ (ìity, I rnentioncd
solncttú1rÉÌ him actually that very cvening. I Ie l-rancìcd mc (lonoco knife ancl l-re
said "Ilerc, you've - )¡ou'vc - you've eamcd part this." And I said. "Don't forget
¿bout tl-rat peÍccrltâfle ¡r¡¡s¡ retiremel1t." FIc said, "I know, I know, I know. I won'l:
forget." And agrecd he owed it me. So I - what woulcl you l-rave rnc do?
(lìlì 2: p. 24,1.20 to p. 25, 1. 16).
t2 *25 'fl're evidence from'I-ctesa Sitnmons \À/âs that she dìscoverecl Paul had not paicl her tlre retrremcnt when she w¿s put o11 lrotice by 1-rer claughte r t¡ 2012. 'I-eresa fìled a
pet.ition to enfotcc the divorcc dcctee on April 3, 2014. (Clì 2:52)(Iìf1 #10).
'l'etesa also testìfied that shc had asl<ed Paul to not forget about the tetirement awarded to 1rer, alrd he stated "I won't forget." Importantly, the rccord in this case
teflects that Paul nevel testifìcd tl-rat'I'cresa's âccoullt the convcrsation between
'I'etesa and Paul never occurred, nol did Paul offet any eviclcnce that het recounting
ofthe cxcl'rangc was inaccutate. It is thereforc uncontrovcrtcd that'l'crcsa inquircd of
Paul about the relirer¡ent ¿ward and that Paul tgreecl be responsiblc fot it.
A finclel fact cannot "ignote undisputcd tcstin-rony is clcal, positìve, direct, otherwrse credible, frcc from contradictiolrs and ìnconsistencies, and could
l.ravc bcen rcaclily controvetted." Ci4t o.f IQ/hr u. l.(/il¡on, 1,68 S.\7.3d 802, B1 (I'cx.
200s).
Under thc facts this casc, when Paul t:ccerved dre reútetrcnt funcls cluc 'I'etesa, I-rc owed her: fìcluciary respotisibility to safekeep the funds and pay I'rer what
was owed. The undisputed testimony is that'I'eresa ashed Paul, and Paul agrccd, tcr
be r;esponsible fot thc tctitemellt duc'fetesa undet the clivolce decree. Paul had sole
conttol over the decision withdr:aw funds fton-r his Conoco accoullt, and he agreed
witl'r 'I'ctcsa's Íequcst be respousiì¡lc for payrncllt when he madc clecision.
Nothíng recorcl would rnal<c thc request by'l-clesa oï thc acceptancc thc
[13]
responsibility by Paul untcasonablc. Iikewise, rotl'ìing in thc r:e cold would rnakc
'l-cres¿'s teliance on Paul to delivel thc payrnent unreasonable, especially considcring
Paul undisputcd acce¡rtance of that responsibiLity. Mor:c important\', it ìs arguable
that Tcrcsa wâs not recluìred tc¡ ask of Paul about tl're retirer¡ent becausc he held her
funds in a constructive ttust, and hc owed a fidr.rciary responsibilìty to'fcresa to pay
her.
It is'I'cresa's contention tl'rat Paul r,rolated his fìduciary responsibiliry to'I'cresa wheu hc teceived the retitement funcls and did not pay her. It is'Icrcs¿'s further
contefltiolr that her requcst to Paul honesdy rnadc ancl undisputcdly accepted by Paul rnal<e thc rctirerner-rt paymclrt satisfìes an)¡ ÍcqrÌircment of re¿sonable diligcrrce for
applicatrou of the discovcry rtrle ir-r this c¿se. 'I'l'rere was no cviclcncc the recor:d to
Put T'eresa on notice that she sllould not re\¡ o11 Pâul's âcccptalrcc her rcquest be
lcspoÍrsible for the ttaûsfet uûtil'I'cresa hcard from hcr daughtcr regardiûg Paul's
possiblc use tctircmcnt fuûcìs, Tcrcsa filecl suit within two ycars tirat notrcc.
Based on the uncìisputecl, clear, ¡rositive ancl direct tcstimon¡, 'Jieresa, which could have been readily coutrovertcd by Paul,'lercsa exercised tcasonablc cliligcnce by
leasonably re\ii11g nu Paul transfct the funds, r:csponsibiLity requested of him ancl
accepted by l'rirn without rescrvâlioû. Undel thc facts this casc, trial court clid
uot abuse its discrct-iolr by fìndng claim by'I'eresa for rctrremcnt funds
did not accrue undl sl'rc was givcn notice by hcr daughter that Paul wâs 1-ìot going to
t4
fulfill l-ris agr:eed-upon rcsponsibility tro trânsfer the retiremcnt funcls to'l'eresa whcn
he tcceived thcm.
Paul's argument to thìs Court: is that'I'etcsa could h¿ve had a QDIIO si¡yred, or she coulcl havc contacrcd Conoco, ol she could I'rave callecl Ì)aul again ancl again on
some undetetmiued tcgr-rlat basis to dctetmrlre his retucmcnt status, whcthct he hacl
reclucsted letìtcment alrroulrt ir-r some fonn from Conoco, and whetl'rer hc had
actually reccived funds from Conoco. It is 'I'ere sa's position that wl-rìle any onc of a
nurnbet of possibilities exist to cxercisc dìligcnce, the fiduciary duty owcd to'l'eresa by
Paul, coupled with 'I'cresa's requcst of Paul to rake rcspor-rsibility for the retiremcnt
transfer, and Paul's unhiûdcred and voluntary acceptallce of that rcqucst to, suppoÍts
'I'etesa's position tl-r¿t is was Par-rl's cluq, to disck¡sc the injuty. fiurdrcr, hcr rcliance on
Paul to malçc thc r:clircrncnt pâymcnt was rcasonal¡lc. Às sucl'r, to thc cxtent r:cc¡uircd -feresa
by any rneasure, cxctcisecì thc "leasonabìc dilìgcncc" l:ccluitcd her towalds
discovety an "inhcrently undiscovelable" rnjury sufficient to allow appJicatìor-r of discovery r:u1e delay irnposrtìon statute c¡f limitations tl'rìs case .
CONCLUSION AND PRA\'ER 'Ihc ttial court propctly fcrund tl-rat'I'cr:cs¿ filcd hct clairn agaínst Paul witl'rin two yeal's datc she hnew ot sl-rould havc l<nown hcr injury. '1'1-re ttial court
ptoPerty tefused bar'I'ercsa's clairn agair-rst Paul fol rctitcmcnt fur-rd s hc failcd tcr
delivcr l'rer. 'I'cresa prays thìs Court deny Paul's tcquested relicf.
15 *28 WH lllìE IrOÌìF,, Plì.li,MIS BS CO NSIDElììjl), Âpp ellcc'l-cres ¿ À. Sirnmon s that this Court affinn thc ttìal cor-rrt's judgrnent, and deuy all telief r:eclucstcd by
Appellant,
lìespcctfully subrnitted, Gartett Clarl<son Fliglcy sIlN 24046074 l,aw Office of Garrett C. I-Iigley, Pl,l-C 508 \(/. 12'r' Street Àustin,'I'cxas 78701 (512) 514-1940 Iìax N<¡. (512) 391-0028 G at ett@higleyfarnilylaw. com Àncl
]-,\W OFIìIC]I'S OF Itoltlit{f 11. LU'rFlIitì, P.c, 800 lììo (lranclc Strcct -Austin,'fexas 78701 (s12) 477-2323
Iìax (512) 478-1,824 By, /S/ lìol¡ert ll. l,uthcr lìobctt lJ. J-uther sIlN 12704000 Ilbluthet(@lu tl.rlaw. cor¡ .Attorncys for: l\ppellce, -I'crcsa Â. Simmons *29 CER'TIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE In accordance with lìule s 9.4(e) and (I) the'IïXAS I{ULES OIr ,ÀPPll'l-LA'I"L, PÌìOCEDUlìlì, undctsiglrccl attorney record certìfìcs that tl're
Ilne f of Appellee contains 14-point typeface for: the body bricf, 121oint
$pefacc fol fo<¡tnotes in the l¡r'ief and contains words, excluding thosc words
identified as not being countcd rn lìulc a.4(Ð(1) ancl was prcparcd on S(/ordPerfect
version X6.
/S/ llobett 11. Luthcr Iìol¡clt Il. Lutl'rer
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I ccrtify that truc copy tl-rc abovc was scrved on Âpcl1ant, by and thr:ougl-r his attorucl's tecord, Melviu (ìray a¡d lìlcd l3rigrna¡ via cservicc at
sgteen@grayandbri¡¡man.com, accordancc wlth tl-re 'I'exas Rulcs of Civil Proccdure tlre'I'exas lìulcs of Âppellatc Procedurc on October 21,2015.
/S/ ltobctt 11, l,uthcr: I{obcrt Il. Lutl-ret T7