Case Information
*1 MODIFY and AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed October 2, 2015.
In The No. 05-15-00081-CR No. 05-15-00126-CR DEJUAN GEIL HOLLIS, Appellant V.
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F13-51945-U, F13-52021-U MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Wright and Justices Fillmore and Stoddart Opinion by Justice Fillmore
DeJuan Geil Hollis pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated sexual assault of a child (cause no. 05-15-00081-CR) and indecency with a child (cause no. 05-15-00126-CR). T P ENAL C ODE NN . §§ 21.11(a), 22.021(a)(1)(B) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014). The trial court sentenced Hollis to five years’ imprisonment on the aggravated sexual assault of a child offense. In the
indecency with a child case, the trial court deferred adjudicating Hollis’s guilt and placed him on ten years’ community supervision. On appeal, Hollis’s attorney filed a brief in which she concludes the appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State , 573 *2 S.W.2d 807, 811–12 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel delivered a copy of the brief to Hollis. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (identifying duties of appellate courts and counsel in Anders cases).
Hollis filed a pro se response raising several issues. After reviewing counsel’s brief, Hollis’s pro se response, and the record, we agree the appeals are frivolous and without merit. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty in Anders cases). We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeals.
Although not arguable issues, we note that both the judgment in cause no. 05-15-00081- CR and the order deferring adjudication of guilt in cause no. 05-15-00126-CR incorrectly reflect there was a plea agreement as to punishment, when, in fact, Hollis entered pleas of nolo contendere with no agreement as to punishment. Accordingly, we modify the sections of the judgment of conviction and the order deferring adjudication of guilt entitled “terms of plea bargain” to state “open.” T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and the order of deferred adjudication.
/Robert M. Fillmore/ ROBERT M. FILLMORE JUSTICE Do Not Publish
T R. PP . P. 47
150081F.U05
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is as follows: the trial court’s judgment. *4 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order of deferred adjudication is as follows: the trial court’s order of deferred adjudication.
