Case Information

*0 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/10/2015 5:05:48 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk NO. 03-14-00386-CR THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 8/10/2015 5:05:48 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE AUSTIN, TEXAS 03-14-00386-CR *1 ACCEPTED ^[6433688] CLERK IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

GAYLEEN S. TODD

Appellant

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee On Appeal from Trial Court Cause No. 13-08168-3 In the County Court at Law Number Three, Williamson County, Texas Hon. Doug Arnold, Presiding STATE’S BRIEF

THE HONORABLE DEE HOBBS WILLIAMSON COUNTY ATTORNEY RYAN PALMQUIST Assistant County Attorney Williamson County, Texas State Bar No. 24073307 405 Martin Luther King, # 7 Georgetown, Texas 78626 PHONE: (512) 943-1111 FAX: (512) 943-1120 ryanpalmquist@wilco.org ` Attorney on Appeal for the State

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

i *2

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Appellant

GAYLEEN S. TODD

2116 Juniper Trail

Round Rock, Texas 78664

Appellate Counsel for Appellant

Pro Se

Trial Counsel for Appellant

Pro Se

Trial Counsel for the State

Charles Falck

Assistant County Attorney

Williamson County Attorney’s Office

405 Martin Luther King Street, #7

Georgetown, Texas 78626

Appellate Counsel for the State

Ryan Palmquist

Assistant County Attorney

Williamson County Attorney’s Office

405 Martin Luther King Street, #7

Georgetown, Texas 78626

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 2

I. State’s Response to Every Point of Error ..................................................... 3 II. Standard of Review ....................................................................................... 5 III. The Statutes Applied to Appellant ................................................................ 6 IV. The Statutes Did Not Violate Appellant’s Right to Travel ........................... 7 V. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction .................................................................. 8 VI. Appellant Received Proper Notice ................................................................ 9 VII. Statute Required the Trial Court Enter a Plea for Appellant ......................11 VIII. Appellant Received a Fair Trial ..................................................................12 IX. Conclusion ..................................................................................................15 PRAYER ..................................................................................................................15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................17

iii *4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases

Bagheri v. State , 119 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. Crim App. 2003) ........................................ 5

Blevins v. State , 672 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.) ...9, 10

Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ........................................ 5

Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ..................... 3, 7, 12, 13

Coyle v. State , 775 W.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no pet.) ......................11

Ex parte Arnold , 916 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d) ................. 7

Green v. State , 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200

(1997) ....................................................................................................................13 Huynh v. State , 901 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ......................................... 8

Jackson v. Virginia , 433 U.S. 307 (1979) .................................................................. 5

McCloud v. State , 527 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ...................................14

McCrory v. State , 643 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ..................................... 4

Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .............................13

Riggle v. State, 778 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1989, no pet.) ................ 8

Runningwolf v. State , 317 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2010), aff’d , 360

S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ....................................................................11 Schinzing v. State , 234 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App. Waco 2007) .................................... 9

Schmutz v. State , 440 16 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ...............................4, 5

Smith v. State , 907 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) .......................................... 3

State v. Blakenship, 170 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App. – Austin 2005, pet. ref’d) ............ 8

Taylor v. State , No. 09-07-00493-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 718 (Tex. App.

Beaumont Feb. 4, 2009)(not designed for publication) ......................................... 7 Statutes

T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . 26.11 .................................................................................11

T EX . C ODE . C RIM . P ROC . 26.12. ...............................................................................11

T EX . C ODE . C RIM . P ROC . 4.08 .................................................................................... 8

T EX . C ODE . C RIM . P ROC . 45.019 ................................................................................ 9

T EX . C ODE . C RIM . P ROC . 45.0426 .............................................................................. 8

T EX . R. A PP . P 34.6 .................................................................................................... 4

T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1. .................................................................................................. 3

T EX . R. A PP . P 44.2 .................................................................................................... 4

T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002 ..................................................................................... 6

T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.051 .................................................................................2, 6

T . T RANSP . C ODE 601.191 ..................................................................................... 6

iv *5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant received a citation for the offense of failure to maintain financial responsibility on or about May 15, 2013 (CR: 8). Appellant was convicted by a

jury in Round Rock municipal court ^[1] on October 1, 2013 and was assessed a fine

of one hundred and seventy-five dollars ($175.00)(CR: 27). The municipal court

denied Appellant’s lengthy Special Appearance and Motion for New Trial on

October 10, 2013 (CR: 73). Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 11,

2013 (CR: 74). On June 3, 2014, the case went to trial in County Court at Law #3

and Appellant was found guilty by a jury (CR: 219). The jury assessed fine of two

hundred and twenty dollars ($220.00)(CR: 222). Appellant filed another lengthy

Special Appearance and Motion for New Trial on June 9, 2014 (CR: 239-280)

which was denied by operation of law. Appellant then filed a Notice of Appeal on

June 13, 2014 (CR: 281).

STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant did not arrange for the production of a reporter’s record, therefore the State cannot give a full and complete State of Facts on record. This limits the

Court’s consideration of the case to the Clerk’s Record alone. ^[2] Appellant was

convicted of the class c offense failing to maintain financial responsibility under

T . T RANSP . C ODE 601.051.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Appellant has not demonstrated any error using references to the record or relevant case law. The eleven points of error amount to unsubstantiated assertions

unsupported by the record. Because of this, Appellant has not provided anything

for this Court’s review and the points of error should be overruled.

To the extent that Appellant has adequately briefed her points of error, they should still be overruled. First, the Texas Transportation Code statutes apply to

Appellant and it does not matter if she was engaged in commerce at the time of

committing the offense of failure to maintain financial responsibility. Secondly, the

statutes are a proper exercise of the State’s police powers as it has an interest in

maintaining safe roadways.

A valid complaint was filed in this case, granting the trial court jurisdiction.

Appellant filed notice of appeal from the municipal court thereby invoking the

jurisdiction of the trial court. She again filed notice of appeal thus invoking the

jurisdiction of this Court.

Appellant received proper notice of the charge against her. The notice started with the issuance of a citation on the day of the offense. There was a valid

complaint filed in the municipal court and in the county court and Appellant had

multiple court dates in both courts.

Finally, Appellant received a fair trial. Statue required the trial court to enter a plea on Appellant’s behalf. Additionally, Appellant knowingly and voluntarily

waived her right to counsel. Appellant did nothing to rebut the presumption of

regularity in proceedings and documents. Appellant has not demonstrated that the

trial court abused discretion during the admittance of evidence. Furthermore, the

trial court’s answered the jury question properly.

None of Appellant’s eleven points of error have any merit and should be overruled and the verdict of the trial court upheld.

I. State’s Response to Every Point of Error Appellant’s points of error are inadequately briefed. It is proper for this Court to overrule points of error as inadequately briefed when Appellant neglects

to present proper argument and authorities as required by T . R. A PP . P. 38.1(i),

Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Furthermore,

points of error can be overruled when arguments and authorities are different in

character from the error alleged. Smith v. State , 907 S.W.2d 522, 532 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1995). Appellant, in the case at hand, cites a litany of authorities that are

improper in that the cases are not relevant, the cases do not stand for the stated

rule, the stated rule comes from dicta, or the cited case itself has been overruled or

superseded. Furthermore, Appellant’s brief contains no references to the record

and Appellant has nowhere applied law to facts illustrating reversible error. In each

of Appellant’s points of error, Appellant fails to cite proper or relevant authority.

As such, this Court should consider each point as inadequately briefed and overrule

each one. In the event that the Court concludes Appellant adequately brief one or

more points of error, the State will address them in turn.

Appellant’s points of error are all unconfirmed, unproven, and unsupported claims. Appellant failed to arrange for the production of a record in this case. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(b). Therefore, without direct support in the record, the claims

of error are only unsubstantiated assertions. As such, the claims are not appropriate

appellate argument and should be overruled. See generally, McCrory v. State , 643

S.W.2d 725, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (noting a court “cannot be expected to

decide cases solely on the basis of self-serving claims by the [Appellant]”).

Furthermore, even if the trial court did err in any way, the points of error should be overruled, as the alleged error did not affect Appellant’s substantial

rights. The Court must disregard any non-constitutional error that does not affect

the Appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is

affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict. Schmutz v. State , 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). In assessing the likelihood that the error adversely affected the jury's

decision, an appellate court considers everything in the record. Id . This includes

testimony, physical evidence, jury instructions, the State's theories and any

defensive theories, closing arguments, and voir dire, if applicable. Id ., citing

Bagheri v. State , 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim App. 2003). As Appellant has

not produced a record, there is nothing for the Court to consider. Additionally,

Appellant has not shown how any alleged error would have affected the jury’s

verdict. The alleged points of error would not have swayed the jury’s verdict at all.

Therefore, this Court should overrule each of Appellant’s points of error.

II. Standard of Review The standard of review in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence at trial was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia , 433 U.S.

307 (1979) and followed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Brooks v. State , 323

S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In Jackson , the United States Supreme

Court held that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

conviction, the reviewing court must determine whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson , 403 U.S. at 319. It

appears from Appellant’s brief that the crux of argument stems from the evidence

not being enough to convict her of failing to maintain financial responsibility. Here

since there is no record, the Court is left only to consider the Clerk’s Record and

view it in the light most favorable to the State.

III. The Statutes Applied to Appellant T EX . T RANSP . C ODE sections 601.051 and 601.191 apply directly to Appellant. According to T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.191(a), a person commits an

offense if the person operates a motor vehicle in violation of Section 601.051.

T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.051 sets out that a person may not operate a motor vehicle

in this state unless financial responsibility is established for that vehicle. To further

define these two statutes, T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002(8) defines operator as the

person in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. Additionally, T EX . T RANSP .

C ODE 601.002(10) defines a person as, amongst other things, an individual.

Finally, T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002(5) defines a motor vehicle as, amongst other

things, a self-propelled vehicle designed for use on a highway. Appellant, an

individual, operated a 2000 silver Mazda Protégé on Gattis School Road and A.W.

Grimes Boulevard (CR: 8), both highways under T . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002(4)

in Round Rock, Williamson County, Texas . Appellant could not and has not to this

day provided proof through any of the statutorily proscribed means the she

possessed valid insurance for that vehicle on May 15, 2013. As such, this Court

should uphold the verdict of the trial court.

A commercial activity distinction does not exist in the statute at hand. T . T RANSP . C ODE sections 601.051 and 601.191 are not restricted to operators of

motor vehicles for hire. Taylor v. State , No. 09-07-00493-CR, 2009 Tex. App.

LEXIS 718, at *7 (Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 4, 2009)(not designed for

publication). If the Legislature wanted to restrict sections 601.051 and 601.191 to

commercial motor vehicles, it would have written the term “commercial” into the

statute. Furthermore, the qualifier “commercial” is also absent from the definition

of motor vehicle, thus not limited to just vehicles engaged in commerce and

applicable, in this case, to Appellant. Additionally, Appellant provides no legal or

factual support anywhere in the brief for the claim that sections 601.051 and

601.191 apply only to commercial vehicles. The commercial distinction is an

unsubstantiated assertion made by Appellant. Since the statute applies to Appellant

and Appellant has not shown through case law or references to the record that it

does not, this Court should uphold the trial court’s verdict. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at

393.

IV. The Statutes Did Not Violate Appellant’s Right to Travel The State has an interest in the safety of the public roadways. Driving is a privilege, not a constitutionally protected right. Ex parte Arnold , 916 S.W.2d 640,

642 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d). Requiring financial responsibility as a

condition of operating a motor vehicle on the state’s highways secures redress for

injured highway travelers and is a proper subject of the state’s police power. Riggle

v. State, 778 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1989, no pet.). The exercise

of police power hinges on the public need for safety, health, security, and

protection of the general welfare. Id. One of the many conditions of the driving

privilege in this state is the requirement for established financial responsibility. As

this was a valid exercise of the state’s police power, Appellant’s right to travel was

not violated. Finally, Appellant does not demonstrate how her right to travel was

violated at the trial court level nor how it created reversible error. As such, this

Court should uphold the judgment of the trial court.

V. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction The trial court had proper jurisdiction to conduct the jury trial from which this appeals stems. A complaint invokes the original criminal jurisdiction of a

municipal court. Huynh v. State , 901 S.W.2d 480, 481 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

A complaint is the sole charging instrument in a municipal court. Id. A complaint

is sufficient on its face to invoke the jurisdiction of a municipal court. State v.

Blakenship, 170 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App. – Austin 2005, pet. ref’d).

Furthermore, T EX . C ODE . C RIM . P ROC . 4.08 provides that county courts shall have

appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases of which justice courts and other inferior

courts have original jurisdiction. T . C ODE . C RIM . P ROC . 45.0426(a) allows for

the perfecting of this type of appeal upon the filing of an appeal bond not later than

the tenth day after the date the judgment was entered. Thus, appellate criminal

jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of an appeal bond, not by filing an indictment

or information Schinzing v. State , 234 S.W.3d 208, 210 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).

Finally, an information is not required in the county court at law because the

complaint in the inferior court served as the functional equivalent of an

information in the county court at law. Blevins v. State , 672 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.). In the case at hand, Appellant was issued

citation #225631 titled “complaint/affidavit” on May 15, 2013 (CR: 8). A sworn

complaint that complies with T . C ODE . C RIM . P ROC . 45.019 was signed and

sworn on June 24, 2013 (CR: 10) thereby invoking the original jurisdiction of the

Round Rock Municipal Court. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 22,

2013 (CR: 74-79) exactly ten days after Appellant’s Motion for New Trial was

denied. As such, the trial court had proper jurisdiction over the matter as an

information was not needed at the trial court level. The jurisdiction points of error

should be overruled and the conviction upheld.

VI. Appellant Received Proper Notice Appellant received notice of the charge against her many times throughout the course of the criminal process. Notice was originally given on the citation that was

issued on May 15, 2013 which bears Appellant’s signature (CR: 8). Notice was

again conferred when the statutorily valid complaint was sworn and signed on June

24, 2013 (CR: 10). Additionally, at the municipal court level, there was a pretrial

date on July 15, 2013 (CR: 9) and trial dates on September 10, 2013 (CR: 11) and

October 1, 2013 (CR: 18) where the charge was discussed. One particular

illuminating piece comes in the form of Appellant’s hand written request for

continuance filed on August 29, 2013 (CR: 14). In that request, Appellant states, “I

planned to procure all documents needed for my case. I need time to receive and

review such documents in order to present my defense to the court.”(CR: 14). This

indicates that Appellant was well aware that she would be preparing a defense for

the failure to maintain financial responsibility charge.

Appellant also received notice of the charge against her many times at the trial court level. Notice was given on the case setting notice from February 11, 2014

which bears the Appellant’s signature (CR: 149), on the case setting notice from

April 7, 2014 which bears the Appellant’s signature (CR: 205), and at the pre-trial

hearing date on March 25, 2015 where the prosecutor handed her the entire appeal

packet. Finally, the same sworn complaint that was used in the municipal court

was filed with the County Clerk on October 22, 2013 (CR: 10) long before the trial

date of June 3, 2014. As stated above, no information was required in the county

court at law because the complaint in the justice court served as the functional

equivalent of an information in the county court at law. Blevins , 672 S.W.2d at

829. Finally, Appellant argues that there was no notice so the case is civil. The

case at hand is obviously a criminal offense that was tried in a criminal trial court,

and is now being heard before this Court in a criminal context. A valid complaint

was a proper charging mechanism, as discussed above, and the clerk’s record

shows Appellant’s awareness of the charge against her. Furthermore, Appellant’s

brief does not contain any support in the record that she did not receive notice or

how this alleged lack of notice was error. Finally, this Court should not allow

Appellant to remain willfully ignorant as to the charge against her, then turn

around and claim error, with no support, on appeal. Thus, each notice point error

should be overruled and the trial court’s verdict upheld.

VII. Statute Required the Trial Court Enter a Plea for Appellant Appellant’s refusal to enter a plea had no effect on the trial court nor does Appellant demonstrate how her refusal caused reversible error. T EX . C ODE C RIM .

P ROC . 26.11 states, “the indictment shall be read, and the defendant asked whether

he is guilty or not, as therein charged.” Next, Article 26.12 states that “if [the

defendant] refuses to answer, the plea of not guilty shall [be entered upon the

minutes of the court].” T . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . 26.12. Therefore, not only was it

not error for the trial court to enter a not guilty plea on Appellant’s behalf, it was

statutorily required to do so. See Runningwolf v. State , 317 S.W.3d 829, 833-34

(Tex. App. – Amarillo 2010), aff’d , 360 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012);

Coyle v. State , 775 W.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no pet.). Since the

trial court was obliged to enter a plea for Appellant and since Appellant does not

assert any error, points one and two should be overruled and the trial court verdict

upheld. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at 393.

VIII. Appellant Received a Fair Trial The number of attorneys used and the access to information is immaterial.

Appellant voluntarily waived her right to counsel when she filed her “Special

Appearance and Waiver of Right to Counsel” on January 31, 2014 (CR 124). In

that motion Appellant asserts that she, “is aware of her right to representation and

that she intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waives such right” (CR 127).

Further, Appellant points to T . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . 45.020(b) as limiting the

number of attorneys to one. However, Chapter 45 governs only justice and

municipal courts, not county courts at law. Furthermore, as stated above, Appellant

waived her right to counsel, but she could have sought legal counsel before

announcing ready for trial. Appellant also argues that she was prevented from

using a computer and complains that the prosecutor was allowed computer usage.

Appellant did not demonstrate how she was prevented from using her own

materials or own laptop computer. Furthermore, Appellant again fails to

substantiate these claims or demonstrate how this is error. Accordingly, these

points should be overruled. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at 393.

The State still had to prove the criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury charge submitted to the jury provides, “if you believe beyond a reasonable

doubt…you will find the defendant ‘Guilty’”. It goes on, “If you do not so believe

or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by

your verdict ‘Not Guilty’” (CR: 213). Appellant has not cited any authority,

referenced the record, or shown any other means how the trial court did not hold

the State to the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Appellant’s points

of error should be overruled. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at 393.

Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial judge abused his discretion on the admission of evidence. A trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence under

Texas Rule of Evidence 403 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and

should not be set aside absent a showing on the record that the trial court abused its

discretion by acting in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Montgomery v.

State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). There should be reluctance

on the part of an appellate court to reverse trial court decisions that admit or

exclude evidence. Id . at 378. The fact that a trial judge may decide a matter

within his discretion in a different manner than an appellate judge does not

demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Id . at 380. The reviewing

court should not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the “zone of

reasonable disagreement.” Green v. State , 934 S.W.2d 92,101-102 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997); Montgomery , 810 S.W.2d at 391.

Appellant has not shown through any references to the record that the trial judge

acted in an arbitrary or reasonable manner. Since the trial court did not abuse his

discretion, this Court should uphold the judgment.

The trial court did not prevent Appellant from defending herself as her brief claims. Appellate courts are to “indulge every presumption in favor of the

regularity of the proceedings and documents” in the trial courts. McCloud v. State ,

527 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The Judgment and Sentence

provides that a jury of six was selected, empanelled, and sworn. It also specifies

that the jury heard arguments and received evidence (CR: 225). By extension and

although there is no record, Appellant was afforded an opportunity for voir dire, to

give an opening statement, and the ability to cross-examine State’s witnesses.

Under the presumption of regularity, Appellant received a full and fair trial and the

judgment of the trial court should be upheld.

Finally, the trial court properly answered the jury question (CR218). Without a record, this Court does not know if Appellant objected to the trial court’s answer,

thus preserving any error for appeal. In addition, if the trial court answered the jury

question differently, he would be giving evidence directly to the jury, supporting or

contradicting testimony, or he would be commenting on the weight or sufficiency

of the evidence. Since this Court does not know if error was preserved and the fact

that Appellant did not demonstrate error this point should be overruled.

IX. Conclusion Without a record, this Court does not know what was said, what testimony was elicited, what objections were lodged, and what rulings on objections and evidence

were made. Additionally, this Court does not know what error, if any, Appellant

preserved at the trial court level. As stated above, Appellant’s brief amounts to

nothing more than inadequately briefed, improperly sourced, unsupported self-

serving claims. Appellant chose to operate a motor vehicle in this State without

established financial responsibility freely and voluntarily. There is no evidence in

the record indicating otherwise. As all of Appellant’s eleven points of error have

no merit and should be overruled, the judgment and sentence of the trial court

should be upheld.

PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State prays this Honorable Court affirm the judgment of the trial court and overrule Appellant’s

points of error.

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Ryan Palmquist RYAN PALMQUIST Assistant County Attorney Williamson County, Texas State Bar No. 24073307 405 Martin Luther King, # 7 Georgetown, Texas 78626 PHONE: (512) 943-1111 FAX: (512) 943-1120 *21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of State’s Brief was served upon Gayleen S. Todd, 2116 Juniper Trail Round Rock, Texas 78664, Appellant, by

certified mail, on this the 10 th day of August, 2015

/s/ Ryan Palmquist RYAN PALMQUIST CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this Brief contains a word count of 4,235, and thus complies with the

requisites of T . R. A PP . P. 9.4(i)(2)(C).

/s/ Ryan Palmquist RYAN PALMQUIST

[1] Round Rock Municipal Court is not a court of record.

[2] The clerk’s record has a “transcript” of sorts from the municipal court level. Appellant filed this document. There is no way of confirming the accuracy, veracity or validity of this document. Appellant does not reference this document in her brief.