Case Information
*0 RECEIVED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/1/2015 1:15:52 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk NO. 03-14-000801-CV THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 7/1/2015 1:15:52 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE 03-14-000801-CV AUSTIN, TEXAS *1 ACCEPTED [5899750] CLERK In the Third Court of Appeals Austin, Texas
T HE U NIVERSITY OF T EXAS S YSTEM AND T HE U NIVERSITY OF T EXAS AT D ALLAS
Appellants,
v. K EN P AXTON , A TTORNEY G ENERAL OF THE S TATE OF T EXAS Appellee,
v.
M ARILYN C AMERON
Intervenor/Appellee. On Appeal from the 345 th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-11-001923 The Honorable Stephen Yelenosky, Judge Presiding A PPELLANTS ’ R EPLY B RIEF
KEN PAXTON H. MELISSA MATHER
Attorney General of Texas Assistant Attorney General
State Bar No. 24010216 CHARLES E. ROY Financial Litigation, Tax, and
First Assistant Attorney General Charitable Trusts Division
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 017-6) JAMES E. DAVIS Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Deputy Attorney General for Telephone: (512) 475-2540
Defense Litigation Facsimile: (512) 477-2348
melissa.mather@texasattorneygen- ROBERT O’KEEFE eral.gov
Division Chief Counsel for Appellants, Financial Litigation, Tax, The University of Texas System and and Charitable Trusts Division The University of Texas at Dallas
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED *2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................... II
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... III
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 2
I. T HE A TTORNEY G ENERAL CONCEDES THAT HIS MOTION IS ONE FOR TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT , AND HAS FAILED TO MEET THAT STANDARD HERE . ......................................................................................... 2 II. T HE A TTORNEY G ENERAL ’ S NARROW READING OF I NDUSTRIAL F OUNDATION IS INCONSISTENT WITH RECENT OPINIONS FROM THE T EXAS S UPREME C OURT EXPANDING PRIVACY - RELATED EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE PIA. ...................................................................... 4 III. C ONSIDERATION OF ADDITIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS NOT RAISED OR AVAILABLE BELOW IS PROPER IN THIS CASE . ............................................ 10 PRAYER ............................................................................................................... 13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 15
II *3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases
Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler , 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995) -------------------------------- 2
Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Tex. Newspapers, Inc ., 652 S.W.2d 546
(Tex. App. - Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) -------------------------------------------- 7, 8, 9
Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Acc. Bd. , 540 S.W.2d 668
(Tex. 1976) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- passim
Johnson v. Sawyer , 47 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1995) ----------------------------------------- 8, 10, 11
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2002) ------------------------------ 2
Nexstar Broad., Inc. v. Fidelity Communications Co. , 376 S.W.3d 377, 381
(Tex. App—Dallas 2012, no pet.) ------------------------------------------------------------ 4
Piper v. Dept. of Justice , 374 F. Supp. 2d 73, 78 (D.D.C. 2005) ----------------------------- 13
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P ., 343 S.W.3d 112
(Tex. 2011) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- passim
Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy , 89 S.W.3d 30, 50 (Tex. 2002) -------------------------------- 4
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas ,
354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010) ------------------------------------------------------------ passim
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010) ----------------------------- 13
Tyler v. Paxton , No. 03-12-00747-cv, 2015 WL 410281
(Tex. App. – Austin 2015, no pet.) ------------------------------------------------ 3, 4, 5, 11
S TATUTES
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001 et seq . -------------------------------------------------------- passim
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101 -----------------------------------------------------------7, 9, 10,12
Tex. Gov't Code § 552.102 -------------------------------------------------------------- 8, 9, 10
Tex. Gov't Code § 552.302 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
III
R ULES
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Tex. R. Civ. P. 483 (West 1946, repealed 1986) ---------------------------------------------- 9
L EGISLATIVE
Tex. H.B. 1295, 84th Leg., R.S. --------------------------------------------------------------- 14
IV
NO. 03-14-000801-CV In the Third Court of Appeals Austin, Texas
T HE U NIVERSITY OF T EXAS S YSTEM AND T HE U NIVERSITY OF T EXAS AT D ALLAS
Appellants,
v. K EN P AXTON , A TTORNEY G ENERAL OF THE S TATE OF T EXAS Appellee,
v.
M ARILYN C AMERON
Intervenor/Appellee. On Appeal from the 345 th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-11-001923 The Honorable Stephen Yelenosky, Judge Presiding A PPELLANTS ’ R EPLY B RIEF
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT:
The rules governing summary judgments apply to every litigant in every case.
For the Attorney General to prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment as
a defendant in this case, he would need to negate as a matter of law an element of the
University’s cause of action or establish as a matter of law an affirmative defense.
Because the Attorney General has done neither, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in his favor, and that ruling should be reversed, with the case re-
manded for further proceedings, including a full trial on the merits.
ARGUMENT
I. The Attorney General concedes that his motion is one for traditional sum-
mary judgment, and has failed to meet that standard here. The Attorney General has failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the excep- tions to disclosure raised by the University in its complaint could not be proved at trial,
and therefore the Attorney General cannot prevail on a traditional motion for summary
judgment. In his brief, the Attorney General recites the applicable summary judgment
standard as follows: “A defendant seeking summary judgment must negate, as a matter
of law, at least one element of each of the plaintiff’s theories of recovery, or plead and
prove as a matter of law each element of an affirmative defense.” Appellee Br. 8 (citing
Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler , 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995)).
The Attorney General makes no attempt to justify its motion as brought under the no-evidence standard of Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i), and does not recite or apply that stand-
ard in his brief. See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2002) (“A no
evidence point will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a
vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to
the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital
fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the
opposite of the vital fact.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In fact, the
entire import of the Attorney General’s brief seems to be that no assessment of any
evidence, whether in favor of or opposed to the application of an exception to disclo-
sure, is required to dispose of the University’s case. See Appellee Br. 5 (“Comparing the
information protected in Industrial Foundation to this list of names results in only one
conclusion: the names of participants are not highly intimate or embarrassing private
information under the common-law privacy test.”) (citing Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex.
Indus. Acc. Bd. , 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976)); Appellee Br. 8 (“Matters of statutory con-
struction are generally legal issues.”); Appellee Br.10 (“The Attorney General cannot be
required to produce evidence to show information is not excepted from disclosure by
common-law privacy.”).
Essentially identical arguments were soundly rejected by this Court earlier this year in Tyler v. Paxton , No. 03-12-00747-cv, 2015 WL 410281 (Tex. App. – Austin 2015, no
pet.) (unpublished), also a case brought under the Public Information Act (PIA). Tex.
Gov’t Code § 552.001 et seq . There the Court addressed competing motions for sum-
mary judgment, and found that the District Attorney for Victoria County, the entity
seeking to withhold information, had “failed to address” the relevant legal standard -
i.e., whether the DA had a “compelling reason” to withhold the documents under
Texas Government Code Section 552.302. For that reason, the DA’s motion was de-
nied. Tyler , 2015 WL 410281, at *4 (citing Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy , 89 S.W.3d 30,
50 (Tex. 2002), for the proposition that a party does not meet its summary judgment
burden when it does not “assert or prove facts necessary to establish” a claim). The
Court then went on to address the Attorney General’s motion, and began by noting
that the “DA’s failure to affirmatively demonstrate a compelling reason, however, does
not necessarily establish that the trial court was correct in granting the AG’s motion
for summary judgment.” Tyler , WL 2015 410281, at *4. The court noted that the AG
had argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the DA “cannot demon-
strate a compelling reason,” but the court found that such arguments could not estab-
lish “as a matter of law that the exceptions asserted by the DA cannot be proven [at
trial] to be compelling reasons.” Id. (citing Nexstar Broad., Inc. v. Fidelity Communications
Co. , 376 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. App—Dallas 2012, no pet.)). Accordingly, the court
affirmed the denial of the DA’s motion for summary judgment, and reversed the grant
of summary judgment to the Attorney General, remanding the case for further pro-
ceedings. Tyler , 2015 WL 410281, at *5. Clearly this Court can and does apply the
standard rules of summary judgment to PIA cases, and to whatever extent the Attorney
General attempts to imply otherwise in his brief, he is mistaken. See Appellee's Br. 9
(asserting that the University's analysis "ignores the unique framework of a PIA case").
Here, just as in Tyler , reversal of the order granting summary judgment to the Attorney
General and remand is the proper result.
II. The Attorney General's narrow reading of Industrial Foundation is incon-
sistent with recent opinions from the Texas Supreme Court expanding pri- vacy-related exemptions under the PIA.
The Attorney General asserts that he has met his summary judgment burden be- cause it must be obvious from any reading of Industrial Foundation that disclosing the
identity of human research subjects participating in a social science study of terrorist
decision-making and behavior would not reveal “highly intimate” or “embarrassing”
facts about these individuals. Appellee Br. 5. For all the reasons cited in the University’s
opening brief, however, the Attorney General cannot establish this proposition without
some evidence demonstrating facts relevant to the legal standard announced in Industrial
Foundation . Appellant Br.11-13; Tyler , 2015 WL 410281, at *4 (reversing summary judg-
ment rendered in favor of the Attorney General because simply asserting that the with-
holding agency had not met its burden was not sufficient to establish that the Attorney
General’s was entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
As described in the University’s opening brief, relevant facts include what the dis- closure of the names would reveal, or could reveal, about the particular people whose
information might be disclosed; whether and to what extent reasonable people would
view this disclosure as revealing information that is “highly intimate” or “embarrass-
ing”; and also the extent of the potential consequences from disclosure, both for the
agency and for the particular individuals whose personal information is at stake. Ap-
pellant Br.11-12 (analyzing cases in which these factors were considered).
In Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P ., 343 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court, in response to privacy concerns raised by the Texas Depart-
ment of Public Safety, created an entirely new exception to the disclosure requirements
of the PIA, and remanded the case to the trial court to apply that standard to the infor-
mation at issue, noting that the “dividing line between disclosure and restraint must be
determined by proof.” Id. at 119. In Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General
of Texas , 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010) (“Comptroller v. AG”), the Court found that state
employees have a “nontrivial privacy interest” in their dates of birth, based not on
whether date of birth alone constitutes “highly intimate” or “embarrassing” infor-
mation, but based on a realistic analysis of modern methods of identity theft, the “reality
of technology” and an analysis of similar exemptions enacted by the legislature. Id. at
343-46.
Even in Industrial Foundation itself, the Court announced the legal standard, and then remanded for factual assessment based on that standard. See Indus. Found , 540
S.W.2d at 685-86 (“Since it appears that the trial court has not considered the individual
files which defendants allege are private, and since it clearly appears that some of these
files may contain personal information the publication of which would be highly objec-
tionable to a reasonable person, it follows that the trial court’s summary judgment for
the [plaintiff] was improper. We therefore remand the case to the trial court for its
determination, in light of this opinion, whether any of the information should be with-
held from disclosure because confidential.”).
The Attorney General’s brief makes no attempt to distinguish the reasoning in these cases, or assess their impact on the analysis required for negating, as a matter of
law, an element of the University’s cause of action.
In support of the proposition that Industrial Foundation , on its face, simply fore- closes the idea that the names of human research subjects in a social science experiment
attempting to model the decision-making and behavior of terrorists, could fall within
the exemption of Section 552.101, the Attorney General cites two cases that apply the
Industrial Foundation test, one from a divided panel of this Court, in which the Texas
Supreme Court refused the writ “n.r.e.”, and years later explicitly disavowed the under-
lying reasoning, and one from the 5th Circuit applying Texas law. See Hubert v. Harte-
Hanks Tex. Newspapers, Inc ., 652 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App. - Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.);
Johnson v. Sawyer , 47 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1995). Both of these cases apply Industrial Foun-
dation after a trial on the merits, and do so in the context of discussing the relevant
evidence introduced by the parties. Hubert , 652 S.W.3d at 553-54 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(recounting detailed fact and opinion evidence introduced at a bench trial); id . at 551
(opinion by Shannon, J.) (distinguishing between categories of candidates established
by the evidence, and relying on alternative theories with respect to one of these catego-
ries); Johnson , 47 F.3d at 718-26 (describing testimony introduced at a bench trial).
In Hubert , a divided panel of the Third Court held that the names of candidates for president of Texas A&M University were not exempt from disclosure under Texas
Government Code Section 552.102 - a similar but distinct provision of the PIA. See
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.102 (exempting from disclosure “information in personnel files,
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”). Justice Shannon wrote an opinion for the Court, in which he agreed with the
intervenors/appellees that the “Industrial Foundation test for information deemed con-
fidential by law under [Section 552.101] . . . should apply also to [Section 552.102].”
Hubert , 652 S.W.3d at 550. The opinion notes that the “basic question in determining
whether information should not be disclosed under [Sections 552.101 and 552.102] is
whether publication of the information would constitute an invasion of an individual’s
privacy,” and that employing a separate balancing test under Section 552.102, as urged
by the university, would “impart unnecessary complexity into judicial interpretation of
the statute.” Hubert , 652 S.W.3d at 550. Justice Phillips concurred in the judgment, and
agreed with Justice Shannon’s rejection of a balancing test, but wrote separately to em-
phasize that in interpreting Section 552.102, “we are not limited to a common law tort
recognized by judicial decision only,” a clear reference to Justice Shannon’s reliance on
Industrial Foundation . Hubert , 652 S.W.3d at 552 (Phillips, J., concurring). Justice Powers
dissented, arguing that a balancing test was appropriate, and that even whether or not
one was applied, it was plain that the evidence produced by the University at trial, in-
cluding fact and expert witnesses, established that disclosure would constitute an inva-
sion of privacy tort. Id . at 560-61. The Texas Supreme Court, operating under the
now-defunct writ system, refused the writ “n.r.e.”, meaning that the Court “was not
satisfied that the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in all respects has correctly
declared the law, but is of the opinion that the application presents no error which
requires reversal.". Tex. R. Civ. P. 483 (West 1946, repealed 1986). Many years later,
in Comptroller v. AG , the Texas Supreme Court explicitly disavowed the core reasoning
of the opinion - that the test for assessing privacy interests must be the same under
Section 552.101 and Section 552.102. Comptroller v. AG , 354 S.W.3d at 342 (citing Justice
Powers’ dissent on the differences between Section 552.101 and Section 552.102 and
stating clearly: “We agree with Justice Powers.”). To the extent that the Attorney Gen-
eral wishes to rely here on the reasoning applied by the court in Hubert, that reasoning
has been disavowed by the Texas Supreme Court on two separate occasions, and does
not constitute either binding or persuasive authority on the correct application of In-
dustrial Foundation.
In Johnson , the Fifth Circuit interpreted Industrial Foundation as a recognition, as a matter of Texas common law, of the tort of public disclosure of private facts, as well as
a description of the elements of that tort, as recognized under Texas common law.
Johnson , 47 F.3d at 731. In applying these elements to the facts adduced at trial, the
court stated that there was “no evidence whatsoever that [the plaintiff’s] middle initial,
his age, his title at [the company where he worked] and his home address, or any of
these, were actually secret or concealed, or were regarded by him, or would be regarded
by the average person, as private or embarrassing or intimate.” Id . at 733 (emphasis
added). In fact, as the court went on to describe, there was evidence in the record that
indicated that such information was public and not concealed. Id . at 733-34. The court
further noted that “[o]f course, the publication of non-private information - e.g., a per-
son’s name or other identifying public facts about him - can invade the subject’s privacy
where it publicly ties that individual to some private occurrence that is intimate or em-
barrassing.” Id . at 734 (emphasis in original). The example given in the opinion is the
disclosure of the name of a person having a secret extramarital affair, but the private
information could just as easily be participation in a study where confidentiality was
assured to the subjects in writing in advance. Id .; (informed consent notice provided to
study participants, including the assurance that “[a]ll the information participants pro-
vide to investigators as part of this research will be protected and held in confidence
within the limits of law and institutional regulation . . . [w]e will not share any personal
contact information”).
In short, these cases simply do not support the idea that courts can or should assess privacy interests based simply on a comparison of the information at issue to the
type of information that was found to be confidential in Industrial Foundation . Instead,
these cases, like Cox , Comptroller v. AG , and Industrial Foundation itself, accept that Indus-
trial Foundation announces a legal standard, not an exclusive list, and that such a standard
needs to be applied based on particular facts that are often assessed after a trial on the
merits. Simply asking whether disclosing the names of participants in a research study
seems to be as bad as disclosing information about medical problems or a sexual assault
is not sufficient to resolve the question as a matter of law. See Tyler , 2015 WL 410281,
at *4 (summary judgment is properly denied when the movant does not “assert or prove
facts necessary to establish” a claim).
III. Consideration of additional legal arguments not raised or available below is
proper in this case.
The University is entitled to reversal in this case because the trial court erred in granting the Attorney General’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant Br. 11-13.
In the alternative, the University has requested that this Court remand the case for the
separate reason that the trial court erred in applying an incorrect legal standard to eval-
uate the exemption codified at Texas Government Code Section 552.101. Appellant Br.
13-18. Specifically, the standard applied by the trial court was unnecessarily truncated
by focusing solely on Industrial Foundation , failing to take into account the University’s
First Amendment interest in academic freedom, and the public’s interest in having pub-
lic institutions conduct sound scientific research. Appellant Br. 13-18.
The University’s arguments in this regard were not raised before the trial court, but nevertheless should be considered here in light of the individual privacy interests at
stake in this litigation. See Comptroller v. AG , 354 S.W.3d at 341. The Texas Supreme
Court permitted just such leniency in Comptroller v. AG , a case in which the Court ruled
in favor of the Comptroller on grounds that she had expressly abandoned at oral argu-
ment. Id . at 340. In that case, the Court stressed that when the privacy rights of indi-
viduals are at stake, but those individuals are not parties to the litigation, “the im-
portance of protecting third parties’ interests makes judicial intervention proper,” even
when a state agency no longer presses a particular argument. Id. at 341. In conducting
this analysis, the Court cited favorably to several federal cases decided under an analo-
gous provision of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Id . (quoting fa-
vorably Piper v. Dept. of Justice , 374 F. Supp. 2d 73, 78 (D.D.C. 2005): “[I]n certain FOIA
cases where the judgment will impinge on rights of third parties that are expressly pro-
tected by FOIA, such as privacy or safety, district courts not only have the discretion,
but sometimes the obligation to consider newly presented facts and to grant [post-judg-
ment relief]”).
Here, as in Comptroller v. AG , this Court can and should analyze all possible bases for remanding this case to the trial court, including those that may have merit, but were
not raised below. See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010)
(trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo).
Recent legislation also supports the University’s position, and acts of the legisla- ture during the pendency of a case may be considered by the court. See Cox , 343 S.W.3d
at 116 (considering the text of a statute establishing an explicit PIA exemption for travel
vouchers of high-level state officials enacted five days after the Court of Appeals issued
its decision ordering disclosure of that information).
Specifically, Section 2 of House Bill 1295, which was signed into law on June 19, 2015, with an effective date of September 1, 2015, amends Chapter 51 of the Texas
Education Code to add Section 51.955, which generally provides that a state agency
cannot enter into a research contract with an educational institution if the terms of the
contract would preclude public disclosure of the final data generated from the research..
Subsection (e) of this new section also provides that “[t]his section does not require the
public disclosure of personal identifying information or any other information the dis-
closure of which is otherwise prohibited by law.” Tex. H.B. 1295, 84th Leg., R.S.
(2015).
While perhaps not directly applicable to this situation, the statute indicates that the Legislature recognizes and appreciates that the disclosure of personal identifying
information associated with publicly funded research is problematic and should be re-
stricted—so much so that even within legislation intended to expand disclosure require-
ments under the PIA, the legislature felt it necessary to expressly recognize and protect
personal identifying information in research from public disclosure. As in Cox , this
understanding is useful in shaping the Court’s view of how to interpret relevant exemp-
tions under the PIA. See Cox , 343 S.W.3d at 116 (“The Legislature has recognized the
importance of protecting physical safety, notwithstanding the mandate that courts con-
strue the PIA in favor of disclosure. . . . Several PIA exceptions are grounded in a
concern for physical safety, and the Legislature’s swift passage of an exception for in-
formation that would pose a ‘substantial threat of physical harm’ confirms the primacy
of this interest.”)
Taking a broader view of the law in this area is favored by the Texas Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on privacy protections and the PIA in Cox and Comp-
troller v. AG , and a faithful application of these cases should result in a remand of this
case for a trial on the merits that will take into account all relevant legal interests.
PRAYER The University asks that the Court reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Attorney General, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Dated: July 1, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas CHARLES E. ROY
First Assistant Attorney General JAMES E. DAVIS
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation ROBERT O’KEEFE
Division Chief
Financial Litigation, Tax, and Charitable Trusts Division
/s/ H. Melissa Mather H. MELISSA MATHER Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 24010216
Financial Litigation, Tax, and Charitable Trusts Division P.O. Box 12548/Mail Code 017-11 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone: (512) 475-4298 Facsimile: (512) 478-4013 melissa.mather@texasattorneygeneral.gov Counsel for Appellants, The University of Texas System and The University of Texas at Dallas *19 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2), this brief con- tains 3359 words, excluding the portions of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ H. Melissa Mather H. MELISSA MATHER CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on July 1, 2015, a true and correct copy of the Appellants’ Reply Brief was served via e-service and/or e-mail to the following:
Kimberly L. Fuchs
Chief, Open Records Litigation
A DMINISTRATIVE L AW D IVISION
P.O. Box 12548, Capital Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
kimberly.fuchs@texasattorneygeneral.gov
Attorney for Appellee, Attorney General
Marilyn Cameron
18222 Outback Lakes Trail
Humble, Texas 77346
mizcameron@yahoo.com
Intervenor/Appellee/Pro se
/s/ H. Melissa Mather H. MELISSA MATHER