Case Information
*0 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/15/2015 2:18:56 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk NO. 03-14-00129-CV THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 6/15/2015 2:18:56 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE AUSTIN, TEXAS 03-14-00129-CV *1 ACCEPTED [5678335] CLERK IN THE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS C ITY OF N EW B RAUNFELS , G ALE P OSPISIL , R OBERT C AMERENO , T OM W ILBER
AND M ARY Q UINONES , Appellants v.
G ARRISON M AURER D / B / A C OMAL T OWING , J ERAMIE H ERNANDEZ D / B / A JJ
T OWING , AND R OBERT F LEMING D / B / A P RO C ARE W RECKER S ERVICE ,
Appellees O N PPEAL FROM THE 433 RD J UDICIAL D ISTRICT C OURT , C OMAL C OUNTY , T EXAS
H ONORABLE D IB W ALDRIP , P RESIDING C AUSE N O C2013-0517D APPELLEES’ RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS ENTIRE CASE AS MOOT TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellees respectfully present this response to appellants’ motion to
dismiss. Appellees want it made clear to the Court that they are not opposed
to appellants’ request that their appeal be dismissed. Appellees, however,
assert that appellants are not entitled to all of the relief requested in their
motion. Specifically, appellants are not entitled to a judgment [1] from this
Court dismissing all of appellees’ claims with prejudice.
I.
This interlocutory appeal was initiated by appellants after the trial
court denied appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction. CR 520. Because the plea
was denied, appellees could proceed to trial on their various claims against
appellants, which include ultra vires claims and violations of the Texas
Open Meetings Act. See CR 119-29.
II.
“While an appeal from an interlocutory order is pending, the trial
court retains jurisdiction of the case . . . .” T EX . R. A PP . P. 29.5. Although
further proceedings were stayed in the trial court during the pendency of
this appeal, see T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE § 54.014(b), jurisdiction over
the entire case, which included claims against other defendants that are not
parties to this appeal, [2] remains vested in the trial court. See T EX R. PP . P.
29.5.
III.
The Court does not have the authority to dismiss all of appellants’
claims with prejudice given the procedural posture of this appeal. Instead,
*3 there are two options: “dismiss the appeal or affirm the appealed judgment
or order.” T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.3. As is explained above, appellees are not
opposed to a dismissal of appellants’ appeal. But there is simply no basis for
appellants to request that this Court enter a judgment dismissing appellees’
claims with prejudice. Any resulting “final judgment” must be issued from
the trial court as it is the court with continuing jurisdiction over appellees’
claims. See T EX R. PP . P. 29.5.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, appellees respectfully
request that this Court deny the appellants’ Motion to Dismiss Entire Case as
Moot to the extent that appellants request that the Court dismiss all of
appellees’ claims with prejudice. Appellees also request that the Court grant
them such other and further relief to which they may be justly and equitably
entitled.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III State Bar No. 24041135 HOUSTON DUNN, PLLC 4040 Broadway, Suite 440 San Antonio, Texas 78209 (210) 775-0882 (210) 826-0075 (fax) Email: sam@hdappeals.com DANIEL P. MCCARTHY State Bar No. 13367100 MCCARTHY LAW FIRM, P.C. 10001 Reunion Place, Suite 640 San Antonio, Texas 78216 (210) 572-7888 (210) 979-8734 (fax) Email: dan@mccarthy-law.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
has been served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
on the 15 th day of June, 2015, to the following:
Ryan Henry via email/eservice
Law Offices of Ryan Henry, PLLC
1380 Pantheon Way, Suite 215
San Antonio, Texas 78232
ryan.henry@rshlawfirm.com
/s/ Samuel V. Houston, III SAMUEL V. HOUSTON, III
[1] Appellants did not specifically request a judgment from the Court dismissing appellees’ claims with prejudice, but a final judgment would have to be entered to effectuate the relief requested by appellants.
[2] Appellees also sued other towing companies for tortious interference with prospective business relations, business disparagement, and defamation. CR 130-32.