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Marcus Brent Patterson, Individually, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Diane Patterson, and as Next Friend of Daniel Patterson and Danae Patterson, and Danae Patterson and Daniel Patterson (Now 18 Years of Age) v. Brewer Leasing, Inc.
01-14-00013-CV
Tex. App.
Jul 27, 2015
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Case Information

*0 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/27/2015 11:31:09 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 01-14-00013-CV FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/27/2015 11:31:09 AM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK NO. 01-14-00013-CV In the Court of Appeals for the First Supreme Judicial District of Texas at Houston, Texas Marcus B. Patterson, individually, as Independent Administrator

of the estate of Diane Patterson, and as next friend of Daniel Patterson and Danae Patterson, and Danae Patterson and Daniel Patterson (now 18 years old),

Appellants v.

Brewer Leasing, Inc., Appellee On appeal from the 334 th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas The Honorable Judge Ken Wise presiding RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR REHEARING State Bar No. 12517300

2000 East 42 nd Street, Suite C-110

Odessa, Texas 79762

432-614-1500 Telephone

361-587-7705 Facsimile

george.long.mexico@gmail.com

*2 Response to Motion for Rehearing

Winning is the goal of every attorney; winning within the rules should

also be every attorney’s goal. Texas Disciplinary Rules 3.01 and 3.03,

together with the Texas Lawyer’s Creed and the Standards for Appellate

Conduct, prescribe boundaries within which an ethical lawyer’s conduct must

conform.

I cannot defend this appeal without a valid basis. At this point there is

no valid basis upon which a defense can be based. No one has, or can,

challenge the jury finding of 100% negligence by Charles Hitchens.

The evidence conclusively establishes Brewer Leasing’s ownership of

the trailer, a fact no one has ever denied. I see no way for Brewer Leasing

to escape liability for Hitchens’ negligent operation of the trailer.

This Court’s opinion absolves Brewer Leasing of liability for Hitchens’

negligent operation of the power unit. Decades of experience in trucking

force me to admit that Brewer Leasing cannot use a claim of an oral lease to

shift liability onto its parent company. Virtually every trial level litigation case

I currently prosecute (all of which relate to trucking), involve the state and

federal requirement that commercial vehicle leases be in writing, a main

purpose of which requirement is to clearly define liability between motor

carriers working under contract or lease. The west Texas oil patch is rife with

motor carriers who seek to avoid payment and other liabilities due their

lessors by failing to enter written leases in order that they ‘re-write’ their lease

at trial.

The last thing I wish to see for the benefit of my clients and my practice

is a Texas appellate court deciding a liability case between motor carriers

based on and alleged oral contract. Such an appellate decision will

encourage and in part enable all non-paying motor carriers who lease trucks

from other motor carriers to allege oral contracts knowing that they will be

considered to assess liability, whether for payment between lessor and

lessee or payment to third party claimants. It will declare ‘open season’ on

small, unsophisticated owner-operator motor carriers by larger motor carriers

who seek, from the beginning, to exploit them financially.

Why would the insurance carrier for Brewer Leasing tender policy limits

in this case prior to trial if they thought that they had a valid defense by virtue

of an oral contract absolving Brewer Leasing of any liability? Even they knew

that such a defense was legally improper, as do I.

I wish I could agree with the opinion on that point, but my “concurrent

duties to the legal system and the public good”, and to the overwhelming

majority of the clients in my practice, require me to “avoid the infliction of

harm on the appellate process, the courts, and the law”. I am required to

fairly and accurately characterize and apply the law, including reporting legal

authority adverse to my position. The court’s opinion on this point is wrong;

the essence of trucking law from 1956 until today is to prohibit motor carriers

(or non-motor carriers operating without legal authority) to evade

responsibility based on oral claims that seek to shift responsibility for the

vehicles they own or operate to others .

Mr. Brewer and Mr. Box’s testimony, if viewed in their favor, might

create doubt on this issue were it a legal defense, but it is not a proper legal

defense.

I have owned and managed registered motor carriers in Texas intra-

and interstate commerce and in the Republic of Mexico continuously for the

past twenty years. I owe it to the trucking industry and to this court to see

that the law is correctly stated. No doubt the court believes that it has

reached a ‘logical’ decision on this point, but as Justice Oliver Wendell

Holmes, Jr. reminded us, ‘the life of the law has not been logic, it has been

experience’. The current state of the law that shuns accepting oral

agreements to place or avoid liability for motor carriers stem from the wealth

of experience acquired prior to 1956. I fear the court is looking narrowly and

logically at this point and is not considering the huge body of regulatory and

statutory law which derived from trucking experience, all of which demand

that liability remain with the vehicle owner unless shifted, in writing, to

another. The vehicle owner was Brewer Leasing. Brewer Leasing is liable. Respectfully Submitted: ________________________ Attorney for Appeallent State Bar No. 12517300 2000 E. 42 nd Street, Suite C-110 Odessa, Texas 79762 432-614-1500 *5 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the typeface and length requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 because:

(1) This brief complies with typeface and the type style requirements

of Rule 9.4(e) because the brief has been prepared in a conventional typeface using MSWord with Arial 14-point font.

(2) This brief complies with the length requirements of Rule

9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 718 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). _______________________ George W. Long Attorney for Appellee *6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure a true and correct copy of the above and

foregoing Brief of Appellee has been sent to all parties and/or counsel

of record listed below by fax on July 25, 2015.

Harry Herzog

Hherzog@hcmlegal.com

David A. Carp

Dcarp@hcmlegal.com

Herzog & Carp

P.O. Box 218845

Houston, Texas 77218-8845

713-781-7500 Telephone

713-781-4797 Facsimile

Dorothea A Dotty @ L. Vidal

Dvidal@gpd.com

Geary, Porter & Donovan, P.C.

One Bent Tree Tower

16475 Dallas Parkway, Suite 400 Addison, Texas 75001-6837

972-349-2211 Telephone

972-931-9901 Facsimile

___________________________

Case Details

Case Name: Marcus Brent Patterson, Individually, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Diane Patterson, and as Next Friend of Daniel Patterson and Danae Patterson, and Danae Patterson and Daniel Patterson (Now 18 Years of Age) v. Brewer Leasing, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jul 27, 2015
Docket Number: 01-14-00013-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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