Case Information
*0 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/10/2015 8:11:30 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk NO. 03-14-00547-CR THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 4/10/2015 8:11:30 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE 03-14-00547-CR AUSTIN, TEXAS *1 ACCEPTED [4853437] CLERK IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN __________________________________________________________________
NO. CR-12-0005 IN THE 428TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS __________________________________________________________________
STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT V.
BRYAN ROLAND CHANDLER, APPELLEE __________________________________________________________________
APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE’S APPEAL
__________________________________________________________________
LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ ATTORNEY AT LAW 1103 NUECES AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701 TELEPHONE: 512-477-7991 FACSIMILE 512-477-3580 EMAIL: LJIR@AOL.COM SBN: 10382944 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE *2 TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW, Bryan Roland Chandler, Appellee, by and through his
attorney of record, Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez, and files this his Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal and in support thereof, would show the Court the
following:
I.
That the above-styled and numbered cause is styled The State of
Texas v. Bryan Roland Chandler, Cause Number CR-12-0005 in the 428th
Judicial District Court of Hays County, Texas. Appellant was sentenced on
February 23, 2012. The trial court entered a judgment nunc pro tunc on
August 7, 2014.
II.
Appellee was convicted of one count of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (family violence) after entering into a plea bargain with the
State. The parties agreed that appellant’s punishment would be assessed at
ten years imprisonment and there would be no affirmative finding of a
deadly weapon. (C.R. 6-13) Despite this agreement, the original written
judgment in the case contained an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.
(C.R. 14-16) A judgment nunc pro tunc signed and entered by the trial court
on March 23, 2012 corrected appellee’s backtime credit but still erroneously
contained an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon. (C.R. 18-19).
III.
On April 17, 2014, Appellee filed a motion for a judgment nunc pro
tunc asking the trial court to correct the deadly weapon finding. (C.R. 20-
35) On August 7, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the matter and after
hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the record in the cause,
granted appellee’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc . (R.R. I) On August
7, 2014, the assistant criminal district attorney filed written notice of appeal.
(C.R. 38-39) On October 2, 2014, the elected criminal district attorney filed
an affidavit saying that she had authorized the assistant criminal district
attorney to file the appeal in this cause. (C.R. 48) The Nunc Pro Tunc
Judgment of Conviction by Court – Waiver of Jury Trial was signed and
filed in this case on October 2, 2014. (C.R. 49-50)
IV.
THE STATE’S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE
NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY SIGNED OR
AUTHORIZED BY THE ELECTED CRIMINAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY.
The Law and the Argument The appellee filed a Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc on April 17,
2014. (C.R. 20-35) The trial court held the hearing on Appellee’s motion
on August 7, 2014. (R.R. I, pp. 4-9) At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court granted appellee’s motion and ordered that the judgment in the
case be corrected by deleting the affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.
(R.R. I, pp. 8-9) The State filed written notice of appeal on August 7, 2014.
This notice of appeal was not signed by the elected criminal district attorney
Sherri K. Tibbe; rather it was signed by assistant district attorney Brian
Erskine. (C.R. 38-39) On October 2, 2014, the State filed an affidavit
signed by Sherri K. Tibbe, the elected criminal district attorney for Hays
County. In her affidavit she stated that on August 7, 2014, she had
authorized Brian Erskine to file an appeal in this cause. (C.R. 48) On
October 2, 2014, the Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment of Conviction by Court –
Waiver of Jury Trial was filed in this case. (C.R. 49-50)
In Muller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992), the Court of
Criminal Appeals looked at the requirements for a State’s notice of appeal.
The Court of Criminal Appeals wrote:
“ . . . Article 44.01 contains two checks on the discretion of a
prosecuting attorney's office. The first check is the requirement
of approval from the prosecuting attorney. Requiring personal
approval creates a bottleneck in the office of the prosecuting
attorney through which all appeals must pass. An assistant does
not have the discretion or personal authority to file a notice of
appeal absent explicit instruction to do so by the prosecuting
attorney. 829 S.W.2d at 810.
The Court went on to write:
“We must next interpret the term "make an appeal," as used in
section (d) of Article 44.01. When considered in light of section
(i)'s express exclusion of assistant prosecutors from its
definition of "prosecuting attorney," it is clear that the phrase
"make an appeal" clearly requires--at the minimum--the
prosecuting attorney to personally supervise and authorize the
appeals to be undertaken by his office on behalf of the State.
That is, the statute, when construed as an internally consistent
and integrated whole, seeks to ensure that the prosecuting
attorney himself personally authorize specific appeals filed on
behalf of the State.
We do not suggest that Article 44.01 necessarily requires that a
State's notice of appeal must, in all cases, reflect the personal
signature of the prosecuting attorney. However, the plain
meaning of the literal text of Article 44.01(d) requires the
prosecuting attorney to "make an appeal" by personally
authorizing--in some fashion--the specific notice of appeal in
question. More specifically, to comply with the statute, he must
either physically sign the notice of appeal or personally instruct
and authorize a subordinate to sign the specific notice of appeal
in question. Because of the jurisdictional limitations of Article
44.01, discussed infra, we further read the statute to require this
personal authorization to occur prior to the expiration of the
fifteen day [1] window of appeal .” 829 S.W.2d at 810.
Thus, if the notice of appeal is signed by an assistant prosecuting attorney,
the State must file something within twenty days of the issuance of the
order, showing that the elected prosecuting attorney authorized the filing of
the notice of appeal.
In this case, the State’s notice of appeal was defective and was not
timely corrected. As noted above, the elected prosecuting attorney--not an
*6 assistant--must personally supervise and authorize appeals pursuant to article
44.01. State v. Muller, supra. To comply with the statute, the elected
prosecuting attorney must either physically sign the notice of appeal or
personally instruct and authorize a subordinate to do so and evidence of that
authority must be filed within the twenty day period in order to perfect the
appeal. Id . The notice of appeal in this cause was signed by the assistant
criminal district attorney. (C.R. 38-39) The affidavit which was signed by
the elected criminal district attorney and filed later on October 2, 2014, was
not timely. This defect could not be cured by the untimely filed affidavit.
State v. Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408, 412-414 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000) . As a result,
the State did not properly file its notice of appeal and this appeal must be
dismissed. State v. Lagunas, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2568 (Tex.App.-Austin
2002, no pet.).
V.
THE STATE’S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE UNDER
ART. 44.01, V.A.C.C.P, THE STATE HAS NO RIGHT TO APPEAL
FROM A JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC.
Art. 44.01, V.A.C.C.P. gives the State a limited right to appeal an
order of a court in a criminal case. The State may appeal from an order
that:
(1) dismisses an indictment, information, or complaint or any
portion of an indictment, information, or complaint;
(2) arrests or modifies a judgment;
(3) grants a new trial;
(4) sustains a claim of former jeopardy;
(5) grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an
admission, if jeopardy has not attached in the case and if the
prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is
not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence,
confession, or admission is of substantial importance in the
case; or
(6) is issued under Chapter 64.
The order which the State seeks to appeal is an order granting a motion for a
judgment nunc pro tunc . This order was made to correct a clerical error --
the court’s judgment incorrectly contained an affirmative finding of a deadly
weapon. Such an order is not one of those listed in Art. 44.01 and thus
does constitute the type of order the State can appeal.
Although in its notice of appeal, the State asserted that it was
appealing “an order that modifies the judgment” a reading of the record,
shows that this is not true. The court’s order approving the entry of a
judgment nunc pro tunc did not modify the judgment but rather conformed
the final judgment paperwork to the events which occurred in the courtroom.
During appellant’s plea hearing, there was no discussion of an affirmative
finding of a deadly weapon by the parties and the trial court made no
affirmative finding of a deadly weapon. Thus the original judgment was in
error when it contained an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon. The
judge’s order approving the judgment nunc pro tunc which omitted the
affirmative finding of a deadly weapon in no way modified the court’s
judgment but rather accurately reflected it. This action did not come within
one of those situations from which the State is given the right to appeal.
The State’s appeal should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellee respectfully
requests that this Honorable Court dismiss the State’s appeal in this cause.
Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ Attorney at Law 1103 Nueces Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 477-7991 FAX #: (512) 477-3580 SBN: 10382944 EMAIL: ljir@aol.com ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE *9 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that this motion was computer generated and contains
1707 words, as calculated by the word count function on my computer.
/s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez, hereby certify that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss the State’s Appeal was
e-served to Brian Erskine of the Hays County District Attorney's Office on
this the 10th day of April, 2015.
/s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ
[1] At the time Art. 44.01, V.A.C.C.P. provided that the State had to file notice of appeal within 15 days of the order it sought to appeal. That time limit is now 20 days. Art. 44.01(d).
[5]