Case Information
*0 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/13/2015 2:02:40 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 4/13/2015 2:02:40 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE 03-14-00789-CR AUSTIN, TEXAS *1 ACCEPTED [4864180] CLERK AT AUSTIN, TEXAS GEORGE HENRY WALKER, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00789-CR
Appellant § TRIAL COURT NO. B 13-0883-SB §
§ CAUSE NO. 03-14-00790-CR V. § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0650-SA
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00791-CR
Appellee § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0994-SB BRIEF OF APPELLANT Appealed from the 119 th Judicial District Court, Tom Green County Texas
Hon. Ben Woodward, presiding COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Phone: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: ecopeland63@yahoo.com Erika Copeland State Bar No. 16075250 Attorney for Appellant APPELLANT HEREBY WAIVES ORAL ARGUMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Contents i,ii
Index of Authorities iii-iv
Identity of Parties and Counsel 1
Statement of Facts/Background 3
Summary of the Argument 6
Professional Evaluation of the Record 6
Conclusion 16
Notice to Client 16
Compliance with Kelly v. State 17
Prayer 17
Certificate of Service and Compliance with Rule 9 18
i *3 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Authorities Page
United States Supreme Court cases Anders v. California 7,15
386 U.S. 738 (1967)
McCoy v. Court of Appeals 15
486 U.S. 429, 108 S.C. 1895, 100 L.Ed.2d 4440 (1988) Padilla v. Kennedy
130 S. Ct. 1477 (U.S. 2010)
Strickland v. Washington 10
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases Ganious v. State 7
436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)
Hernandez v. State 8
988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) Jackson v. State 10
877 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
Jackson v. State 11
973 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) Jackson v. State 15
680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
Keller v. State 12
125 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2003),
pet. dism’d , improvidently granted, 146 S.W.3d 677
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ( per curiam)
ii *4 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, continued Authorities Page
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases, continued Kelly v. State 16
436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
Menefee v. State 13
287 S.W.3d 9, 13-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) Nunez v. State 15
565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
Stafford v. State 15,16
813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
Texas Court of Appeal cases Bradfield v. State 15
42 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d ) Burruss v. State 11
20 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d ) Coronado v. State 15
996 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App. – Waco 2000, pet. ref’d ) Kanouse v. State 15
958 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 1996, no pet .) Keller v. State 12,13
125 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2003) iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, continued Authorities Page
Statutes
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 (West 2014) 12,13
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02 (West 2014) 9
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (West 2014) 7,8
TEXAS PENAL CODE sections 38.04(b)(2)(A) and 38.10(f) 7
(West 2014)
TEXAS HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §481.115(c) 8
(West 2014)
vi *6 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS GEORGE HENRY WALKER, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00789-CR
Appellant § TRIAL COURT NO. B 13-0883-SB §
§ CAUSE NO. 03-14-00790-CR V. § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0650-SA
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00791-CR
Appellee § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0994-SB BRIEF OF APPELLANT TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL COMES NOW George Henry Walker, appellant, who would show the Court that interested parties herein are as follows:
GEORGE HENRY WALKER , appellant, TDCJ No. 01967140, J. Middleton Transfer Facility, 13055 FM 33522, Abilene, Texas 79601.
JOHN SUTTON , trial attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 871, San Angelo, Texas 76902.
ERIKA COPELAND , appellate attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613.
BRYAN CLAYTON and GEORGE MCCREA , Tom Green County Assistant District Attorney and District Attorney, trial and appellate attorneys,
respectively, for appellee, the State of Texas, Court Street Annex, 124 W.
Beauregard, San Angelo, Texas 76903.
STATEMENT OF FACTS/BACKGROUND Offenses Alleged
On November 3, 2014, George Henry Walker appeared before the trial court for a consolidated plea hearing for the three offenses the subject of this brief:
● CA No. 03-14-00789-CR (Trial No. B 13-0883-SB) - evading arrest/detention with vehicle, a third degree felony enhanced; ● CA No. 03-14-00790-CR (Trial No. B-14-0650-SA - failure to appear, a third degree felony enhanced; and ● CA No. 03-14-00791-CR (Trial No. B 14-0994-SB) – possession of cocaine, more than one but less than four grams, a third degree felony enhanced.
Walker entered open pleas of “guilty” to all three offenses. (R.R. 2, p. 10).
He also pleaded “true” to two enhancement paragraphs alleged in each indictment.
(R.R. 2, pp. 10-11). The trial court accepted his various pleas on each case and
moved to hear punishment evidence.
Testimony
Deanna Garcia, the state’s fingerprint expert, testified without objection.
She proved up the fingerprints on pen pockets containing Walker’s previous
convictions, thus proving the enhancement provisions of Walker’s indictments.
(R.R. 2, pp. 22-23).
Kelly Reeves, a San Angelo police officer, testified that she was advised to be on the look-out for a wanted fugitive on August 13, 2013. She subsequently
located the described car being driven by Walker in her patrol area. (R.R. 2, p.
26). When Walker failed to signal his intent to turn prior to stopping at a stop sign,
she activated her overhead emergency lights to detain Walker, the driver. Instead
of stopping, Walker attempted to elude, running at least six stop signs before he
eventually bailed from the vehicle and ran away. (R.R. 2, pp. 28-29).
Craig Thomason, an officer with San Angelo’s special operations section of the Police Department, testified that he eventually located Walker after he ran from
Officer Reeves and arrested him. (R.R. 2, pp. 34-36).
Kelly Lajoie, a detective with the San Angelo Police Department, testified that he also responded to Officer Reeves’ radio dispatches during her pursuit of
Walker. After his eventual arrest, Walker told Lajoie that he ran from Reeves
because he knew he had an outstanding arrest warrant. Walker also admitted to
Lajoie that he possessed marijuana when he was finally caught. (R.R. 2, p. 39).
David Baker, Deputy City Marshall in San Angelo, testified that on September 14, 2014, he had searched for Walker pursuant to an outstanding
fugitive warrant. Baker said that he ultimately located Walker at the home of
Walker’s aunt. When he arrested him, Walker was in possession of both marijuana
and crack cocaine. (R.R. 1, pp. 42-43). The cocaine possession resulted in one of
the cases here under review.
George Walker testified that he had had a troubled childhood, that both his parents used illegal narcotics, and that he began using at a very young age. (R.R.
1, pp. 49-50). In fact, his testimony details his use of narcotics off and on until his
most recent arrest. Walker described his participation in prison drug treatment
programs in the past as largely ineffective in deterring his drug use when he was
released from prison. (R.R. 1, pp. 53-54, 55-56). He specifically asked the trial
court to “help [him] change” by deferring a finding of guilt in the charged offenses
and requiring his attendance at a substance abuse punishment facility (SAFPF) as a
condition of community supervision. (R.R. 2, p. 64). He testified that he wanted
to see his children grow and to “be there” for his kids, that he needed the help
offered by SAFPF to be a better, productive citizen. (R.R. 2, p. 65).
On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Walker about his prior convictions and current criminal charges including two assault/family violence
convictions, one of which resulted in a two year prison term; a possession of
cocaine charge arising from his arrest in September of 2014; his failure to appear
to answer the charges resulting from that arrest; home burglaries in Brazos and
Tom Green Counties, the latter of which had resulted in a stint in the penitentiary;
a theft which resulted in a State Jail conviction and a 540 day sentence in a State
Jail facility; a county charge which had resulted in a 45 day jail sentence, and,
finally, another evading conviction from 2005.
Trial Court Findings and Punishment Assessed
After hearing evidence and argument of counsel in a consolidated hearing, and after reviewing a pre-sentence investigative report, the trial court found
Walker guilty as charged in all three cases. The trial court also found allegations
of prior convictions for enhancement purposes to be true. In each case, the trial
court assessed punishment at 45 years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice with the sentences to be served
concurrently. (R.R. 2, pp. 94-96). Walker gave due notice of appeal from those
verdicts and sentences. (C.R. 1 [each case], pp. 43 [B 13-0883-SB], 34 [B 14-
0650-SA], and 33 [B 14-0994-SB]), respectively.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Appellate counsel concludes that the records examined contain no reversible error or arguable grounds for appeal in any of the referenced causes
the subject of this brief.
PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION OF THE RECORD Counsel has reviewed the appellate records in these cases, which consist *12 of the various documents in the respective Clerk’s Records and the
transcript of Walker’s consolidated plea and punishment hearings. As a matter of
her professional judgment, Counsel reluctantly concludes that the record
contains no reversible error. Neither are there any jurisdictional defects apparent
in the records examined. In such a case, where Counsel concludes that there are
no arguable grounds for reversal, she is required to present a professional
evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be
advanced for appeal. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Ganious v.
State , 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). That evaluation follows.
Arguable Points of Error
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals at San Antonio has provided an instructive list for consideration when complying with Anders . Accordingly,
Counsel in this case has reviewed Mr. Walker’s records for error centering on
the following areas:
1. Whether his original indictments in all three cases were sufficient charging instruments.
2. Whether there were any adverse pretrial rulings, including but not limited to rulings on motions to suppress, motions to quash or the like.
3. Whether there was compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 26.13 and, if appropriate, Padilla v. Kennedy , 130
S. Ct. 1477 (U.S. 2010) in all cases. 4. Whether the issue of Walker’s competency was raised prior to sentencing, so as to warrant an inquiry by the court, and whether appellant was mentally competent when the court accepted his pleas.
5. Whether Walker’s pleas were at all times freely and voluntarily made.
6. Whether there were any adverse rulings during the punishment hearing on objections or motions.
7. Whether there was any failure on the part of appellant’s trial counsel to object to fundamental error.
8. Whether the sentences imposed in all three cases were within the applicable ranges of punishment.
9. Whether the written judgments for each case accurately reflect the sentences that were imposed and whether all credits were properly applied.
10. Whether there is evidence to support Walker’s guilty pleas. 11. Whether Walker was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Prior Proceedings
Indictments – all cases
Walker’s original indictments for the felony offenses of 1) evading arrest/detention, 2) failure to appear, 3) and possession of a controlled substance
tracked the then applicable statutory provisions of TEXAS PENAL CODE
sections 38.04(b)(2)(A) and 38.10(f) (West 2014) and TEXAS HEALTH
AND SAFETY CODE §481.115(c) (West 2014) , respectively. The indictments
met the “requisites of an Indictment” provided in the Code of Criminal
Procedure’s art. 21.02 , and thus constituted proper charging instruments. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02 (West 2014) .
Evidentiary Rulings/Fundamental Error There were no adverse rulings during the plea or punishment hearings, and no failure on the part of Walker’s trial counsel to object to fundamental error.
Plea Hearing – all cases
Original Compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 26.13 On November 3, 2014, Walker appeared with his trial attorney before the trial court in a consolidated plea hearing on the three offenses the subject of this
brief. He entered an open plea of guilty to the trial court to each of the offenses in
open court. (R.R. 1, pp. 10-11). He was properly admonished, and the trial court
secured his waivers of jury trial both orally and in writing in all three cases. (R.R.
2, p. 9), and see in each case, C.R. 1, pp. 24, 10 and 15, respectively). The plea
documents for each case included stipulations of evidence which were signed by
Walker and/or his attorney and which appear proper in all regards. ( See C.R. 1,
each case, pp. 18, 21 and 15, respectively).
Adverse Pre-Hearing Rulings – all cases
There were no adverse pre-hearing rulings in any of the three cases under review.
Trial Error/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – all cases Appellate counsel found no evidence in the records examined which would support a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
Strickland v. Washington , decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1984 established the standard by which to gauge the adequacy of
representation of counsel and articulated a two-step analysis:
1. Did the attorney’s performance fail to constitute “reasonably effective assistance,” i.e. , did the defense attorney’s representation fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms?
2. If so, was there a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings could have been different?
– see Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 690.
(The test in Strickland is properly applied to the punishment phase of a non-
capital case as well. See Hernandez v. State , 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999)).
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court begins with a strong presumption that counsel was effective. Jackson v.
State , 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A reviewing court
presumes counsel’s actions were motivated by sound trial strategy. Id . A
complainant has the burden of rebutting that presumption by evidence from the
record affirmatively supporting the claim. See Jackson v. State , 973 S.W.2d
954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). However, even if a complainant can prove
such error occurred, he must then prove that but for the error, there is a
reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
See Burruss v. State , 20 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2000, pet.
ref’d ).
Here, evidence adduced at Walker’s plea and sentencing hearings included his admission to the allegations in his indictments. Testimony in his
punishment hearing indicated that he had had a number of brushes with the law
that had resulted in a number of misdemeanor and felony convictions. In other
words, the un-objected to punishment evidence showed that Walker had an
extensive criminal history. In light of the testimony, even if examination of his
plea or sentencing hearings revealed instances where his trial counsel possibly
committed an error of some kind in his representation (which the record does
not support), it is highly unlikely that but for such error, there was a
reasonable probability that the outcomes of Walker’s hearings would have
been different.
Sufficiency of Evidence – all cases
Here, Walker admitted his guilt in each offense as alleged. When he pleads guilty, a criminal defendant waives his right to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence. Keller v. State , 125 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted , 146 S.W.3d 677 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam); see also Staggs v. State , 314 S.W.3d 155, 159
(Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). In such cases, review is
limited to determining whether the evidence supports the conviction under
article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . See, TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 (West 2014) (stating that State must “introduce
evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence
shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall
a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to
support the same.”); Keller , 125 S.W.3d at 605 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 1.15 (West 2005) ).The state must offer sufficient proof to support
any judgment based on a guilty plea in a felony case tried before a court.
Keller , 125 S.W.3d at 604 (citation omitted); see also Ex parte Williams ,
703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “The State, however, is not
required to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the supporting
evidence must simply embrace every essential element of the charged offense.”
Staggs , 314 S.W.3d at 159.
Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State to “introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant
and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and
in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient
evidence to support the same.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 ; see
Menefee v. State , 287 S.W.3d 9, 13-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The evidence
supporting a guilty plea may take several forms. Menefee , 287 S.W.3d at
13. Article 1.15 provides that the evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in
such a case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance,
confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to
an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of
testimony by affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other
documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the court. See , TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 (West 2014) . Here, there is sufficient
supporting evidence to uphold Walker’s pleas of guilty. In each case, his plea
documents included a judicial confession and stipulation of evidence.
Competency – all cases There was no issue of competency raised prior to Walker’s pleas or sentencing in any of the cases under review. Further, there is no evidence in his
trial records to suggest that Walker was mentally incompetent to stand trial, and he
presented no evidence suggestive of the defense of insanity. Walker’s responses at
his plea hearing and his testimony at his subsequent punishment hearing appear to
be competent, understandable and coherent. In neither instance does he appear
confused or unable to understand or answer questions posed to him by either the
court or counsel. In short, his testimony does not suggest any evidence of
incompetency.
Sufficiency – Punishment—all cases The trial court assessed the following sentences upon conclusion of Walker’s plea and punishment hearings:
For the felony offense of evading arrest/detention – 45 years. For the felony offense of failure to appear – 45 years.
For the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance – 45 years.
A review of the evidence for sufficiency is inappropriate with respect to the assessment of punishment. See , Bradfield v. State , 42 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Tex.
App. – Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d ); Kanouse v. State , 958 S.W.2d 509, 510
(Tex. App. – Beaumont 1996, no pet .)( citing Jackson v. State , 680 S.W.2d
809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). Here, the sentences ultimately assessed by
the trial court were within the applicable punishment ranges for the subject
offenses, and none of the sentences on their face appear “unreasonable” or
“irrational” in light of the testimony adduced at Walker’s punishment hearing.
See , Nunez v. State , 565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Thus, Walker
cannot establish any error arising from the punishments assessed by the trial
court in any of his three cases.
Standard of Review – ―Frivolous Appeals‖—All Cases In an Anders case, a reviewing court must, “after a full examination of all proceedings, […] decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Anders , 386
U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; accord Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 509-
11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Coronado v. State , 996 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex.
App. – Waco 2000, pet. ref’d ). An appeal is “wholly frivolous” or “without
merit” when it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals ,
486 U.S. 429, 439 n. 10, 108 S.C. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 4440 (1988).
Arguments are frivolous if they “cannot conceivably persuade the court.” Id . at
426, 108 S. Ct. at 1901. An appeal is not frivolous if based on “arguable
grounds.” Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 511.
CONCLUSION Here, appellate counsel cannot in good faith argue that there is a basis “in law or in fact” that an error occurred in any of Walker’s three cases. For
that reason, appellate counsel is required to move for leave to withdraw in each
case to allow appellant the opportunity to submit his briefs in response to this
brief should he choose to do so. See , Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991). Accompanying this brief then, attached as Appendix 1, is a
copy of appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw on those grounds in each case.
An original of the motion has been separately filed with this Court in each case.
NOTICE TO CLIENT Counsel hereby affirms that she has notified George Henry Walker, appellant, of the filing of this brief in each of the referenced cases, of his right
to file pro se response briefs should he choose to do so and of his right to
examine his appellate records per the applicable Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure to accomplish that goal. Notice of those rights and of Counsel’s
motion to withdraw in each case was provided to Mr. Walker by both certified
mail, return receipt requested, and by first-class mail at his last known mailing
address at the date of this filing, to-wit:
George Henry Walker
TDCJ No. 01967140
J. Middleton Transfer Facility 13055 FM 3522
Abilene, Texas 79601 COMPLIANCE WITH KELLY v. STATE Finally, Counsel also hereby affirms that she has provided to Mr.
Walker motions for access to his appellate records as required by the dictates
of Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) for each of the
referenced cases. ( See copy of same in Appendix 2).
PRAYER WHEREFORE , Counsel respectfully prays that this Court permit her to withdraw from each of these cases after this Court’s own examination of the
records and to afford Mr. Walker his right to file pro se response briefs if he
wishes to do so.
COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 *23 Phone: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: ecopeland63@yahoo.com By: /s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland State Bar No. 16075250 Attorney for Appellant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 and KELLY v. STATE This is to certify that on April 13, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on George McCrea, District Attorney,
Court Street Annex, 124 W. Beauregard, San Angelo, Texas and on George
Henry Walker, TDCJ No. 01967140, J. Middleton Transfer Facility, 13055 FM
3522, Abilene, Texas 79601, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure , and that Appellant’s brief is in compliance with Rule 9 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must be included
under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 3397 words. Further, Counsel certifies that she
has complied with the dictates of Kelly v. State insofar as providing motions
for Mr. Walker to gain access to his appellate records if he so chooses.
/s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland *24 APPENDIX 1
IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS GEORGE HENRY WALKER, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00789-CR
Appellant § TRIAL COURT NO. B 13-0883-SB §
CAUSE NO. 03-14-00790-CR V. § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0650-SA
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00791-CR
Appellee § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0994-SB MOTION TO WITHDRAW TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Erika Copeland, PO Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613, appellate attorney for George Henry Walker, and respectfully moves this
Honorable Court to allow said attorney to withdraw as attorney of record in this
matter, terminating his representation of the above referenced appellant and for
good cause would respectfully show this Honorable Court as follows:
I. Contemporaneous with the filing of this Motion to Withdraw, counsel has filed an Anders brief. Withdrawal of counsel is necessary to permit Mr. Walker to
file a pro se response brief, if he so desires.
II. Pending Deadlines Appellant’s brief is due May 11, 2015.
III. Documents Filed and Prepared for Defendant Counsel has prepared a docketing statement and Appellant’s Brief in these causes, and has filed same with this Court. Counsel previously prepared
Appellant’s Notices of Appeal, Requests for Reporter’s Record and Designations
of Clerk’s Record.
IV. Notice of Last Known Address of Defendant Counsel has notified Appellant of the filing of this Motion to Withdraw and of the filing of this brief by mailing a copy of this Motion to Appellant’s last
known mailing address by regular, first class mail and by certified mail, return
receipt requested, and addressed as follows:
George Henry Walker
TDCJ No. 01967140 J. Middleton Transfer Facility 13055 FM 3522
Abilene, Texas 79601
V. WHEREFORE , Movant prays this Honorable Court to allow Movant to withdraw from the representation of appellant and would, in all things, relieve
Movant herein, discharging Movant from her obligations and responsibilities to
this appellant in this matter.
Respectfully submitted, COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Pho: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: ecopeland63@yahoo.com /s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland State Bar No. 04801500 Attorney for Appellant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on April 13, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on George McCrea, District
Attorney, Court Street Annex, 124 W. Beauregard, San Angelo, Texas and on
George Henry Walker, TDCJ No. 01967140, J. Middleton Transfer Facility,
13055 FM 3522, Abilene, Texas 79601, in accordance with the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure , and that Appellant’s brief is in compliance with Rule 9
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must be
included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 451 words.
/s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland *28 APPENDIX 2
IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS GEORGE HENRY WALKER, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00789-CR
Appellant § TRIAL COURT NO. B 13-0883-SB §
CAUSE NO. 03-14-00790-CR V. § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0650-SA
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § CAUSE NO. 03-14-00791-CR
Appellee § TRIAL COURT NO. B 14-0994-SB MOTION FOR ACCESS TO APPELLATE RECORD NOW COMES George Henry Walker, TDCJ No. 01967140, Middleton Transfer Facility, 13055 FM 3522, Abilene, Texas 79601 and
respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant him access to the appellate
record in the above-referenced causes in order to effectuate his right to file a
response to the Anders briefs filed herein by Appellant’s appellate counsel.
Respectfully submitted, George Henry Walker TDCJ No. 01967140
J. Middleton Transfer Facility
13055 FM 3522
Abilene, Texas 79601 Date:
*30 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on April , 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on George
McCrea, District Attorney, Court Street Annex, 124 W. Beauregard, San
Angelo, Texas in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure , and that Appellant’s moion is in compliance with Rule 9 of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must be
included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 238 words.
George Henry Walker TDCJ No. 01967140
J. Middleton Transfer Facility
13055 FM 3522
Abilene, Texas 79601 Date: