Case Information

*0 FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/6/2015 11:22:02 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

*1 ACCEPTED 14-14-00706-cv FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/6/2015 11:22:02 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK NO. 14-14-00706-CV __________________

IN THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS __________________ ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL, INC. and ANGLO-DUTCH (TENGE) L.L.C., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C. and GERARD J. SWONKE, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. __________________________________________________________________ BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANTS GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C. and GERARD J. SWONKE __________________________________________________________________ R USTY H ARDIN & A SSOCIATES , LLP Joe Roden State Bar No. 00794549 Rusty Hardin State Bar No. 08972800 1401 McKinney Street, Suite 2250 Houston, Texas 77010 Telephone: 713-652-9000 Facsimile: 713-652-9800 ATTORNEYS FOR CROSS-APPELLANTS

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

*2 Appellants/Cross-Appellees: Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C. Appellate Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Christopher S. Johns State Bar No. 24044849 805 West 10 th Street, Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 215-4078 Facsimile: (512) 628-7169 cjohns@jmehlaw.com Joseph R. Marrs State Bar No. 24037029 Leah Lanier State Bar No. 24080068 Johns, Marrs, Ellis & Hodge, LLP 500 Dallas Street, Suite 1350 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 609-9503 Facsimile: (713) 583-5825 jmarrs@jmehlaw.com llanier@jmehlaw.com Ryan P. Bates State Bar No. 24055152 Bates PLLC 3300 Harris Park Avenue Austin, Texas 78705 Telephone: (512) 694-5268 rbates@batespllc.com

ii *3 Trial and Appellate Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Appellees: Kenneth R. Breitbeil State Bar No. 02947690 David L. Louie State Bar No. 24074621 McFall, Breitbeil & Eidman, P.C. 1331 Lamar Street 1250 Four Houston Center Houston, Texas 77010-3027 Telephone: (713) 590-9300 Facsimile: (713) 590-9399 kbreitbeil@mcfall-law.com dlouie@mcfall-law.com Appellees/Cross-Appellants: Gerard J. Swonke and Greenberg Peden, P.C. Trial and Appellate Counsel for Appellees/Cross-Appellants: Joe Roden State Bar No. 00794549 Rusty Hardin State Bar No. 08972800 Ryan Higgins State Bar No. 24007362 Rusty Hardin & Associates, LLP 1401 McKinney Street, Suite 2250 Houston, Texas 77010 Telephone: (713) 652-9000 Facsimile: (713) 652-9800 jroden@rustyhardin.com rhardin@rustyhardin.com rhiggins@rustyhardin.com

iii *4 TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL ................................... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................ iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... x STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................. xiv STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................ xviii ISSUES PRESENTED .......................................................................... xix I. Did the trial court misconstrue the numerator and

rounding provisions of the Fee Agreement and erroneously order Anglo-Dutch to pay Swonke $306,000 instead of $1,530,000? 1

II. Did the trial court err by rendering judgment against—

and refusing to render judgment for—Swonke on his

attorneys’ fees claims? 2

III. Did the trial court err by rendering judgment against—

and refusing to render judgment for—Swonke on his

breach of contract claim? 3

IV. Did the trial court err by rendering a judgment on prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, and costs that conflicts with its 2007 Judgment, which remains in force and effect on those issues? 4

1

This issue attacks judgment decrees 2, 4, 5, 6, and 9 in the 2014 Judgment. 2 This issue attacks judgment decrees 8, 11, and 12 in the 2014 Judgment. 3 This issue attacks judgment decree 7 in the 2014 Judgment. 4 This issue attacks judgment decrees 13, 15, and 16 in the 2014 Judgment.

iv *5 STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................ 1 I. The Underlying Dispute .................................................................. 1 II. The Trial Court—Part I ................................................................... 9 III. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ................................................. 12 IV. The Texas Supreme Court ........................................................... 15 V. The Trial Court—Part II .............................................................. 17 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...................................................... 19 ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 21 I. The Trial Court Erred By Misconstruing The

Numerator And Rounding Provisions Of The Fee Agreement, And By Ordering Anglo-Dutch To Pay Swonke $306,000 Instead Of $1,530,000 Under The Fee Agreement. ............................................................................ 21 A. Anglo-Dutch Waived The Declarations Regarding

The Numerator And Rounding Provisions Because The Trial Court’s 2007 Judgment Denied That Relief And That Denial Was Not Appealed. .............. 23

B. The Trial Court Misconstrued The Fee Agreement By Rewriting Its Plain Language In Violation Of The Supreme Court’s Opinion. ........................ 26 1. The Supreme Court’s Opinion Requires

Enforcement Of The Unambiguous Fee Agreement As Written. ............................................... 27 a. The Plain Language Of The Fee

Agreement Makes Swonke’s Hours The Numerator In The Fee Formula. ......................... 28

v *6 b. The Plain Language Of The Fee Agreement Requires Rounding Up To The Next Whole Percentage After The Hours Ratio Is Multiplied By 20%. ..................... 29

2. The Supreme Court’s Opinion Prohibits Rewriting The Fee Agreement Or Adding To Its Language. .............................................................. 30 a. The Trial Court Rewrote The Hours

Ratio In The Fee Formula At Anglo- Dutch’s Request. .................................................. 31

b. The Trial Court Rewrote The Rounding Provision. .............................................................. 33 3. The Supreme Court’s Opinion Requires The Fee Agreement To Be Construed As A Reasonable Person In Anglo-Dutch’s Circumstances Would Have Construed It, Not As Anglo-Dutch Construes It. ............................. 35 a. A Reasonable Person In Anglo-Dutch’s

Circumstances Would Have Recognized That The Numerator Is Swonke’s Hours, Not Greenberg Peden’s Hours. ................ 35 i. The Text Of The Fee Agreement

Plainly States That The Numerator Of The Hours Ratio Is Swonke’s Hours. ............................................................ 35

ii. The Circumstances Surrounding The Execution Of The Fee Agreement Do Not Alter Its Plain Language. ...................................................... 36

vi *7 iii.

The

Post-Fee Agreement Circumstances Do Not Alter The Plain Language Of The Fee Agreement. .................................................... 37

b. A Reasonable Person In Anglo-Dutch’s

Circumstances

Would Have Recognized That The Rounding To The Next Whole Percentage Occurs After, Not Before, Multiplying The Hours Ratio By 20%. ..................................................... 41

i. The Text Of The Fee Agreement Plainly Shows That The Rounding Occurs After, Not Before, Multiplying The Hours Ratio By 20%. ................................................................ 41

ii. Neither The Circumstances Surrounding The Execution Of The Fee Agreement Nor Post-Fee Agreement Circumstances Alter Its Plain Language That Requires Rounding After Multiplying The Hours Ratio By 20%. ..................................... 42

C. Conclusion ............................................................................. 42

II.

The Trial Court Erred By Rendering Judgment Against—And Refusing To Render Judgment For— Swonke On His Attorneys’ Fees Claims. ...................................... 44 A. The Trial Court Erred By Granting Summary

Judgment Against Swonke On His Attorneys’ Fees Claims. ......................................................................... 46

vii *8 1. Anglo-Dutch’s Waiver Of All Complaints About The 2007 Judgment’s Award Of Attorneys’ Fees To Swonke Prohibited The Trial Court From Altering The Award On Remand. ....................................................................... 47

2. Alternatively, Even If Not Waived, Anglo- Dutch’s Grounds For Summary Judgment On Swonke’s Attorneys’ Fees Claims Lack Merit. ............................................................................ 50 a. Notwithstanding The Supreme Court’s

Opinion, Swonke Had Standing And Capacity To Sue For Breach Of The Fee Agreement. ........................................................... 50

b. Anglo-Dutch’s Grounds For Summary Judgment On Swonke’s Claim For Attorneys’ Fees Under The Declaratory Judgment Act Lack Merit. ................................... 53 i. Swonke May Recover Attorneys’

Fees Under The Declaratory Judgment Act Because He Defended Against Anglo-Dutch’s Declaratory Judgment Action. ..................... 53

ii. Swonke’s Breach Of Contract Claim Did Not Fail. .................................................. 54 iii. Anglo-Dutch Waived Its Complaint That Swonke’s Attorneys’ Fee Award Was Not Equitable And Just And, In Any Event, The Award Was Equitable And Just. ...................................... 55

viii *9 B. The Trial Court Erred By Refusing To Render Judgment Of $427,892.50 For Swonke On His Attorneys’ Fees Claims. ....................................................... 58

III. The Trial Court Erred By Rendering Judgment Against—And Refusing To Render Judgment For— Swonke On His Breach Of Contract Claim. ................................. 62 A. The Trial Court Erred By Granting Summary

Judgment To Anglo-Dutch On Swonke’s Breach Of Contract Claim. ............................................................... 62

B. Alternatively, The Trial Court Erred By Refusing To Render Judgment For Swonke On His Breach Of Contract Claim. ............................................................... 63

IV. The Trial Court Erred By Rendering A Judgment On Prejudgment Interest, Post-Judgment Interest, And Costs That Conflicts With Its 2007 Judgment, Which Remains In Force And Effect On Those Issues. ........................... 69 A. Anglo-Dutch Waived Any Complaints About The

Trial Court’s 2007 Judgment On Prejudgment Interest, Post-Judgment Interest, And Costs. .................... 69

B. The 2007 Judgment’s Awards Of Prejudgment Interest, Post-judgment Interest, And Costs Remain In Force And Effect. ............................................... 71

C. The Trial Court Erred By Altering Its Prior Awards Of Prejudgment Interest, Post-judgment Interest, And Costs, And Refusing To Render Judgment Consistent With Its 2007 Judgment. ................. 72

PRAYER .................................................................................................. 73 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 74

ix *10 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................ 75 x *11 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allright, Inc. v. Pearson,

735 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1987) ........................................................... 70 American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2003) ............................................... 30, 31, 33 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) .......................................................................... 10

Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2008, rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011) .............................. passim

Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011) ................................................... passim Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Littlemill Ltd., No. 14-06-00921-CV, 2007 WL 2826900 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] Oct. 2, 2007, pet. denied) .................. 10

Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Smith,

243 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) .......................................................................... 10

Bramlett v. Phillips, 359 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, aff’d, Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d. 229 (Tex. 2013) ...... 59, 60, 61, 71 Brown v. Mesa Distributors, Inc.,

414 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ............................................................................ 51, 53

xi *12 City of Temple v. Taylor, 268 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) ................ 48 Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1,

263 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. 2008) ............................. 59, 60, 61, 67, 68, 71 Hoover Slovaceck, L.L.P. v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006) ........................................................... 58 Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Guitar Holding Co., L.P.,

355 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) ..................................................... 25, 47, 49, 52, 63, 72

Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2001)........................................................ 24, 51 JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 550 F.3d 529 (6 th Cir. 2008) .................................. 49, 67, 68, 72, 73

Medical Ctr. Pharmacy v. Holder,

634 F.3d 830 (5 th Cir. 2011) ............................................... 25, 48, 72 Montemayer v. Ortiz, 208 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) .............................................................................. 54, 58

Ontiveros v. Flores, 218 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2007)........................................................ 24, 51 Pagosa Oil and Gas, L.L.C. v. Marrs and Smith Partnership, 323 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) ........ 51, 52 Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. 2013) ............................................... 60, 61, 71 xii *13 David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. 2008) ............................................... 29, 32, 40 San Jacinto River Authority v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. 1990) ............................................... 24, 51, 71 Sims v. Fitzpatrick, No. 01-13-00176-CV, 2014 WL 1004410 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st . Dist.] March 13, 2014, pet. denied) .......................................................................... 64

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2010) ..................................................... 51, 64 State v. Anderson Courier Serv., 222 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) ...... 26, 49, 73 State v. Biggar, 873 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1994) ........................................... 24, 51, 67, 68 Thomas v. Bilby-Knight, No. 09-03-370CV, 2003 WL 22213590 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2003, no pet.) .......................................................... 70-71

United Resources, L.P. v. Sepco Tubulars, Inc., No. 04-12-00663-CV, 2014 WL 3339537 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 9, 2014, no pet.) .................. 25, 48, 49, 72

Wohlfahrt v. Holloway, 172 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. App.– Houston [14 th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) ......................................... 70

Statutes:

Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers

§ 18(2) (2000) ................................................................................. 35 xiii *14 Rules: T EX . R. C IV . P. 301 ............................................................................. 68-69

xiv *15 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the Declaratory judgment and breach of fiduciary original case: duty action brought by Anglo-Dutch Petroleum

International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C. (collectively “Anglo-Dutch”) against their attorney, Gerard Swonke, and Greenberg Peden, P.C., the law firm to which he was formerly “of counsel.” Swonke counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and fraud. Swonke also sued Scott Van Dyke, the president of Anglo-Dutch, for fraud.

Original trial court: 61 st District Court, Harris County, Judge John Donovan Original jury verdict: The jury found that Swonke was, and Greenberg Peden was not, a party to a contingent fee agreement (“Fee Agreement”) with Anglo-Dutch, and that Anglo-Dutch breached the Fee Agreement. 5 The jury awarded damages of $1,000,000. The jury also found that Swonke complied with his fiduciary duties to Anglo- Dutch. 6

Original trial court Judgment rendered for Swonke on the jury’s

disposition

: verdict for actual damages, attorneys’ fees, pre-

and post-judgment interest, and costs of court. 7 5 A copy of the Fee Agreement is attached as Appendix A. 6 A copy of the original jury verdict is attached to the original final judgment which is attached as Appendix B. 7 A copy of the trial court’s January 22, 2007 final judgment (“2007 Judgment”) is attached as Appendix B.

xv *16 Court of Appeals: Fourteenth Court of Appeals, panel consisting of Justice Boyce (author), Justice Fowler, and Senior Justice Hudson

COA disposition: Affirmed.

COA opinion:

Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg

Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14 th Dist.] Aug. 26, 2008, pet. filed) (“Anglo- Dutch”). 8

Supreme Court Reversed and remanded to the trial court for disposition: further proceedings in accordance with the

opinion. Supreme Court Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg opinion: Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). 9 Nature of the case Declaratory judgment and breach of contract

on remand:

action regarding the fee owed under the Fee

Agreement.

Trial court on 61 st District Court, Harris County, Judge Al

remand:

Bennett

Course of

The trial court construed the Fee Agreement as a

proceedings

matter of law and applied those rulings to on remand: stipulated facts. 10 The trial court also granted an

interlocutory summary judgment against Swonke

8 A copy of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] Aug. 26, 2008), rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011) is attached as Appendix C. 9 A copy of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011) is attached as Appendix D.

xvi *17 on his claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and attorneys’ fees. 11 Finally, the trial court held a jury trial on Anglo-Dutch’s claims for trial, appellate, and post-remand attorneys’ fees and costs. 12

Jury verdict The jury found that Anglo-Dutch’s reasonable on remand: and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs for trial,

appellate, and post-remand work was “$0” with two exceptions. 1 CR 957-968. The jury found that a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Anglo-Dutch’s attorneys for the prior appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas was $50,000. 1 CR 962. The jury also found that reasonable and necessary costs for the appeals to this Court and the Texas Supreme Court was $12,000. 1 CR 965.

Trial court The trial court rendered declaratory judgments

disposition

construing the Fee Agreement in favor of Anglo-

on remand:

Dutch and awarded Anglo-Dutch court costs. The

trial court also rendered a take-nothing judgment against Swonke on his claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and attorneys’ fees. The trial court rendered judgment for Swonke and against Anglo-Dutch for $306,000, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The trial court disregarded the two jury findings in favor of Anglo-Dutch and rendered a take-nothing

10 A copy of the trial court’s order construing the Fee Agreement as a matter of law and applying that construction to stipulated facts is attached as Appendix E. 11 A copy of the trial court’s order granting interlocutory summary judgment against Swonke on his claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and attorneys’ fees is attached as Appendix F. 12 A copy of the jury verdict in the second trial is attached to the trial court’s final judgment which is attached as Appendix G.

xvii *18 judgment against Anglo-Dutch on its claims for

trial, appellate, and post-remand attorneys’

fees. 13

13 A copy of the trial court’s May 13, 2014 judgment (“2014 Judgment”) is attached as Appendix G.

xviii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

*19 The cross-appellants request oral argument. The lengthy procedural history of this case and numerous defects in the judgment may be better explored with the parties’ advocates available to address the Court’s questions that are sure to arise in this complex case.

xix *20 ISSUES PRESENTED I. Did the trial court misconstrue the numerator and rounding

provisions of the Fee Agreement and erroneously order Anglo-

Dutch to pay Swonke $306,000 instead of $1,530,000? 14

II. Did the trial court err by rendering judgment against—and

refusing to render judgment for—Swonke on his attorneys’ fees

claims? 15

III. Did the trial court err by rendering judgment against—and

refusing to render judgment for—Swonke on his breach of contract

claim? 16

V. Did the trial court err by rendering a judgment on prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, and costs that conflicts with its 2007 Judgment, which remains in force and effect on those issues? 17

14 This issue attacks judgment decrees 2(1), 4, 5, 6, and 9 in the 2014 Judgment. 15 This issue attacks judgment decrees 8, 11, and 12 in the 2014 Judgment. 16 This issue attacks judgment decree 7 in the 2014 Judgment. 17 This issue attacks judgment decrees 13, 15, and 16 in the 2014 Judgment.

xx

STATEMENT OF FACTS

*21 I. The Underlying Dispute Gerard Swonke has been a lawyer for 41-years who was “of counsel” to Greenberg Peden, P.C. or its predecessor from 1987 until November 2001. 1 CR 248-250, 1 CR 258. Scott Van Dyke worked for Van Dyke Energy Company (later Vanco Energy Company), his father’s oil company, where he spent 50% of his time negotiating and preparing contracts. Swonke first met Van Dyke in 1987 through Van Dyke’s father. 1 CR 251-253. Soon thereafter, Swonke began to represent Van Dyke’s father’s company. 1 CR 253.

In 1989, Van Dyke and his mother formed Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc., an exploration company. 1 CR 168-171. Van Dyke served as its president. 1 CR 185-186. Beginning in 1993, Van Dyke became the chief architect and negotiator of an elaborate limited liability agreement that brought together disparate investor interests from several countries to pursue a license in Kazakhstan for the development of the Tenge oil and gas field. 1 CR 230, 257. Swonke drafted the formal documents and obtained the assistance of Skip Naylor, a Greenberg Peden shareholder, to help document the *22 transaction. 1 CR 231, 257. Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C. was the entity formed to complete the transaction. See 1 CR 231.

In 1997, Swonke negotiated and drafted confidentiality agreements that Halliburton and Ramco executed in order to view Anglo-Dutch’s confidential data regarding the Tenge field to assess a proposed buyout of Anglo-Dutch’s existing partners. 1 CR 172-175. In February 2000, Anglo-Dutch requested that Swonke examine the viability of a potential lawsuit against Halliburton and Ramco for breaching the confidentiality agreements. 1 CR 187, 260-261. Swonke concluded a lawsuit was viable and so advised Anglo-Dutch. 1 CR 188, 262.

Although Anglo-Dutch wished to pursue the lawsuit, it did not have the financial resources to do so on an hourly basis. 1 CR 176. Anglo-Dutch owed Greenberg Peden a large sum of money. 1 CR 221. For that reason, Greenberg Peden previously had decided and told Van Dyke that it would no longer represent Anglo-Dutch in any matters. 1 CR 208-209, 225-226, 258-259, 232-234. Nevertheless, as required under Swonke’s “of counsel” agreement with Greenberg Peden, Swonke first approached Greenberg Peden and asked if it would represent *23 Anglo-Dutch against Halliburton and Ramco. 1 CR 232-233, 217, 235 ¶ 8. Greenberg Peden flatly refused. 1 CR 218-220, 222-226, 232-233, 235, 237-238, 241-242. Swonke and David Peden, a named shareholder of Greenberg Peden, both informed Van Dyke that Greenberg Peden would not represent it against Halliburton and Ramco, a fact even Van Dyke concedes. 1 CR 188, 208-209, 225-226, 233, 237-238, 241-243.

Swonke then referred the case to McConn & Williams without seeking a referral fee. 1 CR 263. McConn & Williams signed a fee agreement with Anglo-Dutch on March 25, 2000 and filed Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., et al. v. Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd., et al.; in the 61 st Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, Cause No. 2000-22588 (“Halliburton Lawsuit”) on May 2, 2000. 1 CR 318-325, 177-178. McConn & Williams later associated with John O’Quinn to try the case. 1 CR 236.

After Anglo-Dutch hired McConn & Williams, Van Dyke and McConn & Williams’ lawyers frequently asked Swonke for advice and to perform tasks on the Halliburton Lawsuit even though at that time Swonke had no agreement with Anglo-Dutch or McConn & Williams by which he would be paid for his efforts. 1 CR 264-266. After several *24 months of such requests, Swonke finally concluded that he had to be compensated if he was going to continue to work on the Halliburton Lawsuit. 1 CR 266.

Van Dyke called Swonke and specifically asked to retain him, not Greenberg Peden, to work on the Halliburton Lawsuit on a contingent fee because he could not afford to pay Swonke by the hour. 1 CR 267- 268. Van Dyke suggested a contingency fee based on a formula. 1 CR 268. Swonke and Anglo-Dutch agreed to Van Dyke’s terms, which Swonke dictated into a Dictaphone. 1 CR 269-271. Swonke then asked his secretary to transcribe his dictation and finalize the document. 1 CR 272.

The body of the Fee Agreement never mentions Greenberg Peden. 1 CR 312. Instead, the body of the Fee Agreement exclusively uses the personal pronouns “I”, “me”, and “my” twelve times in a nine-sentence contract to refer to Swonke, individually, and his rights and obligations under the Fee Agreement. 1 CR 312-313.

Swonke’s secretary inadvertently put the Fee Agreement on Greenberg Peden letterhead and inserted “GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C.” into the signature block. 1 CR 272. Swonke then signed the Fee *25 Agreement on October 16, 2000, never noticing the references to Greenberg Peden in the letterhead and in the signature block. 1 CR 273, 312. Van Dyke signed the Fee Agreement the next day for Anglo- Dutch. 1 CR 313.

Swonke had no intention to, did not, and could not—because of Greenberg Peden’s prohibition on doing work for Anglo-Dutch—act for Greenberg Peden by signing the Fee Agreement. 1 CR 207. Instead, Swonke signed the contract for himself individually. 1 CR 282. Swonke has never signed a contingency fee contract on behalf of Greenberg Peden. 1 CR 215. Indeed, when Greenberg Peden signs a contingency fee contract with a client, a Greenberg Peden attorney executes the fee agreement. 1 CR 211. Greenberg Peden had flatly refused to represent Anglo-Dutch in the Halliburton Lawsuit and told Van Dyke so—thus, Swonke had no authority to sign the Fee Agreement on behalf of Greenberg Peden, a fact known by Van Dyke. 1 CR 188, 208-209, 218- 220, 222-226, 232-233, 235, 237-238, 241-243. Naylor, Greenberg Peden’s managing shareholder, agreed that Swonke did not execute the Fee Agreement on behalf of Greenberg Peden. 1 CR 239-240.

*26 After signing the Fee Agreement, Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit for 277 hours while physically present at Greenberg Peden’s offices. 1 CR 216. On October 26, 2001, Swonke became “of counsel” to McConn & Williams. 1 CR 347-350. Swonke informed Anglo-Dutch that he was taking its files, including the Halliburton Lawsuit, with him to his “of counsel” position at McConn & Williams unless Anglo-Dutch objected. 1 CR 354. Anglo-Dutch did not object. 1 CR 193-194. Because Swonke was to be compensated for his work on the Halliburton Lawsuit under the Fee Agreement, Swonke’s “of counsel” agreement with McConn & Williams provided that McConn & Williams would not share any fees with Swonke that it derived from the Halliburton Lawsuit. See 1 CR 349. With Anglo-Dutch’s knowledge, Swonke then worked 1,022 hours on the Halliburton Lawsuit while “of counsel” at McConn & Williams. 1 CR 206.

On May 7, 2002, six months after Van Dyke learned that Swonke had physically left Greenberg Peden to become “of counsel” to McConn & Williams, Van Dyke was deposed in the Halliburton Lawsuit. Van Dyke expressly testified that Anglo-Dutch had a fee agreement with Swonke. 1 CR 195, 247. Van Dyke did not remotely suggest during his *27 deposition that Anglo-Dutch had a fee agreement with Greenberg Peden. 1 CR 195.

The jury in the Halliburton Lawsuit rendered a $70,500,000 verdict for Anglo-Dutch against Halliburton and Ramco. 1 CR 179. Halliburton and Ramco then stipulated that Anglo-Dutch incurred reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees of $9,800,000. 1 CR 192. The attorneys’ time for which Anglo-Dutch recovered attorneys’ fees included the 1,022 hours that Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while “of counsel” to McConn & Williams. 1 CR 204, 216.

Anglo-Dutch eventually settled with Halliburton for $51,000,000 on April 1, 2004, and Halliburton funded the settlement on April 15, 2004. 1 CR 180, 378. During this period, Swonke repeatedly emailed Van Dyke about the calculation of his fee, directed Van Dyke’s attention to the fact that Swonke’s wiring instructions were not included with those of other attorneys who received their fees directly from Halliburton, and asked Van Dyke to promptly address “my contract.” 1 CR 364, 368, 373, 383. Van Dyke never suggested in response to these communications that he believed Swonke was not a party to the Fee Agreement. See 1 CR 205, 279. Instead, Van Dyke expressed concern *28 that Greenberg Peden may make a claim for a fee because the Fee Agreement was on Greenberg Peden letterhead. To address Van Dyke’s concern and at his request, on April 16, 2004, before this lawsuit was filed, Swonke obtained an assignment from Greenberg Peden of any rights it had under the Fee Agreement. See 1 CR 385.

On April 20, 2004, Van Dyke met with a lawyer and discussed issues related to Swonke. 1 CR 183. On April 22, 2004, Swonke met with Van Dyke and, for the first time, Van Dyke asserted that the Fee Agreement is between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, shocking Swonke. 1 CR 274-275, 280. Swonke left the meeting, telling Van Dyke “I can’t believe you’re going to do this to me and my family.” 1 CR 281. Several hours later, Anglo-Dutch sued Swonke, asserting that Anglo- Dutch’s Fee Agreement was with Greenberg Peden, not Swonke. 1 CR 286.

Like it did with Swonke’s Fee Agreement, Anglo-Dutch also attempted to avoid numerous other contracts that required it to share the settlement from the Halliburton Lawsuit. For example, Anglo- Dutch executed 33 contracts that would have required it to pay approximately $11,000,000 of the settlement to investors in the *29 Halliburton Lawsuit. 1 CR 196-199. However, Van Dyke did not pay any of the investors the amount they contracted for, thereby saving $4-5 million. 1 CR 198, 200. Like Swonke, at least eight of the investors successfully sued Anglo-Dutch for breach of contract. See, e.g., Anglo- Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, 243 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l,

Inc. v. Littlemill Ltd.

, No. 14-06-00921-CV, 2007 WL 2826900 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] Oct. 2, 2007, pet. denied); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

II.

The Trial Court—Part I

Anglo-Dutch sued Swonke and Greenberg Peden for a declaratory judgment, negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. 1 CR 286-290. Anglo-Dutch sought the following seven declarations regarding the Fee Agreement:

 the Fee Agreement is between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, and not between Anglo-Dutch and Swonke, individually;

 Greenberg Peden’s April 16, 2004 assignment of its rights and interest in the Fee Agreement to Swonke is illegal and unenforceable against Anglo-Dutch;

*30  the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula in the Fee Agreement is the hours Greenberg Peden worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit and does not include the hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams;

 the hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams are included in the denominator in the fee formula in the Fee Agreement;

 the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is determined and before, not after, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.

 the contingency fee owed under the Fee Agreement shall remain in direct correlation to McConn & Williams’ contingency fee percentage—whether the McConn & Williams contingency fee percentage increases or decreases; and

 neither Swonke nor Greenberg Peden can recover any contingency fee under the Fee Agreement from any future recovery against Ramco.

See 1 CR 286-287. In addition, Anglo-Dutch sought fee forfeiture, actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys’ fees. 1 CR SUPP 114. Swonke counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment, for breach of contract against Anglo-Dutch, and for fraud against both Anglo-Dutch and Van Dyke. 1 CR 293-294. Swonke sought actual damages and attorneys’ fees. 1 CR SUPP 100.

*31 After two weeks of testimony, the jury found in response to Question 1 that the Fee Agreement with Anglo-Dutch was entered into on behalf of Swonke, individually, and not on behalf of Greenberg Peden. See 1 CR 303. In response to Question 2, the jury found that Anglo-Dutch breached the Fee Agreement. 1 CR 304. The jury found in response to Question 3 that $1,000,000 would fairly and reasonably compensate Swonke for his damages that resulted from Anglo-Dutch’s breach of the Fee Agreement. 1 CR 305. In response to Question 5, the jury found that Swonke complied with his fiduciary duty to Anglo- Dutch. 1 CR 306. Finally, the jury found in response to Question 9 that Van Dyke did not commit fraud against Swonke. 1 CR 307.

The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict on January 22, 2007 (the “2007 Judgment”). 1 CR 298. That judgment ordered Anglo-Dutch to take nothing from Swonke and Greenberg Peden. 1 CR 298. The judgment also ordered Anglo-Dutch to pay Swonke $1,000,000 and prejudgment interest on that amount of $226,924.50. 1 CR 299. Finally, the judgment also ordered Anglo- Dutch to pay Swonke the following attorneys’ fees for the prosecution of his breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims, and his defense *32 of Anglo-Dutch’s declaratory judgment claims: $352,892.50 for trial; $75,000 if Anglo-Dutch unsuccessfully appealed to the court of appeals; and $50,000 if Anglo-Dutch unsuccessfully appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. 1 CR 299. III. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

On appeal to this Court, Anglo-Dutch complained only that: (1) the Fee Agreement was unambiguously between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, and should have been construed that way as a matter of law; (2) any ambiguity in the Fee Agreement should have been construed against Swonke; (3) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding in Question 1 that the Fee Agreement with Anglo-Dutch was entered into on behalf of Swonke, individually, and not on behalf of Greenberg Peden; (4) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding in Question 5 that Swonke complied with his fiduciary duty; (5) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury; and (6) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2008); 1 CR SUPP 124-183.

*33 Anglo-Dutch did not complain in this Court about the trial court’s take-nothing judgment rejecting Anglo-Dutch’s request for the following declarations, among others:

 the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula in the Fee Agreement is the hours Greenberg Peden worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit and does not include the hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams; and

 the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is determined and before, not after, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.

1 CR SUPP 124-183. Finally, Anglo-Dutch did not attack in this Court: (1) the jury’s finding in Question 2 that Anglo-Dutch breached the Fee Agreement; (2) the jury’s finding in Question 3 that $1,000,000 would fairly and reasonably compensate Swonke for his damages resulting from Anglo- Dutch’s breach of the Fee Agreement; (3) the trial court’s award of $226,924.50 in prejudgment interest; (4) the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke; (5) the trial court’s finding that an award of attorneys’ fees to Anglo-Dutch would not be equitable or just; (6) the trial court’s award of court costs to Swonke and Greenberg Peden; or (7) the trial court’s award of post-judgment interest at 8.25%, compounded *34 annually, from the date of the judgment until paid. 1 CR SUPP 124-

183; Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d

454, 464 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2008), rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011) (“Anglo-Dutch does not challenge on appeal the jury’s finding that it breached the fee agreement; the amount of contract damages awarded for that breach; or the separate statutory fee award for litigating Swonke’s contract claim under the disputed fee agreement, which the parties opted to try to the Court. Anglo-Dutch also does not challenge the rendition of a take-nothing judgment in favor of Greenberg Peden.”).

This Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2008), rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). 1 CR SUPP 8-52. Specifically, this Court stated:

We hold that the October 16, 2000 fee agreement was ambiguous with respect to whether Anglo–Dutch contracted with Swonke individually or with Greenberg Peden. The trial court properly refused to construe the ambiguous fee agreement against Swonke and properly submitted this issue to the jury. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Swonke individually is a party to the fee agreement with Anglo–Dutch, and that Greenberg Peden is not. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Swonke complied *35 with his fiduciary duty to Anglo–Dutch. Anglo–Dutch's charge and evidentiary complaints provide no basis for reversal. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

See 1 CR SUPP 52. IV. The Texas Supreme Court

In the Texas Supreme Court, Anglo-Dutch complained only that: (1) the Fee Agreement was unambiguously between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden; (2) any ambiguity in the Fee Agreement should be construed against Swonke; and (3) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. See 1 CR SUPP 226-269.

Anglo-Dutch did not complain in the Texas Supreme Court about the trial court’s take-nothing judgment rejecting Anglo-Dutch’s request for the following declarations, among others:

 the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula in the Fee Agreement is the hours Greenberg Peden worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit and does not include the hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams; and

 the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is determined and before, not after, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.

1 CR SUPP 134-183. *36 Moreover, Anglo-Dutch did not challenge in the Texas Supreme Court: (1) the jury’s finding in Question 2 that Anglo-Dutch breached the Fee Agreement; (2) the jury’s finding in Question 3 that $1,000,000 would fairly and reasonably compensate Swonke for his damages resulting from Anglo-Dutch’s breach of the Fee Agreement; (3) the trial court’s award of $226,924.50 in prejudgment interest; (4) the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke; (5) the trial court’s conclusion that an award of attorneys’ fees to Anglo-Dutch would not be equitable or just; (6) the trial court’s award of court costs to Swonke and Greenberg Peden; or (7) the trial court’s award of post-judgment interest at 8.25% on the award, compounded annually, from the date of the judgment until paid. See 1 CR SUPP 197-213; 1 CR SUPP 226-296.

In a 5-4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Fee Agreement was unambiguously between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tex. 2011). The Texas Supreme Court’s opinion states: “The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.” Id. *37 V. The Trial Court—Part II

Upon remand, the trial court declared as a matter of law, among other declarations, that: (1) the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs before the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%; (2) the numerator in the fee formula is the hours Greenberg Peden spent on the Halliburton Lawsuit; and (3) Anglo-Dutch owed Swonke $306,000 under the Fee Agreement. 1 CR 524-525.

The trial court also rendered an interlocutory summary judgment ordering, among other things, that: (1) Swonke take nothing on his breach of contract counterclaim; (2) Swonke take nothing on his request for attorneys’ fees under chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; (3) Swonke take nothing on his declaratory judgment counterclaim; and (4) Swonke is precluded from recovering attorneys’ fees under section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 1 CR 668-669.

Finally, the Court held a three-day jury trial on the issues of Anglo-Dutch’s trial, appellate, and post-remand attorneys’ fees and costs. 1 CR 1302. The jury answered “$0” nine times in response to *38 eleven subquestions in the jury charge. 1 CR 1309-1314. However, the jury also found that $50,000 was a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Anglo-Dutch’s attorneys for representation for the prior appeal to the Texas Supreme Court and that $12,000 was the reasonable and necessary costs that Anglo-Dutch incurred in its appeal to this Court and the Texas Supreme Court. 1 CR 1311, 1314. The trial court granted Swonke’s motion to disregard the jury’s findings on those two questions and also ruled that an award of attorneys’ fees or costs to Anglo-Dutch would not be equitable or just. 1 CR 1302.

*39 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Eleven years ago, Anglo-Dutch settled a lawsuit for $51,000,000 and then refused to pay one of its lawyers, Swonke, the amount it had agreed to pay him. Adding insult to injury, Anglo-Dutch then sued Swonke. Thus began this litigation odyssey.

A jury, a trial court (now Fourteenth Court of Appeals) judge, three court of appeals justices, and four Texas Supreme Court justices found that the parties’ Fee Agreement was between Anglo-Dutch and Swonke. However, five justices on the Texas Supreme Court held that—notwithstanding Greenberg Peden’s express refusal to represent Anglo-Dutch, and Van Dyke’s testimony that Anglo-Dutch had a fee agreement with Swonke—the Fee Agreement was between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, not Swonke, as a matter of law.

On remand, Anglo-Dutch treated the Supreme Court’s declaration regarding the parties to the Fee Agreement as a panacea despite its insignificance. Although the Supreme Court did not address or decide how much money was owed under the Fee Agreement because Anglo- Dutch did not appeal the take-nothing judgment on the declarations that would have presented that issue, at Anglo-Dutch’s invitation the *40 trial court literally rewrote the Fee Agreement in contravention of its plain language and the Supreme Court’s opinion. The trial court’s mistaken construction of the Fee Agreement resulted in a judgment for Swonke of $306,000 instead of the $1,530,000 the parties agreed he would be paid.

The remainder of the trial court’s errors on remand resulted primarily from its failure to acknowledge and apply a fundamental rule of appellate practice: issues decided in a judgment that are not appealed are waived and not remanded for a second bite at the apple, even if the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded. In other words, a trial court errs by rendering a judgment on remand that alters its own or a higher court’s prior judgment on an issue that was not appealed because the waived judgment on the issue remains in force and effect. This waiver doctrine serves judicial economy by forcing parties to raise issues whose resolution might spare the courts and parties successive rounds of remands and appeals.

The trial court ran afoul of the waiver doctrine by rendering declarations on remand which had previously been sought, refused by the 2007 Judgment, and not appealed. Similarly, the trial court *41 awarded Swonke attorneys’ fees, pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs in its 2007 Judgment that were not appealed. Nevertheless, the trial court erroneously eliminated or altered those awards on remand.

Despite the trial court’s errors, Swonke had decided to forego an appeal to allow this litigation to end until forced to cross-appeal by Anglo-Dutch’s perfection of its appeal. A proper construction of the Fee Agreement and application of the waiver doctrine will allow a lawyer who helped enrich his client to get paid the agreed amount for his services and end this litigation once and for all.

ARGUMENT I. The Trial Court Erred By Misconstruing The Numerator And Rounding Provisions Of The Fee Agreement, And By Ordering Anglo-Dutch To Pay Swonke $306,000 Instead Of $1,530,000 Under The Fee Agreement. On remand, the trial court construed the Fee Agreement as a

matter of law and ruled, among other things, that: (1) the numerator in the fee formula is the hours Greenberg Peden spent on the Halliburton Lawsuit, and does not include the hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams; and (2) the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is determined and before, *42 not after, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%. See 1 CR 524-525; 1 CR 1303. The trial court then applied its rulings in light of the parties’ stipulations that: (a) Anglo-Dutch’s gross recovery in the Halliburton Lawsuit was $51,000,000, (b) Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit for 277 hours while of counsel to Greenberg Peden; and (c) McConn & Williams’ attorneys, and Swonke while of counsel to McConn & Williams, worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit for a total of 11,652 hours. See 1 CR 524-525; 1 CR 1303-1304.

Based on its construction of the Fee Agreement and the parties’ stipulations, the trial court rendered judgment: (A) declaring the numerator in the fee formula to be Greenberg Peden’s hours and not Swonke’s hours; (B) declaring that the rounding up required by the Fee Agreement occurs before the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%; and (C) ordering Anglo-Dutch to pay Swonke $306,000 under the Fee Agreement. See 1 CR 525; 1 CR 1303-1304. As shown below, the trial court erred by rendering judgment on Anglo-Dutch’s requested numerator and rounding declarations because Anglo-Dutch waived any entitlement to the declarations and, in any event, the declarations misconstrue the Fee Agreement by rewriting its plain language in *43 violation of the Supreme Court’s opinion. These mistakes resulted in the rendition of an incorrect judgment ordering Anglo-Dutch to pay Swonke $306,000 instead of $1,530,000 under the Fee Agreement.

A. Anglo-Dutch Waived The Declarations Regarding The Numerator And Rounding Provisions Because The Trial Court’s 2007 Judgment Denied That Relief And That Denial Was Not Appealed.

The trial court decreed in its final judgment: “As requested in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition at 7 ¶ 23(c), the Court DECLARES that . . . the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula in the Fee Agreement is the hours Greenberg Peden worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit and does not include the hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams . . . .” 1 CR 1303 ¶ 2. The trial court also decreed in its final judgment: “As requested in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition at 7-8 ¶ 23(d), the Court DECLARES that the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is determined [and] before, not after, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.” See 1 CR 1303 ¶ 4.

However, Anglo-Dutch sought these same declarations in the first trial, 1 CR SUPP 110-111 ¶¶ 23(c), 23(d), the trial court rendered a *44 take-nothing judgment on these requested declarations in its 2007 Judgment, 1 CR SUPP 120, and Anglo-Dutch did not complain about the take-nothing judgment on these declaratory judgment claims in its appeal to this Court or the Texas Supreme Court. 1 CR SUPP 124-183, 185-214, 216-269.

Consequently, Anglo-Dutch waived its claims seeking these declarations. See Ontiveros v. Flores, 218 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. 2007) (holding that a party waived any error as to claims by not complaining on appeal about the summary judgment on those claims); Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655-56 (Tex. 2001) (holding that a party waived any error as to a claim by not complaining on appeal about the summary judgment on the claim); State v. Biggar, 873 S.W.2d 11, 14-15 (Tex. 1994) (holding that a party waived all complaints about a damage awarded affirmed by the court of appeals by not complaining in the Texas Supreme Court about the damage award); San Jacinto River Authority v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209-210 (Tex. 1990) (stating that it is a “well-established rule that grounds of error not asserted by points of error or argument in the court of appeals are waived).

*45 Anglo-Dutch’s waiver of all complaints about the take-nothing judgment on its numerator and rounding declarations prohibited the trial court from reversing on remand its prior take-nothing judgment on those requested declarations. 18 See Medical Ctr. Pharmacy, 634 F.3d at 834 (holding that the district court erred by reversing on remand its prior ruling granting declaratory relief which had been waived on appeal); United Resources, L.P. v. Sepco Tubulars, Inc., No. 04-12- 00663-CV, 2014 WL 3339537, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 9, 2014, no pet.) (holding that the trial court erred on remand by modifying its prior take-nothing judgment on cross-claims because no party had attacked that part of the trial court’s judgment in an earlier appeal); Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 355 S.W.3d 428, 434-35 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (holding that the trial court erred on remand by making a finding on prevailing-party status for attorneys’ fees purposes 18 This rule is called the waiver doctrine. “[T]he waiver doctrine . . . holds that an issue that could have been but was not raised on appeal is forfeited and may not be revisited by the district court on remand.” Medical Ctr. Pharmacy v. Holder, 634 F.3d 830, 834 (5th Cir. 2011). “The waiver doctrine . . . serves judicial economy by forcing parties to raise issues whose resolution might spare the court and parties later rounds of remands and appeals.” Medical Ctr. Pharmacy, 634 F.3d at 834 (quotes omitted). “[I]t arises as a consequence of a party’s inaction, not as a consequence of a decision on [the court of appeals] part.” Id. *46 that conflicted with the court of appeals’ prior decision on the issue which had been waived on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court); State v. Anderson Courier Serv., 222 S.W.3d 62, 66-67 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (holding that the trial court erred by awarding attorneys’ fees under the declaratory judgment act on remand when any complaint that the trial court’s original judgment failed to award attorneys’ fees was waived on appeal).

Because Anglo-Dutch waived any complaint about the prior take- nothing judgment on its requested numerator and rounding declarations by not appealing that judgment, and Anglo-Dutch’s waiver prohibited the trial court from reversing the take-nothing judgment on remand, the trial court erred by rendering judgment declaring that the numerator in the fee formula is Greenberg Peden’s hours and that the rounding up required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.

B. The Trial Court Misconstrued The Fee Agreement By Rewriting Its Plain Language In Violation Of The Supreme Court’s Opinion.

Even if not waived, the trial court’s numerator and rounding declarations, and its order that Anglo-Dutch pay $306,000 instead of *47 $1,530,000, are erroneous because the trial court misconstrued the Fee Agreement by rewriting its plain language in violation of the Supreme Court’s opinion. In Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445, 452-53 (Tex. 2011), the Supreme Court did not directly address how much Anglo-Dutch owes under the Fee Agreement largely because Anglo-Dutch did not appeal the take- nothing judgment on its numerator and rounding declarations. However, the Supreme Court discussed interpretive principles which, when applied, compel rejection of the trial court’s rulings that: the numerator in the fee formula is Greenberg Peden’s hours; the rounding up to the next whole percentage occurs before the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%; and Anglo-Dutch owes Swonke $306,000 instead of $1,530,000 under the Fee Agreement.

1. The Supreme Court’s Opinion Requires Enforcement Of The Unambiguous Fee Agreement As Written. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the Fee Agreement was unambiguous. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 452 (“Given our conclusion that the agreement was not ambiguous . . . .”). The Supreme Court also required the Fee Agreement to be enforced as *48 written. See id. (“An unambiguous contract will be enforced as written . . . .”).

a. The Plain Language Of The Fee Agreement Makes Swonke’s Hours The Numerator In The Fee Formula.

As written, the unambiguous Fee Agreement twice states that the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula is Swonke’s hours, without any location-dependent limitation or restriction on those hours:

 “[T]he proportions under which my fees shall be calculated

will be the ratio of the hours I have spent or will spend on

this matter relative to the hours the attorneys at McConn & Williams have spent or will spend after the date the lawsuit was filed. . . .” (emphasis added);

 For example, if McConn & Williams' attorneys spend 1,000 hours on the lawsuit after the date the lawsuit was filed and I spend 90 hours of my time towards the lawsuit, then by rounding up to the nearest whole number, I would be entitled to receive from you 2% (10% of 20%) of the gross revenues and other benefits recovered, if any, from this lawsuit.

1 CR 312. The Supreme Court confirmed this plain language interpretation of the Fee Agreement by expressly recognizing that the numerator in the hours ratio is Swonke’s hours:

Since the fee was contingent on recovery and therefore not based on any attorney’s hourly rate, it would presumably *49 make no difference to Anglo-Dutch who besides Swonke

worked on the case as long as the fee was computed on his

hours. . . . Nor does the fee calculation, based solely on the hours Swonke spent individually, suggest that others at Greenberg Peden were excluded from the work. Taking

Swonke’s time into account provided a way of limiting the

fee.

Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 452 (emphasis added). For these reasons, the numerator in the hours ratio is the 1,299 hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit. See id.; David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450-51 (Tex. 2008) (enforcing the plain language of an unambiguous attorneys’ fee agreement and refusing to impose a limitation on fees not expressed in the agreement).

b. The Plain Language Of The Fee Agreement Requires Rounding Up To The Next Whole Percentage After The Hours Ratio Is Multiplied By 20%.

As written, the unambiguous Fee Agreement also states that the fee is a proportion of 20%, rounded up to the next whole percentage: I agree to assist Anglo–Dutch and that firm with this lawsuit for proportionately the same percentage (20%) of any benefit to McConn & Williams reflected in such agreement. . . . Further, the proportions under which my fees shall be calculated will be the ratio of the hours I have spent or will spend on this matter relative to the hours the attorneys at McConn & Williams have spent or will spend after the date the lawsuit was filed, rounded to the next whole percentage. For example, if McConn & Williams' attorneys spend 1,000 *50 hours on the lawsuit after the date the lawsuit was filed and I spend 90 hours of my time towards the lawsuit, then by rounding up to the nearest whole number, I would be entitled to receive from you 2% (10% of 20%) of the gross revenues and other benefits recovered, if any, from this lawsuit.

1 CR 312. For clarity, the Fee Agreement contains an example that shows when the rounding to the next whole percentage occurs. In the example, the hours ratio (90/1000) is multiplied by 20% resulting in a fee of 1.8%, which is then rounded up to 2%. Expressed algebraically, the example is: 90/1000 x 20% = 1.8% = 2% when rounded up to the next whole percentage. Thus, the plain language of the Fee Agreement shows that the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required occurs after, not before, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.

2. The Supreme Court’s Opinion Prohibits Rewriting The Fee Agreement Or Adding To Its Language. The corollary to the Texas Supreme Court’s mandate that unambiguous fee agreements be enforced as written is its prohibition on courts rewriting or adding language to unambiguous contracts. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 452; American Mfrs. Mut. *51 Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 162 (Tex. 2003) (Courts “may neither rewrite the parties’ contract nor add to its language.”).

a. The Trial Court Rewrote The Hours Ratio In The Fee Formula At Anglo-Dutch’s Request. Incredibly, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s prohibition on rewriting or adding language to the unambiguous Fee Agreement, Anglo-Dutch expressly invited the trial court to “re-write” the Fee Agreement:

Since the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the Fee Agreement was with GP and not Swonke, it is clearer, for analytical purposes, to re-write the Fee Agreement and replace the pronouns with the term GP . . . .”

1 CR 415 (emphasis added). Specifically, Anglo-Dutch asked the trial court to re-write the key phrase regarding the numerator in the hours ratio from “the ratio of the hours I have spent or will spend on this matter” to “the ratio of the hours GP has spent or will spend on this matter”:

Further, the proportions under which GP’s fees shall be calculated will be the ratio of the hours GP has spent or will spend on this matter relative to the hours the attorneys at McConn & Williams have spent or will spend after the date the lawsuit was filed, rounded to the next whole percentage.

*52 Id. at 416 (emphasis added); accord id. (“One need simply determine

the hours GP spent on the matter and divide them by the hours that

MW spent on the matter . . . .”) (emphasis added).

The trial court accepted Anglo-Dutch’s invitation and held that “the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula in the Fee Agreement is the hours Greenberg Peden worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit,” 1 CR 1303 ¶¶ 2-4, or, in another instance, simply inserted “Greenberg Peden Hours” into the hours ratio in the fee formula. 1 CR 524-525. But the Fee Agreement does not state, as the trial court held, that the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula is “Greenberg Peden’s hours” or only the hours Swonke worked “while at Greenberg Peden.”

Without any support in the language of the Fee Agreement, the trial court rewrote the fee formula by: (1) substituting “Greenberg Peden” in two places for “I” in the Fee Agreement; and/or (2) adding “while at Greenberg Peden” to restrict Swonke’s hours in the numerator of the fee formula to those hours he worked while at Greenberg Peden. In doing so, the trial court erred by enforcing an agreement the parties did not make. See David J. Sacks, P.C., 266 S.W.3d at 450-51 *53 (enforcing the plain language of an unambiguous attorneys’ fee agreement and refusing to impose a limitation on fees not expressed in the agreement); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 124 S.W.3d at 162 (Courts “may neither rewrite the parties’ contract nor add to its language.”).

b. The Trial Court Rewrote The Rounding Provision. Similarly, the trial court rewrote the rounding provision of the Fee Agreement. The trial court declared that “the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is determined [and] before, not after, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.” 1 CR 1303 ¶ 4. The trial court expressed its view of the rounding provision algebraically as follows:

Greenberg Peden Hours/McConn Williams Hours = X (rounded up to the next whole percentage) (X1). X1 x 20% = X2. * * * 277 Hours/11,652 Hours = 2.37% (rounded to 3%). 3% x 20% = .006%. .006 x $51,000,000.00 = $306,000.00

1 CR 525. *54 However, this rewritten rounding provision does not comport with the Fee Agreement’s plain language. This is readily apparent because, utilizing the figures in the Fee Agreement’s rounding example and applying the trial court’s holding that any rounding to the next whole percentage occurs before the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%, the fee owed is 1.8%, not the 2% set forth in the example. 19 Since the fee owed after applying the trial court’s holding to the figures in the example (1.8%) does not match the fee owed in the example (2%), the trial court’s holding cannot be correct.

On the other hand, utilizing the figures in the example and applying Swonke’s interpretation that rounding to the next whole percentage occurs after the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%, the fee owed is 2%, precisely that fee set forth in the example. 20 Consequently, Swonke’s interpretation is correct and is necessarily the agreement that Swonke and Anglo-Dutch made in the Fee Agreement. 19 90/1,000 = .09 = 9%. Because 9% is a whole percentage, no rounding up occurs. 9% x 20% = 1.8%. 20 90/1,000 = .09. .09 x 20% = 1.8% = 2% when rounded to the next whole percentage.

*55 3. The Supreme Court’s Opinion Requires The Fee Agreement To Be Construed As A Reasonable Person In Anglo-Dutch’s Circumstances Would Have Construed It, Not As Anglo-Dutch Construes It.

The Texas Supreme Court stated that “a tribunal should construe a contract between client and lawyer as a reasonable person in the circumstances of the client would have construed it.” See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 451 (quoting Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 18(2) (2000)). The Supreme Court applied this standard first to the text of the Fee Agreement and then to the surrounding circumstances. See id. at 449, 452-53.

a. A Reasonable Person In Anglo-Dutch’s Circumstances Would Have Recognized That The Numerator Is Swonke’s Hours, Not Greenberg Peden’s Hours. i. The Text Of The Fee Agreement Plainly

States That The Numerator Of The Hours Ratio Is Swonke’s Hours.

As previously noted, the text of the Fee Agreement, which Anglo- Dutch proposed, 21 twice refers to the numerator in the hours ratio as

Swonke’s hours, without any

location-dependent limitation or 21 See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 452 (“Van Dyke was not an unsophisticated client; indeed, it was he, not Swonke, who proposed the terms of the Fee Agreement.”). *56 restriction on those hours. And, as previously noted, the Supreme Court has already construed this language to mean that the fee calculation was based solely on Swonke’s individual hours because it provided a way of limiting Anglo-Dutch’s fee. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 452 (emphasis added). Thus, a reasonable person in Anglo-Dutch’s circumstances would have recognized from the text of the Fee Agreement that the numerator of the hours ratio is Swonke’s hours.

ii. The Circumstances Surrounding The Execution Of The Fee Agreement Do Not Alter Its Plain Language.

In the words of the Texas Supreme Court, “the circumstances in which the Fee Agreement was executed do not suggest that the parties must have intended something different from what they plainly stated.” Id. at 453. The Fee Agreement resulted from Anglo-Dutch’s desire to have Swonke’s—not Greenberg Peden’s—assistance in the Halliburton Lawsuit:

But Swonke’s continued counsel, based on his involvement in the events leading up to the litigation, was still needed and Van Dyke asked him to assist McConn & Williams, again for a contingent fee.

*57 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 447. And Greenberg Peden, to whom Swonke had presented the potential representation in compliance with his of counsel arrangement, had declined to represent Anglo-Dutch in the Halliburton Lawsuit because Anglo-Dutch had not paid its outstanding bills to Greenberg Peden. Id.

Under these circumstances, when Anglo-Dutch sought Swonke’s help and Greenberg Peden had refused to represent Anglo-Dutch in the Halliburton Lawsuit, it would be utterly illogical to construe the personal pronouns defining the hours ratio as referring to anyone other than Swonke. The circumstances surrounding the execution of the Fee Agreement certainly “do not suggest that the parties must have intended something different from what they plainly stated.” Id. at 453.

iii. The Post-Fee Agreement Circumstances Do Not Alter The Plain Language Of The Fee Agreement.

Again in the words of the Supreme Court, “[e]vents following the Fee Agreement do not cast the situation in a different light.” Id. at 453. When Swonke relocated from Greenberg Peden to McConn & Williams, Swonke informed Anglo-Dutch that Greenberg Peden was going to dissolve and that, absent objection (which was never made), he would *58 continue to represent Anglo-Dutch

in matters,

including the Halliburton Lawsuit, in his new position as of counsel to McConn & Williams:

But a year later, Greenberg Peden dissolved, and Swonke moved to McConn & Williams, again in an “of counsel” relationship. In a letter to Van Dyke, Swonke wrote that he would not take the Anglo-Dutch files with him if Van Dyke objected. Van Dyke did not.

Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 448-49; 1 CR 193-194, 354. At this point in time, Anglo-Dutch could have limited the fees owed under the Fee Agreement to the hours Swonke spent on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to Greenberg Peden, as it now attempts to do, by requiring that the file stay at Greenberg Peden and not allowing Swonke to take it with him to his of counsel position at McConn & Williams. But Anglo-Dutch chose to continue working with Swonke because it needed his help. Because Anglo-Dutch’s decision to permit Swonke to take the Halliburton Lawsuit file with him to his of counsel position at McConn & Williams without objection created the situation about which it now complains, Anglo-Dutch’s complaint about compensating Swonke for the time he worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while there must fall on deaf ears.

*59 With Anglo-Dutch’s knowledge, Swonke worked 1,022 hours on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel at McConn & Williams. See 1 CR 206. Included in those hours was time Swonke spent attending Van Dyke’s three-day deposition, which occurred six months after Swonke relocated from Greenberg Peden to McConn & Williams. 1 CR 206. In his deposition, Van Dyke testified in the present tense that he had a fee agreement with Swonke, and noted through his testimony that his fee agreement with Swonke was separate and distinct from his other attorneys’ fee agreements:

Q: The attorney’s fees, the written contract that you made reference to a moment ago? Van Dyke: Yes. * * * Q: Who is it with? Van Dyke: It is with – there’s actually – there are two

contracts in existence, one is with a contract with Mr. O’Quinn, Mr. McConn and Mr. Williams, and the second contract is with Mr. Swonke.

1 CR 247. Finally, Swonke received no fees from McConn & Williams or any other source for any of the hours he spent on the Halliburton Lawsuit, *60 including the 1,022 hours that he spent on the Halliburton Lawsuit after relocating from Greenberg Peden to McConn & Williams. 1 CR 206.

The post-Fee Agreement circumstances reflect that Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit for more than one thousand hours after relocating from Greenberg Peden to McConn & Williams with the expectation to be paid under the Fee Agreement by Anglo-Dutch, which knew both that Swonke was actively working on the Halliburton Lawsuit and that the Fee Agreement, the numerator in which is based on Swonke’s unrestricted and unlimited hours, was still in full force and effect. These post-Fee Agreement circumstances only bolster Swonke and the Supreme Court’s interpretation that the numerator in the hours ratio is Swonke’s hours. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 452; David J. Sacks, P.C., 266 S.W.3d at 450-51 (enforcing the plain language of an unambiguous attorneys’ fee agreement and refusing to impose a limitation on fees not expressed in the agreement).

Based on its text and the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person in Anglo-Dutch’s circumstances would have recognized that the numerator in the hours ratio is Swonke’s hours.

*61 b.

A Reasonable Person

In Anglo-Dutch’s Circumstances Would Have Recognized That The Rounding To The Next Whole Percentage Occurs After, Not Before, Multiplying The Hours Ratio By 20%. i. The Text Of The Fee Agreement Plainly

Shows That The Rounding Occurs After, Not Before, Multiplying The Hours Ratio By 20%.

As previously noted, the text of the Fee Agreement plainly states that the fee is a proportion of 20%, rounded up to the next whole percentage. And, as previously stated, Anglo-Dutch’s method of rounding does not comport with the Fee Agreement’s plain language because Anglo-Dutch’s method produces an answer different than that in the Fee Agreement’s example. Anglo-Dutch’s rounding method produces an answer of 1.8% for the example while the Fee Agreement plainly shows that proper rounding results in an answer of 2% for the example. Thus, a reasonable person in Anglo-Dutch’s circumstances would have recognized from the text of the Fee Agreement that the rounding up to the next whole percentage occurs after, not before, multiplying the hours ratio by 20%.

*62 ii. Neither The Circumstances Surrounding The Execution Of The Fee Agreement Nor Post- Fee Agreement Circumstances Alter Its Plain Language That Requires Rounding After Multiplying The Hours Ratio By 20%.

Swonke and Van Dyke discussed the rounding feature before the Fee Agreement was signed and it was clear that Van Dyke understood the rounding feature as Swonke did. 9 RR 247-48. Van Dyke never suggested during this discussion that the rounding would occur before the hours ratio was multiplied by 20%. 9 RR 249. Anglo-Dutch first asserted that the rounding should occur before the hours ratio was multiplied by 20% once the lawsuit was filed. Id. Consequently, “the circumstances in which the Fee Agreement was executed do not suggest that the parties must have intended something different from what they plainly stated” regarding when rounding occurs. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, 352 S.W.3d at 453.

C. Conclusion As explained above, the trial court erred by rendering judgment

on Anglo-Dutch’s requested numerator and rounding declarations because Anglo-Dutch waived any entitlement to the declarations and, in any event, the declarations misconstrue the Fee Agreement by *63 rewriting its plain language in violation of the Supreme Court’s opinion. These mistakes resulted in the rendition of an incorrect judgment for Swonke of $306,000 based on the parties’ stipulated facts.

Applying the trial court’s erroneous rounding declaration, but changing its numerator declaration to include in the numerator all of the hours Swonke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit without limitation or restriction, results in a fee owed under the Fee Agreement of $1,224,000, calculated as follows: (1,299/11,652) = .11148301 = 11.148301% = 12% rounded up to the next

whole percentage 12% x 20% = 2.4%

2.4% x $51,000,000 = $1,224,000 Applying the trial court’s numerator declaration, but changing its rounding declaration by rounding up to the next whole percentage after the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%, results in a fee owed of $510,000, calculated as follows:

(277/11,652) x 20% = .475455% = 1% when rounded up to the next whole percentage 1% x $51,000,000 = $510,000 *64 Changing both the trial court’s erroneous numerator and rounding declarations by including all of Swonke’s hours in the numerator and rounding to the next whole percentage after the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%, results in a fee owed of $1,530,000, calculated as follows:

1,299/11,652 = .11148301 .11148301 x 20% = 2.22966% = 3% when rounded up to the next whole percentage 3% x $51,000,000 = $1,530,000 Based on the parties’ stipulated facts, the amount owed under the Fee Agreement when properly construed is $1,530,000. The trial court erred by refusing to render judgment for Swonke in that amount. II. The Trial Court Erred By Rendering Judgment Against—And

Refusing To Render Judgment For—Swonke On His Attorneys’ Fees Claims. The trial court’s 2007 Judgment ordered Anglo-Dutch to pay to

Swonke attorneys’ fees of $352,892.50 for representation in the trial court and $75,000 for representation in the court of appeals. See 1 CR supp 121. The trial court found those attorneys’ fees to be reasonable, necessary, equitable, and just for the prosecution of Swonke’s breach of *65 contract and declaratory judgment claims, and Swonke’s defense of Anglo-Dutch’s declaratory judgment claims. Id.

As Anglo-Dutch has previously conceded, Anglo-Dutch did not appeal Swonke’s attorneys’ fees award: “Anglo-Dutch did not raise a separate and distinct appeal point concerning the award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke.” See 1 CR SUPP 394; Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C. , 267 S.W.3d 454, 464 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (“Anglo–Dutch does not challenge on appeal . . . the separate statutory fee award for litigating Swonke's contract claim under the disputed fee agreement, which the parties opted to try to the court.”), rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011); 2 CR SUPP 766-815; 3 CR SUPP 817-846, 848-901.

On remand, Swonke and Anglo-Dutch cross-moved for summary judgment on Swonke’s attorneys’ fees claims. 1 CR SUPP 77; 1 CR 271. The trial court ruled for Anglo-Dutch and interlocutorily ordered that Swonke take nothing on his attorney fees’ claims. See 1 CR 668-669. Based on that order, the trial court ultimately rendered a take-nothing judgment against Swonke on his attorneys’ fees claims. See 1 CR 1304.

*66 A. The Trial Court Erred By Granting Summary Judgment Against Swonke On His Attorneys’ Fees Claims. Anglo-Dutch sought summary judgment on Swonke’s claim for attorneys’ fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 38 on the sole ground that Swonke did not prevail on his breach of contract claim. See 1 CR SUPP 281-282. Anglo-Dutch argued that Swonke did not prevail on his breach of contract claim because the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Fee Agreement was between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, not Swonke. See 1 CR SUPP 282.

Anglo-Dutch sought summary judgment on Swonke’s claim for attorneys’ fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 37.009 on three grounds: (1) Swonke’s declaratory judgment claim raised only issues already raised by Anglo-Dutch’s original claim; (2) Swonke did not prevail on his breach of contract claim; and (3) it would not be equitable or just to award attorneys’ fees to Swonke. See 1 CR SUPP 282-284.

As shown below, none of Anglo-Dutch’s arguments support the trial court’s summary judgment against Swonke on his attorneys’ fees claims because: (1) Anglo-Dutch waived all complaints about Swonke’s attorneys’ fees award; (2) notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s opinion, *67 Swonke had standing and capacity to sue for breach of the Fee Agreement; (3) Swonke may recover Declaratory Judgment Act attorneys’ fees defending against against declaratory judgment claims; and (4) Swonke’s award of attorneys’ fees was equitable and just and Anglo-Dutch waived any complaint that it was not.

1. Anglo-Dutch’s Waiver Of All Complaints About The 2007 Judgment’s Award Of Attorneys’ Fees To Swonke Prohibited The Trial Court From Altering The Award On Remand.

As previously noted, Anglo-Dutch did not complain on appeal about the 2007 Judgment’s award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke. See 1 CR SUPP 394 (“Anglo-Dutch did not raise a separate and distinct appeal point concerning the award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke.”); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454, 464 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008); 2 CR SUPP 756- 815; 3 CR SUPP 817-846; 3 CR SUPP 848-901.

Anglo-Dutch’s failure to complain on appeal about the 2007 Judgment’s award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke waived all complaints about that award. See Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Guitar Holding Co., L.P. , 355 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) (holding that a party waived its *68 complaint about the court of appeals’ decisions regarding entitlement to attorneys’ fees and prevailing-party status by not appealing those issues to the Texas Supreme Court); City of Temple v. Taylor, 268 S.W.3d 852, 858 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (holding that, even though a party prevailed on appeal in a declaratory judgment action, that party waived all complaints regarding a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in the trial court because the attorneys’ fee award was not challenged on appeal). The complaints waived by Anglo-Dutch include all of the grounds that Anglo-Dutch asserted in its motion for summary judgment on Swonke’s attorneys’ fees claims.

Anglo-Dutch’s waiver of all complaints about the 2007 Judgment’s award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke prohibited the trial court from altering the attorneys’ fees award on remand because a trial court errs by rendering a judgment on remand that alters its own or a higher court’s prior judgment on an issue that was not appealed. See Medical Ctr. Pharmacy, 634 F.3d at 834 (holding that the district court erred by reversing on remand its prior ruling granting declaratory relief which had been waived on appeal); United Resources, L.P., 2014 WL 3339537, *69 at *3 (holding that the trial court erred on remand by modifying its prior take-nothing judgment on cross-claims because no party had attacked that part of the trial court’s judgment in an earlier appeal); Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 355 S.W.3d at 434-35 (holding that the trial court erred on remand by making a finding on prevailing-party status for attorneys’ fees purposes that conflicted with the court of appeals’ prior decision on the issue which had been waived on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court); JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 550 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court erred on remand by rendering judgment on a jury’s $3.3 million lost profits finding because the district court’s previously-rendered judgment on a $0 lost profits finding had been waived on appeal); Anderson Courier Serv., 222 S.W.3d at 66-67 (holding that the trial court erred by awarding attorneys’ fees under the declaratory judgment act on remand when any complaint that the trial court’s original judgment failed to award attorneys’ fees was waived on appeal).

Because Anglo-Dutch waived any complaint about Swonke’s attorneys’ fees award in the 2007 Judgment by not appealing that *70 award, and Anglo-Dutch’s waiver prohibited the trial court from altering the award on remand, the trial court erred by granting a take- nothing summary judgment to Anglo-Dutch on Swonke’s attorneys’ fees claims.

2. Alternatively, Even If Not Waived, Anglo-Dutch’s Grounds For Summary Judgment On Swonke’s Attorneys’ Fees Claims Lack Merit.

Alternatively, even if not waived, Anglo-Dutch’s grounds for summary judgment on Swonke’s attorney’s fees claims lack merit because, as shown below, Anglo-Dutch did not conclusively negate any element of Swonke’s attorneys’ fees claims and genuine issues of material fact remain on those claims.

a. Notwithstanding The Supreme Court’s Opinion, Swonke Had Standing And Capacity To Sue For Breach Of The Fee Agreement.

Anglo-Dutch argued that Swonke was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under chapter 38 on the sole ground that Swonke had not prevailed on his breach of contract claim since the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Fee Agreement was between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, not Swonke. See 1 CR SUPP 282. Two flaws infect this argument.

*71 First, the Texas Supreme Court’s holding that Swonke was not a party to the Fee Agreement was not dispositive of Swonke’s breach of contract claim because Swonke need not have been a party to the Fee Agreement to sue for its breach; assignees and third-party beneficiaries also have standing and capacity to sue for breach of contract. See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex. 2010) (“Because [assignee] holds contractually valid assignments, [assignee] steps into the shoes of the claimholders and is considered under the law to have suffered the same injury as the assignors and have the same ability to pursue the claims.”); Brown v. Mesa Distributors, Inc., 414 S.W.3d 279, 281-82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“In order to establish standing to maintain a breach of contract action, a plaintiff must show either third-party- beneficiary status or privity. Privity is established by proof that the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff.”); Pagosa Oil and Gas, L.L.C. v. Marrs and Smith Partnership, 323 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (parties, *72 assignees, and third-party beneficiaries have standing to sue for breach of contract).

Anglo-Dutch did not argue—much less conclusively prove—that Swonke lacked standing or capacity to sue for breach of the Fee Agreement, or that Swonke was not an assignee or third-party beneficiary of the Fee Agreement. Consequently, Anglo-Dutch was not entitled to summary judgment on Swonke’s breach of contract claim.

Second, the summary judgment evidence affirmatively showed that Swonke had capacity and standing to sue for breach of the Fee Agreement as an assignee and a third-party beneficiary of the Fee Agreement. On April 16, 2004, before this lawsuit was ever filed, Greenberg Peden assigned all of its interest in and under the Fee Agreement to Swonke. See 2 CR SUPP 723. Indeed, on remand, the trial court recognized the validity of that assignment in its May 15, 2012 Order: “[U]nder the Fee Agreement the Court determines that the attorneys’ fees due to Greenberg Peden (and now Swonke by way of assignment) are $306,000.” 2 CR SUPP 734. That assignment also identifies Swonke as the “third party beneficiary” of the Fee Agreement. See id. At a minimum, the assignment and designation of Swonke as a *73 third-party beneficiary raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment for Anglo-Dutch on Swonke’s breach of contract claim. See Brown, 414 S.W.3d at 285-86 (holding that legally sufficient evidence supported the standing of an assignee to sue for breach of contract when the contract that was assigned and the assignment were introduced into evidence).

b. Anglo-Dutch’s Grounds For Summary Judgment On Swonke’s Claim For Attorneys’ Fees Under The Declaratory Judgment Act Lack Merit.

Anglo-Dutch argued that Swonke was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under section 37.009 of the Declaratory Judgment Act for three reasons: (1) Swonke’s declaratory judgment claim only raised issues already raised by Anglo-Dutch’s original claim; (2) Swonke’s breach of contract claim failed; and (3) it would not be equitable or just to award attorneys’ fees to Swonke. 1 CR SUPP 282-284.

i. Swonke May Recover Attorneys’ Fees Under The Declaratory Judgment Act Because He Defended Against Anglo-Dutch’s Declaratory Judgment Action.

Anglo-Dutch argued that Swonke was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act because his declaratory judgment claim only raised issues already raised by Anglo-Dutch’s *74 original claim. See 1 CR SUPP 282. Anglo-Dutch relied on Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208 S.W.3d 627, 666 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied), but Montemayor itself defeats Anglo-Dutch’s argument. In Montemayor, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees to a defendant under the Declaratory Judgment Act because the plaintiff’s original claim was for a declaratory judgment. See Montemayor, 208 S.W.3d at 666-67. Indeed, Montemayor expressly states that the rule upon which Anglo-Dutch relied “does not apply where a defendant is defending against a plaintiff's declaratory judgment action.” Id.

Here, Anglo-Dutch originally brought declaratory judgment claims and Swonke defended against them. See 1 CR SUPP 300; 1 CR SUPP 392 (“Anglo-Dutch filed suit against Greenberg Peden, P.C. . . . and Swonke, seeking relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Act . . . .”). Consequently, Swonke was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Montemayor, 208 S.W.3d at 666-67.

ii. Swonke’s Breach Of Contract Claim Did Not Fail. Anglo-Dutch also argued that Swonke could not recover attorneys’ fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act because Swonke’s breach of *75 contract claim purportedly failed due to the Texas Supreme Court’s holding that Swonke was not a party to the Fee Agreement. See 1 CR SUPP 283. However, for the reasons set forth in section II.A.2.a. above, which are incorporated herein by reference, Anglo-Dutch’s argument that Swonke did not prevail on his breach of contract claim lacks merit.

iii. Anglo-Dutch Waived Its Complaint That Swonke’s Attorneys’ Fee Award Was Not Equitable And Just And, In Any Event, The Award Was Equitable And Just.

Anglo-Dutch finally argued that Swonke could not recover attorneys’ fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act because it would not be equitable and just to award attorneys’ fees to Swonke. See 1 CR SUPP 283-284. In its 2007 Judgment, the trial court expressly found that Swonke’s award of attorneys’ fees was equitable and just. See 1 CR 299. But Anglo-Dutch did not attack that conclusion of law on appeal. See 1 CR SUPP 394 (“Anglo-Dutch did not raise a separate and distinct appeal point concerning the award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke.”); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454, 464 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (“Anglo–Dutch does not challenge on appeal . . . the separate statutory fee award for litigating Swonke's contract claim under the disputed fee *76 agreement, which the parties opted to try to the court.”), rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011); 1 CR SUPP 124-183, 185-214, 216-269. Thus, Anglo-Dutch’s attack on the equitable and just nature of Swonke’s attorneys’ fees award has been waived and could not have been properly revisited on remand by the trial court.

In any event, it was equitable and just to award attorneys’ fees to Swonke under the Declaratory Judgment Act given the circumstances of this case. Swonke has thus far defeated three of Anglo-Dutch’s seven declaratory judgment claims and, when this Court reverses the trial court’s numerator and rounding declarations, Anglo-Dutch will have succeeded on only two of seven requested declarations. And neither of those declarations are significant to the ultimate issue in this case— what does Anglo-Dutch owe Swonke under the Fee Agreement? The declaration that Greenberg Peden is a party to the Fee Agreement is of no moment because, as explained above, it is not dispositive of Swonke’s breach of contract claim. The declaration that Swonke’s hours at McConn & Williams are included in the denominator in the fee formula is insignificant and was agreed to by Swonke because it does not change the fee owed to Swonke under the Fee Agreement. 1 CR 460.

*77 Moreover, the facts contained in the Statement of Facts in this brief, which are incorporated herein by reference, also demonstrate that it was equitable and just to award Swonke attorneys’ fees for his defense of Anglo-Dutch’s declaratory judgment claims. Specifically, Van Dyke’s company, Anglo-Dutch, settled the Halliburton Lawsuit for $51,000,000 and then stiffed Swonke on his fee. Anglo-Dutch then sued Swonke for a judicial declaration that it owed him nothing for the 1,022 hours he had worked on the lawsuit while at McConn & Williams even though:

 Greenberg Peden had expressly refused to represent Anglo- Dutch in the Halliburton Lawsuit and told Van Dyke so;  Van Dyke, not Swonke, proposed the disputed terms in the Fee Agreement;  Greenberg Peden is not mentioned in the body of the Fee Agreement;  The Fee Agreement uses personal pronouns twelve times in nine sentences to refer to Swonke;  Van Dyke himself testified in the Halliburton Lawsuit that Anglo-Dutch had a fee agreement with Swonke;  Swonke worked 1,022 hours on the Halliburton Lawsuit without compensation while “of counsel” at McConn & Williams because he knew he would be compensated under the Fee Agreement with Anglo-Dutch;

*78  Although Anglo-Dutch seeks to avoid paying Swonke attorneys’ fees for the 1,022 hours he worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams, Anglo-Dutch’s verdict that resulted in the $51,000,000 settlement actually included attorneys’ fees for those same hours;

 After settling the Halliburton Lawsuit for $51,000,000, Anglo-Dutch began a concerted effort to avoid its contractual obligations to numerous others who helped it prevail; and

 Swonke has not been compensated by anyone for any of his 1,299 hours of work on the Halliburton Lawsuit that helped Anglo-Dutch recover $51,000,000.

These facts demonstrate that an award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke is equitable and just. See Hoover Slovacek, L.L.P. v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2006) (“[A]ttorneys are entitled to protection from clients who would abuse the contingent fee arrangement and avoid duties owed under contract.”).

B. The Trial Court Erred By Refusing To Render Judgment Of $427,892.50 For Swonke On His Attorneys’ Fees Claims. As previously noted, Swonke moved for a partial summary judgment on his attorneys’ fees claims. 1 CR SUPP 77-270. The trial court denied that motion by ordering that Swonke take-nothing on his attorneys’ fees claims. 1 CR 668. Swonke also moved the Court to render judgment on his attorneys’ fees claims. 3 CR SUPP 1014. The *79 trial court’s final judgment denied that requested relief by rendering judgment that Swonke take nothing on his attorneys’ fees claims. 3 CR SUPP 1304. As shown below, the trial court erred by refusing to render judgment for Swonke on his attorneys’ fees claims.

A lower court’s judgment remains in force and effect as to any issue it decides that is not appealed. See Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 , 263 S.W.3d 910, 918 (Tex. 2008); Bramlett v. Phillips, 359 S.W.3d 304, 311 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012), aff’d, Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. 2013).

In Guitar Holding, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and declared certain water transfer permits and rules relating thereto invalid. See id. On motion for rehearing, the losing party argued that it had prevailed on several other issues in the court of appeals which were unchallenged—and therefore waived—in the Supreme Court. See id. The Supreme Court agreed that those issues were waived and held that “the court of appeals’ judgment remains in effect as to these abandoned issues.” Id. In Bramlett, the court of appeals succinctly stated the rule:

*80 [A]s to issues not addressed by the Supreme Court, the opinions and judgments of this Court [of Appeals] remain in force and effect. Similarly, as to those issues not addressed by either the Supreme Court or this Court [of Appeals], the [original] judgment of the trial court remains in force and effect.

Bramlett, 359 S.W.3d at 311. Indeed, a lower court’s judgment remains controlling on issues it decided that were waived on appeal even when that judgment is “reversed” by a higher court. See Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 233, 237 (Tex. 2013); Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 263 S.W.3d at 918. In Phillips, the Supreme Court held that the portion of a court of appeals’ judgment that reversed punitive damages was not reversed—but instead was “approved”—in the Supreme Court, even though the Supreme Court’s opinion, judgment, and mandate stated that the court of appeals’ judgment was reversed, because that issue went unchallenged in the Supreme Court and unaddressed in its opinion. See id. at 233, 237. Similarly, in Guitar Holding, the Supreme Court held that its reversal of the court of appeals’ judgment did not actually reverse issues decided by the court of appeals that were not appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 263 S.W.3d at 918.

*81 As previously noted, Anglo-Dutch did not appeal to any court the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Swonke in the 2007 Judgment. Consequently, the 2007 Judgment’s award of attorneys’ fees remains in force and effect. See Guitar Holding Co., 263 S.W.3d at 918; Bramlett, 359 S.W.3d at 311.

In Phillips, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that, “[b]y remanding the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with our opinion, we permitted the trial court to enter a final judgment that reflected this [Supreme] Court’s holdings and the court of appeals’ holding . . . .” Phillips, 407 S.W.3d at 237 (emphasis added). Like Phillips, by remanding this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment in accordance with its opinion, the Supreme Court in this case permitted the trial court to render a final judgment that reflected the Supreme Court’s holding—that Greenberg Peden was unambiguously a party to the Fee Agreement—and the prior decisions of the trial court and this Court that were waived on appeal, including the trial court’s award of $427,892.50 to Swonke on his attorneys’ fee claims. See id. The trial court’s refusal to render such a judgment for Swonke on his attorneys’ fees claims was error. *82 III. The Trial Court Erred By Rendering Judgment Against—And

Refusing To Render Judgment For—Swonke On His Breach Of Contract Claim. A. The Trial Court Erred By Granting Summary Judgment To

Anglo-Dutch On Swonke’s Breach Of Contract Claim. On remand, Anglo-Dutch sought summary judgment on Swonke’s breach of contract claim on the sole ground that the Texas Supreme Court had ruled that Swonke did not have a contract with Anglo-Dutch. See 1 CR SUPP 280-281. The trial court granted Anglo-Dutch’s motion and ordered that Swonke take nothing on his breach of contract claim. 1 CR 668.

However, for the reasons stated in detail in section II.A.2.a. above, which are incorporated herein by reference, Anglo-Dutch was not entitled to summary judgment on Swonke’s breach of contract claim because: Anglo-Dutch did not conclusively negate Swonke’s standing or capacity to sue for breach of the Fee Agreement as an assignee or third- party beneficiary; and the April 16, 2004 assignment from Greenberg Peden to Swonke of Greenberg Peden’s interest in the Fee Agreement raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether Swonke had standing and capacity to sue for breach of the Fee Agreement as an assignee or third-party beneficiary. For those reasons, the trial court *83 erred by granting summary judgment to Anglo-Dutch on Swonke’s breach of contract claim.

B. Alternatively, The Trial Court Erred By Refusing To Render Judgment For Swonke On His Breach Of Contract Claim. As explained above, the trial court erred by misconstruing the Fee Agreement and refusing to render judgment that Anglo-Dutch owes Swonke $1,530,000 under the Fee Agreement. In the alternative to that recovery, the trial court erred by refusing to render judgment for Swonke on his breach of contract claim.

Swonke moved the trial court to render judgment for him on his breach of contract claim. 3 CR SUPP 1014. The trial court denied Swonke’s request and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Swonke on his breach of contract claim. 1 CR 1304. As shown below, the trial court erred by refusing to render judgment for Swonke on his breach of contract claim because conclusive evidence and undisturbed jury findings from the original trial entitle Swonke to the rendition of a judgment for $1,000,000 on his breach of contract claim.

Swonke sued Anglo-Dutch for breach of the Fee Agreement. 1 CR SUPP 294-307. The elements of a breach of contract claim are: “(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance *84 by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4)

damages sustained as a result of the breach.” Sims v. Fitzpatrick, No.

01-13-00176-CV, 2014 WL 1004410, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st . Dist.] March 13, 2014, pet. denied).

The first element of Swonke’s breach of contract claim—the existence of a contract—is undisputed and was conclusively proved in the original trial. The Fee Agreement is the contract. 1 CR 312-313; Anglo Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tex. 2011) (“We hold that the agreement was between Anglo- Dutch and Greenberg Peden.”).

Moreover, the evidence conclusively proved that Swonke had standing and capacity to sue for breach of the Fee Agreement as an assignee and a third-party beneficiary of the Fee Agreement. See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex. 2010) (“Because [assignee] holds contractually valid assignments, [assignee] steps into the shoes of the claimholders and is considered under the law to have suffered the same injury as the assignors and have the same ability to pursue the claims.”). On April 16, 2004, before this lawsuit was ever filed, Greenberg Peden assigned *85 all of its interest in and under the Fee Agreement to Swonke. See 1 CR 385 (“Greenberg Peden, P.C. hereby . . . ASSIGNS all of its interest in and under the [Fee Agreement] to Swonke.”); [additional cite]. Indeed, the trial court recognized the validity of that assignment as a matter of law in its May 15, 2012 Order: “[U]nder the Fee Agreement the Court determines that the attorneys’ fees due to Greenberg Peden (and now Swonke by way of assignment) are $306,000.” (emphasis added). That assignment also identifies Swonke as the “third party beneficiary” of the Fee Agreement. See id. For these reasons, the April 16, 2004 assignment conclusively proves that Swonke had standing and capacity to sue for breach of the Fee Agreement.

The second element of Swonke’s breach of contract claim— performance by the plaintiff—is also undisputed and conclusively proved. Swonke promised in the Fee Agreement “to assist Anglo-Dutch and that firm [McConn & Williams, LLP] in this lawsuit [the Halliburton Lawsuit] . . . .” The evidence at trial conclusively proved that Swonke assisted Anglo-Dutch and McConn & Williams in the Halliburton Lawsuit, by working on the lawsuit for 277 hours while of counsel to Greenberg Peden and 1,022 hours while of counsel at *86 McConn & Williams. 1 CR 164, 184, 206, 216. Indeed, the trial court recognized in its May 15, 2012 order that Anglo-Dutch had conceded that Swonke assisted Anglo-Dutch on the Halliburton Lawsuit for 277 hours while at Greenberg Peden (“In addition, the parties have agreed that Swonke spent 277 hours on the representation while at Greenberg Peden . . . .”). 22 For these reasons, Swonke’s performance of the Fee Agreement has been conclusively proved.

The third element of Swonke’s breach of contract claim—Anglo- Dutch’s breach of the Fee Agreement—was proved in the original trial. The jury found in response to Question 2 that Anglo-Dutch failed to comply with the Fee Agreement. 1 CR 304. The trial court incorporated the finding of breach into the 2007 Judgment. 1 CR 298. And Anglo-Dutch did not attack that finding on appeal: “Anglo-Dutch does not challenge on appeal the jury’s finding that it breached the fee agreement . . . .” See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454, 464 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2008), rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). Consequently, Anglo-Dutch waived any attack on the jury’s breach finding and it remains undisturbed and 22 It is significant that Anglo-Dutch neither sought nor obtained a finding that Swonke did not comply with the Fee Agreement. See 1 CR 312-313. *87 in effect. See Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 263 S.W.3d at 918 (holding that a lower court’s judgment remains in force and effect as to any issue it decides that is not appealed); Biggar, 873 S.W.2d at 14-15 (holding that a party waived all complaints about a damage award affirmed by the court of appeals by not complaining about it in the Texas Supreme Court); see also JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 550 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court erred on remand by rendering judgment on a jury’s $3.3 million lost profits finding because the district court’s previously-rendered judgment on a $0 lost profits finding had been waived on appeal).

The fourth element of Swonke’s breach of contract claim— damages resulting from the breach—was also proved in the original trial. The jury found in response to Question 3 that $1,000,000 would fairly and reasonably compensate Swonke for his damages resulting from Anglo-Dutch’s breach. 1 CR 305. The trial court incorporated the $1,000,000 damage finding into the 2007 Judgment. 1 CR 298. And Anglo-Dutch did not challenge that finding on appeal: “Anglo-Dutch does not challenge on appeal the amount of contract damages awarded for that breach . . . .” See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l v. Greenberg *88 Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454, 464 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2008), rev’d, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). Consequently, Anglo-Dutch waived any attack on the jury’s damage finding and it remains undisturbed and in effect. See Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 263 S.W.3d at 918 (holding that a lower court’s judgment remains in force and effect as to any issue it decides that is not appealed); Biggar, 873 S.W.2d at 14-15 (holding that a party waived all complaints about a damage award affirmed by the court of appeals by not complaining about it in the Texas Supreme Court); see also JGR, Inc., 550 F.3d at 533 (holding that a district court erred on remand by rendering judgment on a jury’s $3.3 million lost profits finding because the district court’s previously- rendered judgment on a $0 lost profits finding had been waived on appeal).

Having established all four elements of his breach of contract claim either through undisturbed jury findings or conclusive evidence, Swonke is entitled to the rendition of a judgment on that claim in the amount of $1,000,000. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 301 (“The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and *89 the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity.”). IV. The Trial Court Erred By Rendering A Judgment On Prejudgment

Interest, Post-Judgment Interest, And Costs That Conflicts With Its 2007 Judgment, Which Remains In Force And Effect On Those Issues. A. Anglo-Dutch Waived Any Complaints About The Trial

Court’s 2007 Judgment On Prejudgment Interest, Post- Judgment Interest, And Costs.

The trial court has ordered Anglo-Dutch to pay Swonke $42,127.40 in prejudgment interest. See 1 CR 1304 at ¶ 13. However, the trial court’s 2007 Judgment awarded Swonke $226,924.50 in prejudgment interest. 1 CR 299. Anglo-Dutch did not complain about the trial court’s award of $226,924.50 in prejudgment interest in its appeal to this Court or the Texas Supreme Court. 1 CR SUPP 124-183, 185-214, 216-269.

The trial court has also ordered Anglo-Dutch to pay Swonke post- judgment interest on $348,127.40. See 1 CR 1305 at ¶ 16. However, the trial court’s 2007 Judgment ordered Anglo-Dutch to pay Swonke post-judgment interest on “this judgment and the amounts awarded herein,” i.e., $1,654,817. 1 CR 300. Anglo-Dutch did not complain in its appeal to this Court or the Texas Supreme Court about the trial court’s *90 order to pay Swonke post-judgment interest on the 2007 Judgment and the $1,654,817 awarded therein. 1 CR SUPP 124-183, 185-214, 216- 269.

Finally, the trial court also ordered Swonke and Greenberg Peden to pay all court costs. See 1 CR 1304 at ¶ 15. However, the trial court’s 2007 Judgment ordered Anglo-Dutch to pay all court costs. 1 CR 299. Anglo-Dutch did not complain about the trial court’s order to pay all court costs in its appeal to this Court or the Texas Supreme Court. 1 CR SUPP 124-183, 185-214, 216-269.

Anglo-Dutch’s failure to complain on appeal about the 2007 Judgment’s orders to pay $226,924.50 in prejudgment interest, post- judgment interest on $1,654,817, and costs waived any complaints about those awards. See Allright, Inc. v. Pearson, 735 S.W.2d 240, 240- 41 (Tex. 1987) (holding that a complaint about prejudgment interest is waived if not made in the court of appeals); Wohlfahrt v. Holloway, 172 S.W.3d 630, 639-40 (Tex. App.–Houston [14 th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that a complaint about an award of post-judgment interest must be properly preserved or it is waived); Thomas v. Bilby-Knight, No. 09-03-370CV, 2003 WL 22213590, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont *91 2003, no pet.) (“An issue relating to judgment for costs must be brought in a regular appeal.”); see also San Jacinto River Authority, 783 S.W.2d at 209-210 (stating that it is a “well-established rule that grounds of error not asserted by points of error or argument in the court of appeals are waived).

B. The 2007 Judgment’s Awards Of Prejudgment Interest, Post-judgment Interest, And Costs Remain In Force And Effect.

As previously noted, a lower court’s judgment remains in force and effect as to any issue it decides that is not appealed. See Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 263 S.W.3d at 918; Bramlett, 359 S.W.3d at 311. And a lower court’s judgment remains controlling on issues it decided that were waived on appeal even when that judgment is “reversed” by a higher court. See Phillips, 407 S.W.3d at 233, 237 (Tex. 2013); Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 263 S.W.3d at 918. Because Anglo-Dutch did not appeal to any court the 2007 Judgment’s awards of prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, or costs, those awards remain in force and effect. See Guitar Holding Co., 263 S.W.3d at 918; Bramlett, 359 S.W.3d at 311.

*92 C. The Trial Court Erred By Altering Its Prior Awards Of Prejudgment Interest, Post-judgment Interest, And Costs, And Refusing To Render Judgment Consistent With Its 2007 Judgment.

Anglo-Dutch’s waiver of all complaints about the 2007 Judgment’s awards of prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, and costs prohibited the trial court from altering those awards on remand because a trial court errs by rendering a judgment on remand that alters its own or a higher court’s prior judgment on an issue that was not appealed. See Medical Ctr. Pharmacy, 634 F.3d at 834 (holding that the district court erred by reversing on remand its prior ruling granting declaratory relief which had been waived on appeal); United Resources, L.P., 2014 WL 3339537, at *3 (holding that the trial court erred on remand by modifying its prior take-nothing judgment on cross- claims because no party had attacked that part of the trial court’s judgment in an earlier appeal); Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 355 S.W.3d at 434-35 (holding that the trial court erred on remand by making a finding on prevailing-party status for attorneys’ fees purposes that conflicted with the court of appeals’ prior decision on the issue which had been waived on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court); JGR, Inc., 550 F.3d at 533 (holding that a *93 district court erred on remand by rendering judgment on a jury’s $3.3 million lost profits finding because the district court’s previously- rendered judgment on a $0 lost profits finding had been waived on appeal); Anderson Courier Serv., 222 S.W.3d at 66-67 (holding that the trial court erred by awarding attorneys’ fees under the declaratory judgment act on remand when any complaint that the trial court’s original judgment failed to award attorneys’ fees was waived on appeal). Therefore, the trial court erred by rendering a judgment inconsistent with the 2007 Judgment’s awards of $226,924.50 in prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest on $1,654,817, and costs, and refusing to render a judgment consistent with the 2007 Judgment on those issues.

PRAYER For these reasons, Swonke requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s 2014 Judgment decrees 2(1), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16. Swonke also requests that this Court render judgment that Anglo-Dutch pay Swonke $1,530,000 under the Fee Agreement, $427,892.50 in attorneys’ fees, $226,924.50 in prejudgment interest, *94 post-judgment interest on $1,654,817, and court costs. Swonke also requests all other relief to which he is entitled.

Respectfully submitted, R USTY H ARDIN & A SSOCIATES , LLP

__/s/ Joe Roden_____________

Rusty Hardin State Bar No. 08972800 Joe Roden State Bar No. 00794549 Ryan Higgins State Bar No. 24007362 1401 McKinney Street, Suite 2250 Houston, Texas 77010 Telephone: 713-652-9000 Facsimile: 713-652-9800 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it contains conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. The document also complies with the word-count limitations of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i), as it contains 14,426 words, excluding any parts exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 9.4(i)(1).

___/s/ Joe Roden ________ Joe Roden

*95 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of Appellees’ Merits Brief has been served via electronic service on Mr. Kenneth Breitbeil, Mr. David Louie, McFall, Sherwood & Eidman, P.C., 1331 Lamar Street, 1250 Four Houston Center, Houston, Texas 77010-3027 and Christopher S. Johns, Johns, Marrs, Ellis & Hodge, LLP, 805 W. 10 th Street, Suite 400, Austin, Texas 78701 on April 6, 2015.

___/s/ Joe Roden __________

Joe Roden

*96 NO. 14-14-00706-CV IN THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL, INC. and ANGLO-DUTCH (TENGE) L.L.C., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C. and GERARD J. SWONKE, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. CROSS-APPELLANTS' APPENDIX A. Fee Agreement dated October 16, 2000 B. Final Judgment dated January 22, 2007 C. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Inti v. Greenberg Peden, P. C,

267 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.J 2008) D. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Inti v. Greenberg Peden, P. C, 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011) E. Trial Court's May 15, 2012 order construing the Fee Agreement as a matter of law and applying that construction to stipulated facts

*97 F. Trial Court's May 23, 2013 order granting interlocutory summary judgment against Swonke on his claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and attorneys' fees

G. Trial Court's May 13, 2014 Final Judgment 2 *98 APPENDIX A *99 .<. ~GREENBERG PEDEN P.C.

TELEPHONE: (713) 627-Z72JJ

FACSI:MILE: (713) 627-7f157

ATTORNEYS AN"D COUN"SELORS AT LAW WEBSITE:www.gpsolaw .com TENTH FLOOR. 12 GREENWAY PLAZA HOUSTON. TEXAS 77046

October 16, 2000 Mr. Scott v_ Van Dyke Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. Eight Greenway Plaza, Suite 900 Houston, Texas 77046

Re: Cause No. 2000-22588; Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) eta[ vs. Ramco, et aL; In th~ 15l't Judicial District ofHarris County, Texas. Dear Scott: This letter memorializes our agreement with respect to me assisting you and/or the companies which you control (Anglo-Dutch) and the law firm of McConn & Williams, LLP regarding the above referenced matlf<L In that regard, you ha~e executed a Fee Agreement with the law firm of McConn & Willi~ on March 25, 2000, which is incorporated herein by reference. I !1-gree to assist Anglo-Dutch and that firm in this lawsuit for proportionately the same percentage (20%) of any benefit- to McConn & · Williams reflected in such agreement. However, I will not be responsible for any expenses other than those I may personally incur. Further, the proportions under which my fees shall be calculated will be the ratio of the hours I have spent or will spend on this matter relative to the hours the attorneys at McConn & Williams have spent or will spend after the date the lawsuit was filed, rounded to the next whole percentage. For exa..rilple, if McConn & Williams' attorneys spend 1,000 hours on the lawsuit after the date the lawsuit was ffied and I spend 90 hours of my time towards the lawsuit, then by rounding up to nearest whole number, I wo,uld be entitled tq receive from you 2% (10%' of20%) of the gross revenues and other benefits reeovered, if any, from this lawsuit. In addition, should the Fee Agreement be amended, you agree that I shall be entitled to the benefit of such amendment. If this comports with your understanding of our agreement, please indicate by signing below and returning this letter to me. If you. have any questitms, please contact me.

, ·:"}i;cB:~rnt. , ~c l&=m - 3. .

:-~Jl}lviqot}~ . GJS 000928 ANG20J!Z\03lU7Y795 1 JWORD 10/17/DO -

312 *100 Nfr. Scott V. Van Dyke rage 2 AGREED TO:

, PRESIDENT OF OLEUM INTERNATIONAL, INC. 0

ANG20312\03!\179795 1

!WORD 10f!7/00 . - GJS 000929

313 *101 APPENDIXB *102 o-lf- 1 Pt8

~'1 PGE 0 \ ~ \. cp..BISSE.

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c'r\1'1 pistno\ c\el'l<. l~~ 'l. 1 1n\)1 CAUSE NO. 2004-20712 ~arnsODuni:Y•Ie')(.as peput'i AN-GLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM § IN THE DISTRicfiY OURT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and § ANGLO-DUTCH (TENGE}, LLC §

Plaintiffs, § § vs. .§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS §

GREENBERG PEDEN, P .C. and § GERARD J. SWONKE .§

Defendants 61st JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FINAL JUDGMENT

On November 27, 2006, this case was called for trial.· I. Plaintiffs Anglo-Dutch Petroleum InternationaL Inc., and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), I.LC, appeared through its corporate representative and its attorneys and announced ready for trial Scott Van Dyke appeared in person and through his attorneys and aiJ:?-onnced ready for trial. ll. Defendants

Defendant Gerard J. Swanke appeared in perso:ri and through his attorneys and announced ready for trial. Defendant Greenberg Peden, P.C. appeared though its attorneys and announced ready for trial. III. Trial

@ Before testimony began, all parties agreed that all issues regarding attorneys' fees would C) <!. not be submitted to the jury, but would be separately determined by the . Court after the jurj ~ -

returned a verdict.

~---- _....J--_.:...--- .. ER'S NIEMOAANOUM RECORD , . ^[15] of poor qualir{

000800 This instrumen' . at the time ofl~~~ ^[1] ll\1 ... 297

~[

*103 ( J

After a jury was impaneled. and sworn, it heard the evidence and arguments of counsel. In response to the jury charge, the jury made :findings that the Court received, filed, and entered of record on December 11, 2006. _The questions submitted to the jury and the jury's findings are attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference. IV. Attorneys' Fees

Defendants sought an award of attorneys' fees. On January 12, 2007, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs and Defendants appeared through counsel and presente<i evidence regarding attorneys' fees. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court determined the amounts of the Defendants' reasonable and necessary, equitable and just attorneys' fees incurred and to be incurred in the defense and prosecution of this case. Those amounts are set forth below. The Court also determined that an award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff would not be equitable or just V. .Judgment Decrees

Because ~e jury's verdict was for Defendants and against Plaintiffs, Judgment should be and is now hereby RENDERED on the verdict in favor of Defendants Gerard J. Swanke and Greenberg Peden, P.C., and against Plaintiffs Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC and Counter-defendant Scott Van Dyke.

1. Take-Nothing .Judgment Against Plaintiffs. The Court ORDERS that Plaintiffs Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-

Dutch (Tenge), LLC and Counter-defendant Scott Van Dyke TAKE NOTHING from Defendants Gerard J. Swanke and-Greenberg Peden, P.C. ·

2. Partial Take-Nothing Judgment Against Defendants On Fraud and Exemplary Damages Cl:iims. 1 00080\

298

*104 The Court ORDERS that Defendants Gerard J. Swanke and Greenberg Peden, P.C. take nothing from Plaintiffs Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC and Counter-defendant Scott Van Dyke on Defendants' fraud and exemplary damages claims.

3. Judgment For Defendant Gerard J. Swonke. The Court ORDERS Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge),

LLC, jointly and severally, to pay Gerard J. Swanke the sum of$ 1,000,000.00 and prejudgment interest on the amount totaling $ 226,924.50.

4. Attorneys' Fees. The Court further ORDERS Plaintiffs Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and

Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) LLC, jointly and severally, to pay Defendant Gerard J. Swonke the following reasonable and necessary, equitable and just amounts as attorneys' fees for the prosecution of Defendant Gerard J. Swanke's breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims, and Defendant Gerard J. Swanke's defense of the declaratory judgment claim of Plaintiffs Anglo- Dutc1J. Petroleum International, !nc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) LLC:

$ 35;<, ?Jf;L • 50 -- from April 22, 2004 to rendition of this

(A)

:final judgment; $ 7~ QQO .. 00 --

(B) in the event Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int;rn:onal, Inc. and/or Anglo-Dutch· (Tenge), LLC unsuccessfully appeals to a court of appeals; and $ 5::)\ (JCX), QQ in the event Anglo-Dtuch Petroleum

(C) Intematfonal, Inc. and/or Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC unsuccessfully appeals to the Texas Supreme Court.

5. Costs of Court. The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch

(Tenge), LLC, jointly and severally, to pay all costs of court expended or :incurred in this action by ,. Defendants Gerard J. Swonke and Greenberg Pederi., P .C. 3 000802 299 *105 _( • ''l / - _) 6. Post-Judgment Interest. The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch

(Tenge), LLC, jomtly and severally, to pay post:-judgment mterest on this judgment and the amounts awarded herem at the rate of eight and one-quarter (8.25%) per annum, compounded annually, from the date of this judgment until paid.

7. Writs. The Court ORDERS execution to issue for this judg;ment. ·

VI. Finality of Judgment This judgment is final, disf,oses of all claims and parties, and is appealable. JAN 2·2 2007

SIGNED this __ day of _______ ___,

4 000803 300 *106 ,. " .-. '·,'·· ·. __ ) -··: I .. .

CAUSE NO. 2004-20712

ANGLO"DUTCH PETROLEUM § iN THE DJSTRlCT COURT lNTERNATlONAL, INC. and § ANGLO-DUTCH (TENGE), LLC §

Plaintiffs, § HARRIS COU~,.f!=Y4~ E D

§

•..A'itl:it:niACAR.ISSE vs. § .bllltrict Clerk §· DEC-- 7 2006 GREENBERG PEDEN, P .C. and .§ 61st JUDICIAl ffis"fRf&1'ty, ·r..xns GERARD J. SWONKE §

·ny_ ~ Defendants Deputy CHARGE OF THE COURT· ·. ' ..

LADIES AND. GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:

This case is submitted to you by asking questions about the facts, which you must' decide from the evidence you have heard in this triaL You are the sole judges of .the credibility. of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but.in matters of taw, you must be governed by the instructions in ·this charge. In discharging your responsibUity on this jury; you wjJl observe all the instructions which have previously been· · given you. ·I shall now give you additional-instructions which you should carefully and ·strictly follow during your deliberations: ·:

· · · · · ...... ·. · ba··.n~t i~t .b.ii3s, ·prejudi~~ ~~ ~y~p~thy pi·ay. ~ny p~rt in y~u~ d·~!iberations. ·. · .· · · ·1·. _ ~- In arri~ing at ydu,r ~oswe~~ •. cic;n~ict~r .-o~ly the evidence i~trad·u~~d ·.h~re · under oath and such exhibits,. if any, as. have been introduced for your cons'ideh3tion · under the rulings of the court, that is, what you have seen ·and heard jn tflis courtroom, · together with the _law as given you by ipe· court, In your deliberai;ions, you will not consider or discuss anything that is not represented by the evidence ·in' this case. ·

3. Since every answer that is requii-ed by the charge ls important, no ju.ror should state or consider that any required answer -is not important You must not decide who you think should win, and then try to answer the 4. questions accordingly. Simply answer the questions, and do not discuss nor concern. yourselves with th·e effect of your answers.. ·

You will not decide the ans_werto a question by lot or by drawing straws, or 5. by any other method of c.hance. ·Do not return a quotient verdict. A ·quotient verdict _ means that :the jurors agJ1?e to ·abide by the result to be· reached by adding together each juror's figures and dividing by the number of jurors to get an average. Do nat do· any trading on your answers; that is,· one juror should not agree to answer a certain question one way if others Will agree to answer another question another way.

- l- Exhibit A 000826 *107 ) 6. You may render your verdict upon the vote of ten or more members of the jury. The same ten or more of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the entire verdict You will not, therefore, enter into an agreement to be bound by a. majortty or any other vote of less than ten jurors. If the verdict and an of the answers therein are reached by unanimous ?Qreement, the presiding juror shall sign the verdict for the entire jury. If any juror disagrees as to any answer made by the verdict, those jurors who agree to all findings shall each sign the verdict

These instructions are given you because your conduct is subject to review the same as that of the witnesses, parties, attorneys am:j the judge. If it should be found that you have disregarded any of these instructions, it will be jury misconduct ·and it may require another trial by another jury; then all of our time will have been wasted.

The presidi"ng juror or any other who observes a violation of the court's instructions shall immediately warn the one w~o is violating tlie same and caution the juror not to do so ag·ain. . .

. When words are used hi this charge in a sense that varies from the meaning commonly understood, you are givE?n a proper legal definition, which you are bound to accept in place of any other meaning ..

Answer "Yes." or "No" to au· qyestions ~nless otherwise instructed. A ·"yes" answe~, · !~must be· based on· a preponderanCe of the evidence unless otherwise instructed. If you do\.· .. :n0tfind that a preponderance of the ·evidence supports a "Yes" answer, lhen answer aNa."·.··

The tenn "preppnderance of the :evidence" means th£? greater weight and degree of -;credible testimony .or ~vidence .introduced. ·before ·you and admitted in this .case.: :::Whenever a question requires an answer other than "Yes" or "No," your answer must be:. :based on a preponderance of th? eyidence unless otherwise instructed .

. ...... -2- 000'827 *108 .. - . J ' )

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both. . A fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial evidenc.e when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from other facts proved.

In answering questions about damages, answer each question separately. Do· not increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of the instructions in or your answers to any other questions about damages. Do not speculate about what any party's ultimate recovery may or may nat be. Any recovery wm be determined by the court when it applies the law to your answers at the time of judgment

The "Fee Agreementn means Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. "Halliburton Lawsuit" means "the lawsuit brought .. by Anglo-Dutch against

Halliburton, Ramco Oil & Gas et al. and styled Cause No. 2000-22588, Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) LLC, eta/. v. Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd., eta/.

"Anglo-Dutch" means Anglo-Dutch Petroi(3Um International, Inc. and Anglo~Dutch (T.Snge) LLC. . . - .. ·· . ' . "Swanke" mear:is Gerard J, Swanke~ ;'Van Dyke" mearlS Scott\lan Dyke ..

~ ... -3- .... 000828 i . *109 QUESTION 1 Do you tind that the Fee Agreement with Anglo-Dutch (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) was entered into on behalf of Greenberg Peden, or on behalf of Swanke, individually? You must decide the agreemenfs meaning by determining the intent of the parties at the time of the agreement. Consider all .the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement, the interpretation placed on the agreement by the parties, and the conduct of the parties. As to your two choices below, you must answer uYES" as to only one, and "NO"

as to the other. · Answer:· l AID On behalf of Greenberg Peden On behalf of Swanke, individually

-4- 000829 .. *110 .I i, QUESTION NO. 2 Did Anglo-Dutch fail to comply with the Fee Agreement?

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Answer "Yes" or "No": -+ -= - - - - - - -5- 000830 *111 If you answered ''Yes" to Question No. i as to Swanke, individu~lly, and ''Yes" to Question No.2, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

QUESTION NO. 3

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Swanke for his damages, if any, that resulted from such failure to comply! Con~tder tt1e following eleme.nts of damages, if any; and none· oth~r. The amount Anglo-Dutch agreed to pay Swanke in the Fee Agreement for the Halliburton settlement. De not add any amount fcir interest on damages, if any. Answer in dollars and cents for damages, if ariy:

-6- 00083\ *112 ; : i "., I

' ' lf you answered ''Yes" to Question No.1 as to Greenberg Peden, and "Yes" to Question No. 2, then answer the following question. OtheiWise, do not answer the following question.

QUESTION NO. 4

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compehsate Greenberg Peden for its damages,·if any, that resulted from such failure to comply? '

' Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none 'other. The amount Anglo-Dutch agreed to pay in the Fee· Agreement for the Halliburton settlement · Do not add any amount for i!lterest on damages, lf ·any.

. . . ' Answer in dollars and cents for damages, if any: . '·:' Answer. $ ____ ~-~~---·~·~··--~~--,._·_· __ __ -7- 000832 *113 ... QUESTlON 5 Did Swanke comply with his fiduciary duty to Anglo-Dutch? As Anglo-Dutch's attorney, Swanke owed Anglo-Dutch a fiduCiary duty. To prove

that.he complied with his fiduciary duty, Swanke must show: . . a. The transactions in question were fair and equitable to Anglo-Dutch; b. Swanke made reasonable use of the confidence that Anglo-Dutch placed in

him; c·. Swanke acted in the utmost good faith and exercised the mast scrupulous honesty toward Anglo-Dutch; . . . d. Swanke placed the interests of Anglo-Dutch before his own, did not use the advantage of his position to gain any benefit for himself at the expense of Anglo-Dutch, and did not place: himself in any _position where his self-interest might conflict with his obligations as a fiduciary; and

e. Swanke. fu!ly an-d fairly disclo::>ed all important information to Anglo-Dutc~~ concerning the transactions. · ·: · · Answe-r ''YES" or:;'NO": · Answer.

... . . -ll- 000833 *114 If your answer to Question 5 is "NO," and you did not answer Question 3 with .a dollar amount, then answer Question 6. Otherwise, do not answer Question 6.

QUESTION 6

What was the amount of Swanke's fees, lf any, under the Fee Agreement? Answer in dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ _ _ ..... X..,_..,. _____ _

-9- 000834 *115 •, . \ \ ~ If your answen .... Gluestion 5 is "NO," then answer Ou ... ;:;tion 7. Otherwise, do· not' answer Question 7. You are instructed that, in order for you to answer the following question "Yes,'' your answer must be unanimous. ~

QUESTION 7

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Anglo-Dutch resulted from malice or fraud? "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a 'firm belief or conviction· of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

"Malice" means a specific intent by Swanke to cause substantial injury or ~arm to Anglo-Dutch~ Fraud occurs when- · a. a party'makes a material misrepresentation, b. the misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or made

'recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as .a positive assertion, c. the misrepresentation is made wlth the intention that it should be acted onr by the ·o~her party, and ·. d. the other party relies on the misrepresentation and thereby suffers' injury. Fraud also OCCUrS When~ · . . a. a partY fails" to '·disClose a rriateiiallact'witliin the' knowledge of that party, b. the party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not

. hav.e an_·eqqal o.pportunity to discpver the truth, · .. . . .. . .... . .. . . . c. the party intends to induce the other party to take some action b\Vfailing to J;;t:? I · · ~ disclose the fact, and · . d. the other party suffers· injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact. · · · "Misrepresentation" means: a. a false l=>tatement of fact, b. a promise of future performance m?de with an intent, at the time the

·promise was made, not to perform as promised, · c. a statement of opinion· based on a false statement of fact, d. a statement of opinion that the maker knows to be false, or e. an expression of opinion that is false, made by one claiming or implying to

have special knowledge of the subject matter~ the opinion. "Special knowledge" mean's knowledge or information superior to that possessed by the other party and to which the other party did not have equal access. Answer "YES" or "NO": Answer: "K

000835 - 10- *116 \

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If your answer to Question 7 is "YES," then answer Question 8. Otherwise, do not answer Question 8. You are instructed that, in order for you to find exemplary damages, your answer to the question regarding the amount of such damages must be unanimous. . -

QUESTION 8

What sum of money, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against Swanke and awarded to Ang!o-Dutch as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 7? ·

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion· award as a penalty or by way of punishment Factors to consider in awa:rded exemplary damages; if any, are- a. The nature of the wrong.- b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpability of Swanke. d. The situation af.ld sensibilities of the parties concerned.

- e: The extent to which such conduct offen4s' a puclic sense of justice and·; J8. propriety. _ . - f. The net wonh qf Sw.o'nke .. '. ' Answer in.dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ · )<' _' -

- 11 -

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*117 If you answered "Yes" to Question No.1 as to Swanke, individually, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. . QUESTlON NO.9 Did Van Dyke commit fraud agafnst'Swonke? Fraud occurs when a promise; of future performance· is made with an intent, at

the time the promise was made, not to perform as promised. JN 6 Answer "Yes" or "No": ·--~~~~--------- 000837

- 1:!-

*118 If your answer 'to Question No. 9 Is "Yes," then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

QUESTION NO. 10

. What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash,.would fairly and reasonably compensate Swanke for his damages, if any, that resulted from such fraud? Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other .

. . The amount Anglo-Dutch agreed to pay Swanke. Do not add any amount fudnterest on damages, if any.

:Answer separately in dollars and cents for damages, if any: . - .·· Answer. $._·_·_·'-X__,_··_·. ___ · · · · · 000838 *119 If you have answered "Yes" to Question No_ 9, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. You are instructed that. in order for you to answer the following question "Yes," your answer must be unanimous.

QUESTION N0:1.1

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Swanke resulted from fraud or malice? · Answer "Yes" or uNo." _)('

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the :truth of the allegations sought to

be estal;llished_

.. "Fraud" me:aris fraud other than constructive· fraud: UM~Iice" means a specific intent by Van Dyke to .cause s~bstantra1Jnjury ~r

harm to Swanke. · - 14- .000839

)

*120 If you have answered "Yes" to Question No. i 1, thEm answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following ques_tioo. You are instructed that, ln order for you to find exemplary damages, your answer to the question regarding the amount of such damages must be unanimous.

QUESTION NO. 12

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in c·ash, should be assessed against Van Dyke and awarded to Swanke as exemplary damages, if any, fo-r the conduct found in response to Question 11? ·

"Exemplary damages'' means ~m amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment. Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, ifany, are- a. The nature of the wrcirig. b. The character 9fthe conduct involved. c.· The degree ofcul_papilio/ of Van Dyke. d. The .situation and sensibilities ofthe parties concerned. e. The extenno wriicti such c~n.duct offends a public sense at justice anct

·propriety. · · [ The networtli ofVan Dyke .. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. v $ ____ ~~-------- ( -15- 000840 *121 After you retire to the jury room, you wiil seleCt your own presiding juror. Th~ first thing the presiding juror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud and then you will. deliberate upon your answers to the questions asked.

It is the duty of the presiding juror- 1. to preside duting your deliberations, 2. to see that your .deliberations .are conducted in an orderly manner and in

accordance with the instructions in this charge, 3. · to write out and hand to the bailiff any communications concerning the case that you desire to have delivered to the judge, to vote on the questions, - 4. to write your ~ns~ers to the questions in the spaces provided, and ·5. 6. to certify to- your ·verdict in the space provided for the presiding juror's

signature or to ._obtain 'the signatures of all the jurors who agree with the verdict if your verdict is less than unanimous .

. . · . . . You should. riot discuss ·the case with anyone, not even wlth other memberS of tfie jury; unless all of .you:ar:e: pr.e.sent and .assembl~d in th~ jury room.' Should ~nyone attempt to talk to· you about' the ·case before the verdict is returned, whether at the . cowrlhouse, at your home, or elsewhere, please inform the judge ofthis fact.

. . : : . ' When you have:··a'n·s~e'r~d aU the questions you are required to answer under the instructions of the judge and you·r presiding juror has placed your answers in the spaces provided and signed the verdict· as presiding juror or obtained the signatures, you will inform the bailiff at the door of the jury room that you have reached a verdict, and then you will retum into court with your verdict.

- 16- 00084\

CERTlFlCATE

*122 We, the jury, have answered the above and foregoing questions as herein indicated, and herewith return same into court as our verdict I certify that the jury was unanimous in answering the following questions: Answer "~llu or list questions: _..:;:,2~-----------'----

Printed Name of Prestding Juror · {lfihe answers to sqme question·s were not ·unanimous, the jurors wlio agreed to those answers must certifY l?S follo'A(s:). . . . . . . . . · . :

. . . . .. · . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . ' . . . ' We agree to the answers to the following questions: list questiomt ·-\-. ··~ ·: 5 · 9- ·

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. - . . . . . ' 1·2. ___ .,.......,~....-..-'----"-"-- ..... · . . . . 000843 *124 APPENDIX C *125 Petroleum intern., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 267 S.W.3d 454 West Headnotes (23) Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.). Appeal and Error [1] ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL, Cases Triable in Appellate Court INC. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., Appellants Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is v. a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C. and Gerard J. Swanke, Appellees. Cases that cite this headnote Aug. 26, 2008. No. 14-07-00343-CV. [2] Contracts Synopsis Construction as a whole Background: Former client brought action seeking Contracts declaration that it did not owe attorney contingency fees. Extrinsic circumstances Attorney counterclaimed. The 6lst District Court, Harris To determine whether a contract is ambiguous, a County, John J. Donovan, J., entered judgment on a jury court looks at the agreement as a whole in light verdict for attorney, and former client appealed.

of the circumstances present when the parties entered the agreement.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, William J. Boyce, J., held Cases that cite this headnote that: [3] Appeal and Error [1] contingency fee agreement was ambiguous regarding Conduct of trial or hearing in general whether the fees were owed to attorney individually or to firm An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision in which attorney was "of counsel;"

to submit or refuse a particular instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. [2] ambiguity in agreement would not be construed against attorney as the drafter;

Cases that cite this headnote [3] evidence was sufficient to establish that attorney did not breach his fiduciary duty when he drafted fee agreement; [4] Trial

Authority to instruct jwy in general [ 4] evidence was sufficient to establish that client owed the Trial contingency fees to attorney rather than to firm; Definition or explanation of terms A trial court enjoys wide discretion in framing [5] instructions adequately informed the jury regarding the a jwy charge and is given broad latitude consideration of the client's perspective offee agreement; and to determine the propriety of explanatory instructions and definitions.

[6] trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that investors had funded the underlying action, that

1 Cases that cite this headnote former client did not pay investors their contracted amounts, and that former client did not pay legal fees owed to other law

[5] Appeal and Error firms in unrelated actions. Rulings on admissibility of evidence in general Affirmed. *126 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008)

An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision printed on law firm's stationery and attorney to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of signed agreement under law firm's signature discretion. block, agreement's text did not reference law

firm, agreement made multiple references to the l Cases that cite this headnote attorney individually, attorney was of counsel to law firm, and law firm had refused to do any further work for former client because of unpaid Trial

[6] legal fees. Admission of evidence in general Trial Cases that cite this headnote Exclusion of improper evidence A trial court abuses its discretion in admitting or [10] Contracts excluding evidence if it acts without reference Intention of Parties to any guiding rules and principles, or if the act A court's primary concern when interpreting a complained of is arbitrary and unreasonable. contract is to ascertain and give effect to the Cases that cite this headnote intent of the parties as that intent is expressed in the contract. [7] Appeal and Error Cases that cite this headnote Rulings as to evidence and instructions An appellate court must uphold a trial court's [111 Contracts evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis Language of contract in the record to support it. A contract's language is the primary evidence of 1 Cases that cite this headnote the intent of the parties to the contract. Cases that cite this headnote

[8] Appeal and Error Evidence in General [12] Contracts Appeal and Error Construction as a whole Prejudicial Effect When construing a contract, a court examines A successful challenge to evidentiary rulings and considers the entire writing in an effort to usually requires the complaining party to show harmonize and give effect to all the provisions that the judgment turns on the particular evidence of the contract so that none will be rendered excluded or admitted. meaningless. Cases that cite this headnote Cases that cite this headnote [9] Declaratory Judgment [13] Contracts Questions for jury Construction as a whole Contingency fee agreement former client had Contracts entered into regarding attorney's assistance Extrinsic circumstances in legal action was ambiguous with respect To determine whether a contract is ambiguous, a to whether attorney contracted for himself court looks at the agreement as a whole in light individually or for law firm, and thus issue of the circumstances present when the parties of the parties' intent was for the jury to entered into the agreement. determine, in trial of former client's lawsuit seeking declaration that it did not owe attorney

Cases that cite this headnote the contingency fees; though agreement was *127 Cases that cite this headnote [14] Contracts Existence of ambiguity A contract is unambiguous if it can be given a [18] Attorney and Client definite or certain meaning. Pleading and evidence Evidence was sufficient to establish that attorney Cases that cite this headnote did not breach his fiduciary duty to client by drafting contingency fee agreement which was

[15] Contracts ambiguous in regard to whether fees were owed Existence of ambiguity to attorney individually or to law firm, in trial of Contracts former client's lawsuit seeking declaration that Ambiguity in general it did not owe attorney the contingency fees; attorney testified that he had explained on many If a contract is subject to two or more reasonable occasions his "of counsel" status at law firm, interpretations, then the contract is ambiguous client acknowledged that law firm had refused and the jury is entitled to resolve the fact issue to assist client in the undedying action due to concerning the parties' intent. unpaid legal bills and that attorney had referred Cases that cite this headnote client to a second law firm, and attorney testified that, after client had retained second law firm, client still requested attorney's personal services

[16] Contracts in the underlying action and that when agreement Existence of ambiguity was negotiated he explained to client and client An ambiguity in a contract can be patent or understood that agreement was with attorney latent; a "patent ambiguity" is evident on the individually and not the law firm. contract's face, while a "latent ambiguity" arises from a collateral matter when a contract that

Cases that cite this headnote appears to be unambiguous on its face is applied to its subject.

[19] Attorney and Client Employment Cases that cite this headnote Evidence was sufficient to establish that under the terms of ambiguous contingency fee

[17] Attorney and Client agreement former client owed contingency fees Construction and Operation of Contract to attorney individually rather than to law Ambiguity in contingency fee agreement firm, in trial of former client's lawsuit seeking regarding whether attorney contracted for declaration that it did not owe attorney the himself individually or for law firm would not be contingency fees; though agreement was printed construed against attorney as the drafter, in trial on law firm's stationery, agreement's text did of former client's lawsuit seeking declaration not reference law firm, agreement made multiple that it did not owe attorney the contingency references to the attorney individually, attorney fees, where the client was sophisticated and testified that client understood that he was "of experienced, agreement was not presented counsel" at law firm, client acknowledged that to client on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and law firm had refused to do any further work agreement was instead negotiated between for client because of unpaid legal fees, attorney attorney and client after attorney's law firm told testified that contingency fee agreement was client it would not undertake the representation negotiated after client requested his continued due to unpaid legal bills. Restatement (Third) assistance on underlying action after such action The Law Governing La\\oyers § 18. had been referred to a second law firm, and *128 attorney testified that client understood fees were Cases that cite this headnote owed to him rather than law firm. Cases that cite this headnote

[23] Attorney and Client Evidence [20] Appeal and Error Declaratory Judgment Conduct oftrial or hearing in general Admissibility Because a trial court enjoys wide discretion Witnesses in determining which instructions should be Competency of contradictmy evidence included in the jury charge, review is limited Trial court did not abuse its discretion, in trial to determining whether the court acted without offormer client's lawsuit seeking declaration that reference to any guiding rules or principles. under terms of contingency fee agreement it did not owe attorney individually the contingency

Cases that cite this headnote fees but instead owed the fees to firm in which attorney was "of counsel," by admitting evidence

[21] Attorney and Client that client entered into agreements with investors Instructions to fund underlying action, testimony by one of Instructions adequately informed the jury the investors that he had to sue attorney's former regarding the consideration of the client's client when he was asked to accept less than what perspective of fee agreement and the fiduciary he had contracted for after underlying action was duties attorney owed client, in trial of former settled, and evidence that former client had not client's lawsuit seeking declaration that under paid fees it owed to other law firms in unrelated the terms of contingency fee agreement it did actions; evidence of the investment agreements not owe attorney individually the contingency went to attorney's individual work with respect to fees but instead owed the fees to law firm in the investors, and evidence that former client did which attorney was "of counsel," by providing not pay investors their contracted amounts and that the jury was to consider all of the facts did not pay bills owed to other law firms went to and circumstances surrounding the making of the credibility of client's owner when he testified the agreement, the interpretation placed on the that client did not owe attorney the fees. agreement by the parties and the conduct of the

1 Cases that cite this headnote parties, and by separately instructing the jury on attorney's fiduciary duties and submitting question on whether attorney breached his fiduciary duties in regard to the fee agreement.

Attorneys and Law Firms 1 Cases that cite this headnote *457 Gregory S. Coleman, Donald B. McFall, Richard B. Farrer, Austin, *458 Kenneth R. Breitbeil, Ke1meth Wayne

[22] Trial Bullock II, Houston, TX, for appellants Matters oflaw Trial Rusty Hardin, Joe M. Roden, Ryan Kees Higgins, Houston, Duty to give requested instruction; TX, for appellees. erroneous requests Panel consists of Justices FOWLER and BOYCE and Senior Not every correct statement of the law belongs Justice HUDSON. * in a jury charge; a requested instruction can set forth a correct statement of the law and still be unnecessary in the charge.

OPINION

*129 Petroleum !ntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008) Swonke. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 38 001 WILLIAM J. BOYCE, Justice. (Vernon 2008). Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch Anglo-Dutch assails the trial court's final judgment in favor (Tenge) L.L.C. (collectively, "Anglo-Dutch") appeal the trial ofSwonke on multiple grounds. Resolution of Anglo-Dutch's court's judgment in favor of Greenberg Peden, P.C. and appellate challenges requires a detailed discussion of the Gerard J. Swonke in connection with this fee dispute between evidence adduced at trial and the circumstances surrounding a client and an attorney. execution ofthe October 16, 2000 fee agreement. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Facts Overview Swonke joined Greenberg Peden as "of counsel" in 1987. 1 This status gave Swonke discretion to choose his clients and

This appeal arises from a contingency fee agreement dated *459 gave Greenberg Peden a right of first refusal regarding October 16, 2000. It is undisputed that the client, Anglo clients and matters Swonke brought to the firm. Swonke Dutch, entered the fee agreement. It is undisputed that remained as "of counsel" to Greenberg Peden until the firm Anglo-Dutch's president, Scott V. Van Dyke, signed the fee dissolved in 2001. agreement on behalf of Anglo-Dutch. It is undisputed that the attorney, Swonke, also signed the fee agreement. It is hotly

The "of counsel" relationship between Swonke and disputed whether Swonke signed the fee agreement on behalf Greenberg Peden operated under a fee sharing agreement. For of himself individually or on behalf of the Greenberg Peden matters accepted by the firm, it billed Swanke's time through law firm, where he was "of counsel" at the time. the firm computer system and deducted a percentage from Swonke's fees; the size ofthe deduction depended on the fee

Swonke contends he signed on behalf of himself individually agreement with a particular client. This deduction reimbursed and can recover fees individually. Anglo-Dutch contends Greenberg Peden for Swanke's use of office space, paralegals, Swonke signed on behalf of the law firm and cannot recover secretaries, and parking. Clients in matters accepted by the fees individually. Greenberg Peden disclaims rights to or firm paid their fees for Swanke's time directly to Greenberg interest in the disputed fees. The law firm assigned any Peden, which made appropriate deductions and then paid the interest under the October 16, 2000 fee agreement to Swonke; balance to Swonke. released Anglo-Dutch from liability to Greenberg Peden for the disputed fees; and acknowledged that Greenberg Peden is

Swonke met Van Dyke in 1987 at a lunch with Van Dyke's not entitled to receive money from Anglo-Dutch under the father while Van Dyke was working for his father's company. agreement. Van Dyke's father asked Swonke to perform legal work for the company. Swonke already had joined Greenberg Peden as

The trial court concluded that the October 16, 2000 fee of counsel at that point. While Van Dyke was still working agreement is ambiguous with respect to the capacity in which for his father, Van Dyke and his father later asked about Swonke signed, and submitted that issue to the jury. The Swanke's salary at Greenberg Peden because they wanted to jury sided with Swonke on that issue, finding that he signed hire Swonke as in-house counsel for the father's company. the fee agreement with Anglo-Dutch on behalf of himself Swonke responded that as "of counsel" he did not receive individually and not on behalf of Greenberg Peden. The jury a salary from the firm, but was paid only when clients further answered that Anglo-Dutch failed to comply with paid; Swonke explained that he generated his own work and the fee agreement; that Swonke complied with his fiduciary sometimes made more money than at other times. Van Dyke, duty to his client Anglo-Dutch; and that Van Dyke did not his father and Swonke decided to maintain their existing commit fraud against Swonke. The jury awarded $1 million relationship, under which Swonke performed legal work for as contract damages to Swonke for Anglo-Dutch's failure to the father's company as "of counsel" at Greenberg Peden. comply with the fee agreement. The trial court signed a final Swonke testified that he also explained his "of counsel" status judgment in conformity with the jmy's findings awarding to Van Dyke and Van Dyke's mother on several occasions. contract damages and additional statutory attorney's fees to *130 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008)

.. ... . Van Dyke testified that he did not recall being told Swonke lawsuit but lacked financial resources to pay an attorney on was "of counsel" to Greenberg Peden. an hourly basis. Van Dyke left his father's company in 1988 and together with Pursuant to Greenberg Peden's right of first refusal, Swonke his mother formed Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, asked the firm in February or March 2000 if it wanted an oil and gas exploration company. Approximately four to represent Anglo-Dutch in a suit against Halliburton years later, Van Dyke asked Swonke to perform legal work and Ramco arising from breaches of the Tenge Field for Anglo-Dutch in connection with development of oil confidentiality agreements. Greenberg Peden refused to and gas properties in an area known as the Tenge Field in represent Anglo-Dutch on an hourly or a contingency basis Kazakhstan. Swonke began performing a substantial amount because of Anglo-Dutch's unpaid bills and a history of of legal work for Van Dyke and Anglo-Dutch in 1993. difficulty in collecting fees from Anglo-Dutch. Thereafter, This work focused on preparing documents addressing the Swonke told Van Dyke that Greenberg Peden would not participation of multiple national and international investors represent Anglo-Dutch in a lawsuit against Halliburton and in Anglo-Dutch's Tenge Field project. Swonke worked Ramco due to Anglo-Dutch's outstanding legal bills. The with Greenberg Peden shareholder Skip Naylor to draft the bills remained unpaid. 2 Van Dyke did not ask Swonke to elaborate documents Van Dyke requested to bring investors

represent Anglo-Dutch against Halliburton and Ram co at that together and create an entity called Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) time.

L.L.C.

Because Greenberg Peden refused to represent Anglo-Dutch In 1997, Anglo-Dutch invited Halliburton Energy Services, in a suit against Halliburton and Ramco, Swonke referred Inc. and Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. to invest in the Tenge Van Dyke to several other law firms. Anglo-Dutch signed Field project. Anglo-Dutch hoped to use funds from these a contingency fee agreement with McConn & Williams in new investors to buy out its existing investors. To evaluate March 2000. That firm filed a lawsuit against Halliburton and Anglo-Dutch's proposal, Halliburton and Ram co entered into Ramco in May 2000. See generally Ramco Oil & Gas Ltd. confidentiality agreements with Anglo-Dutch and received v. Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 207 S.W.3d 801 (Tex.App. confidential data to review. Swonke negotiated and drafted Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). the confidentiality agreements for Anglo-Dutch. Van Dyke and attorneys from McConn & Williams frequently Anglo-Dutch ceased paying Greenberg Peden's bills at about asked Swonke for advice and help with tasks in furtherance of this time and began accumulating a large account payable the lawsuit against Halliburton and Ramco in the months that to the firm. Anglo-Dutch's unpaid legal bills prompted followed this filing. After providing unpaid legal assistance Greenberg Peden to stop working for Anglo-Dutch in 1999. for months, Swanke decided that he wanted compensation By early 2000, Anglo-Dutch owed Greenberg Peden more for time spent helping Anglo--Dutch with its lawsuit against than $200,000. Swonke and Greenberg Peden shareholder Halliburton and Ramco. Swonke informed McConn & David Peden met with Van Dyke in 1999 or early 2000 to Williams ofhis desire to be paid. McConn & Williams said its discuss Anglo-Dutch's unpaid legal bills. *460 Peden told fee interest was not large enough for that firm to compensate Van Dyke that no Greenberg Peden attorney would perform him out of its interest. VanDyke then called Swanke directly; legal work for Anglo-Dutch until it paid its accumulated legal asked him to help with the lawsuit; and offered to pay him bills to the firm. for doing so. Van Dyke and Swonke negotiated the terms of Swonke's compensation for his participation in Anglo-

A dispute arose between Anglo-Dutch, Halliburton and Dutch's suit against Halliburton and Ramco. Ramco in early 2000 regarding breach of the Tenge Field confidentiality agreements and disclosure of Anglo-Dutch's

Van Dyke proposed to pay Swanke based on a contingency confidential data. Van Dyke asked Swonke in February 2000 fee agreement because Anglo--Dutch could not afford an to evaluate the potential for a lawsuit against Halliburton and hourly fee. When Swanke suggested a flat percentage fee, Ramco for breach of the confidentiality agreements. Swonke Van Dyke responded by insisting on a formula that would ( 1) advised Van Dyke that Anglo-Dutch had viable claims incorporate a ratio ofhours Swonke spent to hours McConn & against both companies. Anglo-Dutch wanted to pursue the Williams attorneys spent, and then (2) multiply the 20 percent contingency fee contained in the McConn & Williams fee

*131 Petroleum Intern., inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 Ramco. McConn & Williams understood that Swanke had agreement by that ratio. Van Dyke thought this would be the a separate fee agreement with Anglo-Dutch in connection only fair way to measure Swanke's hours. Swanke initially with the case. Swanke worked another 1,022 hours on Anglo rejected Van Dyke's formula because he thought it was too Dutch's lawsuit as "of counsel" to McConn & Williams. complicated; *461 later, he acquiesced to using it with a rounding feature.

Several months after Swanke left Greenberg Peden and Swanke's secretary typed the contingency fee agreement joined McConn & Williams, Van Dyke was deposed in negotiated by Van Dyke and Swanke on Greenberg Peden the Halliburton and Ramco lawsuit. At the deposition, Van letterhead; dated it October 16, 2000; and inserted the Dyke testified that Anglo-Dutch had two contingency fee words "Greenberg Peden, P.C." in the signature block. The agreements. He testified that one such agreement was with letter's opening paragraph states that it "memorializes our John O'Quinn, Jett Williams, and Luke McConn, and the agreement with respect to me assisting you ... and the law other was with Swanke. Van Dyke did not identifY any firm of McConn & Williams, LLP" regarding the suit against contingency fee agreement with Greenberg Peden. Halliburton and Ramco. In the next paragraph, the letter states that "I agree to assist Anglo-Dutch and [McConn & Anglo-Dutch's lawsuit against Halliburton and Ramco was Williams] ... in this lawsuit.. .. " tried for nine weeks beginning in August 2003. Anglo

Dutch sought more than $600 million in damages. See Ramco Oil & Gas Ltd., 207 S.W.3d at 806-07. The Swanke signed the fee agreement's signature block on jury found that Halliburton and Ramco breached their October 16, 2000 and sent it to Van Dyke for signature the same day. Van Dyke signed the fee agreement on October 17, respective confidentiality agreements with Anglo-Dutch. 2000 and returned it to Swanke. The jury awarded Anglo-Dutch $64 million in lost profits for

Halliburton's breach of its confidentiality agreement and $6.4 million in lost profits for Ramco's breach of its confidentiality Van Dyke also sent a separate transmittal letter to Swanke agreement. The parties *462 stipulated to $9.8 million in on October 17, 2000 with a copy of the McConn & Williams contingency fee agreement. In the transmittal letter's second reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, which included the paragraph, Van Dyke states that the McConn & Williams fee 1,022 hours Swanke spent working on the lawsuit while at agreement "provides the basis for the Agreement between McConn & Williams. Greenberg Peden P.C. and Anglo-Dutch." The transmittal letter was stamped "received" by Greenberg Peden. At the Anglo-Dutch settled with Halliburton on April 1, 2004 for time of receipt, Swanke did not respond to the transmittal $51 million. 3 After Swanke learned of the settlement, he sent letter; did not challenge its reference to a fee agreement

an e-mail to Van Dyke on April 7, 2004 reminding him that "between Greenberg Peden P.C. and Anglo-Dutch;" and the October 16, 2000 fee agreement required a comparison did not assert that the fee agreement was between Anglo of Swanke's hours to those billed by McConn & Williams. Dutch and Swanke individually. Swanke did not examine or Swanke sent another e-mail to Van Dyke the same day setting respond to Van Dyke's letter at the time of receipt because forth the total number of hours he worked on the lawsuit. the letter transmitted the McConn & Williams fee agreement Swanke's email asserted his entitlement to three percent of that Swanke already had in his file. Swanke testified that he the settlement amount according to Swanke's calculations. normally would not read a letter that refers to a document he Van Dyke responded to Swanke's email on April 13, 2004. already had in his files. Van Dyke said he had lost his voice and agreed that he and Swanke needed to discuss Swanke's situation. Swanke

The Greenberg Peden firm dissolved on October 1, 2001. By replied, asking Van Dyke to call him when he felt well that time, Swanke had worked 277 hours on Anglo-Dutch's enough to speak and inquiring whether Van Dyke received a suit against Halliburton and Ram co. Swanke joined McConn memorandum Swanke sent him providing examples of work & Williams as "of counsel" in October 2001 and informed Swanke performed in furtherance of the lawsuit. The record Anglo-Dutch that he was taking its files with him to McConn does not reflect a written response by Van Dyke to this & Williams unless Anglo-Dutch objected. There was no inquiry. objection. Under his contract with McConn & Williams, Swanke did not share in any McConn & Williams fees for

The final Halliburton settlement documents were signed on working on the Anglo-Dutch lawsuit against Halliburton and April 15, 2004. At Van Dyke's request, Swanke's name was *132 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008) removed from the wiring instructions given to Halliburton. "Office conferences with Scott Van Dyke regarding claims of Swanke e-mailed Van Dyke that afternoon to note that Gerard Swanke; Draft, review and revise Plaintiffs Original Swanke's wiring instructions were not included with those of Petition." At 2:52 p.m. that day, Anglo-Dutch filed a suit other attorneys who had worked on the lawsuit. Swanke asked against Swanke and Greenberg Peden seeking a declaratory Van Dyke how he wanted to handle payment of Swanke's judgment in connection with the October 16, 2000 fee fees. In the meantime, attorneys at McConn & Williams asked agreement. Swanke to not force the fee issue with Van Dyke until after Anglo-Dutch asked for a declaration that the fee agreement is the settlement was funded and completed, fearing it could between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden. Anglo-Dutch jeopardize the settlement.

also asserted that Swanke breached the fiduciary duties he On April 16, 2004, Swanke e-mailed Van Dyke to owed as an attorney to client Anglo-Dutch, and requested fee forfeiture. Swanke later filed a counterclaim seeking a congratulate him on receiving a $30 million portion of the Halliburton settlement. Swanke asked Van Dyke to address declaration that the fee agreement is between Anglo-Dutch payment of Swanke's fees. Swanke said he would fax to Van and Swanke individually. Swanke also asserted claims for Dyke a release signed by Greenberg Peden, which Van Dyke breach of contract against Anglo-Dutch, and for fraud against had requested. In that document, the law firm assigned any Anglo-Dutch and Van Dyke individually. interest under the October 16, 2000 fee agreement to Swanke and released Anglo-Dutch from liability to Greenberg Peden The jury returned a verdict after a two-week trial. In answer to for fees under that agreement. Question 1, the jury found that the fee agreement with Anglo

Dutch was entered into on behalf of Swanke individually and On April 19, 2004, attorneys Luke McConn and Edward not on behalf of Greenberg Peden. In answer to Question 2, Crain wrote letters to Van Dyke at Swanke's request in the jury found that Anglo-Dutch failed to comply with the support of Swanke. Both stated that Swanke's assistance had fee agreement. The jury awarded $1,000,000 to Swanke in been invaluable in prosecuting the suit against Halliburton, Question 3 for his damages resulting from Anglo-Dutch's and that Swanke's submitted hours were fair and reasonable. failure to comply with the fee agreement. The jury answered Swanke also faxed a letter to Van Dyke on that date further "yes" to Question 5 asking if Swanke complied with his explaining his hours and offering an audit of his hours. Van fiduciary duty to Anglo-Dutch. The jury answered "no" to Dyke and Swanke set up a meeting for April 22, 2004 to Question 9 asking if Van Dyke committed fraud against discuss Swanke's fee request. Swanke. 4 *463 On April 20, 2004, Van Dyke met with attorney

The trial court signed a final judgment in conformity with the Sandy Dow to get a "fresh look" at Swanke's fee request. jury's verdict on January 22, 2007, ordering that Anglo-Dutch Swanke subsequently met with Van Dyke and his mother and Van Dyke take nothing from Swanke and Greenberg as scheduled at 8 a.m. on April 22, 2004. At the April 22 Peden; that Swanke and Greenberg Peden take nothing meeting, Van Dyke challenged the munber of hours Swanke on their fraud and exemplary damages *464 claims from claimed to have worked on the lawsuit and the language of the Anglo-Dutch and Van Dyke; and that Anglo-Dutch pay Greenberg Peden release. Van Dyke asserted at this meeting Swanke $1 ,000,000 and prejudgment interest on that amount that Anglo-Dutch entered the October 16, 2000 fee agreement totaling $226,924.50. As agreed by the parties, the trial with Greenberg Peden-not with Swanke individually. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney's meeting concluded without resolution of the fee dispute. fees. The trial court ordered that Anglo-Dutch pay Swanke $352,892.50 in attorney's fees for the prosecution of his

After meeting with Van Dyke, Swanke returned to his office breach of contract claim and for defense of the declaratory and sent an email at 9:08 a.m. to Van Dyke and other judgment claims. Following denial of its post-trial motions, recipients. The email stated that Swanke no longer would Anglo-Dutch timely filed a notice of appeal from the trial represent Van Dyke or his companies. court's final judgment. After meeting with Swanke, Van Dyke met with attorney On appeal, the main dispute centers on whether Anglo Sandy Dow for about two hours. Dow's billing records for Dutch contracted with Greenberg Peden or with Swanke April22, 2004 describe the activity at this meeting as follows: individually when Anglo-Dutch and Swanke signed the *133 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Intern., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008) October 16, 2000 fee agreement. Anglo-Dutch approaches "Instifficient Evidence Points of Error," 38 Tex. L.Rev. 361, this issue from several angles, contending that ( 1) the fee 362-63 ( 1960)). agreement unambiguously is between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, and should be construed that way as a *465 We must consider evidence in the light most favorable matter oflaw; (2) any ambiguity in the fee agreement should to the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference that be construed against the drafter, attorney Swonke; (3) the would support it. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822. If evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the the evidence allows only one inference, neither jurors nor jury's finding that the fee agreement is between Anglo-Dutch the reviewing court may disregard that evidence. Id. "The and Swanke individually; and (4) the evidence is legally traditional scope of review does not disregard contrary and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that evidence in every no evidence review if there is no favorable Swonke complied with his fiduciary duty. Anglo-Dutch also evidence (situation (a) above), or if contrary evidence renders challenges the correctness of the trial court's jury charge and supporting evidence incompetent (situation (b) above) or certain evidentiary rulings during trial. 5 conclusively establishes the opposite (situation (d) above)."

!d. at 810-11. If the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions, then jurors must be allowed to do so. !d. at 822. Accordingly,

Standards of Review the ultimate test for legal sufficiency always must focus on whether the evidence would enable reasonable and fair

A. Contract Interpretation minded jurors to reach the verdict under review. Id. at 827. [1] [2] Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a Legal sufficiency review in the proper light must credit question oflaw subject to de novo review on appeal. Bowden favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could do so, and v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 705 (Tex.2008). must disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors To determine whether a contract is ambiguous, we look at the could not do so. Id. The reviewing court cannot substitute its agreement as a whole in light of the circumstances present judgment for that of the trier offact if the evidence falls within when the parties entered the agreement. David J. Sacks, P. C. this zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 822. v. Haden, No. 07-0472,2008 WL 2702184, at *3 (Tex. July 11, 2008).

In reviewing factual sufficiency, we must consider and weigh all the evidence. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757,761 (Tex.2003). We can set aside a verdict only

B. Legal and Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the We apply the standard and scope of review for legal great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is sufficiency of the evidence discussed in City of Keller v. clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. I d. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex.2005). After City of Keller, it is difficult to make general pronouncements about the scope

For both legal and factual sufficiency review, the jury is the of review for a legal sufficiency challenge. The better course sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight is to focus on the specific type of legal sufficiency challenge to be given to their testimony. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at that is being made; this, in tum, frames the scope of review 819; Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S. W.3d at 761. for appeal. City of Keller endorsed Chief Justice Calvert's description

C. Charge Instructions of legal sufficiency challenges. "No-evidence" challenges [3] [ 4] We review a trial court's decision to submit or refuse may be sustained only when the record discloses one of the a particular instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. following situations: (a) a complete absence of evidence of Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 456 a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of (Tex.2006). A party is entitled to a jury question, instruction, evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered or definition on an issue raised by the pleadings and evidence. to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove Tex.R. Civ. P. 278; Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 456. The trial a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the court enjoys wide discretion in framing a jury charge and is evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital given broad latitude to determine the propriety of explanatory fact. Id. at 810 (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and instructions and definitions. HE. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotta, 985 S.W.2d 22,23 (Tex.1998). A trial court's error inrefusing

*134 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Intern., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 257 S.W.3d 454 (2008) an instruction is reversible if that refusal probably caused the E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex.2006). rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 456.

[13] [14] To determine whether a contract is ambiguous, we look at the agreement as a whole in light of the

D. Admission of Evidence circumstances present when the parties entered into the [5] [7] [8] We review a trial court's decisioragreement. David J. Sacks, P.C., 2008 WL 2702184, at [6] to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. In *3 (contract for legal services was not ambiguous and re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex.2005). A trial court unenforceable as written because it only could be reasonably abuses its discretion in admitting or excluding evidence if it

interpreted as setting forth agreement that client agreed to pay acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles, law firm hourly fee and contained no cap on fees); Enter. or if the act complained of is arbitrary and unreasonable. Leasing Co. v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex.2004). A Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite or certain 687 (Tex.2002). We must uphold a trial court's evidentiary meaning. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 ruling if there is any legitimate basis in the record to support (Tex.2005). it. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex.l998). We will not reverse a trial court for an

[15] [16] If the contract is subject to two or more erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the error was reasonably reasonable interpretations, then the contract is ambiguous and calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition the jury is entitled to resolve the fact issue concerning the of an improper judgment. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see parties' intent. J.M Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d also *466 Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 223,229 (Tex.2003); Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. New Ulm 394, 396 (Tex.l989). A successful challenge to evidentiary Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1996). An ambiguity rulings usually requires the complaining party to show that can be patent or latent. E.g., Ji'riendswood Dev. Co. v. the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or McDade & Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 n. 1 (Tex.1996). A admitted. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, patent ambiguity is evident on the contract's face. ld. at 282. 753-54 (Tex.1995). A latent ambiguity arises from a collateral matter when a contract that appears to be unambiguous on its face is applied to its subject.Id. at 282-283.

Analysis We begin with the October 16, 2000 fee agreement, which A. The Fee Agreement is Ambiguous reads in its entirety as follows: [9] Anglo-Dutch first argues that the trial court erred by

Dear Scott: allowing the jury to interpret the fee agreement because it unambiguously is between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg

This letter memorializes our agreement with respect to Peden-not between Anglo-Dutch and Swonke individually. me assisting you and/or the companies which you control We reject Anglo-Dutch's contention because we agree with (Anglo-Dutch) and the law firm of McConn & Williams, the trial court's determination that the fee agreement is LLP regarding the above-reference matter. ambiguous with respect to whether Swonke contracted for himself individually or for Greenberg Peden.

In that regard, you have executed a Fee Agreement with the law firm ofMcConn& Williams onMarch25, 2000, which [12] Our primary concern when interpreting a

[10] [11] is incorporated herein by reference. I agree to assist Anglo contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Dutch and that firm in this lawsuit for proportionately parties as that intent is expressed in the contract. Perry Homes the same percentage (20%) of any benefit to McConn & v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 606 (Tex.2008). The contract's Williams reflected in such agreement. However, I will not language is the primary evidence of that intent. !d. We be responsible for any expenses other than those I may examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to personally incur. Further, the proportions under which my harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract fees *467 shall be calculated will be the ratio ofthe hours so that none will be rendered meaningless. Seagull Energy I have spent or will spend on this matter relative to the hours the attorneys at McConn & Williams have spent or

*135 will spend after the date the lawsuit was filed, rounded Greenberg Peden while specifYing which Greenberg Peden to the next whole percentage. For example, if McConn & attorney would perform the work; and (3) Van Dyke's October Williams' attorneys spend 1,000 hours on the lawsuit after 17, 2000 transmittal letter demonstrates his belief that the fee the date the lawsuit was filed and I spend 90 hours of my agreement was between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden. time towards the lawsuit, then by rounding up to nearest whole number, I would be entitled to receive from you Swonke emphasizes other circumstances surrounding 2% (10% of20%) of the gross revenues and other benefits execution of the fee agreement. The fee agreement was signed recovered, if any, from this lawsuit. In addition, should against a backdrop that included ( 1) previous explanations the Fee Agreement be amended, you agree that I shall be dating back at least a decade regarding the nature of Swonke' s entitled to the benefit of such amendment. "of counsel" status at Greenberg Peden; (2) Greenberg

Peden's refusal to perform work for Anglo-Dutch since If this comports with your understanding of our agreement, 1999 due to unpaid legal bills; and (3) Greenberg Peden's please indicate by signing below and returning this letter specific refusal to represent Anglo-Dutch on an hourly tome. or a contingency fee basis in its suit against Halliburton and Ramco, again due to unpaid legal bills. Van Dyke

If you have any questions, please contact me. acknowledged that after 1999, no Greenberg Peden attorney had performed legal work for Anglo-Dutch. Van Dyke

Very truly yours, admitted that Swonke informed him of the firm's refusal to GREENBERG PEDEN P.C. represent Anglo-Dutch in the lawsuit against Halliburton and Ramco due to Anglo-Dutch's unpaid legal bills. /s/ *468 We reject Anglo-Dutch's contention that the October GERARD J. SWONKE 16, 2000 letter agreement unambiguously establishes a contract between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden in light Anglo-Dutch contends the fee agreement is an unambiguous of the letter's content and the circumstances surrounding its contract between Greenberg Peden and Anglo-Dutch, execution. The use of Greenberg Peden letterhead and the stressing that it is printed on Greenberg Peden letterhead. inclusion of "Greenberg Peden P.C." in the signature block Swonke's address, telephone and fax number are not included. reasonably suggest a contract with the law firm rather than Swonke signed under the "Greenberg Peden P.C." signature an individual attorney. But the absence of any reference block.

to Greenberg Peden in the letter's body-combined with Swonke's exclusive use of personal pronouns in the letter For his part, Swonke stresses that the agreement's text does after the law firm repeatedly and emphatically told Van Dyke not reference Greenberg Peden. The fee agreement refers it would not represent Anglo-Dutch-reasonably suggest five times to McConn & Williams by name but never says a contract with Swonke individually. These circumstances Greenberg Peden will perform legal services for Anglo Dutch. Swonke also highlights multiple references to himself render the fee agreement ambiguous and give rise to a fact individually. The letter refers to "our agreement with respect issue. The trial court properly submitted that fact issue to the jury for resolution. to me assisting you and/or the companies which you control (Anglo-Dutch)." It continues with "I agree to assist," "I will," "I may," "my fees," "I have spent," "I spend 90 hours of This conclusion should not be misconstrued as a holding that my time ... I would be entitled to receive from you," "I shall any appearance of personal pronouns in an engagement letter be entitled," and concludes with "If this comports with your or fee agreement creates ambiguity about whether the client understanding of our agreement." hired a law firm or an individual lawyer. It usually will be

clear when a client hired a law firm with an expectation that particular lawyers at the firm would work on a particular The circumstances surrounding formation of the fee matter. However, an ambiguity exists in this case due to agreement also bear on this issue. See Enter. Leasing Co .. conflicting indications on the fee agreement's face combined 156 S.W.3d at 549. Anglo-Dutch points to the following with the law firm's prior express refusals to represent Anglo circumstances: (1) Anglo-Dutch had a longstanding Dutch, which refusals were communicated directly to Van relationship with Greenberg Peden; (2) the personal pronouns used throughout the fee agreement are consistent with hiring *136 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum ~ntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2otl!l) Dyke. Regardless of whether the ambiguity is characterized Anglo-Dutch nevertheless invites this court to construe the as "patent" or "latent," an ambiguity exists. ambiguous October 16, 2000 fee agreement against Swanke. Anglo-Dutch cannot change this conclusion by pointing to

1. Should the ambiguous fee agreement be construed the October 17, 2000 transmittal letter Van Dyke sent to against Swonke? Swanke. As noted earlier, the transmittal letter states as follows: "This fee agreement with McConn & Williams, LLP

a. Contra proferentem provides the basis for the Agreement between Greenberg Anglo-Dutch invokes the doctrine of contra proferentem Peden P. C. and Anglo-Dutch." Even assuming for argument's to advocate strict construction of the fee agreement against sake that a separate letter signed after execution of the fee Swanke. Under this doctrine, an ambiguous contract will agreement can be considered as part of the circumstances be interpreted against its drafter. See, e.g., Evergreen Nat'! existing when the fee agreement was executed, the transmittal Indem. Co. v. Tan It All, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 669,677 (Tex.App. letter merely underscores the existence of an ambiguity in the Austin 2003, no pet.) (if insured's interpretation of ambiguous fee agreement. policy provision is reasonable, it will be adopted even if insurer's interpretation is objectively more sensible, as long

After examining the fee agreement as a whole and the as insured's construction is not unreasonable). Courts employ circumstances present when the parties signed it, we hold this doctrine as a device of last resort when construing that the fee agreement is ambiguous and that the trial court ambiguous contracts; it essentially operates as a tie-breaking properly submitted a question asking the jury to determine the device to prevent arbitrary decisions. I d. identity of the contracting parties. Anglo-Dutch acknowledges that Texas case law has not We overrule Anglo-Dutch's first issue. applied this doctrine in blanket fashion to all ambiguities in attorney-client fee agreements. Anglo-Dutch nonetheless argues that recent Texas Supreme Court decisions suggest a

B. Determining Which Parties Entered the Ambiguous preference for strictly construing ambiguities in fee contracts Fee Agreement against the attorney and in favor ofthe client. We analyze the Anglo-Dutch next argues that the trial court should have cases cited by Anglo-Dutch in light of its assertion. construed the fee agreement against Swanke because ( 1) any ambiguities in attorney-drafted fee agreements should be

In Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, construed strictly against the attorney-drafter; and (2) there 559 (Tex.2006), Walton hired attorney Parrott of Hoover is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the Slovacek to recover royalties from oil and gas companies jury's finding that Swanke is a party to the fee agreement and operating on his ranch. Under the fee agreement, Hoover Greenberg Peden is not. Slovacek was entitled to a 30 percent contingent fee for all claims on which collection was achieved. Id. The fee

The fact finder usually is tasked with weighing evidence agreement also included a provision stating that, in the event of the parties' intent and choosing among competing the firm was discharged before completing the representation, interpretations of an ambiguous contract. See Columbia Walton immediately had to pay a fee equal to the present Gas Transmission Corp., 940 S.W.2d at 589. However, value ofthe firm's interest in Walton's claim. Id. ambiguities sometimes are construed in favor of one contracting party over another to address disparities in

Parrott negotiated settlements with Texaco and El Paso negotiating power or to promote public policy goals. See, e.g., Natural Gas, and Walton paid the firm its contingent Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex.2006) fee. Parrott then turned to Walton's claims against Bass (if an exclusion in an insurance contract has more than one Enterprises Production Company, and Walton authorized reasonable *469 interpretation, it will be construed in favor Parrott to settle for $8.5 million. !d. Parrott's initial settlement ofthe insured). demand was for $58.5 million. A month later, Bass offered $6 million not only to settle Walton's claims, but also to acquire

Anglo-Dutch acknowledges that Texas has not adopted a surface estates of eight sections of Walton's ranch. I d. Walton blanket rule construing all ambiguities in contingency fee refused to sell, authorized Parrott to settle Walton's claims for agreements against the attorney and in favor of the client. unpaid royalties for $6 million, and expressed his discontent *137 Petroleum Intern., inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 257 S.W.3d 454 (2008) a definite legal meaning and it is not reasonably susceptible with Parrott for not consulting Walton before making the to more than one meaning. Jd. at 861. By filing a cash $58.5 million settlement demand. I d. at 559-60. When Parrott responded by urging Walton to sell part of his ranch, Walton deposit to perfect an appeal, the court found that an appeal discharged Parrott and hired Andrews & Kurth LLP. Id. had been "taken" and the appellate court's jurisdiction had at 560. That firm settled Walton's claims against Bass for been invoked under a plain reading of the appellate rules. !d. $900,000. Jd. In the meantime, Hoover Slovacek demanded The court concluded that the unambiguous contract would be that Walton pay $1.7 million under the fee agreement. Hoover enforced as written. !d. at 862. Accordingly, because the case Slovacek contended that Bass's $6 million offer and Walton's was appealed to a higher court when Westinghouse perfected subsequent authorization to settle for that amount established its appeal, the firm did not breach the contract by charging the the present value of Walton's claims at the time of discharge. additional appeal fee. !d. I d.

Justice Gonzales dissented in Lope::; and argued that the The court examined whether the termination fee provision phrase "appealed to a higher court" is ambiguous and should was contrary to public policy. I d. at 561-66. It concluded that have been construed against the attorneys. !d. at 865. Justice the firm's provision penalized Walton for changing counsel; Gonzales acknowledged that, when the objective meaning of granted the firm an *470 impermissible proprietary interest a contract term is ambiguous, the parties' subjective meaning in Walton's claims; shifted the risks of representation almost of the term becomes a fact question. !d. Nonetheless, he entirely to Walton's detriment; and subverted several policies advocated that the special relationship between an attorney underlying the use of contingent fees. I d. at 566. Thus, the and client as well as the attorney's superior understanding of court determined that it was unenforceable because it was contract terms generally require an ambiguous contract to be construed against the attorney-drafter. Id at 866. unconscionable as a matter of law, severed the termination provision, and held the remainder of the fee agreement was Finally, in Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 enforceable. Id.

S.W.3d 92, 93 (Tex.2001), the Levines agreed to pay their In Lope::: v. Munoz, Hockerna & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d attorneys "one-third of any amount received by settlement or recovery from their lawsuit" for foundation damage. 857, 859 (Tex.2000), the Lopezes hired Munoz, Hockema & Reed to represent them in a wrongful death suit against The Levines' $243,644 award was offset to extinguish their Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Their contingency fee mortgage obligation, giving them clear title and resulting in agreement assigned 40 percent of any recovery to the firm, a net recovery of $81,792.62. Jd. A dispute arose regarding and 45 percent if the case "is appealed to a higher court." computation of fees before or after the offset. I d. The court I d. After a $25 million jury verdict in favor of the Lopezes, sided with the Levines and held that "any amount received" the parties began settlement negotiations. Jd. The parties meant net recovery. I d. at 95. The court reasoned that, because tentatively agreed to a settlement, but Westinghouse filed a the attorney is better able to predict and provide for fee cash deposit in lieu of a cost bond with the trial court to arrangements, the burden should *471 fall on the attorney perfect an appeal in case the settlement fell through. I d. When to express in the agreement with the client whether the the firm met with the Lopezes to discuss the settlement and contingent fee will be calculated on non-cash benefits as the firm's fees, the firm explained that its fee would be 45 well as money damages. !d. In Levine, there was no contract percent of the recovery. No one objected at the time. Id. at ambiguity and the court did not discuss or apply the doctrine 859-60. The Lopezes signed a settlement statement reflecting of contra proferentern. the firm's 45 percent fee and the funds were distributed. Id. at 860. These cases do not establish that Texas law requires

an ambiguity concerning the identity of parties to a fee Three years later, the Lopezes sent the firm a letter asking agreement to be resolved against the attorney. the firm to refund the additional five percent fee. Jd When the firm refused, the Lopezes sued the firm alleging a breach Hoover Slovacek does not apply here because it addresses of contract claim. I d. They argued that the phrase "appealed whether a fee agreement's termination provision is to a higher court" was ambiguous and should be construed unconscionable and unenforceable. Hoover Slovacek, 206 against its drafter, the firm. !d. However, the court held that S.W.3d at 559. It did not decide whether contra proferentern the contract language is unambiguous because it can be given *138 is to be construed in light of the circumstances in which should be applied to construe an ambiguous fee agreement it was made, the parties' past practice and contracts, against the attorney-drafter.

and whether it was truly negotiated. When the reasons In Lopez, Justice Gonzales argued in dissent that the fee supporting the principle are inapplicable-for example, agreement was ambiguous and should be construed against because the client had help of its own inside counsel the attorney-drafter because of the special relationship or another lawyer in drafting the contract-the principle between attorney and client. Lopez, 22 S.W.3d at 866. No should be correspondingly relaxed. subsequent Texas Supreme Court case has acted on the Lopez RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING dissent's urging to adopt a broad contra proferentem rule for LAWYERS § 18 cmt. h (1998). Comment h identifies attorney-client fee contracts. multiple factors that may influence interpretation of an

ambiguous attorney-client *472 agreement, and it guides Levine placed a burden on attorneys to express clearly the our disposition here. contemplated computation in fee agreements. 40 S.W.3d at [17] Comment h does not mandate that ambiguities in 95. That decision did not address an ambiguity concerning attorney-client contracts always must be construed against the attorney. Rather, comment h contemplates reliance on the identity of parties to a fee agreement, and it did not adopt a contra proferentem rule for all ambiguities in all attorney the customary resources used for contract interpretation, client fee agreements. including consideration of the contract language and

surrounding circumstances; the client's sophistication and experience; the parties' past practice; and whether the Given the absence of definitive teaching from the Texas contract terms were truly negotiated or instead were imposed Supreme Court, we look for guidance on this issue from unilaterally. This approach encompasses multiple factors and comment h to section 18 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) encourages sensitivity to the particular circumstances of a OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ........ Both sides invoke comment h in favor of their respective positions. particular case. Comment h ultimately grounds the analysis Comment h provides in pertinent part: on this question: What would "a reasonable person in the

client's circumstances" understand or expect? Construction of client-lawyer contracts. Under this Section, contracts between clients and lawyers are to be

The "client's circumstances" in this case do not involve construed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the an unsophisticated individual whose lawyer presented an client's circumstances. The lawyer thus bears the burden of already-drafted agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. ensuring that the contract states any terms diverging from To the contrary, this case involves a sophisticated and a reasonable client's expectations. The principle applies to experienced client who vigorously negotiated the fee fee terms ... as well as other terms. agreement with an individual attorney after being told the law firm would not take the case. The evidence in this case establishes that ( 1) Van Dyke is an experienced businessman who had been instrumental in drafting complex contracts

* * * and setting up complex business ventures with national and Many tribunals have expressed the principle as a rule that international investors; (2) the fee agreement was created ambiguities in client-lawyer contracts should be resolved through a collaborative process between Van Dyke and against lawyers. That formulation can be taken to mean Swonke; (3) the fee agreement's terms were vigorously that the principle comes into play only when other means negotiated; (4) all provisions Van Dyke insisted upon were of interpreting the contract have been unsuccessful. Under included in the contract; (5) Van Dyke had experience in this Section, the principle that the contract is construed retaining attorneys; (6) Greenberg Peden previously told as a reasonable client would understand it governs the Van Dyke it no longer would represent Anglo-Dutch due construction of the contract in the first instance. However, to unpaid legal bills; and (7) Swonke told Van Dyke that this Section does not preclude reliance on the usual Greenberg Peden specifically refused to represent Anglo resources of contractual interpretation such as the language Dutch in the lawsuit against Halliburton and Ramco. of the contract, the circumstances in which it was made, and the client's sophistication and experience in retaining These circumstances make the present case an inappropriate and compensating lawyers or lack thereof. The contract vehicle for applying the doctrine of contra proferentem-

*139 either broadly with respect to all ambiguities that may C. Swonke acted in the utmost good faith and exercised the arise in connection with attorney-client agreements, or most scrupulous honesty toward Anglo-Dutch; specifically with respect to the particular ambiguity at issue here regarding the identity of Anglo-Dutch's contracting

D. Swonke placed the interests of Anglo-Dutch before his counterpart. Construing the October 16, 2000 fee agreement own, did not use the advantage of his position to gain from the standpoint of a reasonable client in the circumstances any benefit for himself at the expense of Anglo-Dutch, of Anglo-Dutch's Van Dyke, there is ample basis for and did not place himself in any position where his self concluding that such a client would understand Anglo-Dutch interest might conflict with his obligations as a fiduciary; had contracted with an individual lawyer rather than the and law firm. At a minimum, a triable issue of fact is presented regarding the parties' intent.

E. Swonke fully and fairly disclosed all important information to Anglo-Dutch concerning the transactions.

b. Breach of fiduciary duty Anglo-Dutch tries to bolster its argument for applying contra

Answer "YES" or "NO": proferentem by linking that doctrine to Swonke's asserted Answer: YES breach ofhis fiduciary duty. It is worth noting that the jury did not answer "no" to a Anglo-Dutch argues that the ambiguous fee agreement question asking whether Swonke breached his fiduciary duty. should be construed against Swonke because he breached his In other words, the jury's answer is not merely a failure to fiduciary duty. Anglo-Dutch contends that Swonke breached find actionable conduct in answer to a question that put the his fiduciary duty by mistakenly drafting an ambiguous fee burden of proof on Anglo-Dutch. Cf Bliz::ard v. Nationwide agreement and then failing to disclose to Van Dyke his own Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex.App.-Dallas interpretation of that agreement as an individual contract, 1988, no writ) ("the jury's negative answer does not establish which diverged from Van Dyke's stated belief that Anglo the contrary of the question asked;" it establishes only that Dutch contracted with Greenberg Peden rather than Swonke the party with the burden ofprooffailed to meet that burden). individually. Rather, the jury here answered "yes" to a question that put the burden of proof on Swonke. It is an affirmative finding in

[18] Anglo-Dutch's argument is hampered by the jury's Swonke's favor establishing that he complied with all facets finding that Swonke complied with his fiduciary duty. Anglo of his fiduciary duty to Anglo-Dutch-including his duty to Dutch's linkage of contra proferentem and Swonke's asserted "fully and fairly disclose[ ] ... all important information to breach of fiduciary duty malces it appropriate at this juncture Anglo-Dutch concerning the transactions." to address Anglo-Dutch's contention that legally *473 and factually insufficient evidence supports the jury's finding in

We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually favor of Swonke on this issue. sufficient to support the jury's "yes" answer to Question 5. Jury Question 5 asked: Anglo-Dutch asserts that it conclusively established Swonke's breach of fiduciary duty because the evidence is Did Swonke comply with his fiduciary duty to Anglo undisputed that Swonke failed to ( 1) clarify the nature of the Dutch?

fee agreement when the parties signed it, or explain his view As Anglo-Dutch's attorney, Swonke owed Anglo-Dutch a of the terms governing his entitlement to a fee; (2) respond fiduciary duty. To prove that he complied with his fiduciary to Van Dyke's October 17, 2000 transmittal letter, which duty, Swonke must show: set forth Van Dyke's divergent view of the fee agreement's meaning; (3) inform Anglo-Dutch about his interpretation of

A The transactions in question were fair and equitable to the fee agreement after he left Greenberg Peden and about Anglo-Dutch; the repercussions his move would have; (4) inform Anglo Dutch of a conflict of interest Swonke created when he

B. Swonke made reasonable use of the confidence that began working at McConn & Williams while considering Anglo-Dutch placed in him; himself to be exempt from the fee agreement Anglo-Dutch *140 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum !ntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008) had with McConn & Williams; (5) consult with Anglo Dutch; !mew that no one at Greenberg Peden would do Dutch regarding the assignment of rights he negotiated with any more work for Anglo-Dutch; and knew that no one at Greenberg Peden at the time he negotiated the release; and ( 6) Greenberg Peden had done any work for Anglo-Dutch since act with the strictest fairness and honesty with respect to his 1999. Swanke testified that Van Dyke absolutely and without fee because he sought to recover a fee five times the amount a doubt understood that Swanke would be paid individually Anglo-Dutch reasonably expected to pay. when he moved to McConn & Williams; Anglo-Dutch had

been with Swanke for 15 years and Greenberg Peden had As stated above, when conducting a legal sufficiency review, severed ties with Anglo-Dutch earlier. Further, when Swanke we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to joined McConn & Williams as "of counsel," he sent Van the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would Dyke a letter informing Van Dyke of his move and his support it. We will credit favorable evidence if reasonable intent to take the clients' files to McConn & Williams absent jurors could do so and disregard contrary evidence unless objections. Van Dyke did not object to Swanke taking Anglo reasonable jurors could *474 not do so. City of Keller, Dutch's files with him to McConn & Williams. 168 S.W.3d at 822, 827. If the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their Swanke also testified that he complied with his fiduciary conclusions, then jurors must be allowed to decide the issue. duty to Anglo-Dutch. Swanke stated that he (1) was perfectly !d. at 822. Under the governing standard and scope of review, honest with Van Dyke about any fee arrangements; (2) did not we consider the following evidence in assessing Anglo engage in any self-dealing; (3) did not do anything concerning Dutch's contention that the evidence was undisputed and the fee agreement that was to his advantage but to Anglo conclusively established Swanke's breach of fiduciary duty. Dutch's disadvantage; ( 4) never received any benefit for the

work he performed on behalf of Anglo-Dutch in the lawsuit; Swanke testified that he explained his "of counsel" status to (5) acted with absolute candor and honesty, and without any Van Dyke on several occasions, although Van Dyke claimed concealment or deception toward Anglo-Dutch; ( 6) provided to have no recollection of these explanations. Swanke Anglo-Dutch his undivided loyalty; (7) never failed to inform testified-and Van Dyke acknowledged-that Greenberg Van Dyke of matters material to the representation; and (8) Peden refused to represent Anglo-Dutch in the lawsuit never believed there was a conflict of interest in this case. against Halliburton and Ramco because of unpaid legal fees. Swanke testified-and Van Dyke acknowledged-that This evidence entitled the jury to conclude that the transaction Swanke continued to provide services in furtherance of was fair and equitable to Anglo-Dutch, and that Swanke fully the lawsuit after Swanke referred Anglo-Dutch to McConn and fairly disclosed all important information regarding the & Williams without receiving compensation from Anglo terms of the fee agreement. The jury was entitled *475 to Dutch. Swanke testified-and Van Dyke acknowledged conclude that Van Dyke knew the fee agreement was between that Van Dyke approached Swanke asking for Swanke's help. Anglo-Dutch and Swanke individually, and that no further

disclosure was necessary. Further, the testimony entitled the Van Dyke proposed a contingency fee agreement. Swanke jury to find that Swanke acted with fairness, loyalty, and testified that he wanted a flat fee, but Van Dyke insisted honesty toward his client Anglo-Dutch, and that he did not on computing the fee based on the hourly formula stated in create any conflict of interest when he moved to McConn & the fee agreement. After negotiations, Swanke acquiesced to Williams; his move had no effect on the parties' relationship Van Dyke's formula but added a rounding-up feature. Swanke because the fee agreement was between Anglo-Dutch and testified that he and Van Dyke discussed the rounding feature, Swanke individually, and would follow him wherever he and that Van Dyke understood it. Van Dyke testified that chose to practice as of counsel. he recommended the fee agreement be based on the hourly formula and that Swanke proposed the rounding-up feature. Additionally, Swanke testified that he did not respond to Van

Dyke's October 17, 2000 transmittal letter because he did not According to Swanke, the parties achieved a meeting of see it. Swanke testified that he normally would not read a the minds when they entered the fee agreement after Van letter that refers to a document he already had in his files. Dyke specifically called Swanke and requested his personal Swanke stated that he would have responded to the letter if services. Swanke testified that Van Dyke knew the fee he had seen it and had thought Van Dyke was contending agreement was Swanke's personal contract with Anglo- the fee agreement was with Greenberg Peden. Swanke *141 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Intern., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 In addition to the evidence discussed above, Anglo-Dutch testified that Van Dyke's assertion of a fee agreement between relied on testimony from a fiduciary duty expert, Robert Greenberg Peden and Anglo-Dutch was suspicious because both knew that the fee agreement was between Anglo-Dutch Schuwerk. He testified that Swonke had a duty to clarify who the contracting parties *476 were because the fee and Swonke individually. According to Swonke, it is not possible that Van Dyke was simply expressing his belief in agreement was on Greenberg Peden letterhead and contained the transmittal letter because Van Dyke had continued calling the firm's signature block. Schuwerk opined that Swonke Swonke for help with the Halliburton lawsuit. When Swonke owed a fiduciary duty to clear up any misunderstanding became tired of helping Van Dyke without compensation, regarding who the contracting parties were-if he received Van Dyke asked Swonke for help and proposed the fee the October 17, 2000 transmittal letter from Van Dyke. agreement without anyone at Greenberg Peden knowing Schuwerk could not point to any case or treatise establishing about it. that an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty by not acting on a

document he never saw or read. Schuwerk declined to opine on whether Swonke breached his fiduciary duty if he had not This evidence entitled the jury to conclude that Swonke never seen or read the October 17, 2000 transmittal letter. saw the October 17, 2000 letter and, therefore, did not have to take further steps to disclose information to Anglo-Dutch regarding its contracting counterpart. Schuwerk also testified that Swonke owed a duty to write a

new contract when he left Greenberg Peden for McConn & Williams, and to explain how the move might affect Anglo Swonke also testified that when he told Van Dyke he wanted Dutch's obligation to pay legal fees. He opined that Swonke to be included on the settlement distribution list, Van Dyke should have redone the fee agreement even if Swonke and asked Swonke to obtain a release from Greenberg Peden. Van Dyke both knew the fee agreement was an individual According to Swonke, Van Dyke insisted that Swonke get a release to prevent the law firm from making a claim against contract. Swonke testified that it would have been "ludicrous" Anglo-Dutch because the fee agreement was printed on to redo the fee agreement because it was Swanke's individual Greenberg Peden letterhead. Swonke drafted a release and agreement. assignment to address Van Dyke's request. Swonke explained that he was acting as Anglo-Dutch's attorney and was trying Having reviewed all the evidence before us and considered to draft exactly what Van Dyke requested. Swonke testified that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the that there was nothing in the release document to cause witnesses, we conclude that the jury's "yes" answer to concern to an attorney representing Anglo-Dutch. Question 5 was supported by factually sufficient evidence.

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was legally and This evidence entitled the jury to conclude that Swonke factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that Swonke obtained the Assignment and Release Agreement at Van complied with his fiduciary duty. Dyke's insistence; that Swonke made reasonable use of the confidence Anglo-Dutch placed in him; that he acted in the In light of the jury's amply supported answer to Question utmost good faith; and that he did not use the advantage of 5, we reject Anglo-Dutch's argument that Swanke's asserted his position to gain any benefit for himself at the expense of breach of fiduciary duty justifies applying contra proferentem Anglo-Dutch. and construing the ambiguous October 16, 2000 fee

agreement against Swonke. The finding that Swonke Having reviewed the evidence and considered that the jury complied with his fiduciary duty reinforces our decision is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, we to forego reliance on contra proferentem and to refrain conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient because it from automatically construing the ambiguous fee agreement would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to find that against Swonke. The trial court properly left this issue to the Swonke complied with his fiduciary duty to Anglo-Dutch. jury's resolution. Alternatively, Anglo-Dutch argues that the evidence in this

2. Evidence supports the finding that Swonke contracted case is factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that individually Swonke complied with his fiduciary duty. [19] We now turn to Anglo-Dutch's argument that legally and factually insufficient evidence supports the jury's finding

*142 Petroleum lntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008) "'······.·.··.···.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.··· " ' ' ' ' that the fee agreement is between Angh-Dutch and Swonke reasonable and fair-minded jurors from relying upon it to individually. answer "yes" as to Swonke in response to Question 1. Question 1 asked and instructed the jury as follows: Anglo-Dutch next contends that the only competent evidence

in the record conclusively shows that the fee agreement Do you find that the Fee Agreement with Anglo-Dutch always was intended to be between Anglo-Dutch and (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) was entered into on behalf of Greenberg Peden. This argument corresponds to situation (d) Greenberg Peden, or on behalf of Swonke, individually? set out above because it asserts that the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact.

You must decide the agreement's meaning by determining the intent of the parties at the time of the agreement.

Under this challenge, Anglo-Dutch asserts that the Consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Assignment and Release Agreement obtained from making of the agreement, the interpretation placed on the Greenberg Peden on April 16, 2004 reveals the parties' true agreement by the parties, and the conduct of the parties. intent. That assignment and release says Swonke signed the fee agreement on behalf of the law firm; that the firm assigned

As to your two choices below, you must answer "YES" as any interest under the fee agreement to Swonke; and that the to only one, and "NO" as to the other firm released Anglo-Dutch from liability to Greenberg Peden Answer: NO on behalf of Greenberg Peden for fees under the fee agreement. Anglo-Dutch argues that Swonke would not have needed an assignment of rights if YES on behalf of Swonke, individually he believed he had an individual fee agreement with Anglo Dutch and the rights already belonged to him. Anglo-Dutch

Anglo-Dutch argues that the evidence does not support the contends that Greenberg Peden shareholder Skip Naylor jury's answer to Question 1. As noted above, we will sustain acknowledged that the fee agreement was executed on behalf no evidence challenges when the record discloses: (a) a of the firm. complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight

Anglo-Dutch also stresses that other contingency fee to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the agreements Swonke signed in his individual capacity were evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more *477 than printed on Swonke's own letterhead. It further argues that a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively Swonke's outward appearance and behavior indicated he was the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d employed by Greenberg Peden while working on Anglo at 810. Ultimately, our review will focus on whether the Dutch matters; this included his billing practices, recording evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to time on the firm's system, using the firm's paralegals, and find that the fee agreement was entered on behalf of Swonke using the firm to bill Anglo-Dutch for expenses relating individually. !d. at 827. to the Halliburton lawsuit. Anglo-Dutch contends that its execution of a promissory note in favor of Greenberg Peden

Anglo-Dutch first contends that "[t]he only evidence and not Swonke individually-for the outstanding legal fees it offered at trial by Swonke in support of the alleged owed confirms that Swonke worked on Anglo-Dutch matters ambiguity amounts to no evidence." This argument appears through the firm and not individually. Additionally, Swonke's to correspond to situation (b) identified above. Anglo-Dutch letter informing Anglo-Dutch of his move to McConn & asserts that the use of personal pronouns in the fee agreement Williams stated that his legal services had been provided is no evidence because the fee agreement is unambiguous "through [his] association with Greenberg Peden P.C." -an argument we already have rejected. Anglo-Dutch also contends that Van Dyke's deposition testimony in

Van Dyke further suggested in his testimony that Anglo the Halliburton lawsuit, in which he stated that he had a Dutch agreed to the rounding feature in the formula for fee contract with Swonke, does not support or create an calculating the fee only as a reward to Greenberg Peden for its ambiguity and thus constitutes no evidence because it related forbearance on prior unpaid legal bills. He also pointed to the to a different topic-the number and rough identity of the October 17, 2000 transmittal letter he sent *478 to Swonke, fee contracts that Anglo-Dutch had at the time. We reject which he portrays as confirmation the parties intended the fee this contention because the jury was entitled to consider agreement to be between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden. this testimony and its context; that context does not prevent *143 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntem., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008) system; under the fee sharing arrangement between Swonke Lastly, Anglo-Dutch contends that, after Swonke moved to and Greenberg Peden, the firm would deduct a certain McConn & Williams, he maintained every appearance of percentage ofthe fees the clients paid to reimburse Greenberg acting as a McConn & Williams attorney using the firm office space, letterhead, e-mail account and billing system. Peden, among others, for using office space, paralegals, secretaries, and parking. According to Anglo-Dutch, this gave Anglo-Dutch no reason to believe Swonke was employed individually under the terms ofthe October 16, 2000 fee agreement. Swonke told Van Dyke he generated his own work, did not

get a salary from the firm, and was paid only when the clients This evidence does not rise to the level of allowing "only paid. Swonke told Van Dyke he was not part of the firm, one logical inference" in favor of a finding that Anglo despite appearances that Swonke had "all the trappings ofthe Dutch contracted with Greenberg Peden. See City of Keller, firm." Further, Naylor testified that sending Anglo-Dutch a 168 S.W.3d at 822. Swanke's testimony provided contrary bill for Halliburton lawsuit expenses was simply a mistal(e on evidence and established that more than one inference was Greenberg Peden's part. permissible in this case. The choice between these competing narratives belonged to the jury. We will not disturb that Additionally, Swonke testified that Van Dyke proposed a choice. contingency fee agreement. Although Swonke suggested his

usual flat percentage fee, Van Dyke insisted on the formula Swonke testified that the Assignment and Release Agreement stated in the fee agreement. Swonke initially rejected the was drafted only because of Van Dyke's "hypersensitivity" formula because he thought it was too *4 79 complicated, but and concern that Greenberg Peden would attempt to assert later acquiesced to it because Van Dyke thought this would be a right to fees under the October 16, 2000 fee agreement. the only fair way to measure Swonke's hours. Swonke added a When Swonke told Van Dyke that he wanted to be included rounding feature because he knew Van Dyke had a propensity on the settlement distribution list, Van Dyke insisted that for "putting decimals out there to a long degree." Swonke first obtain a release from Greenberg Peden because the fee agreement was on firm letterhead and Van Dyke According to Swonke, Van Dyke absolutely and without a was worried that the firm would make a claim against doubt knew that Swonke would be paid individually when Anglo-Dutch. Swonke and Greenberg Peden shareholder he moved from Greenberg Peden to McConn & Williams. Skip Naylor drafted a release and assignment to address Swonke also sent Van Dyke a letter informing him of Van Dyke's request. Swonke testified that he prepared a Swanke's move to McConn & Williams as "of counsel" and release and an assignment because an assignment had to occur Swonke's intention to take Anglo-Dutch's files with him before there could be a release, and Swonk.c and Naylor were unless Anglo-Dutch objected. trying to draft a document that would give Van Dyke the comfort he sought. Swonke testified that the release implicitly Finally, Swonke testified that he did not see the October 17, required an assignment of rights to place Swonke and Anglo 2000 transmittal letter because it transmitted the McConn & Dutch in the position Van Dyke, Swonke and Greenberg Williams contingency fee agreement, which Swonke already Peden believed they should occupy. Naylor explained that the had in his file. Normally, Swonke would not read a letter that language in the document was there to assure Van Dyke that, refers to a document he already had in his files. Swonke stated when Anglo-Dutch paid Swonke, it would owe Greenberg that he would have responded to the letter if he had thought Peden nothing. Van Dyke was contending the fee agreement was not with

Swonke individually. Swonke's practice was to use his personal letterhead whenever he entered into an individual contingency fee From this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that agreement with a new client, and Anglo-Dutch was not Van Dyke knew the implications of Swanke's "of counsel" a new client. Further, Swonke testified that Van Dyke status at Greenberg Peden and McConn & Williams because knew he was "of counsel" to Greenberg Peden because he Swonke had explained the meaning of his status before they explained the meaning of his "of counsel" status to him on signed the October 16, 2000 fee agreement. The jury also several occasions, including once while Van Dyke worked was entitled to conclude that executing the promissory note at his father's company in the late 1980s. Swanke's work as in favor of Greenberg Peden was consistent with the "of "of counsel" was billed through Greenberg Peden's billing counsel" arrangement Swonke had with the firm.

*144 it agreed to pay attorney's fees and Swonke agreed to work The jury could conclude that the fee agreement's rounding on the Halliburton lawsuit. feature was included to not as a reward for Greenberg Peden's forbearance, but as a means of addressing Van Dyke's Further, on the record before us, Angler-Dutch cannot show a propensity for "putting decimals out there to a long degree." complete absence of evidence establishing the vital fact that The jury could further conclude that Swonke never saw Van Angler-Dutch and Swonke intended to contract for payment of Swonke's individual services rather than the services Dyke's October 17, 2000 transmittal letter until after the of Greenberg Peden. Evidence establishing this vital fact dispute arose. Finally, the jury was entitled to conclude that constitutes much more than a scintilla and includes the Swonke obtained the Assignment and Release Agreement following. only at Van Dyke's insistence to calm his fear that Greenberg Peden would assert an interest in the fee agreement, and that In 1999 or early 2000, Swonke and David Peden had a Swonke was willing to satisfY all of Van Dyke's demands to get paid under the fee agreement. meeting with Van Dyke at which Peden expressly told Van

Dyke that Greenberg Peden no longer would perform legal Therefore, the evidence does not conclusively establish work for Angler-Dutch due to unpaid legal bills. No one at that the parties always intended the fee agreement to be Greenberg Peden had performed legal work for Angler-Dutch between Angler-Dutch and Greenberg Peden; and Angler since 1999. Dutch cannot assert a successful legal sufficiency challenge based on this argument. In February or March of 2000, Greenberg declined to

represent Angler-Dutch in the Halliburton lawsuit on an Lastly, we conclude that Angler-Dutch cannot prevail on a hourly and contingency fee basis due to the unpaid bills. no evidence challenge described in situations (a) and (c) Van Dyke admitted that Swonke informed him of Greenberg under Chief Justice Calvert's formulation applied above in Peden's refusal. Swonke testified that, after Angler-Dutch City of Keller. The vital fact at issue here is whether the signed a contract with McConn & Williams, he did not want parties intended the fee agreement to be between Angler to be involved with the Halliburton lawsuit but Van Dyke Dutch and Greenberg Peden, or between Angler-Dutch and and McConn & Williams attorneys continued to call him for Swonke individually. advice and help. More than a scintilla of evidence supports the jury's answer When Swanke became weary of providing legal services to Question 1. This evidence includes consistent use of without compensation, Van Dyke called him and asked personal pronouns throughout the fee agreement against a for his personal services. Swonke testified that Van Dyke backdrop of undisputed evidence that Van Dyke repeatedly knew no one at Greenberg Peden would help him, and that was told Greenberg Peden would not represent Angler-Dutch Van Dyke intended to hire Swonke individually. Van Dyke proposed the fee agreement and the parties negotiated the due to unpaid legal bills. These circumstances give the choice of personal pronouns added significance, and the jury was terms. Swonke also testified that the use offirm letterhead and entitled to consider these circumstances. signature block made no difference because he, Van Dyke and

Greenberg Peden all knew that Angler-Dutch was contracting This evidence also includes Van Dyke's 2002 deposition with Swonke individually. testimony in the Halliburton lawsuit. Van Dyke testified that Anglo-Dutch had two contingency fee contracts: one with Swonke consistently maintained that he was working John O'Quinn, Jett *480 Williams, and Luke McConn, and for Angler-Dutch individually and consistently demanded the other with Swonke. Van Dyke did not mention Greenberg payment for his legal work on that basis. This was also evident Peden in his deposition testimony. Van Dyke's deposition from Swonke's e-mails and other written correspondence with testimony reasonably can be read to conflict with his trial Van Dyke and others after the Halliburton lawsuit was settled. testimony; deciding the credibility of witnesses and the Swonke testified that, before the meeting on April 24, 2002, weight to be given to conflicting testimony is left to the jury's Van Dyke never mentioned that he thought the fee agreement discretion. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819. There is was with Greenberg Peden. more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury's finding that Angler-Dutch contracted with Swonke individually when *145 a client, along with "a generally applicable instruction on the In addition to this testimony from Swonke, there is other 'presumption of unfairness' that automatically arises when an evidence the jury could have relied upon in determining the attorney contracts with an existing client." parties' intent. Naylor and Peden both testified that the fee agreement Anglo-Dutch asked the trial court to include "general" was between Anglo-Dutch and Swonke individually. Naylor instructions applicable to Questions 1, 2, and 3. This cluster stated that the Greenberg Peden letterhead does not determine of questions pertained to the identity of the contracting the identity of parties to the fee agreement because the firm parties, failure to comply with the fee agreement, and contract had refused to be involved in the Halliburton lawsuit and damages. Anglo-Dutch requested the following "general" Van Dyke knew that; therefore, the fee agreement described instructions: how Swonke individually would assist Anglo-Dutch in the

You are instructed that a law firm and its lawyers, including Halliburton lawsuit and not how the firm would assist any "OfCounse1" lawyers who provide services for clients Anglo-Dutch. Naylor reiterated that, despite the use of firm of that firm, owe a fiduciary duty to the client. A lawyer letterhead, Van Dyke knew the firm would not represent who works as an "Of Counsel" to a law firm is treated under Anglo-Dutch and Swonke would do so. the law as an employee ofthat firm. The jury also heard testimony from Nancy Strong, a McConn A lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to a client and must act & Williams attorney, *481 who worked on the Halliburton with integrity and fidelity and in the best interest of his lawsuit. She testified that she became aware that Anglo client. Some of the fiduciary duties a lawyer owes his client Dutch resisted paying Swonke because Van Dyke was not include the: taking Swanke's calls or calling him back after having talked to him on a daily basis for years. She told Swonke that Van

1. duty to be strictly and perfectly honest about fee Dyke would try to renegotiate his contract and pay less than arrangements and to refrain from self-dealing; what he bargained for as he had done with all the other people 2. duty to act with absolute candor, openness, honesty, and he dealt with, including McConn & Williams in a previous without any concealment or deception; matter and the Anglo-Dutch investors.

3. duty to represent the client with undivided loyalty, Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the keeping the client's best interest in mind; evidence in this case is legally sufficient because it would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to find that Anglo

4. duty to inform the client of matters material to Dutch contracted with Swonke individually. See City of representation; Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. The evidence also is factually sufficient to support the jury's answer to Question 1. After 5. duty to provide the client at the outset with a clear considering and weighing all the evidence, we conclude that and accurate explanation of the basis or rate of the fee to the evidence is not so weak and the finding that the parties be charged under the fee agreement and how it is to be intended the fee agreement to be between Anglo-Dutch and calculated; Swonke individually is not so against the great weight and

6. duty to timely inform the client of a conflict of interest. preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.

You are further instructed that, with regard to the fee agreement in question, it is the attorney's and law firm's

We overrule Anglo-Dutch's second and fifth issues. burden to provide that the attorney and law firm acted with perfect fairness, adequacy, *482 and equity with regard to the client. Where self-dealing on the part of the

C. Jury Instructions attorney and/or the law firm is alleged by the client, a In its third issue, Anglo-Dutch seeks reversal and a new trial presumption of unfairness automatically arises and it is on grounds that the trial court erroneously refused Anglo the attorney's and law firm's burden to prove (a) that the Dutch's requests for additional instructions to accompany questioned transaction was made in good faith, (b) for a fair Question 1. Anglo-Dutch contends that the trial court should consideration, and (c) after full and complete disclosure of have submitted additional instructions applicable to Question all material information to the client. 1 identifYing the relevant fiduciary duties an attorney owes to *146 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Intern., Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 267 S.W.3d 454 (2008)

pertaining to treatment of an "of counsel" attorney as a firm You are further instructed that attorneys, law firms, and employee. Even assuming for argument's sake that this is a attorneys performing services as "Of Counsel" to a law correct statement of the law, not every correct statement of the firm have a duty, at the beginning of representation of a law belongs in the jury charge. A requested instruction can set client on a contingency fee matter, to inform that client forth a correct statement of the law and still be unnecessary of the basis or rate of the contingency fee. Also, the in the charge. See Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 attorney must inform the client about the implication of a S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex.l984); Maddoxv. DenkaChem. Cmp., contingency fee agreement. 930 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). The trial court acted within its discretion when it

Anglo-Dutch also asked the trial court include the following refused to include this unnecessary additional statement. instructions as part of Question 1: The remaining requested instructions pertain to Swanke's In answering this question, you are instructed that the fiduciary duty. Anglo-Dutch's *483 request to include agreement must be construed as a reasonable person in the "general" fiduciary duty instructions applicable to Question circumstances of the client would have construed it. 1 is another manifestation of Anglo-Dutch's larger effort to link the contract interpretation issue with its contention that

You are further instructed that the obligation of clarifYing Swonke breached his fiduciary duties. attorney-client contracts falls on the attorney because ofthe attorney's greater knowledge and experience with respect

We already have concluded that Swonke's asserted breach to fee arrangements and because of the trust the client has of his fiduciary duty does not influence the manner in placed in the attorney.

which the fee agreement is interpreted in this case. The The trial court refused Anglo-Dutch's requests. trial court submitted a separate fiduciary duty question and accompanying instructions describing the facets of that duty

[20] Because a trial court enjoys wide discretion in in Question 5. The jury answered "yes" to Question 5, which determining which instructions should be included in the jury (a) asked whether Swonke complied with his fiduciary duty to charge, our review is limited to determining whether the court Anglo-Dutch, and (b) placed the burden on Swonke to justifY acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. his conduct and establish his compliance with his fiduciary See Tex. A & lvf Univ. v. Chambers, 31 S.W.3d 780, 783 duty. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied). A trial court's asserted the jury's "yes" answer to Question 5. The instructions error in refusing an instruction is reversible only if it probably

accompanying Question 5 describe the fiduciary duty that caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.App. P. Anglo-Dutch sought to apply to Question 1 via its requested 44.1; Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 456. instructions. The trial court acted within its discretion in

submitting fiduciary duty instructions as part of Question [21] We conclude that the trial court acted within 5, and in refusing to submit another set of fiduciary duty its discretion when it refused Anglo-Dutch's requested instructions applicable to Question 1. additional instructions. Further, any asserted error in refusing the requested instructions was harmless.

In any event, the asserted charge error in refusing to include fiduciary duty instructions applicable to Question I was

[22] With respect to the construction placed upon the harmless because fiduciary duty instructions were submitted fee agreement by a reasonable person in the client's as part of a separate question that the jury answered adversely circumstances, Question 1 already included a broad to Anglo-Dutch. See Times Herald Printing Co. v. A.H. instruction that told the jury to "[c]onsider all of the facts and Bela Cmp., 820 S.W.2d 206, 214 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement, the Dist.] 1991, no writ) (omission of requested instructions was interpretation placed on the agreement by the parties, and the harmless in light of separate question that applied requested conduct of the parties." The existing instruction encompassed legal standard and was answered adversely to party seeking the client's perspective ofthe fee agreement, and the trial court the instructions). was not obligated to provide further instructions tailored to a particular litigant's liking. Similarly, the trial court acted We overrule Anglo-Dutch's third issue. within its discretion by rejecting the requested instruction

*147 them to take less than they agreed to in their lawsuit funding D. Admission of Evidence agreements so that the Halliburton lawsuit could be settled. In its fourth issue, Anglo-Dutch asserts that a new trial Van Dyke also testified without objection that he did not pay is required because the trial court erroneously admitted any of the 33 investors the amounts contracted for in the evidence regarding other litigation involving Anglo-Dutch. funding agreements. Further, the trial court admitted evidence Specifically, Anglo-Dutch challenges the trial court's that investors in the Halliburton lawsuit had sued Anglo admission of evidence relating to ( 1) "investor lawsuits," Dutch because it did not pay them the amounts for which they "lawsuit funding agreements," or "Anglo-Dutch's payment, had contracted. Without objection, the jury was later again nonpayment, or attempts at resolving any claims related informed of these investor lawsuits. thereto;" (2) investor Michael Lore's testimony; and (3) any unpaid fees to McConn & Williams or any other law firm.

With respect to Michael Lore's testimony, the trial court found that it was admissible for the limited purpose of stating that

Because we review a trial court's admission of evidence for he was an investor; of impeaching Van Dyke's testimony in abuse of discretion, In re J.P. B .. 180 S.W.3d at 575, we must which he claimed the investors were happy with the payment uphold the evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis they had received from Anglo-Dutch; and in rebuttal to in the record to support it. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp .. McConn's assertion that Van Dyke was a fine man. Lore 972 S.W.2d at 43. We will not reverse a trial court for an testified that he was displeased when Van Dyke asked him erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the error was reasonably to accept less than he contracted for; that he didn't sign calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of the release Van Dyke requested; that he was never told the an improper judgment. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see also Gee, Halliburton settlement amount by Van Dyke; that he sued 765 S.W.2d at 396. Anglo-Dutch to recover the amount originally contracted for; that and he did not think Van Dyke was a fine man.

[23] We conclude that the trial court acted within its Only during cross-examination by Anglo-Dutch's attorney discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. A key issue did Lore answer more particular questions regarding his at trial focused on the parties' intent in signing the fee investor lawsuit. agreement in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Those facts and circumstances included the challenged

Nancy Strong testified without objection that a dispute arose evidence, which related in significant part to the parties' between Van Dyke and McConn & Williams because he sophistication and intent. We cannot say that the trial court failed to pay the entire legal bill after the firm had successfully abused its discretion in admitting evidence relating to the represented Van Dyke in an unrelated lawsuit against OPIC, lawsuit funding agreements and investor lawsuits, or investor one of Anglo-Dutch's Tenge Field project partners. Strong Michael Lore's testimony. also testified that Van Dyke owed the law firm of Looper Reed legal fees for its work in the lawsuit against OPIC. 6

*484 Additionally, any error in admitting the challenged Swonke testified without objection that Van Dyke could not evidence was harmless because it was introduced at different hire the Looper Reed law firm to represent Anglo-Dutch in stages of the trial without objection by Anglo-Dutch. See the Halliburton lawsuit because "as it tum[ ed] out, he owed Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 907 Looper Reed quite a bit of money, too." (Tex.2004) (error in admission is deemed harmless if the objecting party permits the same or similar evidence to be

Finally, Anglo-Dutch has not established on this record introduced without objection). that the verdict turned on the challenged evidence. See City of Brownsville, 897 S.W.2d at 753-54. This trial was

The trial court admitted evidence that Anglo-Dutch had in significant part a credibility battle based on the jury's entered into lawsuit funding agreements with investors assessment ofSwonke and Van Dyke. Both testified at length. to offset Anglo-Dutch's expenses during prosecution of Anglo-Dutch has not demonstrated that the admission of the Halliburton lawsuit. The trial court reasoned that this evidence regarding collateral agreements and disputes during evidence tended to show Swonke's individual legal work with a lengthy trial featuring voluminous evidence likely caused respect to Anglo-Dutch's investors. Evidence regarding these the rendition of an improper judgment. same lawsuit funding agreements was later admitted by the trial court without objection when Van Dyke testified that he

We overrule Anglo-Dutch's fourth issue. instructed Swonke to draft releases for investors to encourage *148 to the jury. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Swonke individually is a party to the fee agreement with Anglo-Dutch, and that Greenberg Peden

*485 Conclusion is not. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Swonke complied with his fiduciary

We hold that the October 16, 2000 fee agreement was duty to Anglo-Dutch. Anglo-Dutch's charge and evidentiary ambiguous with respect to whether Anglo-Dutch contracted complaints provide no basis for reversal. with Swonke individually or with Greenberg Peden. The trial court properly refused to construe the ambiguous fee

We affirm the trial court's judgment. agreement against Swonke and properly submitted this issue Footnotes *

Senior Justice J. Harvey Hudson sitting by assignment.

Swanke in fact joined a predecessor firm, which changed its name and composition from time to time. Because these changes do not affect the disposition of this appeal, we refer to "Greenberg Peden" throughout this opinion.

2 In June 2001, Anglo-Dutch signed a promissory note in favor of Greenberg Peden for $231,749.16. Anglo-Dutch paid the note with interest in December 2003, about two years after Greenberg Peden had dissolved.

3 This settlement spawned a separate series oflawsuits and appeals involving investors who signed litigation funding agreements in return for a portion of Anglo-Dutch's recovery from the lawsuit against Halliburton and Ramco. After the jury returned its verdict against Halliburton and Ramco, Anglo-Dutch sought to reduce amounts it owed to investors who financed the lawsuit and a number of those investors sued Anglo-Dutch. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Smith, 243 S.W.3d 776 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. filed); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Littlemill Limited, No. 14--06-00921-CV, 2007 WL 2826900 (Tex.App. Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 2, 2007, pet. filed); Case Funding Network, L.P. v. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 38 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. filed); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Anglo-Dutch's judgment against Ramco was reversed on appeal. See Ramco Oil & Gas Ltd., 207 S.WJd at 827.

4 The jury did not answer Question 4, asking what sum of money would compensate Greenberg Peden for its damages that resulted from Anglo-Dutch's failure to comply with the fee agreement, because it was conditioned on finding that the fee agreement was entered into on behalf of Greenberg Peden and not Swonke individually. The jury did not answer Question 6, asking the jury to determine the amount of Swonke's fees under the fee agreement, because Question 6 was conditioned on the jury answering Question 5 in the negative and not answering Question 3 with a dollar amount. Further, the jury did not answer Question 7, asking if clear and convincing evidence showed that Anglo-Dutch's harm resulted from malice or fraud, because it was conditioned on the jury answering Question 5 in the negative. Lastly, the jury did not answer Question 8, addressing exemplary damages against Swonke for the harm Anglo-Dutch suffered from Swonke's conduct, because it was conditioned on the jury answering Question 7 in the affirmative.

5 Anglo-Dutch does not challenge on appeal the jury's finding that it breached the fee agreement; the amount of contract damages awarded for that breach; or the separate statutory fee award for litigating Swonke's contract claim under the disputed fee agreement, which the parties opted to try to the court. Anglo-Dutch also does not challenge the rendition of a take-nothing judgment in favor of Greenberg Peden.

6 Anglo-Dutch objected to this testimony only on hearsay grounds. Governrnent VVorks, *149 APPENDIXD *150 Petroleum international, Inc. v. Greenberg ... , 352 S.W.3d 445 (2011} 54 fex. sup. ct: J .1669 ··-··· ·· .. ·.·.·.·.··. ... · .... Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that must be decided by examining the

352 S.W.3d 445 contract as a whole in light of the circumstances Supreme Court of Texas. present when the contract was entered.

ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL,

13 Cases that cite this headnote INC., and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., Petitioners, v. [2) Attorney and Client GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C., and Dealings Between Attorney and Client Gerard J. Swonke, Respondents. Because a lawyer's fiduciary duty to a client No. oS-0833. Argued Sept. 14, covers contract negotiations between them, such I Decided Aug. 26, 2011. contracts are closely scrutinized. 2010. Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 2011. 3 Cases that cite this headnote Synopsis Background: Former client brought action seeking Attorney and Client

[3) declaration that it did not owe attorney contingency fees. Dealings Between Attorney and Client Attorney counterclaimed. The 61st District Court, Harris Part of the lawyer's duty is to inform the client of County, John J. Donovan, J., entered judgment on a jury all material facts with regard to contract between verdict for attorney, and former client appealed. The Court attorney and client; so that this responsibility is of Appeals, William J. Boyce, J., 267 S.W.3d 454, affirmed. not a mere and meaningless formality, the lawyer Former client petitioned for review which was granted. must be clear. 3 Cases that cite this headnote

[Holding:) The Supreme Court, Hecht, J., held that agreement was between client and law firm for which attorney

[4] Attorney and Client was of counsel, rather than with attorney individually. Dealings Between Attorney and Client Only reasonable clarity as to material facts with regard to contract between attorney and client is Reversed and remanded. required, not perfection; not every dispute over the contract's meaning must be resolved against Wainwright, J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed the lawyer. opm10n.

1 Cases that cite this headnote Lehrmann, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Medina, and Green, JJ., joined.

[5] Attorney and Client Dealings Between Attorney and Client Object of imposing duty on attorney to inform West Headnotes (10) the client of all material facts with regard to contract between attorney and client is that the

[1) Contracts client be informed; thus, whether the lawyer has Construction as a whole been reasonably clear must be determined from Contracts the client's perspective. Extrinsic circumstances 4 Cases that cite this headnote Contracts Ambiguity in general [6) Contracts *151 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. v. 352 S.W.3d 445 (2011) 54fex. sup. ct. J. 1669

Language of contract Construing client-attorney agreements from the perspective of a reasonable client in Contracts the circumstances imposes a responsibility of Extrinsic circumstances clarity on the attorney that should preclude a Evidence determination that an agreement is ambiguous Showing Intent of Parties as to Subject in most instances; attorneys appreciate the Matter importance of words and are more able than most Understanding the context m which an clients to detect and repair omissions in client agreement was made is essential in determining attorney contracts. the parties' intent as expressed in the agreement, but it is the parties' expressed intent that the Cases that cite this headnote court must determine; extrinsic evidence cannot be used to show that the parties probably meant,

[10] Attorney and Client or could have meant, something other than what Construction and operation their agreement stated. Attorney and Client 8 Cases that cite this headnote Questions for jury A client's best interests, which its attorney is obliged to pursue, do not include having a jury Attorney and Client [7] construe their attorney-client fee agreements. Construction and operation Legal fee agreement for contingency fee Cases that cite this headnote representation was between client and law firm for which attorney was of counsel, rather than with attorney individually, although agreement used personal pronouns to refer to attorney,

Attorneys and Law Firms where personal pronouns did not suggest that only the individual attorney, to the exclusion of

*446 Gregory S. Coleman, Richard Bernard Farrer, Yetter other firm attorneys, would be working on the Coleman LLP, Craig T. Enoch, Enoch Kever PLLC, Mike A. matter, one use of the word "I" clearly referred to Hatchell, Charles R. 'Skip' Watson Jr., Locke Lord Bissell firm, client had never been individual attorney's & Liddell, LLP, Austin, TX, Donald B. McFall, Kenneth R. non-firm client, and agreement was written on Breitbeil, McFall, Breitbeil & Smith, P.C., Brian K. Tully, firm letterhead, and signed on the finn's behalf. JesseR. Pierce & Associates, P.C., Houston, TX, for Anglo Dutch Petroleum International, Inc.

2 Cases that cite this headnote Rusty Hardin, Joe M. Roden, Ryan Kees Higgins, Rusty Hardin & Associates, P.C., Robert M. 'Randy' Roach Jr., Attorney and Client

[8] Daniel William Davis, Roach & Newton, L.L.P., Houston, Construction and operation TX, Amy J. Schumacher, Roach & Newton, L.L.P., Austin, Extrinsic evidence of attorney's and client's TX, for Greenberg Pede, P.C. intent could not be used to show the parties' motives or intentions apart from the fee

Linda Eads, Dedman School of Law, Dallas, TX, prose. agreement; it could only provide the context in which the agreement was reached. Christopher S. Jolms, Dawson Sodd Ellis & Hodge LLP,

Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Abrams Scott & Bickley, 3 Cases that cite this headnote

L.L.P.

[9] Attorney and Client Construction and operation *152 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntemationa!, Inc. v. 1) 54 tex. sur;:ct. . .r 1559·····

the firm; if the firm refused, Swonke could undertake the Opinion representation individually. Swonke used personal stationery -"Law Offices of Gerard J. Swonke Attorney at Law"-and

Justice HECHT delivered the opmwn of the Court, in signed individually when representing clients who were not which ChiefJustice JEFFERSON, Justice JOHNSON, Justice also clients of the firm. Even in those situations, the firm sent WILLETT, and Justice GUZMAN joined. the bills and retained ten percent of the fees. Swonke agreed to Van Dyke's proposal and dictated the following agreement

The parties dispute whether an attorney fee agreement is ("the Fee Agreement"), which his secretary prepared on firm ambiguous. The client contends that an agreement on law firm letterhead and he signed on its behalf: letterhead, signed by a lawyer on behalf of the firm, is with the firm, not with the lawyer personally. The lawyer counters

GREENBERG PEDEN P C.

that his use of personal pronouns in the agreement, as well as surrounding circumstances, create an ambiguity that must

TELEPHONE: (713) 627-2720

be resolved by a jury. We agree with the client and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 1 FACSIMILE: (713) 627-7057

WEBSITE: www.gpsolaw.com ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW

I TENTH FLOOR, 12 GREENWAY PLAZA HOUSTON, Scott V. Van Dyke, president of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum

TEXAS 77046

International, Inc., asked Gerard J. Swonke, a lawyer "of counsel" with the firm of Greenberg Peden, P.C., to represent Anglo-Dutch as plaintiff 2 in a *447 suit against Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. and Ramco Oil & Gas, October 16, 2000 Ltd. for disclosing confidential information concerning the

Mr. Scott V. Van Dyke development of oil and gas prospects in the Tenge Field in Kazakhstan. Greenberg Peden had represented Anglo

Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. Dutch on various matters for years and had drafted the confidentiality agreement that would be central to the suit.

Eight Greenway Plaza, Suite 900 Swonke had been responsible for Anglo-Dutch's initial Houston, Texas 77046 engagement as a firm client and had done much of its work. He and Van Dyke were friends.

Re: Cause No.2000-22588; Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) et al. v. Ramco, et al; In the 151st Judicial District of Harris

The Tenge Field case was expected to be protracted and County, Texas. difficult, and Anglo-Dutch could not afford to pay Greenberg Peden's hourly rates, as it had done in the past, so it proposed

Dear Scott: a 20% contingent fee. The firm declined. Anglo-Dutch had fallen behind in its obligations to the firm, and the firm had

This letter memorializes our agreement with respect decided not to accept further business from Anglo-Dutch to me assisting you and/or the companies which you until it became current. Plus Greenberg Peden believed that control (Anglo-Dutch) and the law firm of McConn & it lacked the resources needed to prosecute the case on a Williams, LLP regarding the above-referenced matter. contingent-fee basis. Swonke referred Van Dyke to another In that regard, you have executed a Fee Agreement firm, McConn & Williams, which took the case.

with the law firm of McConn & Williams on March 25, 2000, which is incorporated herein by reference.

But Swonke's continued counsel, based on his involvement I agree to assist Anglo-Dutch and that firm with this in the events leading up to the litigation, was still needed, lawsuit for proportionately the same percentage (20%) and Van Dyke asked him to assist McConn & Williams, of any benefit to McConn & Williams reflected in again for a contingent fee. Swonke's arrangement with such agreement. However, I will not be responsible for Greenberg Peden required him to offer new business to

any expenses other than those I may personally incur. *153 352 S.W.3d 445 (2011} Further, the proportions under which my fees shall be October 17, 2000 calculated will be the ratio *448 of the hours I have spent or will spend on this matter relative to the hours

Mr. Gerard J. Swonke the attorneys at McConn & Williams have spent or will spend after the date the lawsuit was filed, rounded to

Greenberg Peden P.C. the next whole percentage. For example, if McConn & Tenth Floor Williams' attorneys spend 1,000 hours on the lawsuit after the date the lawsuit was filed and I spend 90 hours

12 Greenway Plaza of my time towards the lawsuit, then by rounding up to the nearest whole number, I would be entitled to

Houston, TX 77046 receive from you 2% ( 10% of20%) ofthe gross revenues and other benefits recovered, if any, from this lawsuit. In addition, should the Fee Agreement be amended, Re: McConn & Williams, LLP you agree that I shall be entitled to the benefit of such Attorney's Employment Agreement amendment.

Dear Jerry: If this comports with your understanding of our agreement, please indicate by signing below and

Pursuant to our Fee Agreement dated October 16, 2000, returning this letter to me. please find enclosed a copy of the executed Attorney's Employment Agreement with McConn & Williams,

If you have any questions, please contact me. LLP related to Cause No.2000-2258; Anglo-Dutch Very truly yours, (Tenge) et al. Vs. Ramco, et al.; in the !51st Judicial District of Harris County Texas.

GREENBERG PEDEN P.C.

This fee agreement with McConn & Williams, LLP Is/ G.J Swanke provides the basis for the Agreement between Greenberg Peden P.C. and Anglo-Dutch.

GERARD

J. SWONKE Very truly yours,

AGREED TO:

Is/ Scott Van Dvke

SCOTT

V. VAN DYKE, PRESIDENT OF Scott V. Van Dyke ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL, INC.

President

DATED: __ _ _

Of significance is Van Dyke's reference to the Fee The next day, Van Dyke signed the agreement and returned it Agreement as "the Agreement between Greenberg Peden to Swonke. He also wrote Swonke the following letter: P.C. and Anglo-Dutch." Swonke received the letter but did not read it and thus did not respond.

ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL

Swonke continued to work on the case, and as provided by the Fee Agreement, Greenberg Peden invoiced Anglo-Dutch EIGHT GREENWAY PLAZA, SUITE 900 for expenses. But a year later, Greenberg Peden dissolved,

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77046

and Swonke moved to McConn & Williams, again in an "of counsel" relationship. In a letter to Van Dyke, Swonke wrote

UNITED STATES

that he would not take the Anglo-Dutch files with him if Van Dyke *449 objected. 3 Van Dyke did not. Swonke continued

TEL: (713) 993-9303

to work on the Tenge Field case at McConn & Williams as

FAX: (713) 993-9011

did other lawyers, including two who were also "of counsel". email@anglo-dutch.com *154 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum international, Inc. v. 54 Tex. sup: cr J.1669 As the litigation wore on, Anglo-Dutch and McConn & We begin by considering what standards to apply in Williams decided to retain additional counsel, and they hired construing lawyer-client contracts. We then apply those John M. O'Quinn & Associates. McConn & Williams reduced standards to the Fee Agreement, first to its text, and then to its 20% fee to 16-2/3%, and Anglo-Dutch agreed to pay the circumstances surrounding its execution. O'Quinn 20%, for a total contingent fee of 36--2/3%. Still later, Anglo-Dutch agreed to pay the fee net of expenses. The case was tried to a plaintiffs' verdict and then settled for

A

$51 million. Anglo-Dutch's legal fees and expenses totaled slightly over $20 million.

[1] [2] [3] " 'Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that must be *450 decided by examining

A few days before the settlement was funded, Swonke the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances present told Van Dyke that he expected to be paid under the Fee when the contract was entered.' " 6 One such circumstance Agreement not only for the 277 hours he worked while at is the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between Greenberg Peden but also for 1,022 hours he worked at the parties. 7 Because a lawyer's fiduciary duty to a client McConn & Williams. All the other lawyers at McConn & covers contract negotiations between them, such contracts are Williams were to be paid under the firm's agreement with closely scrutinized. 8 Part of the lawyer's duty is to inform the Anglo-Dutch. Greenberg Peden assigned its interest in the client of all material facts. 9 And so that this responsibility Fee Agreement to Swonke. The assignment, which Swonke prepared and signed, recited that "Swonke executed [the

is not a mere and meaningless formality, the lawyer must be Fee Agreement] on behalf of (and while affiliated with) clear. Greenberg Peden as an Of Counsel". Van Dyke offered to pay $293,338.85 for Swanke's work on the case while at

Clarity in fee agreements is certainly important to clients. Greenberg Peden but refused to pay for the time spent by In an amicus brief supporting Anglo-Dutch, Professor Linda Swonke at McConn & Williams. Eads explains: [Clients] need to know they can Anglo-Dutch sued for a declaration that the Fee Agreement depend on the firm they thought they was with Greenberg Peden, not Swonke personally. It hired to represent their interests. When also sued Swonke for breach of fiduciary duty. Swonke there is uncertainty about a firm's or counterclaimed for breach of contract, asserting that he attorney's responsibility for a matter, personally was party to the agreement. Swonke also alleged there is a real risk that loyalty to that Van Dyke had defrauded him. Based on Swanke's that client will become watery. And testimony that his use of firm letterhead and the firm if disputes arise about fees or other signature block, and his characterization of the agreement issues, clients need to know who has in the assignment, were mistakes, and extrinsic evidence of ultimate authority to negotiate the the parties' relationship, the trial court concluded that the issue, firm management or just the agreement was ambiguous and submitted the parties' dispute attorney working on the matter. 10 to the jury. The jury found that the Fee Agreement was with Swonke, that Swonke had complied with his fiduciary duty to Anglo-Dutch, and that his damages were $1 million. The

Clarity is also important to lawyers. Professor Eads continues: jury failed to find that Van Dyke had defrauded Swonke. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict, and the court of

Law firms need to know whether they are entitled to appeals affirmed. 4 fees in order to budget their expenses and organizational strategy; firms need to know how much, and what scope of, malpractice insurance to purchase; they need to know

We granted Anglo-Dutch's petition for review. 5 who their clients are in order to analyze potential conflicts of interest; and firms need to know what matters are theirs in order to staff them appropriately and ensure their clients'

II

interests are protected. *155 Petroleum lntematlonai, Inc. v. r·m"'"'''r."'rn 352 S.W.3d 445 1) 54feX..sup. cXJ.1669 * * *

*452 B

[Individual] lawyers will want the certainty that their law firm stands behind them, that the firm's malpractice carrier

[7] On its face, the Fee Agreement is plainly one with will defend them if necessary, and that the fee agreements Greenberg Peden, not Swanke personally. The clear indicia of they draft will be interpreted to avoid readings that would the firm letterhead and signature on the firm's behalf are not involve violations of the rules of discipline. Further, in contradicted by the personal pronouns in the text. Swanke's cases in which the existence of an ambiguity appears to uses of 'T', "me", and "my" indicate that he would himself *451 favor the lawyer, allowing a lawyer initially to be working on the matter, which Anglo-Dutch certainly benefit from the ambiguity might not be a good thing, intended, but none suggests that other attorneys and staff at even for the lawyer. By suing a former client, the lawyer's Greenberg Peden would be excluded from the case any more reputation often suffers. And if the ambiguity was drafted than they had been from other Anglo-Dutch matters. Since by the lawyer, Texas courts will have to decide how to the fee was contingent on recovery and therefore not based handle malpractice claims based on poor draftsmanship of on any attorney's hourly rate, it would presumably make no the fee agreement. 11 difference to Anglo-Dutch who besides Swanke worked on the case as long as the fee was computed on his hours. One

A number of law firms also appearing as amicus cunae use of"''' clearly included the firm: "I will not be responsible endorse these views. 12 for any expenses". The firm, not Swanke, invoiced the clients for expenses, on firm letterhead. Moreover, the second person pronouns show that the word "you" refers sometimes

[4] [5] Only reasonable clarity is required, not perfection; only to Van Dyke individually ("you and/or the companies not every dispute over the contract's meaning must be resolved against the lawyer. But the object is that the client be which you control"), sometimes only to Anglo-Dutch ("I informed, and thus whether the lawyer has been reasonably would be entitled to receive from you"), and sometimes to Van Dyke and his companies ("you have executed" the clear must be determined from the client's perspective. McConn & Williams fee agreement-Van Dyke signing for Accordingly, we agree with the Restatement (Third) of the his companies). In sum, the pronouns indicate only inexact Law Governing Lawyers that "[a] tribunal should construe a drafting; none says that despite the firm letterhead and firm contract between client and lawyer as a reasonable person in signature, the agreement could only have been with Swanke the circumstances of the client would have construed it." 13

personally. [6] Other circumstances surrounding the execution of Nor does the fee calculation, based solely on the hours a contract may inform its construction, but "[t]here are Swanke spent individually, suggest that others at Greenberg limits." 14 We have said: Peden were excluded from the work. Taking Swonlce's time into account provided a way of limiting the fee. If anything, the rounding-up feature of the calculation might suggest

An unambiguous contract will be enforced as written, and a means of providing additional compensation for others parol evidence will not be received for the purpose of who did work on the case. Anglo-Dutch was to reimburse creating an ambiguity or to give the contract a meaning expenses, which were billed by Greenberg Peden, not by different from that which its language imports. Only where Swanke individually. a contract is ambiguous may a court consider the parties' interpretation and "admit extraneous evidence to determine

Even if the Fee Agreement had expressly provided that the true meaning of the instrument." 15 only Swanke would render the legal services required, the Understanding the context in which an agreement was made representation could still have been a firm matter. Anglo is essential in determining the parties' intent as expressed in Dutch was already a Greenberg Peden client and had been the agreement, but it is the parties' expressed intent that the for years. Although Swanke had first engaged Anglo-Dutch court must determine. Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to as a client and had been responsible for most of its work, show that the parties probably meant, or could have meant, Anglo-Dutch had never been Swanke's non-firm client. From something other than what their agreement stated. 16 Anglo-Dutch's perspective, nothing in the Fee Agreement *156 - - - - ------~--------- Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. v. Greenberg ... , 352 S.W.3d 445 (21:11 1) 54i'ex. sl.Ji]: ct:J: 1669

ww·w· ·• •·····.···.···.·· .. ·.·.·.· .. · ....• reasonably suggested that its relationship with its lawyers was [9] [10] Construing client-lawyer agreements from the changing. perspective of a reasonable client in the circumstances

imposes a responsibility of clarity on the lawyer that should preclude a determination that an agreement is ambiguous in most instances. Lawyers appreciate the importance of

c

words and "are more able than most clients to detect and

repair omissions in client-lawyer contracts." 17 A client's best

[8] The trial court having determined the Fee Agreement to be ambiguous, the parties offered extensive extrinsic evidence interests, which its lawyer is obliged to pursue, do not include of their intent in the ten-day trial. Given our conclusion that

having a jury construe their agreements. the agreement was not ambiguous, this evidence is oflimited relevance. It cannot be used to show the parties' motives or The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case intentions apart from the Fee Agreement; it can only provide is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. the context in which the agreement was reached. Van Dyke was not an unsophisticated client; indeed, it

Justice WAINWRIGHT filed an opinion concurring in part was he, not Swonke, who proposed the terms of the Fee and dissenting in part. Agreement. But for years Anglo-Dutch had been a client of Greenberg Peden, not Swonke personally. Van Dyke

Justice LEHRMANN filed a dissenting opinion, in which knew Greenberg Peden was concerned that Anglo-Dutch was Justice MEDINA and Justice GREEN joined. delinquent in its payments to the firm, but the Tenge Field representation was on a contingent-fee basis. He also knew Justice WAINWRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in that the firm had refused to be lead counsel in the case, but part. the firm certainly had sufficient resources for a consulting Scott Van Dyke, president of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum role. Nothing about the parties' relationship preceding the International, Inc., and his attorney Gerald Swonke signed an Fee Agreement required *453 Van Dyke to recognize that engagement letter, dated October 16,2000, in which attorney though the agreement purported to be with Greenberg Peden, Swonke agreed to represent Van Dyke's company, Anglo it was really with Swonke. Dutch, in litigation with Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

Swonke was "of counsel" at the law firm of Greenberg Events following the Fee Agreement do not cast the situation Peden P.C. Anglo-Dutch contends that under the terms of in a different light. The day he signed the Fee Agreement for the letter, Swonke also bound Greenberg Peden to represent Anglo-Dutch, Van Dyke wrote Swonke that the agreement Anglo-Dutch in the Halliburton litigation. The letter contains was with Greenberg Peden. When the firm dissolved a year Swonke's references to expenses he would "personally incur", later and Swonke moved to McConn & Williams, he treated fees that "I would be entitled to receive", the agreement for all of Anglo-Dutch's files as having belonged to Greenberg "me" to assist you in the so-called Halliburton litigation, but Peden. Even after the Tenge Field case settled and the present it is drafted on Greenberg Peden letterhead. Swonke contends controversy began to emerge, Swonke stated that he had this was an oversight. Swonke testified that for a couple of signed the Fee Agreement on behalf of Greenberg Peden and years prior to the Halliburton litigation, he had individually obtained an assignment of its interest. represented Anglo-Dutch under his "of counsel" arrangement

at Greenberg Peden. Notwithstanding this evidence, the In sum, the circumstances in which the Fee Agreement was Court disagrees with the trial court and concludes that the executed do not suggest that the parties must have intended engagement letter is unambiguous and as a matter of law something different from what they plainly stated. We hold bound the Greenberg Peden firm to represent Anglo-Dutch. that the agreement was between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg I therefore agree with mSTICE LEHRMANN'S dissent Peden. that the engagement letter is ambiguous and with her other

departures from the Court's opinion. I write to explain another basis for my disagreement with the Court's position.

III

*454 The Court holds the two parties to an agreement that neither of them entered in October 2000, as their trial

*157 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. v. 54fex:sui.J:crT1669 '''"''' '''"'',',',',', testimony indicates. Van Dyke testified that he knew at the quite a turnabout for Anglo-Dutch as its litigation position time of the engagement letter that Greenberg Peden would contradicts the knowledge of its president, who signed the not represent Anglo-Dutch in any new matters, such as the engagement letter. Knowing that Greenberg Peden refused Halliburton litigation. Why? Van Dyke explained. Anglo to represent Anglo-Dutch in the Halliburton litigation, Van Dutch was over $200,000 behind in paying Greenberg Peden, Dyke now asserts that the engagement letter unambiguously and Greenberg Peden was not interested in further exposure did just that. on contingency fee cases. The exchange on this point during Van Dyke's testimony at trial is unequivocal, as Swanke told The jury heard all about the dispute from all four sides him in February 2000 that Greenberg Peden was not his law -Swonke, Van Dyke, Greenberg Peden and another law firm. firm Anglo-Dutch engaged (McConn & Williams}-and

found that the two signers of the engagement letter intended Attorney: Mr. Van Dyke, my question was a more limited that Swanke, not Greenberg Peden, would represent Anglo one, and you can say, "No, he didn't tell me that," if you Dutch. want. I agree with the Court that attorneys owe fiduciary duties to I'm just asking: Did he [Swonke] not tell you from their clients in this context that include: exercising the utmost the beginning that Greenberg Peden wouldn't represent good faith and most scrupulous honesty toward clients; you in any lawsuit here, no matter whether it was ensuring that engagement letters are clear to the clients; contingency or hourly at all until you-because you fully and fairly disclosing all important information to clients hadn't paid off that debt. concerning the transactions; and explaining material changes in the arrangement, such as moving from one law firm to

Van Dyke: Yes. another. Ambiguity in the fee agreement should be construed Furthermore, Van Dyke knew that no Greenberg lawyers against the lawyer-drafter of the agreement. The *455 Court would work on his files from that time forward. Harlan and amici set these duties out in some detail. 1 I do not Naylor, Greenberg's managing partner, explained to the jury conclude, however, that application of these duties to this case that the firm's lawyers were instructed not to work for Anglo means that an ambiguous contract should be designated clear Dutch-"neither the shareholders nor the associates were and then enforced to a result that neither signer intended at going to do any more work for Mr. Van Dyke on that case." the time he signed it. At base, our task here is to enforce the This testimony from Van Dyke and Naylor is undisputed. parties' agreement. The duties and presumptions of counsel Swanke explained to the jury that Greenberg had essentially in such cases should help determine what the contractual terminated Van Dyke as a client. obligations are, not override the agreement they entered. Greenberg Peden had told him in I therefore agree with the arguments in ruSTICE my presence they wouldn't do any LEHRMANN'S dissent. However, because I agree that the more work for him. I had been doing judgment should remand the case to the trial court, I concur work for him individually in my in the Court's judgment, while respectfully dissenting from its own capacity for-I don't know reasoning. Unlike the Court, I would remand for a new trial two years, with Greenberg Peden not and instruct the jury to be guided by the lawyer's fiduciary having involvement at all. duties in interpreting the ambiguous engagement letter. The uncontested testimony at trial establishes that Greenberg Peden's name partner (David Peden) told Van Dyke before he

Justice LEHRMANN, joined by Justice MEDINA, and signed the engagement letter that the Greenberg Peden firm Justice GREEN, dissenting. would not represent Anglo-Dutch in any new matter, whether I agree that a court should review an attorney-client contingency or hourly, because it was delinquent in paying agreement from the perspective of a reasonable person in the the firm over $200,000 in legal fees. Swanke was present at client's circumstances when deciding whether it is subject to that meeting. Nevertheless, Anglo-Dutch contends that the two or more reasonable interpretations. I disagree, however, engagement letter signed after the meeting bound Greenberg with the Court's assumption that an agreement on firm Peden to represent it in the Halliburton litigation. This is letterhead unambiguously creates an agreement with the firm. *158 Ang!o-Dutch Petroleum !ntemationa!, inc. v. 54Tex:sup:ct.J.f669 - -.· .. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.-- ·········· Dutch's unpaid bills and a history of difficulty in collecting The use of letterhead must be viewed in light of clear fees from Anglo-Dutch. evidence that the client understood the firm had refused to represent him in the case due to large unpaid legal bills, the lawyer's testimony that his secretary mistakenly used firm Unable to retain Greenberg Peden, Anglo-Dutch, based stationery, and the fact that the agreement referred solely to on Swonke's recommendation, hired the law firm of the individual lawyer and contemplated a fee structure where McConn & Williams under a twenty percent contingency only that lawyer's time would be compensated. I therefore fee arrangement. As the Halliburton lawsuit progressed, am compelled to respectfully express my dissent. I would Van Dyke asked Swonke to serve as an advisor to affirm the court of appeals' judgment and hold that the trial McConn & Williams because of his familiarity with the court correctly determined the agreement was ambiguous and underlying contracts. After initially consulting for free, properly submitted the agreement's meaning to the jury. Swonke requested compensation as his involvement in the

case became more substantial. McConn & Williams declined to pay Swonke because the firm's contingency fee interest was not large enough, so Van Dyke called Swonke directly

I. BACKGROUND

and offered to pay him for the work. It is undisputed that Van Dyke and Swonke negotiated the tenns of Swonke's

Scott Van Dyke, the president of Anglo-Dutch, and Swonke, representation and that Swonkc finally agreed to accept the attorney, had a long-standing relationship that began when compensation in the form of a fraction of the total recovery Van Dyke worked at another company. Swonke was "of calculated based on the hours he worked, divided by the total counsel" at the law firm of Greenberg Peden when the subject hours billed by the McConn & Williams attorneys. agreement was executed in 2000. One of the firm's founders testified at trial that Greenberg Peden understood Swonke

Swonke dictated the body of the one-page agreement and his sometimes contracted with clients the firm did not want to secretary printed it on Greenberg Peden letterhead, with a represent, and it was understood these were Swonke's "side Greenberg Peden signature block. Swonke signed his name deals". Greenberg Peden had the right of first refusal for all under the Greenberg Peden signature block and sent the of Swonke's potential clients. agreement to Van Dyke, who signed and returned it the next day. Swonke testified he did not notice the letterhead or the

In 1997, when Anglo-Dutch committed to develop an oil signature block and did not think to correct them at any point field in Kazakhstan with two business partners, Halliburton because he and Van Dyke both knew the agreement was and Ramco, Van Dyke contacted Swonke to prepare the personal to him. necessary documents. It is undisputed that the parties understood that Greenberg Peden, not Swonke individually,

The day he signed the agreement, Van Dyke also drafted took on the representation at that time. No formal fee and sent Swonke a separate transmittal letter attaching a agreement was signed. The joint project ended in early copy of the McConn & Williams contingency fee agreement. 2000 when Halliburton and Ram co allegedly *456 breached The letter said that the McConn & Williams document the parties' confidentiality agreement and disclosed Anglo "provides the basis for the Agreement between Greenberg Dutch's confidential data to third parties. Van Dyke consulted Peden P.C. and Anglo-Dutch." At trial, Swonke questioned with Swonke, who advised him that Anglo-Dutch had viable Van Dyke's motives for sending the letter separately from the claims against Halliburton and Ramco. main agreement, and for sending it at all as Van Dyke had previously given him the McConn & Williams agreement.

Around the same time, Anglo-Dutch ceased paymg Swonke testified that he did not read the letter, and would not Greenberg Peden's bills and began accumulating a large normally read a transmittal letter referring to a document he account payable to the firm. Anglo-Dutch's unpaid legal bills already had in his files. prompted Greenberg Peden to stop working for Anglo-Dutch in 1999. By early 2000, Anglo-Dutch owed Greenberg Peden

Swonke worked on the Halliburton lawsuit for 277 hours more than $200,000. It is undisputed that Van Dyke asked while at Greenberg Peden. After Greenberg Peden dissolved if Greenberg Peden would represent Anglo-Dutch in the in 2001, Swonke joined McConn & Williams as "of counsel". lawsuit against Ramco and Halliburton, but the firm refused McConn & Williams and Swonke agreed that he would not to take on any more work for Anglo-Dutch because of Anglo- share in the finn's fees from the Halliburton lawsuit, but *159 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntemationa!, Inc. v, 54 Tex. sup: ct. J. 1669 did not relay that agreement to Anglo-Dutch. Swonke did I agree with the standards the Court applies in determining inform Anglo-Dutch of his move to McConn & Williams, whether this attorney-client agreement is ambiguous. and told Anglo-Dutch he planned to take his client files with Ambiguity is determined by examining the contract as him unless Anglo-Dutch objected. Receiving no objection, a whole in light of the circumstances present when the Swonke worked 1,022 hours on the matter at McConn & contract was entered. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. Williams. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 SW.2d 587, 589 (Tex.l996).

When an agreement's language is ambiguous in light of *457 Anglo-Dutch won a $70.5 million verdict against the circumstances present when the parties entered into Halliburton and the parties stipulated to $9.8 million in it, its meaning becomes an issue for the fact-finder. Jlvf. attorney's fees. The verdict was appealed and Halliburton Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.2003); ultimately settled the case for $51 million in 2004. A few see Columbia Gas, 940 S.W.2d at 589. days before Halliburton was going to wire the attorneys' fees portion of the settlement to individuals and firms I also agree that there are limits. Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, involved in the case, Swonke's name was removed from the 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.l981 ). Parol evidence will not be wiring instructions at Van Dyke's request. Noting the change, received to create an ambiguity or to give a contract a meaning Swonke e-mailed Van Dyke asking how he wanted to handle different from that imparted by its language. David J Sacks, his compensation. Prior to discussing payment, Van Dyke P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d447, 450-51 (Tex.2008)(citations requested that Greenberg Peden assign any interest under omitted). Courts may not consider the parties' interpretation the Anglo-Dutch agreement to Swonke, purportedly to avoid or "admit extraneous evidence to determine the true meaning any possible problems with multiple claims for attorney's of the instrument" if the express language of the agreement fees. Swonke contacted Greenberg Peden, and the no-longer may be interpreted in only one way. I d. at 450 (quoting Nat'! operating firm's representatives agreed to the assignment in Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, exchange for a ten percent fee from all amounts collected 520 (Tex.1995)). Ambiguity likewise does not arise simply by Swonke from Anglo-Dutch, an amount consistent with because the parties advance conflicting interpretations of the their original agreement that he would pay the firm a flat ten contract; rather, for an ambiguity to exist, both interpretations percent to cover overhead for matters handled by Swonke must be reasonable. See Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, individually. L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 866 (Tex.2000); Nat'! Union Fire Ins.,

907 S.W.2d at 520. Soon after obtaining the assignment letter, Van Dyke informed Swonke that he'd consulted lawyers and determined *458 Further, as the Court observes and Anglo-Dutch that Anglo-Dutch's contract was with Greenberg Peden and amici 1 contend, clarity is obviously critical, and courts and not with Swonke individually. Accordingly, Van Dyke

should therefore view the agreement from the perspective of a refused to include the hours billed after Swonke left reasonable client to determine if it is susceptible to more than Greenberg Peden in the contingency ratio, a position that one reasonable interpretation. Such a rule will protect clients would reduce Swonke's total compensation due by over a from unscrupulous attorneys, reduce disputes, and create a million dollars. Swonke asserted that the agreement was predictable rule that is in the best interest ofthe legal system, personal to him and that he should be paid for all of the individual clients, lawyers, and law firms. work he performed for Anglo-Dutch. It is undisputed that had the trial court determined that the agreement was with

And it is beyond dispute that attorney-client agreements Greenberg Peden, Anglo-Dutch would be able to calculate are subject to heightened scrutiny by the courts because the compensation ratio based solely on the 277 hours Swonke of the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship. billed while at Greenberg Peden. Anglo-Dutch argued that See Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 560 the 1,022 hours Swonke billed at McConn & Williams were (Tex.2006). The attorney, unlike a commercial party to an covered by that firm's contingency percentage. agreement, bears a duty to ensure the client understands the terms of the representation because of the trust the client places in the attorney. See Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W3d 92, 95 (Tex.2001). To fulfill this duty, the

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

lawyer must be clear. *160 Ang!o~Dutch Petroleum !ntemationa!, Inc. v. Greenberg ... , 352 S.W.3d 445 (2011) s4fex.suiJ·.ct:J.1669.. · · ··· ··· Like the Court, I believe that the approach set out in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers is Undoubtedly, Swanke's use of the Greenberg Peden workable. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW letterhead in this case contributed to the agreement's GOVERNING LA WYERS § 18, cmt. h. Under this ambiguity. But in times of increasing fluidity in the legal approach, such agreements should be viewed from the profession, the solution the Court implements-to construe perspective of a reasonable client, taking into consideration agreements based on the letterhead regardless of the parties' the parties' relative bargaining power and other circumstances understanding of their terms-could lead to unnecessarily surrounding the agreement. See id. A reasonable client to harsh results: a lawyer who made a mistake in choosing whom this standard is applied is "a reasonable person in the stationery-or even used the only stationery available client's circumstances." Id. I do not agree, however, that any would lose. See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, potential ambiguities should be resolved against the attorney. Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation

of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAML.REV. 2137,2191 (2010) (noting that the economic downturn marks a "transition for law firms less because of its immediate financial impact and

III. ASSESSING AMBIGUITY IN

more because it has highlighted and accelerated the trend

ATTORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS

toward the disaggregation of legal services that had begun before it"). While the entire Court would hold lawyers to a

The evaluation of whether an agreement is subject standard of reasonable clarity, perfection is not required. The to multiple reasonable interpretations should be made Court's analysis of the agreement should focus on the terms as from the perspective of a reasonable person in the negotiated and agreed to, not on interpretations that the parties client's circumstances. This does not mean, as Anglo (and, at times, their counsel) have subsequently adopted in Dutch and the Court presume, that the individual light of the changed circumstances. While giving due weight client's interpretation prevails. Instead, the reasonableness to a lawyer's fiduciary obligations, we should do so from a of potential interpretations will be viewed from the reasonable, not predatory, client's perspective. reasonable client's perspective, taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the agreement's formation, such as the parties' past dealings, their relative bargaining

1. Reasonableness of alternative interpretations power, and the client's experience negotiating such agreements to determine whether the agreement was "truly

The Court holds that, even applying the Restatement's negotiated". See id. If the court determines, as a matter approach, a reasonable client would only interpret the of law, that the agreement is subject to more than agreement to be with Greenberg Peden. I disagree with that one reasonable interpretation from a reasonable client's mechanical approach: application of the factors outlined in perspective, construction of the agreement becomes a fact the Restatement leads me to conclude that the agreement issue for the judge or jury to resolve. is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations under the circumstances and thus ambiguous. The express terms of

The Court claims not to construe the agreement against the the Anglo-Dutch agreement cast doubt that it could only be attorney. See Levine, 40 S.W.3d at 94; Lopez, 22 S.W.3d understood to form a contract with Greenberg Peden from a at 860-61. However, in concluding that the circumstances reasonable client's perspective. surrounding the agreement do nothing to negate the letterhead on which the agreement was printed, the Court does just that.

The Anglo-Dutch agreement invites more than one The Restatement emphasizes that in applying the reasonable reasonable interpretation of the parties' intentions in spite of client standard, courts should not ignore "the usual resources the fact that it was printed on Greenberg Peden letterhead of contractual interpretation such as the language of the and signed under a Greenberg Peden signature block. First, contract, the circumstances in which it was *459 made, the body of the agreement did not reference Greenberg and the client's sophistication and experience in retaining and Peden while it referred to McConn & Williams by name compensating lawyers or lack thereof." RESTATEMENT five separate times. It defined the client as "you and/ (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS § 18, or the companies which you control (Anglo-Dutch)" but cmt. h. An agreement should be "construed in light of the exclusively used personal pronouns throughout to refer to circumstances in which it was made, the parties' past practice Swonke. The one-page document repeatedly used language and contracts, and whether it was truly negotiated." Id. such as "I agree to assist Anglo-Dutch and [McConn & *161 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntematlonal, Inc. v. s4 l'ex. sup. i::iJ.1669 and all other attorney or paralegal time will be billed at this Williams] for proportionately the same percentage (20%) of law firm's normal rate for that person"); In re Enron Corp. any benefit to McConn & Williams;" "the proportions under Sec., Deriv. & ERIS'A Litig., 586 F.Supp.2d 732, 767 and n. which my fees shall be calculated will be the ratio of the hours I have spent ... relative to the hours [of McConn & Williams 32 (S.D.Tex.2008) (recognizing that law firm contingent fees attorneys];" "if ... I spent 90 hours of my time towards the take resources into account by holding that "in light of the lawsuit, ... I would be entitled to receive;" "I shall be entitled complexity and difficulty of the litigation, the fee percentage to the benefit of any amendment;" "I will not be responsible would have to be sufficient to create adequate incentives for for any expenses other than those I may personally incur;" the firm to dedicate the substantial resources, possibly over and the like. a long period of time"). The agreement's compensation ratio

and the use of personal pronouns throughout, in conjunction Second, the fee structure contemplated by Anglo-Dutch and with its use of Greenberg Peden letterhead and the Greenberg Swonke, which based Swonke's compensation solely on the Peden signature block, make it open to more than one hours he individually billed, creates an ambiguity, *460 reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, it must be read in especially when compared to other firm fee agreements. The light of surrounding circumstances. See Columbia Gas, 940 applicable provision states that: S.W.2d at 589; Sun Oil, 626 S.W.2d at 731.

the proportions under which my fees shall be calculated will be the ratio of 2. Circumstances surrounding the agreement the hours I have spent or will spend

It is undisputed that Van Dyke knew Greenberg Peden had on this matter relative to the hours the refused to represent Anglo-Dutch in the Halliburton lawsuit attorneys at McConn & Williams have due to the large amount of unpaid legal bills and the history spent or will spend after the date the of difficulty in collecting fees from Anglo-Dutch. Van Dyke lawsuit was filed, rounded to the next admitted that he knew that Anglo-Dutch's account payable whole percentage. exceeded $200,000, and that Greenberg Peden therefore The four corners of the Anglo-Dutch agreement indicate that wanted to play no part in the lawsuit against Halliburton. Anglo-Dutch and Swonke negotiated a contingency fee based Given this admission, it is difficult to see how a reasonable solely on the hours Swonke (and no other Greenberg Peden client in Anglo-Dutch's position could have believed that the attorneys or support staff) worked on the lawsuit, divided agreement was with the firm, rather than with Swanke. by the total hours billed by "the attorneys at McConn & Williams." 2 It is helpful to contrast this fee structure with the Moreover, it is undisputed that the contract in this case

arose in the context of genuine negotiations between Swanke structure of the law firm agreement in Sacks, which likewise and the client, both of whom had previous experience contained personal pronouns: *461 negotiating such agreements. Van Dyke testified that negotiating agreements was a significant portion of his job.

My ... rate for this particular matter will be $200.00 per He testified that Anglo-Dutch retained other counsel prior to hour. The other lawyers in my firm range from $150.00 switching to Greenberg Peden and had another attorney draft to $200.00 per hour, and paralegals range from $50.00 to a demand letter to Halliburton prior to retaining McConn & $100.00 per hour. You are responsible for all costs and Williams. Further, Van Dyke testified that he and Swanke had expenses in the case as incurred. These expenses include, many discussions about contract drafting over the years, and but are not limited to, copies; binding; fax transmissions; Swanke had even given Van Dyke advice on best practices travel; lodging; parking; etc. when drafting agreements. Sacks, 266 S.W.3d at 448-49.

While the Anglo-Dutch agreement stated Swonke would Concerns that an attorney could exercise undue influence not be responsible for expenses, it did not anticipate over an existing client are valid, but they are minimized compensation beyond one attorney's billable hours. Compare here because this agreement was truly negotiated. The Anglo-Dutch, 267 S.WJd at 460-61 with Sacks, 266 agreement was not suggested by Swanke to an uninformed S.W.3d at 448-49; In re Inslaw, Inc., 97 B.R. 685, and agreeable client-to the contrary, Van Dyke proposed 688 (Bankr.D.D.C.l989) (discussing an hourly law firm it to ensure that he would continue to receive the benefit of agreement stating that "[ m ]y partner ... will be billed at $170 Swonke's experience when McConn & Williams refused to *162 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum lntemationai, inc. v. Greenberg ... , 352 S.W.3d 445 (2011} 54Tex. sup. ct: J .. 1669

surrounding the agreement's formation, made it open to compensate Swonke for his services. Although the Anglo multiple interpretations. The use of the letterhead could lead Dutch agreement is only one page, both Van Dyke and a reasonable client to believe the agreement was with the Swonke testified that they negotiated its terms. Significantly, law firm. However, it was every bit as reasonable, given there is undisputed evidence that Van Dyke, not Swonke, Greenberg Peden's repeated refusal to do more business suggested the unusual compensation ratio that Swonke with Anglo-Dutch, for the client to understand that it was initially resisted, requesting a flat percentage fee instead. a personal agreement with Swonke. Van Dyke's undisputed testimony that the firm declined all further representation

Viewing the agreement from a reasonable client's perspective, of Anglo-Dutch highlights the ambiguity resulting from I disagree that Anglo-Dutch's interpretation is the only the circumstances surrounding the agreement's formation. reasonable one. Certainly, the use of personal pronouns in His one-paragraph letter to Swonke, describing it as the an engagement letter does not alone create an ambiguity agreement between "Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden," as to whether the client hired a law firm or an individual showed only Anglo-Dutch's self-serving interpretation ofthe lawyer. To be reasonable, an alternative interpretation agreement, not whether it would unmistakably be understood must be one a client could reasonably understand from that way by a reasonable client given the scope of the the agreement's language and the circumstances of the agreement. Moreover, because the letter is external to negotiation between the parties. Yet the negotiations between the contract's formation, it is not properly considered m the parties demonstrate an understanding that the law firm of determining whether the agreement is ambiguous. Greenberg Peden was uninterested in future work for Anglo Dutch, and Swonke negotiated the compensation for himself

Consideration of the language of the actual contract and the individually. The Court is persuaded by the letterhead on circumstances surrounding *462 its formation lead me to which the agreement was printed after its terms were already conclude that the fee agreement was ambiguous as a matter negotiated and accepted by both parties, and by the language of law. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court properly of a Greenberg Peden assignment of interest letter, signed submitted the agreement's construction to the jury. Because years after the agreement was reached. Neither one bears the Court effectively construes the agreement against the on the parties' understanding at the time they reached their lawyer, I am compelled to respectfully express my dissent. agreement. I would hold that the language of the agreement, as shown

Parallel Citations by the compensation ratio, the use of personal pronouns, the use of Greenberg Peden letterhead and the Greenberg

54 Tex. Sup. Ct. I. 1669 Peden signature block, together with the circumstances Footnotes 1 267 S.W.3d 454 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist]2008). 2

An affiliate, Anglo--Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., was also a plaintiff and is a petitioner here, wholly aligned with Anglo--Dutch Petroleum International, Inc.

3 Swanke wrote to Van Dyke on November 6, 2001: "For many years, I have had the pleasure of representing you and your interests through my association with Greenberg Peden, P.C. However, recently Greenberg Peden, P.C. has decided to dissolve. As a result, I will have the pleasure of continuing to represent your interests as 'Of Counsel' with the law firm of McConn & Williams, L.L.P .... I am planning to take your files with me to my new firm. If you do not wish for me to take your files, please contact me as soon as possible so that we can make arrangements for you to take possession of them."

4 267 S. W.3d 454. 5 53 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 758 (May 28, 2010). 6 David J. Sacks. F. C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Tex.2008) (per curiam) (quoting Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas. Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587,589 (Tex.l996)). 7 See Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 560 (Tex.2006) ("When interpreting and enforcing attorney-client fee agreements, it is 'not enough to simply say that a contract is a contract There are ethical considerations overlaying the contractual relationship.' "(quoting Lopez v. Muiio::. Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 868 (Tex.2000) (Gonzales, J., concurring and dissenting))).

*163 Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. v. 54 'rex. sl.Jr). ct. 3.1669 ...... · .... ·.·.·· ·· 8

Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 699 (Tex.2000) ("Contracts between attorneys and their clients negotiated during the existence of the attorney-client relationship are closely scrutinized."); Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex.1964) ("Although an attorney is not incapacitated from contracting with his client for compensation during the existence of the relation of attorney and client, and a fair and reasonable settlement of the compensation to be paid is valid and enforceable, if executed freely, voluntarily, and with full understanding by the client, the courts, because of the confidential relationship, scrutinize with jealousy all contracts between them for compensation which are made while the relation exists." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 18, cmt. e (2000) ("Client-lawyer fee contracts entered into after the matter in question is under way are subject to special scrutiny .... ").

9 Keck, 20 S.W.3d at 699 (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex.l997)). 10 Brief of Amicus Curiae Linda S. Eads, Associate Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University, in Support of Petitioner at 2 L

11 ld. at 20-2 L 12 Brief of Amici Curiae Abrams Scott & Bickley, L.L.P., Arnold & Itkin LLP, Caddell & Chapman, Cornell, Smith & Mierl, LLP, Dawson, Sodd, Ellis & Hodge LLP, Law Office of James M_ McCormack, and Quilling, Selander, Cummiskey & Lownds, P.C., in Support ofPetitioner at 11-12. These firms describe themselves as follows: "Some ... are larger firms with multiple offices and dozens of attorneys practicing before the Texas bar; others are small firms with just a few attorneys. Some represent primarily defendants, some represent primarily plaintiffs, and some represent plaintiffs and defendants on a regular basis. The amici curiae are thus in a balanced position to address the interpretation of fee agreements between lawyers and their clients." I d. at I.

l3

RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 18(2).

14 Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Made ley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981) ("If, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the language of the contract appears to be capable of only a single meaning, the court can then confine itself to the writing. Consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of a contract, however, is simply an aid in the construction of the contract's language. There are limits.").

15 David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450-451 (Tex.2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (quoting Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Fa. v. CBllndus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex.l995) (per curiam), and citing Universal C.l. T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, !50 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154, !57 (1951)).

16 See Gannon v. Baker, 818 S.W.2d 754, 755-756 (Tex.1991) (per curiam) ("The parol evidence rule applies only to contractual or jural writings evidencing the creation, modification, termination or securing of a particular right or obligation. Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Cmp., 562 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex.1977). The rule does not apply to mere statements or recitals of past facts.").

17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 18 cmt. h. 1 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Linda S. Eads, Associate Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University, in Support of Petitioner at 21. See Brief of Amici Curiae Abrams Scott & Bickley, L.L.P., Arnold & Itkin LLP, Caddell & Chapman, Cornell, Smith & Mierl, LLP, Dawson, Sodd, Ellis & Hodge LLP, Law Office of James M. McCormack, and Quilling, Selander, Cummiskey & Lownds, P.C., in Support of Petitioner. The law firm amici state that they "are not suggesting that lawyers and law firms should always lose a fee dispute." ld. at 8.

1 Two amicus briefs were submitted in support of Anglo-Dutch: one by Linda Eads, Associate Professor of Law at the Dedman School of Law and another by the law firms of Abrams Scott & Bickley, L.L.P.; Arnold & Itkin LLP; Caddell & Chapman; Cornell, Smith & Mierl, LLP; Dawson, Sodd, Ellis & Hodge LLP; Law Office of James M. McCormack; and Quilling, Selander, Cummiskey & Lownds, P.C.

2 Anglo-Dutch's agreement with McConn & Williams provided for a flat 20 percent contingency fee, later reduced to 16 and 2/3 percent.

of 5 Thon-.scn Reu!erc;. No d2in1 original Governrnent VVorks. *164 APPENDIXE *165 CAUSE NO. 2004-20712 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM § INTERNATIONAL, INC. et al. §

Plaintiffs, § § § vs. HARJUSCOUNTY,TEXAS~ _.=: ~ ; § ........... 9!:; C ) Jlllllllillll io C'-.1 ~ GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C., et al. § 61 ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ~ ~~ ~ Defendant. § ... .... >- "' ' Jail! ..c ^[10] <r "' Oi I (.) Q :::IE :r ORDER I ~ a; I The Court has been asked to determine the correct calculation of the attorneys' fees E != ~

provision under the October 16, 2000, Fee Agreement signed by Gerald Swanke and Scott V. Van Dyke of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. On this issue the Court relies on the following guidance:

(i) October 16, 2000, Fee Agreement; Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int 'l, Inc. et al. v. Greenberg Peden, P. C., 352 (ii)

S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). In addition, the Court has reviewed the briefs and heard the oral arguments of the respective parties on this issue.

As to the threshold question, "Who are the parties to the Fee Agreement?" the Texas Supreme Court has unequivocally answered that question. The Supreme Court, after extensive briefing and oral arguments, has stated the Fee Agreement was "between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden." Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc., 352 S.W.3d at 453. As such, only Swanke's work while at Greenberg Peden is covered by the Fee Agreement.

From that starting point, the Court looks to the Fee Agreement to determine the appropriate formula for calculating the attorneys' fees. The Fee Agreement spells outs the following:

I [Greenberg Peden] agree to assist Anglo-Dutch and that firm [McConn & Williams] in this lawsuit [Cause No. 2000-22588; Anglo-Dutch (Fenge) eta!. v. Ramco et al., In the

RECORDER'S MEMORANDUM 524 This instrument is of poor quality

at the time of imaging *166 I 51st Judicial District Court ofHarris County, Texas] for proportionately the same percentage (20%) of any benefit to McConn & Williams reflected in such agreement. However, I will not be responsible for any expenses other than those I may personally incur. Further, the proportions under which my fees shall be calculated will be the ratio of the hours I have spent or will spend on this matter relative to the hours the attorneys at McConn & Williams have spent or will spend after the date the lawsuit was filed, rounded to the next whole percentage.

Fee Agreement, page 1. [not in original] The Court reads the above recitals to result in the following formula:

Greenberg Peden Hours/McCmm Williams Hours= X (rounded up to the next whole percentage) (XI). Xl x 20% = X2.

The Fee Agreement goes on to say that the factor X2 will be applied to "gross revenues and other benefits received" to determine the attorneys' fees.

We know "gross revenues" to be $51,000,000.00 which represents the amount of the negotiated settlement. In addition, the parties have agreed that Swanke spent 277 hours on the representation while at Greenberg Peden and that McConn Williams spent 11,652 on the representation. Hence, the Court makes the following calculation under the guidance of the Texas Supreme Court, the Fee Agreement, and the undisputed evidence:

277 Hours/11,652 Hours= 2.37% (rounded to 3%). 3% x 20% = .006% . . 006 X $51,000,000.00 = $306,000.00

Thus, under the Fee Agreement the Court determines that the attorneys' fees due to Greenberg Peden (and now Swanke by way of assignment) are $306,000.00. This determination will be applied to and will be used to resolve all outstanding issues remaining in the above captioned case.

MAY 1 5 2012

Signed ________ ___ _

525 *167 APPENDIXF *168 CAUSE NO. 2004-20712 § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM § INTERNATIONAL, INC. and § ANGLO-DUTCH (TENGE), LLC,

§ ~ .... .!It ~ I filil .m ~ = § PLAINTIFFS, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ~~~ = c- C'o.J § cuU v. § § ........ .c. ~ ,....us 2 § GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C. and ~ § GERARD J. SWONKE, § ~

!"

6lst JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS. §

ORDER

The Court has considered Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) LLC's Motion for Interlocutory Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). After considering the Motion, the responses and replies thereto, if any, and the arguments of counsel, if any, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion is meritorious and should be GRANTED in all respects. It is therefore,

ORDERED that Defendant Gerard J. Swonke TAKE NOTHING on his Breach of Contract Counterclaim. It is further, ORDERED that Defendant Gerard J. Swonke TAKE NOTHING on his request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code§ 38.001 et seq. It is further, ORDERED that Defendant Gerard J. Swonke TAKE NOTHING on his Declaratory Judgment Counterclaim. It is further, ORDERED that Defendant Gerard J. Swonke is precluded, as a matter of law, from recovering attorneys' fees under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code§ 37.009. It is further, ORDERED that Anglo-Dutch is entitled to attorneys' fees as are equitable and just pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code§ 37.009. It is further, 668

ORDERED that Defendant, Greenberg Peden, P.C., recover $4,063.70 prejudgment

*169 interest through September 28, 2012. It is further, ORDERED that Defendant, Greenberg Peden, P.C. recover prejudgment interest at the rate of$1.73 per day from September 28, 2012, through the date of the entry of the judgment. Signed this __ _ day o,_AY_2_3_20_\3_--jjl1-r

-2-

669 *170 APPENDIXG *171 CAUSE NO. 2004-20712 ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL, INC. et al. §

Plain tiffs, § § vs. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS § GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C., et al. § 61 5 Defendant. § T JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FINAL JUDGMENT

The parties to this final judgment are Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc., Anglo- Dutch (Tenge), LLC (collectively "Anglo-Dutch"), Greenberg Peden, P.C. ("Greenberg Peden"), and Gerald J. Swonke ("Swonke").

Trial On January 13, 2014, this case was called for trial. All parties appeared and announced ready for trial. A jury was impaneled and sworn; it heard the evidence and arguments of counsel. In response to the Charge of the Court, the jury made findings that the Court received, filed, and entered of record on January 15, 2014. The questions submitted to the jury and the jury's findings are attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference.

Post-Trial Swanke and Greenberg Peden moved the Court to rule as a matter of law that Anglo- Dutch waived its trial, appellate, and post-remand attorneys' fees and costs claims. The Court denied that motion. Swanke and Greenberg Peden also moved the Court to disregard the jury's findings to Questions 2(2) and 4(B). The Court initially denied that motion, but upon reconsideration has agreed to that motion. Specifically, after considering the evidence introduced at trial, the jury's verdict, and the entire record, the Court finds that an award of attorneys' fees or costs to Anglo-Dutch would not be equitable or just.

RECORDER'S MEMORANDUM

Th1s mstrument IS of poor qualrty

at the t1me of 1magmg 1302 *172 Anglo-Dutch moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court denied that motion. Judgment Decrees Based upon the Court's pretrial rulings, the jury's verdict, and the post-verdict arguments of counsel, the judgment should be and is now hereby RENDERED as set forth below: 1. As requested in Plaintiffs' First Amended Petition at page 7, ~ 23(a), the Court DECLARES that the Fee Agreement is between Anglo-Dutch and Greenberg Peden, and not between Anglo-Dutch and Swanke individually.

2. As requested in Plaintiffs' First Amended Petition at 7 ~ 23(c), the Court DECLARES that: (1) the numerator in the hours ratio in the fee formula in the Fee Agreement is the hours Greenberg Peden worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit and does not include the hours Swanke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams; and (2) the hours Swanke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit while of counsel to McConn & Williams are included in the denominator in the fee fommla in the Fee Agreement.

3. The Court DECLARES that the fee owed under the Fee Agreement is based on Anglo-Dutch's gross recovery in the Halliburton Lawsuit. 4. As requested in Plaintiffs' First Amended Petition at 7-8 ~ 23(d), the Court DECLARES that the rounding up to the next whole percentage that is required by the Fee Agreement occurs after the hours ratio is determined before, not after, the hours ratio is multiplied by 20%.

5. Based on the parties' stipulations that (a) Anglo-Dutch's gross recovery in the Halliburton Lawsuit was $51,000,000, (b) Swanke worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit for 277 hours while of counsel to Greenberg Peden, and (c) McConn & Williams' attorneys, and Swanke

Page 2 of 4 1303 *173 while of counsel to McConn & Williams, worked on the Halliburton Lawsuit for a total of 11,652 hours, the Court DECLARES that Greenberg Peden (and now Swanke by way of assignment) is owed $306,000.00 under the Fee Agreement.

6. The Court ORDERS Anglo-Dutch, jointly and severally, to pay Swonke $306,000.00. 7. The Court ORDERS that Swonke take nothing on his breach of contract counterclaim. 8. The Court ORDERS that Swonke take nothing on his request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code§ 38.001 et seq. 9. The Court ORDERS that Swonke take nothing on his declaratory judgment counterclaim. 10. The Court ORDERS that Swonke take nothing on his fraud and exemplary damages claims. 11. The Court ORDERS that Swonke is precluded, as a matter oflaw, from .- recovering attorneys' fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 37.009. 12. The Court ORDERS that Swanke take nothing on his request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code§ 37.009. 13. The Comt ORDERS that Anglo-Dutch, jointly and severally, pay Swonke $42,127.40 in prejudgment interest. 14. The Court ORDERS that Anglo-Dutch take nothing from Swonke or Greenberg Peden on Angle-Dutch's claims for trial, appellate, and post-remand attorneys' fees and costs. 15. The Court (as required by T.R.C.P. 131) ORDERS that Swonke and Greenberg Peden, jointly and severally, pay all costs of court expended or incurred in this action by Anglo- Dutch.

Page 3 of 4 1304 *174 16. The Court ORDERS that Anglo-Dutch, jointly and severally, to pay post- judgment interest on the amount of$348,127.40 at the rate of8.25% per annum, compounded annually, from the date of the Original Final Judgment until paid.

17. The Court ORDERS execution to issue for this judgment. Finality of Judgment All relief not expressly granted in this Final Judgment is he y DENIED. This judgment is final, disposes of all claims and parties, and is appeal MAY

1

3 2014

SIGNED this __ day o f - - - - - - - - - - - e - -11 -

Page 4 of4 1305 *175 ORIGINAL @ .,. .... CAUSE NO. 2004-20712 ^[0] "' ...... ... .... ANGLO-DUTCH PETROLEUM § IN THE DISTRICT COURT ' ...

INTERNATIONAL, INC. and § ANGLO-DUTCH (fENGE), LLC §

§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS vs. § § .. ., .. • GREENBERG PEDEN, P.C. and § GERARD J. SWONKE §

CHARGEOFTHECOURT MEMBERS OF THE JURY: After the closing arguments, you will go to the jury room to decide the case, answer the questions that are attached, and reach a verdict. You may discus~ the case with other jurors only when you are all together in the jury room.

l Remember my previous instructions: Do not discuss the case with anyone ' else, either in person or by any other means. Do not do any independent investigation about the case or conduct any research. Do not look up any words in dictionaries or. on the Internet. Do not post information about the case on the Internet. Do not share any special knowledge or experiences with the other jurors. Do not use your phone or any other electronic device during your deliberations for any reason. I will give you a number where others may contact you in case of an emergency.

Any notes you have taken are for your own personal use. You may take your notes back into the jury room and consult them during deliberations, but do not show or read your notes to your fellow jurors during your deliberations. Your notes are not evidence. Each of you should rely on your independent recollection of the evidence and not be influenced by the fact that another juror has or has not taken notes.

You must leave your notes with the bailiff when you are not deliberating. The bailiff will give your notes to me promptly after collecting them from you. I will make sure your notes are kept in a safe, secure location and not disclosed to anyone. After you complete your deliberations, the bailiff will collect your notes. When you

EXHIBIT A 1306 *176 are reJeased from jury duty, the bailiff will promptly destroy your notes so that nobody can read what you wrote.

Here are the instructions for answering the questions. 1. Do not let bias, prejudice, or sympathy play any part in your decision. 2. Base your answers only on the evidence admitted in court and on the law that is in these instructions and questions. Do not consider or discuss any evidence that was not admitted in the courtroom.

3. You are to make up your own minds about the facts. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. But on matters of Jaw, you must follow all of my instructions.

4. If my instructions use a word in a way that is different from its ordinary meaning, use the meaning I give you, which will be a proper legal definition.

5. All the questions and answers are important. No one should say that any question or answer is not important. 6. Answer "yes" or "no" to all questions unless you are told otherwise. A "yes" answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are told otherwise. Whenever a question requires an answer other than "yes" or "no," your answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are told otherwise. The tenn "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of credible evidence presented in this case. If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "yes" answer, then answer "no." A preponderance of the evidence is

.... <!) not measured by the number of witnesses or by the number of ..0

E

:> z documents admitted in evidence. For a fact to be proved by a

preponderance of the evidence, you must find that the fact is more likely true than not true.

Page 2 of 12 EXHIBIT A 1307 *177 7. Do not decide who you think should win before you answer the questions and then just answer the questions to match your decision. Answer each question carefully without considering who will win. Do not discuss or consider the effect your answers will have.

8. Do not answer questions by drawing straws or by any method of chance. 9. Some questions might ask you for a dollar amount. Do not agree in advance to decide on a dollar amount by adding up each juror's amount and then figuring the average.

10. Do not trade your answers. For example, do not say, "I will answer this question your way if you answer another question my way."

11. Unless otherwise instructed, the answers to the questions must be based on the decision of at least ten of the twelve jurors. The same ten jurors must agree on every answer. Do not agree to be bound by a vote of anything less than ten jurors, even if it would be a majority.

As I have said before, if you do not follow these instructions, you will be guilty of juror misconduct, and I might have to order a new trial and start this process over again. This would waste your time and the parties' money, and would require the taxpayers of this county to pay for another trial. If a juror breaks any of these rules, tell that person to stop and report it to me immediately.

5

E

;:l ^[0] D Q "' u

Page 3 of 12 <;:; ... <I) u

EXHIBIT A 1308 *178 QUESTION NO. 1: What are the fees for the services of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC's attorneys, stated in dollars and cents? You are instructed to include only fees for services that relate to Anglo Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC's declaratory judgment claims.

You are further instructed that if any attorney's fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees. Intertwined facts do not make unrecoverable fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated. A party, however, may recover attorney's fees incurred in overcoming defenses or counterclaims to a claim for which attorney's fees are recoverable.

You are further instructed to exclude from your answer any attorney's fees that relate solely to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and gross negligence. Answer with an amount for each ofthe following:

For representation in the trial court for the original trial. Answer: ---------------

Page 4ofl2 EXHIBIT A 1309 *179 QUESTION NO.2: What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC's attorneys, stated in dollars and cents?

You are instructed to include only reasonable fees for necessary services that relate to Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC's declaratory judgment claims.

You are further instructed that if any attorney's fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees. Intertwined facts do not make unrecoverable fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated. A party, however, may recover attorney's fees incurred in overcoming defenses or counterclaims to a claim for which attorney's fees are recoverable.

You are further instructed to exclude from your answer any attorney's fees that relate solely to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and gross negligence.

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly. 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 4. The amount involved and the results obtained. 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances .

.... 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.

II)

.t:l E z c II) 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyers or lawyers E performing the services. ::> ^{[0] [0]} Cl "0

Page 5 of 12 d) t;:; •t: .., u

EXHIBIT A 1310 *180 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered. Answer with an amount for each of the following: l. For representation for the prior appeal to the court of appeals.

:I 0 __ _..:;:. ____ _

Answer:

2. For representation for the prior appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas.

..i/ 50; ct?O

Answer:

------~------ .... ^[0] .£>

E

::J z

Page 6 of 12 EXHIBIT A 1311 *181 QUESTION NO.3: What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC's attorneys, stated in dollars and cents?

You are instructed to include only reasonable fees for necessary services that relate to Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC's declaratory judgment claims.

You are further instructed that if any attorney's fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees. Intertwined facts do not make unrecoverable fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated. A party, however, may recover attorney's fees incurred in overcoming defenses or counterclaims to a claim for which attorney's fees are recoverable.

You are further instructed to exclude from your answer any attorney's fees that relate solely to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and gross negligence.

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions

involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly. 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 4. The amount involved and the results obtained. 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances. 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyers or lawyers

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EXHIBIT A 1312 *182 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered. Answer with an amount, if any, for each of the following: I. For representation in the trial court fi·om December 16,2011 to the present. _j/ 0

Answer:

------~--------- 2. For representation for an appeal in the court of appeals. ::/r 0

Answer:

------~~------- 3. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas. :flo

Answer:

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4. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of

Texas. · j/ 0

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-------=--------- 5. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas. Ito

Answer:

Page 8 of 12 EXHIBIT A 1313 *183 QUESTION NO. 4: State the amount of reasonable and necessary costs incurred, if any, by Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC. You are instructed to include only reasonable costs for necessary services that relate to Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC's declaratory judgment claims.

You are further instructed that if any costs relate solely to a claim for which such costs are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable costs. Intertwined facts do not make unrecoverable costs recoverable; it is only when discrete costs advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated. A party, however, may recover costs incurred in overcoming defenses or counterclaims to a claim for which costs are recoverable.

You are further instructed to exclude from your answer any costs that relate solely to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and gross negligence.

Answer with an amount for each of the following: a. For representation in the original trial court and post-trial motions

ending in February 2007. 1fo

Answer:

---------------------------- For representation through the prior appeal to the Court of Appeals b. and to the Supreme Court of Texas. :If/ ;}.. , 0 0 0 Answer: --------~--~------------- c. For representation from the issuance of the Supreme Court of Texas' December 16, 20 I I, Mandate to the completion of proceedings in the trial court. Answer: ----------------------------

Page 9 of 12 EXHIBIT A 1314 *184 ! - Presiding Juror: l. When you go into the jury room to answer the questions, the first thing you will need to do is choose a presiding juror. The presiding juror has these duties: 2. have the complete charge read aloud if it will be helpful to a. your deliberations; b. preside over your deliberations, meaning manage the discussions, and see that you follow these instructions; c. give written questions or comments to the bailiff who will give them to the judge; d. write down the answers you agree on; e. get the signatures for the verdict certificate; and f. notifY the bailiff that you have reached a verdict.

Do you understand the duties of the presiding juror? If you do not, please tell me now. Instructions for Signing the Verdict Certificate:

1. Unless otherwise instructed, you may answer the questions on a vote of ten jurors. The same ten jurors must agree on every answer in the charge. This means you may not have one group of ten jurors agree on one answer and a different group often jurors agree on another answer.

2. If ten jurors agree on every answer, those ten jurors sign the verdict. If eleven jurors agree on every answer, those eleven jurors sign the verdict. If all twelve of you agree on every answer, you are unanimous and only the presidingjuror signs the verdict. Page 10of12 EXHIBIT A 1315 *185 3. All jurors should deliberate on every question. You may end up with all twelve of you agreeing on some answers, while only ten or eleven of you agree on other answers. But when you sign the verdict, only those ten who agree on every answer will sign the verdict. Do you understand these instructions? If you do not, please tell me now.

Page 11 of 12 EXHIBIT A 1316 *186 Verdict Certificate Check one: __ Our verdict is unanimous. All twelve of us have agreed to each and every answer. The presiding juror has signed the certificate for all twelve of us. Signature of Presiding Juror Printed Name of Presiding Juror __ Our verdict is not unanimous. Eleven of us have agreed to each and every answer and have signed the certificate below.

Vour verdict is not unanimous. Ten of us have agreed to each ;nd every answer and have signed the certificate below. Signature Name Printed I. ~bi01All

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