Case Information
*1 No. Pb-1010-15 1010-15
ORIGINAL By the T. Court of Criminal Affeals borns Muntrell Bends Petitioner
RECEIVED IN COURT OF ORIGINAL APPEALS SEP 25 2015
Abel Acosta, Clerk
FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS SEP 25 2015
Abel Acosta, Clerk
Patition For Discretionary Review
In Affial No. 10-11-00255-0 from the Court of Affeals for the twelfth Suiiial bistri Thee, Th. 15102
borns Bends * 1951124 Telford Unit 3299 State Unit 13 New Boston, Th. 15510
*2
TABel of Contents
Index of Authorities ..... P3. 11 Statement Desriding oral Assunent ..... P3.1 Statement of The Case ..... P3.2 Statement of Focelural Histori ..... P3.2 Ground For Review ..... P3.3 "Ground For Review No. one": A, mis clarification of a local state staide of the Lout of Affeals mis. Imfting the contents of the IAU... En: A clear definition on sthat is Considered an "Affirmative Act" that fromotes the commission of the affexse. that the nouse committed when it comes to the sfecties of an Aucorftice where .... the: Alcorftice witness starberard can APIY under It's Autisis. Arsument Number one ..... P3s. 1-6 Exeter For Relief ..... P3s. 5-6 Certificate of Service ..... P3. Le Aflentix ..... A) 7
*3
Index of Authorities
Beuthrd V. Stake 207 SUd. ad 423, 428 (Tes .Crim. AR. 1989) ......... P3. 5 Dovithin V. Stake 931 SUd. ad 244 (Tes. Crim. AR. 1989) ...... P3. 4 Gin V. Stake 873 SUd. ad 45, 48 (Tes. Crim. AR. 1994) ...... P3. 5 Geef V. Stake 931 SUd. ad 537, 544 (Tes. Crim.AR. 1996)....... P3. 5 Munot V. Stake 853 SUd. ad 558, 559 (Tes. Crim.AR. 1993)....... P3. 5 Smith V. Stake 332 SUd. ad 439 (Tes. Crim.AR. 2011)....... P3. 5
Statutes, Lobes, Arts Rules
Tes Revul Lote Ann 3 1.02 (A) (2) .......... P3. 5 Tes Lobe Crim.Rod. Art. 38.14 .......... P3. 2, 45
*4 No. PS-1040-15
In The Tk. Court of Criminal Affeals
Dennis Miotrell Bentl Petitioner V.
The State of Texas Reslament
Petitioner's Retition For Discretionary Review
To the Tk Court of Criminal Affeals:
Petitioner, respectfully, submits this Retition For Discretionary Review and moves that this Honorable Court Srant Review of this Cause and offers the fallacies in support there of:
Statement Responding Oral Argument
The Petitioner Request, oral argument, is this case but ask that this Court Sustitute (Actual Argument) In the first form, of a Brief, so that Petitioner can be read to Actually Asse due to him Being so se. Without the Resistace of a Reconsistade Aborsed into Is Itess by the BArum, because, such Argument may assist the Court in Affiliate the facts to the issue Raised. It, is suggested that oral argument may well simplify the fraction and, clarify the issue.
*5
Statement of The Case
The, Purlose for this Retition is that there's an Iméchant Question of state IAD in a UAD that conflicts in with; the Affligeride decisions of the Court of Criminal Afleals that whisases on Retitioners' Contributional Risits under Federal IAD. "As, to what is consbered an Affirmative Act that honates the commission of the offense that the ALuse committed when it comes to the Sertifics Pro. of; An Alumfice? So that the ANAlisis of Article 38.14 TEX. Code (rim. Pro. can be ImAtes in a Rosecution.
Stretest of Rovelural Histort
In Cause No: 241-1575-13 Retitioner who charsed with the offense of Murder. The, Retitioner who convicted of such offense on (Ausunt 28, 2014) and Affertes the conviction. on, (Sull 22, 2015) the TWelth Court of Afferts Affirmed the conviction no Motion For Rehearsis who Fited. On 9-1-15 this Retition for bisceptionant Resfied who timely Forwhrated taw, the Court of Afferts for filins Account to Rule 9.2 (6) T. R. AR. Frol.
*6
(Sxownt for Review)
I.
A, mis clarification of a last state status of the cost of afterls mis-
Imelties the contents of the laus. In: A clear definition on what is consuered as "affirmative act" that denotes the commission of the effective. That the accuse committed when it comes to the electrics of an accomplice, in where: the Aguanftice withess staised
CMd AFFH wher it's analysis.
see: clerks R. At 194 III Ref's at 103,104 ID at XIII Refs R. at A vI Refs R. at ID at Afterlasts 6R 9-12
*7 A Sumert Number One As, In the business of (Smith): Retitioner ; contends that the follomins (A) Mixer Can (B) Mateline Wallace (C) Ratheem Galbstein (D) Harthan Barrelt (E) Stellian Holtemon
0 Are All "Alconflies" As thet disftated an Affirmative Act um, that; would romote the commission of the Aferase the the Acluse committed. Before, duvins; And After the Lime olwifted See 352 S. 3131434 (Tek. (him. MP. 204) Smith 4. Stake. Myra Con. on, the mislt of the Stoolins met, Retitioner and other co- terested Retireen Galbstein of um A ; Gass station for the Purfases of travins Gass She was a Passerizer. Who, thand of should have hroun a personate Person (cous Iffer the "Subtivious Actwifl" was... About ; to tabe Place with travins each Individual was of to something No Good. where, No where In the Revers would be sussect this was bane ... on; A Resulter Bross that tax would over loth as of the Storm. She, was the phasensee of hef friend 1 Rominate Mateline Wallace the (Sirl friends) ... of, Retireen Galbstein, she whon't think to the Fart theretore, this makes her Just As Guilt. As, A Fart travellins In the Set-A. WAT verliche to And from the 2068 off Destitution see X R R: 154; X E R R 23 ; XR: 155,168 a XR: 162 Mateline Wallace. Is, the owner of the Let-A-Wat Vericte, that was uses buvins the Stoolins as Reids the... Sirl Fricnd, of Retitioner's Co- Deterrised Retireen Galbstent she who knew of should have hroun a A, cersonable Person (cous Iffer that Sustivious Actwifl" was about to tabe Place where No where .... In, the Reund whung T Suggest this was bane on A Resulter Bross that tax would over loth As of the Storm. Here, Suarflies cars with one of her Bortriend's Fricnd that she didn't thnw without twifes something to SHI. Therefore, she whon't glind to the fact And this makes her Set As Guilt As a Fart .... travellins; In the Set-A. WAT veriche to And from the 2068 off Destititution. See X E R R 18 ; X E R R 23 ; And X E R R 31, 38.34 Retireen Galbstent. Who, one of the Stoolins where the Reund will show he Also Was charised with MuSER The... the, Retitioner And, Became a stake. Stake withless testituals Aswint Retitioner Futhies the Prices, together for the Resection. For, his own Personal SHI minimusors his Role, tarlins the best And Resoure off of himself ... when he Areafised the Production of the Set-A. WAT Vericte Provins there, was Retitution by wissed: Anonst himself And the Retitioner from his testimons See X E R R 131, 110 ; X E R R 141 , 160-165 that marthies him AN Alconllice. Harthan Barrelt. Was, the individual who binfised of the Murder werfens that he testified was Sivert to him 84 the Retitioner... And, his co- Deterrised Retireen Galbstein who hras of should have hroun a Personate Person:
*8 cous inter that "soulsus Athuill" has taken flue if thet were asked to disfece of some Guns. Therefore, he whent ellind to the tract; thus this makes him 34 st as suill as a fartl because he thent.... there : Suns, SAs uses for a "Cominal act" and still chose to disfece of them where too deep freacution he assistets had exforement in towhere them; one resures. See RR 2016 XIII : 2 XIII RR 210: XIV RR 21 Shelton Whitemon. Retere, to as Slick or shield Also helfes disface of the murder wethlors (and Sove Petitioner .... Anl: 10. Defendant Aitbeem Goldstein on [AR-11] he theed wls Ssers to be used In a Criminal Act. Thus, mathin him an Alcomfice that Sove resistante where he to wls Sserted immunitt.... See V. VI RR 15-16: XVI RR 12, 211: 4 XVI RR 67-70
All of these individuals IW their own (Aftuill Aised Anl or resisted In the crime duxirs: Retore: Also fater if ocussed where thet Callable Mental state ... exssesed, them into tarns that of thices Asted of them 84 the (beferdant's) thet: thent whent of the Morin. That, wouls, existhten them to the fact that Criminal Athuill has dransfied mathin, "I them: Criminally Reflensible As A (and where the two of thities See Tof Herd (see Ann 2 7.03(A) (2) Chies: (c)FF V. State 431 S.ub. 24531,544 (Tol. Chim. APR. 1441e) To, relesserilt thou what the crime In It self hend In hard does not elasth need to be thown lars as .... It: can be Roven that that theul something whon't Bostit who has taten three of a Criminal Act which makes them An Alcomfice. the, state Is wans other Frelecent, to overfute and mis-Imnlt the hasbires of (Smith) that intrilises on, "Attitioner's : state Ans Federal (constitutional Richts where this court of Criminal Affects : Intervention, and Determination as to what the statuses of the habers of (Smith) Athuill imflies wouls .... (Anil): the Issue As to eAnil) what etteat is a ferson considered An Alcomfice: When, for can Yove each infuidual "Intent" of hrasiles that a Criminal Athuill has trowkied where .... the: Aphlliss of Art. 33.14 TEL. (c)E. Chim. Frol. (Tetiment of Alcomfices) imllies: Refuiarils, the wittless tetiment to be iotfomontes but It's unclear As to had much evidence Is Needed: where, this save the State's Case some lead will not recesserift (cousins the (Draken) to It's maximum that .... WAs: Pre Sudical to his defense In vildness, his Substantive the Races Richts where Retitioner's (tian) WAs not "FOR: See Douthit v. State 431 S.ub. 24 244 (Tol. Chim. APR. 1441e) The. Record will srad there wls no other evidence from testimonies of other wittlesses to betramine .... IY: Retitioner WAs connected to the crime See IVI RR: 10: IV RR: 11-115: 4 XVI RR: 148-87 (tinys Munoz v. State 253 S.ub. 24 553,554 (Tol. Chim. APR. 1443) and 6111 V. State 813 S.ub. 24 45. 48 (Tol. Chim. APR. 1444) Even, If Petitioner WAs fresert It's Insufficient to iotfomontte Alcomfice tetiment See Precthord v. State 747 S.ub. 24423 , 428 (Tt. Chim. APR. 1481). Actians, disfflated by each In dividual WAs an "Afrimative Act" that fronted the commission of the offense .... Thus: the 12th Court of Affects mis-construes the contents of the hasbires IW (Smith): Anl: Affirmed Retitioner's conviction on mis-Utilitication of the Statute where tive tine the Refsums stated .... Retitioner: Paris that this court of Criminal Affects reverse and demand back to the trial court. With, Kober Instruction of what constitute an Alcomfice As to the statuses of (Smith) for a new sentence ".... hereins, because overfuius (Smith's) hasbires con'tibuted to Retitioner's conviction Beins, refrained. on, this the sentence he releved rulius "Individuals" Involved as non-Alcomfices where As with.... A: clear definition from the court of Criminal Affects In It's context As to what the Statute Athuill Imflies.
*9
It's, Possiste that there would be a different outcome having no other Indefentert evidence, but, ceus Per 307 the Petitioner was adyall Involves or not with no other. Riot to brins about an cosviction.
Certificate of Sorvice
The, under Sismed Petitioner, here by certifies that a true and correct call of the tave Soins Petition for biscietioners Reajed they Dean um mailed: In Aftal Ruosty clef Leut of Criminal AWeals P.O. Box 13308, Crifitol Station, Austin, Tt. 1811, by WAY of the United States mar Postase the ckid on this bar
151 Demnis Beendig 1-15 Petitioner
*10
COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
JULY 22, 2015
NO. 12-14-00255-CR
DENNIS MONTRELL BENDY,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
Appeal from the 241st District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 241-1575-13)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
James T. Worthen, Chief Justice. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
*11 NO. 12-14-00255-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
DENNIS MONTRELL BENDY, APPELLANT V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
§ APPEAL FROM THE 241ST § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
§ SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dennis Montrell Bendy appeals his conviction for murder. In two issues, Appellant argues that the nonaccomplice evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in denying his requested jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
During the evening of July 13, 2013, Darrian Lee drove his friend Ke’Avier Wilson-Hurd to a local park in Tyler, Texas, to meet a group of women. Lee and Wilson-Hurd were gang members.¹ The park was located in a rival gang’s territory, and they knew they might encounter trouble. Appellant is a member of the rival gang.² Wilson-Hurd and Lee walked to the park pavilion to determine whether any rival gang members were present. Wilson-Hurd was nervous and held a handgun in plain view. Once they determined that no members of the rival gang were present, they began socializing with the women. Brianna Young, the victim, was one of the women. She was at the park with her young son.
¹ Wilson-Hurd and Lee were in different gangs, but they were not rival gangs.
² Wilson-Hurd met Appellant earlier in the day and agreed to a truce. Lee was present at this meeting. Lee acknowledged that entering the territory of Appellant’s gang would be a violation of that truce.
*12 Members of the group noticed that a white Hyundai Elantra circled the park two or three times. On the final time, Lee noticed that someone exited the vehicle and then the vehicle circled around to their location. Almost immediately thereafter, shots were fired just outside the vehicle, and separately, next to a bathroom in the park near where the individual was let out of the vehicle. The shooters fired from opposing positions at Wilson-Hurd indicating that this was a coordinated ambush designed to cut off any escape routes. Wilson-Hurd ran towards Lee's vehicle, and the shooters tracked his movement as they continued firing. Young rushed to aid her son, who was in the area where the shots were fired. During that process, two bullets struck Young, and she died shortly thereafter.
None of the witnesses at the park could identify the shooters. However, investigating officers were led to Rakheem Goldstein, who ultimately admitted to having been involved in the shooting. Goldstein is in the same gang as Appellant, and Appellant and their gang had a feud with Wilson-Hurd and his gang. A few hours before the incident at the park, Appellant told Goldstein that Wilson-Hurd had just shot at Appellant and that Goldstein needed to meet with Appellant for retribution. [3] They learned that Wilson-Hurd was at the park. According to Goldstein, Appellant planned to switch vehicles with Goldstein's girlfriend so they would not be recognized. The pair brought a change of clothes to make it more difficult to identify them after the act was carried out. They also obtained a Glock handgun and an AK-47 assault rifle. Appellant drove the vehicle because Goldstein did not have a driver's license. The purpose of this was to minimize the chance of a vehicle search in the event they were detained by police. A search would have revealed their possession of the weapons. They also picked up fellow gang member Elisha Williams, who possessed a Ruger handgun.
Goldstein stated that as they drove to the park, Appellant devised a plan to let Williams out of the vehicle so that he could cut off Wilson-Hurd's escape route. Goldstein explained further that as they circled around the park, Appellant jumped out of the vehicle and began firing almost simultaneously with Williams, but from an opposing direction. Appellant returned to his vehicle and sped away. [4] Goldstein denied that he actively participated in the shooting.
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Goldstein eventually told officers that they went to Katyron Barrett's home to dispose of the Glock and the AK-47. Barrett claimed he declined to handle the weapons and told Tyiska Gray, a friend smoking marijuana at the house with him, to dispose of them. Barrett also claimed that Gray dumped the weapons in the woods. During the investigation, Barrett ultimately disclosed the location of the Glock and the AK-47, which were recovered by the authorities. Williams told Goldstein that he gave the Ruger to Stephan Whitemon, who turned the Ruger over to detectives. Ballistics testing on the firearms revealed that the two bullets that struck the victim matched the Ruger that the detectives recovered. [3]
Appellant pleaded "not guilty," and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found him guilty of murder. After a punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for life. This appeal followed.
SUFICIENCY OF THE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE
Appellant contends in his first issue that absent the accomplice witness evidence, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A conviction cannot be secured upon the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (West 2005); Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14. In analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of corroborative evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
To evaluate the sufficiency of corroboration evidence, we must eliminate all accomplice testimony from consideration and examine the remaining portions of the record to see if any evidence tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime. Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The corroborating evidence need not be sufficient by itself to establish guilt. Id. The nonaccomplice evidence need not link appellant directly to the crime or establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex.
*14
Crim. App. 1997). And the accomplice testimony need not be corroborated on every element of the offense. Griffin v. State, 936 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). There need only be other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense. Id. Corroboration is sufficient if there is any evidence that confirms a "mere detail" of the offense even if it does not independently establish the elements of that offense. Lee v. State, 29 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.). This may include "apparently insignificant circumstances." Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
When there are two permissible views of the evidence, one tending to connect the defendant to the offense and the other not tending to connect the defendant to the offense, appellate courts should defer to that view of the evidence chosen by the factfinder. Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The issue is not how an appellate court independently would assess the nonaccomplice evidence, but whether a rational factfinder could conclude that the nonaccomplice evidence tends to connect the accused to the offense. Id. at 509. Direct or circumstantial nonaccomplice evidence is sufficient corroboration if it shows that rational jurors could have found that it sufficiently tended to connect the accused to the offense. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Each case must be judged on its own facts, and there is no set amount of nonaccomplice corroboration evidence that is required. Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Proof that the accused was at or near the scene of the crime at or about the time of its commission, when coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may tend to connect the accused to the crime so as to furnish sufficient corroboration to support a conviction. Id. But the presence of a defendant at the scene of a crime, by itself, is insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony. Id. Therefore, we consider the combined force of all of the nonaccomplice evidence that tends to connect the accused to the offense. Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442 .
Discussion
Appellant argues that the nonaccomplice evidence is insufficient to connect him to the commission of the offense because it at most shows that he was in the area of the offense when it occurred, and that he may have been aware of the offense or with others involved in committing
*15 the offense. [6] As part of his argument, Appellant contends that Madeline Wallace, Goldstein's girlfriend who supplied the vehicle, along with Kiara Cain, who was her passenger at the time of the switch, are accomplices. Appellant also contends that Barrett, who helped hide the Glock and AK-47 after the murder was committed, is an accomplice. We note that Appellant never contended at trial that these witnesses were accomplices. In any event, none of them are accomplices as a matter of law under the accomplice witness rule.
A person who allows the defendant to borrow a vehicle used in the commission of the offense is not an accomplice under the accomplice witness rule if she did not know that it would be used to commit the offense and did not otherwise participate or plan the crime. See Sierra . State, 157 S.W.3d 52, 61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff'd, 218 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Wallace supplied the vehicle, but there is no evidence that she knew it would be used to commit the offense. In fact, the record shows that she believed Appellant and Goldstein would use the vehicle for temporary contract work and that Appellant and Goldstein preferred her fuel efficient vehicle over Appellant's large Lincoln. [7] The record also shows that it was not unusual for Goldstein to borrow Wallace's vehicle. As to Cain, the record reflects that she was Wallace's roommate at the time, and was simply along for the ride as a passenger in her vehicle. There is no evidence that either knew Appellant, Goldstein, and Williams would use the vehicle to commit a crime. Consequently, they are not accomplices.
With respect to Barrett, a witness is not an accomplice simply because of his knowledge of the offense, even if he does not report the offense or helps to conceal the offense. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 439. A witness's assistance in disposing of a weapon after a crime does not make him an accomplice witness without evidence of an affirmative act promoting the commission of the murder. See Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Cruz v. State, 690 S.W.2d 246, 250-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Wincott v. State, 59 S.W.3d 691, 698 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. ref'd). Appellant and Goldstein eventually traveled to Barrett's home to
*16 dispose of the weapons. The evidence shows at most that Barrett learned of the crime for the first time after the fact and helped dispose of the weapons. He had no affirmative role in planning or participating in the commission of the offense. Therefore, he is not an accomplice under the accomplice witness rule.
Turning to the nonaccomplice witness testimony, we conclude that the evidence tends to connect Appellant to the commission of the offense. Cain and Wallace testified that they switched vehicles with Appellant and Goldstein. The investigating detectives learned the location of the car switch from them and obtained a video recording confirming that Appellant and Goldstein obtained the white Hyundai Elantra shortly before the murder was committed. Lee and the group of women at the park confirmed at trial that they observed a white or light colored Hyundai Elantra circled the park two or three times. Lee testified that he saw a person exit the vehicle shortly before the shooting, and he knew the person who exited the vehicle was the shooter close to the bathroom.
The detectives obtained Appellant's cellular phone records and determined he was at or near the location of the murder at the time it occurred. See Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ("Proof that the accused was at or near the scene of the crime at or about the time of its commission, when coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may tend to connect the accused to the crime so as to furnish sufficient corroboration to support a conviction."). The detectives were also able to speak with Barrett, who confirmed that Appellant arrived at his house in the white Elantra and asked him to dispose of the weapons. See Roys v. State, 416 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2013, pet. ref'd) (evidence that defendant gave weapons used in committing the offense to a third party for disposal tends to connect him with the murder). Barrett also led the detectives to the Glock and the AK-47. Separately, the 5 g , he 119 detectives obtained the Ruger. Ballistics testing on the firearms showed that the Glock, fired by the Appellant, was fired at least eight times and the Ruger, fired by Williams, was fired at least a 104 eleven times. See Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ("Proof that in the westerns the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 , the 3 ,
*17
JURY INSTRUCTION
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his requested jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
Standard of Review
We apply a two-step process to determine whether a defendant was entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). First, we determine whether the offense qualifies as a "lesser included offense" under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.09. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (West 2006); Sweed v. State, 351 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This is a question of law. Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Next, we determine whether there is some evidence that would have permitted the jury to rationally find that, if the defendant was guilty, he was guilty only of the lesser offense. Id. at 536.
Although the threshold showing for an instruction on a lesser included offense is lowmore than a scintilla of evidence-the evidence must establish that the lesser included offense is a valid and rational alternative to the charged offense. Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536. "[I]t is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted." Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Applicable Law
A person commits murder, in pertinent part, if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or] (2) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02 (b)(1), (3) (West 2011). A person acts "intentionally" with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). A person acts "knowingly" with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that
*18
the circumstances exist. Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id.
A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Id. § 19.04(a) (West 2011). A person acts "recklessly" if with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. Id. § 6.03(c). The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. Id.
Discussion
The parties correctly agree that manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder as charged in this case. See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 384; Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, the first step of the two-step test is satisfied.
Appellant contends Goldstein's testimony demonstrates that a rational jury could have found him guilty only of manslaughter. Specifically, Appellant argues the record shows only that he had a desire to retaliate, and not necessarily to kill, Wilson-Hurd. He relies on Goldstein's statements that Goldstein did not believe an actual shooting would take place and that he did not believe there was a specific plan to kill Wilson-Hurd. As they arrived at the park, Goldstein discussed with Appellant the danger to bystanders of shooting in a crowded area such as the park. In response, Appellant assured Goldstein, "Man, I got aim. You know, I got this." This evidence, Appellant argues, shows that he was aware of a substantial risk to others, that he chose to ignore it, and consequently the jury could rationally find that he was guilty only of manslaughter.
However, this evidence shows that Appellant actually intended to shoot Wilson-Hurd. See Patterson v. State, 950 S.W.2d 196, 200-01 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd) (holding that shooting at vehicle occupied by rival gang members might allow jury to find involuntary manslaughter, but evidence that defendant chased victim's car and shot at it, with other testimony that he intended to "do" them, failed to show he was not guilty of murder, and lesser included offense manslaughter instruction not warranted). The fact that the bullets hit an unintended victim does not entitle Appellant to a charge on a lesser included offense, because his intent with regard to his intended victim transfers to the actual victim. See Tex. Penal Code
*19 ANN. § 6.04(b) (West 2011); see also Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Harrell v. State, 659 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
Moreover, the evidence at trial shows that Appellant (1) heard K.J. was at the park, (2) planned to "get that n----r" according to Goldstein, (3) exchanged cars to avoid detection, (4) drove around the park a few times and crafted a plan for Williams to come from another direction to ambush Wilson-Hurd, (5) jumped out of the car and shot at least eight times into the crowd, (6) disposed of the guns, and (7) exchanged vehicles again to avoid being identified. At the time Appellant and Williams fired into the crowded group, their shots followed Wilson-Hurd as he ran to Lee's vehicle. Unfortunately, Young was killed in the process.
In sum, the evidence shows that the crime was intentionally planned by Appellant, and there is no evidence in the record that would have permitted the jury to rationally find that if Appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of manslaughter. See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385 (no evidence directly germane to recklessness, as pulling out a gun, pointing it at someone, pulling the trigger twice, fleeing the scene, and later telling a friend "I didn't mean to shoot anyone" does not rationally support an inference that Appellant acted recklessly at the moment he fired the shots); Robinson v. State, 945 S.W.2d 336, 342-43 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref'd) (holding that shooting between the defendant and intended victim earlier in the day, the defendant's "haste to procure an automatic rifle," and his "intentional firing" at an apartment negated a finding of manslaughter and supported the trial court's denial of that instruction in the jury charge).
Furthermore, the evidence mandates that the jury could find only that Appellant, at a minimum, knowingly caused Young's death when he fired the weapon. When a defendant uses a deadly weapon in a deadly manner by firing it into a crowd, he knows that death or serious bodily injury that could result in death could occur. See Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that a defendant was not entitled to a lesser included instruction on manslaughter where evidence showed that defendant fired into a crowd without the intent to kill any particular person); Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that "[a]ppellant's use of a deadly weapon in a tavern filled with patrons supplies ample evidence for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the requisite intent to kill"); Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Rojas v. State, 171 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) ("The
*20
evidence supports the inference that appellant knew his shooting the gun in the general direction of a group of people including the four-year-old victim was reasonably certain to result in a death.").
Since the evidence does not show that Appellant is guilty only of consciously disregarding a known substantial and unjustifiable risk that serious bodily injury or death would occur, he was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
Appellant's second issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant's first and second issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial. court.
James T. Worthen
Chief Justice Opinion delivered July 22, 2015. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
NOTES
Wilson-Hurd's shooting at Appellant apparently took place on the same day after the truce meeting occurred.
Appellant did not wait for Williams after the shooting occurred. Williams escaped by other means.
Goldstein admitted to possessing the AK-47 during the shooting, but said he never fired it. The investigating officers did not obtain any shell casings matching the AK-47.
Appellant points out that the DNA profiles obtained from the firearms specifically exclude him, making his connection to the offense even more tenuous. Specifically, Kimberlee Mack, the forensic scientist who tested the guns, obtained a partial DNA profile from the grip of the Ruger, which excluded Williams. She found three DNA partial profiles on the Glock, and those excluded Appellant. However, we view the corroborative evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Brown, 270 S.W.3d at 567. Mack stated that the shooters could have been wearing gloves when handling the firearms or they could have wiped them prior to relinquishing possession of the weapon's to third parties for disposal. She also noted that there was no DNA profile on the trigger of the Ruger or the Glock.
Goldstein did not own a vehicle or have a valid driver's license.