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GUILLORY, JOSEPH Jr.
WR-73,994-03
| Tex. App. | May 1, 2015
|
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Case Information

*1 IN THE 252 NO DISTRICT COURT OF JESTERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

Ex PARTY JOSEPH GUTLLOBY, JR. WELT NO. 8330 MAY 012015 APOLICANT, QQO SE

TETE HONORABLE TEXAS COURT OF CARMINAL APPEALS:

NON COMES JOSEPH GUTLLOBY, JR. PRO SE, Applicant, and PERCETFully requests this Honorable Court to accept this Response to the 252 nd District Court's findings to the above habeas corpus memorandum, by the Applicant.

None of the 9 issues are waived. A few issues are dd- dressed minimally as possible, to convey Applicant's con- tinual stance. One major issue is that the trial attorney lied to this Honorable Court. Other issues, the findings are not being forth right truthful, in the trial court's stance.

Please read the following only after reading both Applicant's issues and memorandum and the 252 nd's trial court's findings, in order for a fair meaning may be had in the instant case.

Please refer to the court's findings at 11 12. In Search and by affidavit, the trial attorney did

*2 What most competent attorneys would refuse to do: He LIGD To THIS HONORABLE COURT.

RULE OF LAW

Refer to Government Code 311.01 (a) (b) on the use of words and phrases read in context and construed according to rules of grammar of common usage as well as words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning. Refer also to Government Code 311.01 (c) (d) and (e) on the technical definitions of "my", "shall", and "mu", respectively.

CRELLAW ON FRELURE To INSTRUCT

If a phrase, term, or word is statutorily defined, the trial court must submit the statutorily-defined definition to the Jury. Moore v. State, 82. 5.W.34 399 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, get. Feb'd). See, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14; Murphy v. State, 44. 5.W. 3d 656, 661 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no get.) (Defendant's are entitled to be convicted on correct statements of law. (Murphy, 44. 5.W. 3d at 665)).

Trial counsel did not contest the admissibility of the 464 (b)-type allegations in court findings 441. To declare Applicant hit or stopped the Complainant for this or that reason is not argued. What is

*3 argued is that the testimony declared the reason for the alleged murder was for renumeration of insurance funds; also for the admissibility that Appellant was alleged to have advanced, sexually, upon Comminent's team daughter. There was no 334 (a) objection. There was no requested out-of-the-presence-of jury determination. See V. A.C.C.P. at. 37.07 (c). Under at. 37.07 sec. 3(g), in post states: "If the attorney representing the State intends to introduce an extraneous crime or bad ad that has not resulted in a final conviction in a court of record... notice of that intent is reasonable only if the notice includes the date on which and the county in which the crime or bad act occurred and the name of the alleged victim of the crime or bad ad." This article 37.07 sec. 3(g) is alleged to be no reasonable; done to satisfy the requirements of the Criminal Procedures of the Texas Rules of Evidence Rules 102 , 104 , 402 , 403,404 (b), V.A.C.C.ProL. at. 37.07 sec. 3(g).

To allow extensive, inadmissible testimony to come in without objection, if considered counsel's trial strategy, it cannot reasonably be considered sound trial strategy. Robertson v. State, 1875,W. 24475 , 482 - B3 (Tov. Crim.Sg. 2006). What was the States reasoning to have a dual expansion of the Record

*4 utilizing capital murder testimony as well as the introduction of a sexual offense against Applicons? These dual expositions entered with no objection, at all, by trial counsel, nor were they raised on Appeal. If either of these 404(b)-type Record expositions are serious enough, an acquittal of for is required.

These egregious errors as alleged and proved, are JAC and have violated Applicons's federal and State Constitutional rights for a fair and impartial trial; and for effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends 5, 6, 14; Wiggin 7 . Smith, 539 U.S. 510,534 (2005), Strickland v. Washington, 460 U.S. 668,687 (1994), Tex. Const. ACT I, 810; Thompson v. State, 9 5.14.34 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. b pp. 2003).

Rule 404 (b) embodies the established principle that a defendant is not to be tried for collateral crimes or for being a criminal generally. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); Hobles v. State, 843 5.14.34 503, 514 (Tex. Crim. b pp. 1982). With the Rules of Evidence, Cobe of Criminal Procedures coupled with the Texas Appeds Courts declare the State CANNOT use this evidence or testimony, especially at guilt/innocence phase. This Hobbes Court is requested to find the trial attorney was ined, ineffective; that

*5 the trial court's findings are contrary to all the holdings on the evidence or testimony, in the case at bar, which constitutes egregious trampling of Application's federal and State constitutions rights to a fair and impartial trial; as well as to have effective assistance of counsel of trial as well as of the appellate level. See, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Counsel sputtered along on the Constitutions Highway. Errors along the way, either, singularly or cummulatively, had on effect, which was a denial of any meaning but assistance of all. Croker v. McCotter, 805 F. 2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1980). This was egregious harm. Cupt v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973).

Murder for remuneration is now on the Jury's decision table. Tov. Pen. Code 819.03 (3).

Texas Penal Code § 19.02(d) declares that defense, at punishment phase may raise the issue of sudden passion" arising from an adequate cause ... (c) The defense would be punished as a second degree felony. Trial counsel never objected that 'sudden passion', (though he raised the issue), was not on the Jury instruction, while "accident" was defined for -5 -

*6 the Jury. To preserve counsel must make a timely and specific objection at trial. Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309,319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987). "Accident" is the first word or phrase defined in the Jury Charge. No objection by any attorney. "I'll is clear while "accident" may have been a defense at one time it is no longer." Valenzuela v. State, 943 S.W. 2d 130,192 (Tex. App.-Amorillo 1997, no pat.); Annamay v. State, 866 S.W. 2d 210,229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994). The Jury Charge must contain an accurate description of the law, and when it does not, the 'integrity' of the verdict is called into doubt. When raised, the theory of "sudden passion" should be considered "law applicable to the case." See Tex. Pen. Code § 2105 (b)(3)-(D). [Eleconse the Charge is so essential to the Juris deliberations, "it is clear that a Charge must include an accurate statement of the law ..." (Emphasis added). Cone v. State, 698 S.W. 2d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

Dibjected to or not by trial counsel or the prosecution, the 'integrity' of the verdict is − 6 −

*7 Colled into grove doubt. This is "plain error" or "fundamental error," and the Hobens Court must review pursuant to article 36.19 and not under T.P.A.P. 44.2 (6), as the trial court appears to hose done. See V.A.C.P. 5it. 36.191, Tex. R. App. Proc. 44.2 (6). Jiminez v. State, 32 5.4, 2d 233 (Tex. Crim. Bpp. 2000),

Applicant is not attempting to re litigate any of the expressions trial. He is out to see that Justice is served, by presenting how his trial attorney did admit, in the Record, that he did not object much of all, and, by presenting how the State presented 404 (b) testimony or evidence into live court without any hearing. Also, admitting "Accident" and omitting "sudden Passion" lessened the State's burden of proof for the court is obliged to charge the Jury on the "low applicable to the case." V.A.C.P. 5it. 36.191, 3ea, Gwevans v. State, 152 5.4, 2d 45, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Evidence is sufficient to support conviction so long as the evidence is sufficient to support conviction for one of the theories submitted to the Jury." The illegal "Accident" was submitted, while the legal "sudden passion" was omitted.

*8 When one of the States most valuable heresy witness declared that Applicont would kill Complainant once she got homey trial counsel does not seek cell phone records of alleged call. What trial counsel does state is " [ A ] s well as the other times I'd like the Court to know that I'm getting these statements for the first time and I'm just now reviewing them." (R R Vol III P. 76 L L 17-25) (emphasis added). (Cf. R R. Vol. III B L 5-11). Mr. DesHotel's testimony blind-sided trial counsel. This demonstrates that it is highly unlikely trial counsel ever interviewed Mr. DesHotel or any other of States witnesses.

Applicant presented what was discovered by inmates and what was presented on-air by ABC's 20/30 Show, that found that Dr. Tommy J. Brown, Mr. had declared a man found dead at the Eleganté Hotel, in Beournont, Texas, most likely died of natural causes. The dead man's wife hired another person to look at her 47-year old husband's body. This other examiner declared that it was most likely the shot in the heart by a 22 bullet that caused the man's death. In that case No one was being accused of murder.

In another case, 20 miles away, in Lumberton,

*9 Texes, the Grand Jury hears Dr. Brown explain that a man had died of an overdose of the PCP drugs, yet he failed to tell the Grand Jury of the cracked skull and whelps put on the deceased, why? The Lumberton Police were being accused. In yet another case, though properly sub- poenced, Dr. Brown, M.E. was a no-show. A falon was on trial for murder. There in yet another case, Dr. Brown declared that a shotgun blast killed a man. Other pathologists declare that it was impossible for the shotgun blast to kill the man for the pellets had no gunpowder on them. Yet, the jury did not hear of a .25 bullet in the man's brain. The state was after the shotgun shooter as the man that shot the .25 derringer turned state with ness. Bias is clearly demonstrated.

SOMEONE IS LYING "I extensively interviewed Applicants I witnesses and discussed various trial strategies with him." Trial counsel - Duesler.

It is apparent that Mr. Duesler wants this Honorable Court to believe this life. Does -Q-

*10 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure at 38.18 (a)(b) have any meaning, at all, when an attorney sweets the above quote while others say this: "I never been contacted ... spoken to attorney Dressler." Yvonne. "I had not been contacted... by Mr. Dussler," Melissa. "I had not been contacted or..." Clara. "... several months passed and I had not been contacted by Mr. Dussler... Denise. (See all officials in tobacco application).

Mr. Dussler as Applicant knew what any of these women would say in open court. The trial court declared what the above would say would be irrelevant under the circumstances. This may well be, Applicant's main point is NOT what these witnesses may have said, but he trusted and believed Mr. Dussler, but, in fact, "extensively interviewed" them all, as he expects this Honorable Court to also believe. In the Texas Pans' Code this is called "PERSURY."

According to the Court's findings (455) that Pamela Brossard, in her lay main ignorance -10-

*11 assassinates this trial attorney. This same trial court failed to see how this same trial attorney, Mr. Dweller, had assassinated his own client at Note Dive and, at the dose of the trial in the case at Bork. He described his client as a Plogrant womonizer at Voir Dive. At close he asked the Jury, "Did you notice how little I objected, because the defendant and I believed everything they said." That is a one- sentence summation of the defense; by the trial attorney Dweller. He basically tells the Jury the Capitol murder reasoning and the sex allegations are true. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 6:40, Rylon ter v. State, 101 S.W. 24 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. Sept. 2005).

Summation and Close Counsel Liep! He did not investigate. He was off playing poker as was a testimony. He did not interview anyone as none knew what to expect or what to say. This is plain as white on rice,

*12 Mr. Dussler disrespected his profession, the Texas Book, all his years, and every Court, including this Honorable Court of Criminal Appests.

Applicant did request the Jefferson County District Clerk to supply the Court with a "Motion For Designation of Record For Article II. 07 Hobbes Corpus Heating." See attached Motion, This Motion requested at least 10 known items pursuant to Tex. P. App. Proc. 34. The items that are complained by the trial court are not factually true.

Finally, at close, see Applicant's memorandum at 9:55 42. The state closes it argument with: "Cynthia (Compliant) had the RIGHT to KILL HEN" (Applicant), to the Juvy with not a peep of a 33.1 (a) objection by trial counsel. Yet, the Juvy also heard from trial counsel, "Every thing they said, the defendant and I believed them."

This was not a fair nor impartial trial utilizing an effective assistance of counsel,

*13 PRAYER

Applicant props this Court for a favorable review and at a minimum, a retreat for resenfencing using the "Golden Position" definition or in the maximum, for reasons stated above in the expansion of indictment that there will be an acquittor ordered. So proyed.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph Gullory Jr. pro se Applicant

Innate Declaration

I, Joseph Gullory, Jr., being presently incor ected in mank to, stlles Unit, declare under penalty of perjury that, according to my belief, the Farcs stated herein are true and correct. Suped this 20-day of April 2015.

A Fiontly staffing of the Applicant

  • 13-

*14 Centiflante of Service, I, Joseph Guttory, Jr. Applicant, in the above hobbes cocous, wirt no. 83302-C, have misled the above Response Vis First-Class Registered Us. Mail on the 28th day of April - 30 - 15.

*15 APÉGALDIX

*16 Joseph Guillory, Jr. TDCJ# 1085141 MARK W. STILES UNIT 3060 FM 3514 Beaumont, Texas 77705 May 2014 District Clerk of Jefferson County, Texas 1001 Pearl Street Beaumont, Texas 77701

RE: FILING HABEAS CORPUS

Dear District Clerk: Please find the enclosed application, memorandum, exhibits, and other motions to the trial court in the above habeas petition.

Please present such to this Court at the earliest convenince.

I do thank you for your prompt, courteous, and professional handling of this important matter.

Again, thank you,

Respectfully,

Joseph Guillory, Jr.

*17

CAUSE NO. EX PARTE JOSEPH GUILLORY, JR. PETITIONER, pro se

IN THE 252 ND

DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION FOR DESIGNATION OF RECORD FOR ARTICLE 11.07 HABEAS CORPUS HEARING

COMES NOW, Josph Guillory, Jr. Petitioner, in the abovestyled and -numbered cause, proceeding pro se, and pursuant to T.R.A.P. 34, files this Motion For Designation of Record For Article 11.07 Hearing, and respectfully request that the following documents and volumes be included as part of the Record for the habeas corpus hearing in this cause:

  1. Pre-trial motions by the State;
  2. Pre-trial motions by the Defense;
  3. All pre-trial statements by the State's witnesses; (whether the witness testified or not);
  4. Any transcripts of en camera colloqueys;
  5. Any transcripts of en banc colloqueys;
  6. All pre-trial decisions by the trial judge;
  7. All police Records and notes taken by any detective or other Police officer, be it State, County or city;
  8. All photographic documentations taken by law enforcement by the State, county or city;
  9. All photographic investigation by trial attorney;
  10. All notes taken by trial attorney's interviews with State or Defense witnesses in the case at bar;
  11. Trial transcripts;
  12. Findings of the Court;
  13. Post-trial Motions by trial attorney;
  14. All post-trial Orders by the trial court; and
  15. Any post-trial motions by the State;
  16. Appeal motion and PDR mations.

Case Details

Case Name: GUILLORY, JOSEPH Jr.
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: May 1, 2015
Docket Number: WR-73,994-03
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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