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Pruett, Robert Lynn
WR-62,099-03
| Tex. App. | Apr 8, 2015
|
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*0 RECEIVED COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 4/8/2015 ABEL ACOSTA, CLERK *1 WR-62,099-03 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 4/8/2015 12:55:52 PM Accepted 4/8/2015 1:12:29 PM ABEL ACOSTA CLERK No. WR-62,099-03 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINALAPPEALS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS In re Robert Lynn Pruett, Petitioner, vs.

William Stephens , Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division Respondent.

_________________________________ MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE BERT RICHARDSON _________________________________ CAPITAL CASE MR. PRUETT IS SCHEDULED TO BE EXECUTED ON APRIL 28, 2015.

_________________________________ David R. Dow ddow@central.uh.edu University of Houston Law Center 100 Law Center Houston, Texas 77204-6060 TEL: (713) 743-2171 FAX: (713) 743-2131 *2 No. WR-62,099-03 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS In re Robert Lynn Pruett, Petitioner, vs.

William Stephens , Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division Respondent.

_________________________________ MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE BERT RICHARDSON _________________________________

To avoid any appearance of impropriety and promote public confidence in

the integrity of the judiciary, Relator-Petitioner Robert Lynn Pruett asks that Judge

Bert Richardson recuse himself, or be recused by the Court, from further

participation in this case. The basis for this motion is that Judge Richardson

presided over the DNA proceedings in this case in the trial court. The petition

filed in this cause pertains to the evidence that was at issue in the trial court

proceedings over which Judge Richardson presided.

The grounds for recusal of appellate judges are the same as the grounds for

the recusal of trial judges. See Tex. R. App. P. 16.2. Under Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 18b(2), a judge must recuse himself in any proceeding in which:

(a) his impartiality might reasonably be questioned;

(b) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a

party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a), (b).

The standard for assessing judicial bias in this context is whether the

allegation of lack of impartiality is grounded on facts that would create doubts

concerning the judge’s impartiality – not in the mind of the judge himself, or even,

necessarily, in the mind of the party filing the motion, but rather in the mind of a

reasonable person with knowledge of all the circumstances involved. Kemp v.

State , 846 S.W.2d 289, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see Rogers v. Bradley , 909

S.W.2d 872, 880-82 (Tex. 1995) (Enoch, J., responding to declaration of recusal).

The language of the rule is mandatory. The standard is an objective one: It

requires “the judge to recuse if ‘his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’

regardless of the source or circumstances giving rise to the question of impartiality

and even though the source and circumstances may be beyond the judge’s volition

or control.” Rogers , 909 S.W.2d at 874 (Gammage, J., declaration of recusal).

Because of Judge Richardson’s presiding over proceedings in the trial court,

his impartiality with respect to the instant petition might reasonably be questioned

by a reasonable person. Moreover, if Judge Richardson acquired any knowledge

during those proceedings that was outside of the record on appeal received by this

Court, that knowledge would seem to require his recusal.

If these proceedings were in the federal (rather than state) courts, Judge

Richardson’s recusal would be required. See 28 U.S.C. § 47 (“No judge shall hear

or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”).

Similarly, his recusal would be required if Texas was among the states to have

adopted the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See

Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(A)(6)(d) (requiring a judge to disqualify

himself if he “previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court”).

The federal rule reflects that a reasonable person would harbor doubts as to the

impartiality of an appellate court judge, when that same judge previously acted as

the trial court judge in the same case.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Pruett asks that Judge Richardson recuse

himself, or be recused by this Court, from the case.

Respectfully Submitted, s/ David R. Dow __________________________ David R. Dow University of Houston Law Center 100 Law Center Houston, Texas 77204-6060 Tel. (713) 743-2171 Fax (713) 743-2131 Counsel for Robert Pruett *6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the 8th day of April 2015, a true and correct copy of the

above legal document was delivered via email to:

Jefferson Clendenin

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Appeals Division

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

Tel. (512) 936-1600

Fax (512) 320-8132

Email jay.clendenin@texasattorneygeneral.gov

Melinda Fletcher

Special Prosecution Unit

mfletcher@sputexas.org

s/ David R. Dow _________________________ David R. Dow

Case Details

Case Name: Pruett, Robert Lynn
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Apr 8, 2015
Docket Number: WR-62,099-03
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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