Case Information

*1

1213-15

ORIGINAL

No. 14-14-00530-CR

This Court of Criminal Appeals

Austin, Texas

No. 01-30078

This 25th Detrit Court of Texas

Liberty County, Texas

Christopher W. Parks

V

State of Texas State

Petition for Discretionary Review

To the Honorable Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals Comer was the Appellant by and through Pro-se of record on appeal and Prssuant to Texas Rules of Appollate procedure Rule 66.3 presents Petition for Discretionary Review for Appollant.

Christopher Wesley Parks Pro-se TOC34 193398

Wyme Unit Sio F.M. 2831 Huntsville, Texas 77349

*2 Table of Contents ..... Page Iacritty of Parties ..... 9 Index of Authorities ..... 3 Introductory Page ..... 4 Statement Regarding Oral Argument ..... 5 Statement of the orse ..... 6 Statement of Procedural History ..... 7 Grands for Review ..... 7 Argument ..... 8 AID-AppeIlate arict

*3

Identity of Parties and Lawes

Edge:

Rosecuter:

Defense Caused: (At frid)

Appollate Caused:

Appollate: Mr. Christophor Wesley Park: #01933953 Wynne Unit - TOCJ SIO F.M. 2821 Hundsville, Texas 77349

*4

Index of Authorities

Oise Law Page U.S. v Obtion 130 Sct. 9169,9174 9 U.S. v Ruston 565 F. 3a 892,901

9 Winckip 397 U.S. 358,364 10 Appal Brief - A/B Rules and Statutes Teens Code Criminal Proceave Article 901 (e) Teens Code Criminal Procedure Article 40.00

*5 No. 14-H-00530-CL In the Court of Criminal Appeals In Austin, Texas

NO. CR30070 In The 15th District Court of Liberty County, Texas

Christopher Wesley Parks Appellate v.

State of Texas State

Petition for Discretionary Review Genes Now the Appellant, by and through his Pro-se record on appeal presents this Petition for Discretionary Review for Appellant.

*6 Statement Regarding Oral Argument Petitioner request Oral argument pursuant to TX R. Evidence goled defendants right to be heard. Defendant who has never spoken to his Appellate Attorney but has written him many times do him to Annexd his appeal brief with "Newly disowered evidence" which would show Appellate was somewhere else during All Alleged a Penses. Also showing why his wife and her kids would benefit greatly from appellates incarceration. As well as Medical Evidence of his E.D. that his wife promised she would get to testify before the Grand Jury of subpened by Mr. Parks, that he husband could not have committed these accusations against him and hawher chandkids Iold her that he did not do anything wrong (ABS-ISI). See Pro-ses motion for Judicial Notice" Aled July 10, 905.

*7 Statement of the Case This is an appeal from A Comerction for the offense of Centinues sexual Abuse of A child (ce-4, 131-132). Appellate was arrested August 8, 2012, and suffered a stroke Jine 21, 2013, and on Dettor 1, 2013 based ou a report from a medical Doctor the Trial Curt Anna Appetate incompetent to Stand Trial and Mr. Parks be clarified to Vernons State Mental hospital to determine the likelyhood of defendant to be able to stand Trial again. (ce-18-19). A bench Warrant Motion by Prosecutor issued April 8, 2014.

Trial began June 9, 2014, Appellant once again entered a plan of Not Guilty. And with a jury to assess guilt or innocence June 13, 2014 returned a guilty verdict and asses punishment to Confinement inthe Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Re Life. (CR-131). The Certification of Defendants right to Appenl and Notice of Appenl was Flea Samedary (ce 139-140).

*8 Statement of Procedural History The Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appell's Case Number 14-14-00530-08 was handed down and Affirmen, August 13, 2015. No motion for a rehearing was fine. Grands for Review 1) Competency - Constitutional Rejkt to due process violated when Aicea to stane-Trial After being determined to be incompe- tiont. 2) Extraneous offense - The Court erred in admitting extraneous offense. 3) Joy Unanimity - The Joy Unanimity Charge as applied to Appelland was erroneous and onse egregious mirna.

*9

I. Competency

Appellate signed Medical Records Relase Authorization forms August 10, 2015 and in two years No Mental Health Records were Ever Aqued by anyone (08-15)-152. While on July for the United States Post Office Mr. Parks Suffered a stroke and was an Social Security Disability (April 904 - April 2015) and was Certified to be incompetent by the Texas Department Health Services Prior to Arrest.

To Either Complicate matters Mr. Parks Suffered another stroke while being detained and forced to stand trial. Appellate has never been tested for incompetency as a result from stroke at Venom state Mental Hospital but was tested for his "blow Cancer and cyst in his"Gram," the Reason for his E.D." Theoretically One defendant is referred to stand Trial The burden of Proof for Incompetency Now is on defendant. Mr. Parks maintains the proof has always been on Record with the Texas Department Health Services. U.S. v. Ruston 565 F. 3d 942, 901 (5th Cir. 8009)

*10 II. Extraneous Offense

Appellate was not notified of additional extraneous Act As soon as sinte notice" but was in fact known to them "about a year and half ago" earlier. (1882-88) but was delayed for tactical advantage. The processor is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element with which a defendant is charged in an indictment. The defendant must be aquitted if the Cart defines reasonable doubt in a way that impermissibly eases the burden of proof. "Elements of a crime" that must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable dabit and sentencing factors that can be proved to a Judge at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence." Mr. Parks did not like on an key street with a garage next door in 9007-9012. Mr. Parks sister fund his video that shows where he lived during all alleged crimes and shows evidence of stolen items "the vensus way they wuided him incarcerated" and to regain stolen property.

*11

III. Any Unanimity

Distinguishing betweent eloments that must be charged in an indictment and praen to a juy" beyond-a-doub Standard and Sentencing factors that an be proved to a Judge at Senteecling by a propondorance of the evidence provides "concrete substance" to presumption of innocence.

By Windship beyond-a-roasomble dust stanand the Prosecutor filled to prove every element of the crimes in the Indictment. With Recently discovered evidence" Home Video" will prove beyond-a- dust that appullab did not commit a single Act in the indictment, Athermore it shows why they bewildered greatly from Mr. Parks' incarcertion Evidence of a robbery Perpetrated by Shena, Patrick Glaviv and Albert Holman. Itens were stored in Chistina Park's storage building before Mr. Parks and Chistina Seprated. See Dayton Police report CFS# 013580 where they came to remove Mr. Parks by force from his home. See also Amendment to Appen Brief may 26, 305 and Pro-ses" Motion for Judicial Notice" to be taken Aled July 10, 1005 Windship 391 U.S. 358,394

Pcayce

The Retitianer prays that the Honorable Court reuers his conviction and he be remmanded for a new trial to cered his unkownil Contrement.

*12 Extraneous offense Page 10 Contingue... As stated the extraneous offense of oral See (RE6-71-25) was in the Institnted to inswporate by Reforme and a firmed Vny Institntedt DA.CASEt FOSIGD and TENH 41389057 A002 Tive Bill Indictined for Allegra Victim Hayown George the only Indictment Insformation Available 20 days before trial was missing information Essential Elements of Data, Place and Building of Whore Crimes Decurred To witt "Garage Noxt door to 307 Ray 5t Ltt-41nGrade" to be able to Assert a Double Jeopardy Defense. The only information before trel was July 24, 2015 AMIs-to-posis Sexual Contact September 13, 2014 through June 23, 2012. The Contradictory Statements for (2007-2018): "The First tine was 1st grade (2007) at a house on Ray street (RE6-55) and "The First tine was at atrailes on 2323 (2007) (RE6-411-142) Both extraneous פרents occurred in the Scope of 2007-2011. The essential Elements of Data, Place and Building of wherersimes occurred where missing in order to assert a Double Jeopardy Defense. Rom indichtungit Proof of whore I thee 2007-201 "Homelides" Has been Provided making both Statements false. See Selecty Notice of Homelides After July 10, 2015. Santos y Ruros, 193 F, 3d 367, 369 (sth.Cr. 1998)

*13 Facts

Christian Parks - married "sick times, Applicable was told only three times with the best marriage being his best friend and Father of Shams, and Albert Helman Jr. (mumdered)

Christian - the Nass Altner Albert Helman Jr. was "mumdered" Sonesy by her Next husband Joe Richardsen (1911-1940). They went on the Lamb Dam (1901) Co. Joe was using Albert Helman Siss Social Security Number and identity, She gave him social. She used her best friends Social 'Kim Burch Cucalius civo (see investigation Report), Texas Rensgers

Christian - when the kids became mad at their Stop After Dr. Irving their mom into Liberty Co. Using the same tactics put Joe Richardsen in prison for 116 (Same Charges) ended same charges as appellate in prison for 116 see Joey Allen Richardsen vs. State of Arkansas (1911-1945).

Christian - was to testy to Grand Jury about Mrs. Parks "Erectile Applaudtion" and of Trial Testifical exact opposite, (see 151) So Mr. Parks went not Divorce for Bygomy, Still married to Hermann 2 (see 188) (see 15).

Patrick - when Mr. Parks was going to turn him into Authorities he bothed Christian with Abouse (Mr. Parks house) 18000.00, and a New Cor (Toyota Vans, Joe Myers Toyotn Hooter)

Patrick - Manager of Ross" state Usa Shams and brother Albert Helman Jr. to get past Security Chmmsis with Stalev Property"see home Video"

Patrick- and IRS. 30,000.00, "Tom Scam to help prey Christianis bribe They used his earned income credit for his kids which Christian was not support and he went Not get money back from Jgs Amhav. (see End of America Mascacita 2013)

Patrick- Needed Stalev Wrasher/Dryer back from Mr. Parks and itwas still in his home. (Traded money for our and lawyer for Shams) (W/Drver all Home videotape)

Patrick and Shams never remarried to continue getting bewifty from the Government for single mother (day one, Student Loms, Read Stamps etc...) (see Attorney General for Case Numbers Mr. Parks turned into Government)

*14 Unsucorn Declaration Under Penalty of Pequy state law V.T. C.A. OY. PAC. and REN. Code 3132.001 -132.003/PAC. LAW 31946

I christopter w. Parks TOCI H 1933992 certify that Iam currently incarcerated at the John M. Wynn unit 800 F.M. 2021 Hontsville, Texas 77349 Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division located in Walker County, Decline under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on This day of August 21, 2015.

| Allies | | | :--: | :--: | | | Christopher Wesley Parks H 1933982 | | | Wyme Chilt Walker County | | | 80 F.M. 2821 | | | Hontsville, Texas 77349 |

*15 Certificates of Series I Christopher W. Parks, TOCS No 1933982 certify that I have sent"a original copy" and" original/ duplicate copy" of petitioners Pro-Se Petition for Discretionary Review. Via U.S. mail postage prepaid to the Pollawing Parties:

Lagan Pickett, Prosecutor 1933 Sarn Huston suite IIA Library, Texas 77575

State Prosecuting Attorney P. G Box 13046

Austin, Texas 78711-3046

File Mark Service Requested Executed on this the day of 31 August 2015.

| Ann Muteo | P0-S | | :--: | :--: | | | Christpour Westy Paris ^[4] PEERRA | | | Wyme Unit | | | 610 EM. 2621 | | | Huntsville, Texas 71349 |

*16

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 13, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Ccourt of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00530-CR

CHRISTOPHER WESLEY PARKS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 75th District Court Liberty County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CR30078

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Christopher Wesley Parks, was indicted for the felony offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). ^[1] A jury convicted appellant of the charged offense

*17

and found the enhancement allegation to be true. A jury assessed punishment of life in prison, a fine and court costs.

In three issues, appellant contends (1) his constitutional right to due process was violated because he was forced to stand trial after being determined to be incompetent, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense, and the jury unanimity charge, as applied to appellant, was erroneous and caused egregious harm. We affirm. ^[2]

I. COMPETENCY

In his first issue, appellant complains he was forced to stand trial after being determined to be incompetent. "A criminal defendant who is incompetent may not be put to trial without violating due process." Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996)).

In September 2013, counsel for appellant filed a motion requesting that he be examined by a psychiatrist to determine his competency to stand trial. One month later, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that appellant was incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to be committed to the Vernon State Hospital for further evaluation and treatment to determine his competency at a later date. In March 2014, the Texas Department of State Health Services determined that appellant was competent to stand trial, and it provided that information to the trial court.

Additionally, prior to the commencement of trial in June 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine which individuals were the outcry witnesses. See

*18

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Neither appellant nor his counsel complained he was incompetent to stand trial, and both the State and appellant announced ready.

After appellant's initial examination and finding of incompetence, he was later examined and found to be competent to stand trial. The record does not contain evidence that appellant's mental condition rendered him incompetent to know and understand the charges against him or evidence that he was in any way prevented from meaningfully participating in his trial. Thus, we conclude that appellant was competent to stand trial. See Ex parte Long, 558 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (concluding that even if defendant was incompetent to stand trial four months earlier, there was no evidence to suggest he was incompetent when he pled guilty and no suggestion a separate competency hearing was required); see also Moralez v. State, 450 S.W.3d 553, 559-60 Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet ref'd) (determining that once the defendant has been found restored to competency, he had the burden to prove he was incompetent); Johnson v. State, 429 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding that after defendant was found competent to stand trial, any inappropriate court behavior does not show defendant lacked understanding of the proceedings and require a second competency examination). We overrule appellant's first issue.

II. EXTRAneous OFFENSE

In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of oral sex upon the complainant when appellant was not provided notice of the extraneous offense of performing oral sex acts upon the complainant. We review the trial court's admission of evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We

*19 uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.

As noted above, Section 21.02(b) provides that a person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.02(b). Section 21.02(c) provides that an "act of sexual abuse" means any act that is in violation of various penal laws, including aggravated kidnapping, indecency with a child under Section 21.11(a)(1), or sexual assault under Section 22.011. See id. art. 21.02(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The indictment tracked Section 21.02(b) alleging: [A]ppellant did then and there during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, to-wit: from on or about September 13, 2011 through June 30, 2012, when the defendant was 17 years of age or older, commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against a child younger than 14 years of age, to contact the sexual organ of [appellant] and, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of said [appellant] and/or [complainant], intentionally or knowingly engage in sexual contact with [complainant] by touching the genitals of [complainant], a child younger than 14 years of age. . . ." Appellant objected that the extraneous offense exceeded what was included in the indictment and constituted surprise and unfair prejudice. At the hearing, the State explained that in preparing for trial the night before the complainant was to testify, the complainant described an act of oral sex. The State claimed it "absolutely shores up the indicted offenses" and argued it involved the same witnesses who are present and can testify at trial. The trial court noted that this "is the nature of these kinds of offenses. The more that a child is interviewed it seems the more it comes to light." The trial court overruled appellant's objection, denied

*20 his request for a one-day continuance, ordered a ten-minute recess, and ordered the State to provide all information to appellant and his counsel.

Appellant contends that the State emphasized the extraneous offense in closing argument. Relevant portions of the State's argument are:

This is a boy that got touched on his genitals by his grandfather; and the stories stayed consistent all except for, "It happened more times than I originally told you. The worst thing that happened was he made me put my mouth on his penis while he was sucking mine." That's how the story changed. Consistency is there all the way through except for more times that it happened and more stuff that happened.

That little boy was sexually assaulted by his grandfather.

Then imagine talking about your grandpa, whatever name you use for him and having to come in here and tell a group of people sitting in here that, "I put my mouth on my grandpa's penis." . . . An 11-yearold boy is telling you what has been going on for more than four years to (sic) of his life. [Complainant] said the last time it happened was in June -all the way back to 2007, September 1, that this man committed two sex acts, i.e. touching [complainant's] genitals or taking his penis and touching his butt, he's guilty of continuous sexual assault of a child. Appellant requested notice of extraneous offenses under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 38.37, Section 3 and Texas Rules of Evidence 404 and 609. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37 § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); Tex. R. Evid. 404, 609. Article 38.37, Section 3 requires that the State shall give notice of its intent to introduce in the case-in-chief evidence of sexual offenses described in Section 1 or 2, including continuous sexual abuse of a child,

*21 indecency with a child and sexual assault of a child, thirty days prior to trial. See Texas Code of (Tex. Crim. App. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37 §§ 1, 2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). ^[3] Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identify, absence of mistake, or lack of accident" when the prosecutor provides "reasonable notice before trial that it intends to introduce such evidenceother than that arising in the same transaction-in its case-in-chief." Tex. R. Evid. 404(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The purpose of the Rule 404(b) notice provision is preventing surprise and informing the defendant of the offenses the State intends to offer at trial. See Hernandez v. State, 176 S.W.3d 821, 825 (Tex. (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

The State gave notice of other extraneous offenses it intended to offer before trial. The notice contained numerous instances of sexual contact between appellant and complainant, but none specifically referred to the appellant performing oral sex acts upon the complainant. One instance referred to appellant "causing the genitals of [another child under the age of 14] to contact the mouth and/or tongue of [appellant]." In its Notice of Intent to Use Child Abuse Victim's Hearsay Statement, the State also disclosed inter alia that complainant had reported that appellant had been "doing inappropriate things with him, including touching [complainant] in his private area."

In considering appellant's objection, the trial court stated that this "is the nature of these kinds of offenses. The more that a child is interviewed it seems the more it comes to light." The appellant was notified of the additional act as soon as

*22 the State had notice of it. In addition, the appellant had been notified of other extraneous acts. The witness was present, and appellant was able to cross examine the witness about the offense. Under these circumstances, we cannot agree that appellant was harmed by the late notice of this offense. See Hayden v. State, 66 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Webb v. State, 36 S.W.3d 164, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (concluding notice depends on the facts and circumstances of the case).

We overrule appellant's second issue.

III. JURY UNANIMITY

In his third issue, appellant contends that the jury unanimity charge, as applied to appellant, was erroneous and caused egregious harm. Texas Penal Code Section 21.02(d) provides:

If a jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the defendant or the exact date when those acts were committed. The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).

The jury need not unanimously agree on which specific acts of sexual abuse appellant committed or the exact dates on which the acts were committed. See id. Jury unanimity is required in felony cases. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Appellant did not object to the court's charge at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. Thus, appellant is entitled to relief only if the charge is incorrect and the record establishes that egregious harm occurred. See id. at 743–44. We must first determine whether there was an error in the jury charge. Id.

*23 Appellant contends the charge "effectively authorized" the jury to convict appellant of continuous sexual abuse of a child if the jury believed the oral sex abuse allegation but did not believe the offenses alleged in the indictment. We disagree.

The charge of the court defined "act of sexual abuse" as "any act that constitutes indecency with a child, as well as any act of aggravated sexual assault of a child. It also defined aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by contact and contained the following instructions: (1) to find the appellant guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child, it would be required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse during the prescribed period of time; and (2) if there is any evidence that appellant committed an offense other than those alleged in the indictment, it cannot consider that evidence for any purpose unless it believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed such offense and, if so, it may only consider that evidence than for determining motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identify, and only if the jury believed the extraneous offense evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus the jury was limited to a unanimous finding as to those acts in the indictment. We conclude that the charge was not erroneous. See Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (concluding the jury "is presumed to have understood and followed the court's charge"); Lane v. State, 357 S.W.3d 770, 775-76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (holding no jury charge error existed where charge tracked the language of statute). We overrule appellant's third issue.

*24

Having overruled all of appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

/s/ John Donovan Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Donovan, and Wise. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

NOTES

${}^1$ Section 21.02(b) provides "A person commits an offense if: (1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and (2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is a child younger than 14 years of age." Id. § 21.02(b).

${}^2$ This case was transferred to our court from the Beaumont Court of Appaals; therefore, we must decide the case in accordance with its precedent if our decision would be otherwise inconsistent with its precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

${}^3$ Section 2(b) provides: "Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts committed by the defendant against the child who is the victim of the alleged offense shall be admitted for its bearing on relevant matters, including: (1) the state of mind of the defendant and the child; and (2) the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and the child." Id. art. $38.37\S 2$ .