Case Information

*1

193.5

ORIGINAL

COURT OF ABPEALS

RECEIVED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

APR 172015

Abel Acosta, Clerk

RETIION FOR DISCLIIETIOMARY REVIEW

No. 01-13-004LA-CR

FILLED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS APR 172015

Abel Acosta, Clerk

LUCIUMD VARIAN PROJILA - APPELAMY

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS - APPELLE

APPEAL FILM THE 149 th DISTRACT COURT OF BENONISE COURY (TRIAL COURT No. 69049)

JUNESEMENT BENONISES FEBRUARY 3, 2015

*2

TARTERS TO THE CASE.

APPELLANT: LLEGAND HARRMS PASSELLA

ATTOONEL FOR APPELLAT AT TRIAL: NAME: Dominizave Erenan ADORES: Lel3 muLbeller 5 T . ANDELSON: TL 72515 ATTOONEL FOR APPELLAN ON APPEAL: NAME: JOSEPH KIIE VERREY ADORES: 1200 BROADUHN! 161 E. 2745 TEARLAND: TL. 77584 APPELLEE: THE GRAVE OF TELAS ATTOONEL FOR THE GRAVE AT TRIAL: NAME: DILAN ARACL PADRES: III E. LOCUST, SUZEE YDRA ANDELSON: TL 77515 BARTOOLA COWNT CARRONAL DISABELT ATTOONEL'S OFFICE BARTOOLA COWNT CARRITASSE (979) BLU - 1230 (979) BLU-1525 (FAR)

ATTOONEL FOR GRAVE ON APPEAL: NAME: DAVID BOUERMAN - ABSELAM CRANINAL DISABELT ATTOONEL ADORES: IIIE. LOCUST, 5TE. YOB-A ANDELSON: TL. 77515 BARTOOLA COWNT CARRONAL DISABELT ATTOONEL'S OFFICE BARTOOLA COWNT CARRITASSE. (979) BLU-1230 (979) BLU-1525 (FAR)

*3 Courts of criminal Dowers Judgement Dwell: NAmès: Justice week Justice Hieret Justice Penou DONSON DRSWERD b. JUSTICE HIERET

Enough one for Ahement: No EvideNle was submitted to show Appletar wanked to Jurcmake NARCOFICS MAKING INFORMATION FIDM EI. MERSEN.

Enough two for Ahement: stare fasted to pone that the Accused EVERlised AccuNl Carte, courtdl, And Mankement over the courtraman, and second fasted to pene the crucial element that the Accused Had UnowlsDof of the thins possessed.

Enough three for Ahement: Ineffective Absstance of counsel

*4

List of Authoritics

CASES

Cude U. state $t$ 116 5.w. 2d 416,47 (Tel. Cerm. App. 1986) Dees U. state 222 6.w. 2d 209, 214-15 (Tek.AP. - Corpus Chasst 1986) Hewndow U. state 287 6.14. 2d 408-409-10 (Tek. ca.AP. 1990) Hewnsen U. state 561 6.w. 2d 125, 129 (Tek. Ca. App. 1928) Illinois v. states 462 U.S. At 230, 103 6. C. At 2328) Labourny V. state 29 5us, 2d 236, 240 (Tek. App. Corpus Chasst 1897 No Per.) Mantion v. state 253 5.w. 2d 384, 387 (TeL. Ca. App. 1988) Menacher V. state 401 5.14. 2d 640, 651 (TeL.AP. Corpus Chasst 2001 No Per.)

Onts U. state 642 5.w. 2d 194, 197 (TeL.Ca. App. 1982) Sandoval U. state 446 6.14. 2d 492, 496 (TeL. AB. Corpus Chasst 1897 No Per.) Grossmann V. Westinkion 4616 U.S. 668, 80 L.E.D. 2d 694, 104 5. C. 2052 )

*5 ADPALANT WAS INDICATED FOR THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL BARKS, EFFEMPUTURE, OR INVESTMENT. THE CASE WAS TICKED BEFORE A SURV WATCH FOURD HAM BUSINESS. ON ANALYSIS 29.1285. THE TREAL COURT RECEIVERED PUNISHMENT AT 10 (TEN) YEARS IMPASSONMENT. APPElant APPERLED TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPERLIS, WHICH BENDEREO A SUBDEPRIENT ON TREALARY 3, 2015, APPERL N0. OI-15-0091A IN THE 14th COURT OF APPERLIS OF HOUSTON, TX.

No MOTSON FOR REMEALING WAS FILER.

ORAL ARLUMENT REAWESTED: ORAL ARLUMENT IS REAWESTED DUE To CONTRADICTING STATEMENTS MADE ARAINST APPELANT. APPELANT ASLLS THE COURT OF APPERLIS FOR AN ORAL ARLUMENT SO THAT THE CACKS CAN RE HERAD AND ARRANGED DALLY. THERE'S NO EUSDENCE THAT APPELANT BEEL TALLED To CI TO PURCHASE NARLOITES. THE RECORD GROWS THAT CASE IS MORE MEASAN. THE APPELANT NEVER EVERCISED ACVUAL CASE OR UNITOOL, AND APPELANT NEVER GROUED OR EXERCIED THE DORINGOUS OWEL THE TRIVED POUSESSED. RECORD INDICATES THAT APPELLANT'S PRESENCE ALONE PROVIDED H3S CONVERSION, THAT THE PRESENCE OF CO-DEPENDANT BEHNABE WAS ALSO A FACICI BUT WAS ELDORATASED. APPELANT PARKS THAT ORAL ARLUMENT BE HERAD TO DICUGS SUGH CALCULAL ARRANments TO THIS CASE.

*6 Parker for Belief

In conclusion defulant parts that the proper belief should be entered, proper subjectives vacated. And a proper subjectives deindeed. Due to existence below so UNOULD the classical that it desisces that findamentalist UNEASY, but follows provides mechanism for Belief. Wherefore, applicant texts that the court cannt product deflief to which the man be entitled in this procedure.

DANE 535115 $✓$ Lucince Varies radica

*7

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SEEKING RELIEF FROM FINAL FELONY CONVICTION UNDER CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ARTICLE 11.07

INSTRUCTIONS

1. You must use the complete form, which begins on the following page, to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from a final felony conviction under Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (This form is not for deathpenalty cases, probated sentences which have not been revoked, or misdemeanors.)
2. The district clerk of the county in which you were convicted will make this form available to you, on request, without charge.
3. You must file the entire writ application form, including those sections that do not apply to you. If any pages are missing from the form, or if the questions have been renumbered or omitted, your entire application may be dismissed as non-compliant.
4. You must make a separate application on a separate form for each judgment of conviction you seek relief from. Even if the judgments were entered in the same court on the same day, you must make a separate application for each one.
5. Answer every item that applies to you on the form. Do not attach any additional pages for any item.
6. You must include all grounds for relief on the application form as provided by the instructions under item 17. You must also briefly summarize the facts of your claim on the application form as provided by the instructions under item 17. Each ground shall begin on a new page, and the recitation of the facts supporting the ground shall be no longer than the two pages provided for the claim in the form.
7. Legal citations and arguments may be made in a separate memorandum that complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73 and does not exceed 15,000 words if computer-generated or 50 pages if not.
8. You must verify the application by signing either the Oath Before Notary Public or the Inmate's Declaration, which are at the end of this form on pages 11 and 12. You may be prosecuted and convicted for aggravated perjury if you make any false statement of a material fact in this application.
9. When the application is fully completed, mail the original to the district clerk of the county of conviction. Keep a copy of the application for your records.
10. You must notify the district clerk of the county of conviction of any change in address after you have filed your application.

*8

Case No.

(The Clerk of the convicting court will fill this line in.)

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SEEKING RELIEF FROM FINAL FELONY CONVICTION UNDER CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ARTICLE 11.07 NAME: LUCISAND UNIVERS PASTILA DATE OF BIRTH: $$ PLACE OF CONFINEMENT: TEXAS - LARIEN EASY UNIVERS TDCJ-CID NUMBER: 1892109 SID NUMBER: (1) This application concerns (check all that apply): $◻$ a conviction $◻$ a sentence $◻$ time credit $◻$ a sentence $◻$ time credit $◻$ parole mandatory supervision out-of-time appeal or petition for discretionary review (2) What district court entered the judgment of the conviction you want relief from? (Include the court number and county.)

DUVEY OF HABEAS: FANCY DERMENCY OF TEXAS APPEAL FORM OUR WRIT. PREFERENTE COURT OF PERMODER COURT What was the case number in the trial court?

TOTAL COURT - No. 109099 APPEALS COURS: No: 01 - 15 - 009999 - C:R (4) What was the name of the trial judge?

TOTAL SURVEY HABEAS SURVEY: LARIEN EASY UNIVERS. TEXAS

*9

(5) Were you represented by counsel? If yes, provide the attorney's name:

5. V4LE UERNEY

(6) What was the date that the judgment was entered?

YEENUNG 2, 2015

(7) For what offense were you convicted and what was the sentence?

IUGAN SUVÉNÉNÉN IN COCANAE ( 10 YEARS 7005 )

(8) If you were sentenced on more than one count of an indictment in the same court at the same time, what counts were you convicted of and what was the sentence in each count?

N/A

(9) What was the plea you entered? (Check one.) $◻$ guilty-open plea $◻$ goilty-plea bargain $◻$ not guilty $◻$ nolo contendere/no contest If you entered different pleas to counts in a multi-count indictment, please explain: (10) What kind of trial did you have? $◻$ no jury $◻$ jury for guilt and punishment

*10

S/ jury for guilt, judge for punishment (11) Did you testify at trial? If yes, at what phase of the trial did you testify? (12) Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction? $S/$ yes $◻$ no

If you did appeal, answer the following questions: (A) What court of appeals did you appeal to? Eas/ DYnRis COURS of ADPORs HUMAN, TH (B) What was the case number? DI-TS-DOALA-CA (C) Were you represented by counsel on appeal? If yes, provide the attorney's name:

SOECH VIVE VERBET

AFRICA THE SUMPHER OF THE (D) What was the decision and the date of the decision? TOTAL COURD DEVELOPMENT THIS (13) Did you file a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals? THIS IS MR. PETITION TON DISORTION AND REVIEW. $◻$ yes $◻$ no N/A If you did file a petition for discretionary review, answer the following questions: (A) What was the case number? $N/A$ (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision? $N/A$

Have you previously filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure challenging this conviction? $◻$ yes N/A $◻$ no If you answered yes, answer the following questions: (A) What was the Court of Criminal Appeals' writ number?

*11 (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision? $$ N $N$ (C) Please identify the reason that the current claims were not presented and could not have been presented on your previous application.

(15) Do you currently have any petition or appeal pending in any other state or federal court? $◻$ yes

If you answered yes, please provide the name of the court and the case number:

(16) If you are presenting a claim for time credit, have you exhausted your administrative remedies by presenting your claim to the time credit resolution system of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice? (This requirement applies to any final felony conviction, including state jail felonies) $◻$ yes $◻$ no If you answered yes, answer the following questions: (A) What date did you present the claim? N/A (B) Did you receive a decision and, if yes, what was the date of the decision?

If you answered no, please explain why you have not submitted your claim:

*12 (17) Beginning on page 6, state concisely every legal ground for your claim that you are being unlawfully restrained, and then briefly summarize the facts supporting each ground. You must present each ground on the form application and a brief summary of the facts. If your grounds and brief summary of the facts have not been presented on the form application, the Court will not consider your grounds. If you have more than four grounds, use pages 14 and 15 of the form, which you may copy as many times as needed to give you a separate page for each ground, with each ground numbered in sequence. The recitation of the facts supporting each ground must be no longer than the two pages provided for the ground in the form.

You may include with the form a memorandum of law if you want to present legal authorities, but the Court will not consider grounds for relief set out in a memorandum of law that were not raised on the form. The citations and argument must be in a memorandum that complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73 and does not exceed 15,000 words if computer-generated or 50 pages if not. If you are challenging the validity of your conviction, please include a summary of the facts pertaining to your offense and trial in your memorandum.

*13 GROUND ONE: PETRITONER MARSY TREAL COURT ADVEND TES DESCRIPTION BY DEVITING HIS PROTEIN TO GUOROERS, 12) PETRITONER MARSY HE SUPPERED ELEMENTSUY MAMM DUE TO THE TREAL GUORERS FALLURE TO INCLUDE A THIS INSTICTION CONDENSIVE EVIDENCE CONDORRATIONS &; CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TREATMANDS TESTIMONIAL TREE WAS INHERCCTENT EVIDENCE TO CONDORRATE THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TESTIMONAL AND (4) INHERCCTIVE ADVRENCE OF CONFERL.

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND ONE: ON 7th as of the BEYONDNE FORM THE EARLY OF CRIMINANI APPEARS INSTOURES THAT OFFICERS DID NOT HOP THE CAR BASED ON A TRAPESE VIOLECION, DUE BASED ON INFORMATION OF A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT THE MEN WERE REVIAN TO FURCHME MASCOTICS FROM THE C.I. RECORD INSTOURES THAT PRODABLE CAME EXTMED TO ARREST ADELLANE, AND THE OTHERS BEFORE MAWING THE TRAPPESE EACH, DUE TO BEASONABLE GUORICTON THAT A PERSON IS VIOLECING THE THE LAW. RECORD AND INSTOURES THAT SUPPERION EACH IF THE OFFICER HAS SPEEVER, ENTERVULABLE FACIL THAT, WHEN CONDINED WITH DATIONAL INFERENCES FROM THE FACIL, WOULD LEND HYBR TO CONCLUDE THAT A PRASEVULAR PERSON INSTDUE IS, WAS USED, OR SOON WITH BE ENCANDED IN DESTITUAL ACTIVITY. THE REPELLANT ARRIVERS THAT INFORMATION FROM THE C.I., THAT REPELLANE WHATED TO FURCHME A ULTED OF COEXPNE WAS NOT CREDENE BURD PRASE PRASEVAT, NO EVERYEME GROU THAT SUCH ADELATIONS BEEN OTHER THAN C.I. UNE SING THAT REPSENTIA EASY CONSEDVE USED EWAND WANTHO TO FURCHME A ULTED OF COEXPNE. THE RECORD INSTOURES NO EVERYEME WAS CONDINDED EWAND IS AUGUST USOED, OR PRACE CONDRENCTION WASH MOUSCAME TO GROU THAT HE WHYER TO FURCHME ANTHOING. THERE FONE MUSKES INFORMATION FROM C.I. HEARLY, IN WYERE THE REVERSITIVING AND CREDIZEDLITY ARE USEDLY RELEVANTS EACELNS. THE INFORMATION REVERSITIVY OF FACIL OF UNESEMBLING IS BELEVED IN DEVEYMANING HAS DISERVIONS (LULNOS) U. BLACKS WIL D.S. BY 750,102, S. 53, AT 7578). THE RECORD DID NOT INSTOURE NO INFORMATION REPREGING THE REVERSITIVY OF THE INFORMATION ENSYCERED NO PERSONAL CONDRENCTIONS, PRASEVAT MASCCTAL AND THE REVERSIT. ALWAN (DEES U. BLACKS 371 S.14, 73, 209, 244-151 TRE. ADV. COEXPUS CHESTS) NO 787.17861). THERE IS NO PROOF THAT REPELLANE WHATED TO FURCHME MASCOTICS, NO DUE ON-DUE OR RECORDED CONDRENCTIONS WASH REPELLANE, THAT PERSONAL THAT FURCHME WAS FOR REPELLANE WUEN RECORD DEVEYEMS THAT DEVITING WAS ON ALL RECORDED CONDRENCTIONS. THERE ARE NO FACIL THAT A CROME INVOLVED REPELLANE WAYING PHASE HAS DEVEYMANING AND ABOXIA ILLECING. FROM CAN REPELLANE BE CHANGED IS HE NEVER

*14 The George Sazked to Powe or meet his children, Fadst the State Sazked to Powe the accused Elercised Accual Care; Control, or Announcement oHd the Conflaband: And second Sazked to Powe the Conclas Sermon that the second and إلusisibed of the confaband. (MARTIN V. STATE 353 S.M. 2A 3RA, 592 (TRE. CA. AIP. 1488). (MERRETA V. STATE 341 S.M. 2A 195, 119 (TRE. CA. AIP. 1948). The one he Passable of the accused as a State was the Conflaband in Israel. Died, nor made him a Baqy to Saint Joseph, Even if he knows of the confaband EsisTienle. (DALY V. STATE 642 S.M. 2A 134, 133 (TEL. CA. AIP. 1980). Posteression Phends those then design was the the Accus 35: In IsWOLVED THE EIERCISF OR DOROUSIQU, buo control oHd the term Duelenol PoHdALed. (SEE ID). When an eccused to not an excusive DOWENSTEIN and CONSIDD of the State was the confaband to send to cannot be concluded that the had is possibdly on combal oHd the confaband unled TWede the Adoctional Independent Facts on cracumstandes to Accusiveness. (LIVI MAY 2D THE CONTRABAND. (MERMIDON V. STATE 393 S.M. 2A 408, 409-10 (TEL. CA. AIP. 1990). (DWDE V. STATE 346 S.M. 2A 46, 49 (TEL. CA. AIP. 1984). (SANDOVAL V. STATE, 446 S.M. 2A 472, 496, (TEL. AIP. CORENS EXERCIVE 1499, 10 PTE). Completely when the confaband is not found on the Accused's debon, or to not an excusive DOWENSTEIN of the accused, additional Facts and cracumstandes must LIVI the Accused to the confaband. (LEVYNST V. STATE, 34 S.M. 2A 334, 340 (TEL. AIP. CORENS EXERCIVE 2007: UN PTE). PERALSO (MENCHACA V. STATE 901 S.M. 2A 640, 651 (TEL. AIP. EL. PAO PTE 282 ID).

2D. I (EURYNST D) THE DANCE BEDONS whom the EENwABE obENEO the conVE but CONDENSINENT IN THE INVOS CAN TINC ECRUWDED TO EENWABE, AND TOLD APPLILANT TO dOW THE MANEY AND APPLILANT ADOIVED THE MANEY. AND TINC ON dU. II OF THE BEDONS OF THE CARES OF OLDONAL ADPEND BECKED REFIEDS THAT APHER TINCY HED EATEN TINCY WEBY TO THE CAE. IN THE CAE EENWABE TOLD APPLILANT TO HAND THE MANEY TO REVIERIA, APPLILANT D90 AND EENWEAR SALVED THE MANEY TO THE INFLAMANT, THESE ADE CONDENSITIVE CONFIDENT. PLUSIE BECKED REFIEDS SENE EMBLIMENT GREENE THAT APPLILANT ADOIVED (I. THE MANEY, AND ON (DW. II) OF THE BEDONS OF HAND THAT REVIERIA SHOULD THE (I. THE MANEY. THESE CONDENSITIVE CONFIDENT) TEEP EMBLILATED IN OLDON to MALE APPLILANT OERD DUSITY, WEBY AN THE WELLE EENWABE WED THE ONE WID TOLD APPLILANT THERE WAS MANEY IN THE LUNG CONDENSINENT. EENWABE. DANEO ON POTU RECORDS, (DW. I. PALLERRENTO) AND APPLILANT TO GROW THE MANEY, AND ON DW. I. EINSORT D. WE TOLD THE BEFELANT TO EQUIE THE MANEY TO REVIERIA, AND REVIERIA ADOIVED THE MANEY. Is IN TAKY, Is APPLILANT WAS MALE PROCABEAL, WALLOW APPLILANT KNOW MANEY WAS IN THE EQUIE DUE, AND Is IN TAKY Is THE APPLILANT WAS THE PERSON CONSTITUED THE CATIME OF WALLOW to DUPEDAS CAEATHE, APPLILANT WALD OF CONTEN THE MANEY EXPLASE, DUPEDASSE OPESED THE LEGIVE DUE AND TOLD APPLILANT TO EQUIE THE MANEY, TINC GROUY EENWABE HAD UNONVERSE OF THE MANEY

*15 The money he had in the place too, and the unvulcable of this money he wanted shown to the C.I. shows that he еeecosed monal control and contrision. Because again in control, knownin the money was in the place commonly even, buted open the place too. Tell us, then again the instance does it not have question, and then again the instance now could be be eliminated of all other changes when in fact the record should show this result. What before was used that when the estimated and existing data combined, the to contradiscisin systems that appellant shown the C.I. the money, or that because did yourelevant to the money you would have conterdiscised statements, even though the money was found under theomenge of the report a reasonable doubt, the money could of in fact had been out under the year of Review. (Ph. 4) of the Review of the International Reports, informant claims that these are conterdition, repellant and said" I want to youl of Review. So, you know, then tested the that I was common for reple in the narcisist rafficking made to speak in code, who was the "marcel" and "may" that I went back to the review. I went back to the review and could mean anything, even just exactly what the systeme. So, he readcots were involved in the case for repellant to regard to the date of any narcisist rafficking. Discuss us the rebal period a reasonable doubt, could mean he passed up the rebal year of review the time of repellant to the date of any narcisist rafficking. Discuss us the rebal period a reasonable doubt, could mean he passed up the rebal year of review the time of repellant to the date of any narcisist rafficking. Discuss us the rebal period a reasonable doubt, could mean he passed up the rebal year of review the time of repellant to the date of any narcisist rebal year of review the time of refallant to the date of any narcisist refalling the time of refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of any refalling the time of refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of any refalling the time of refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of any refalling the time of refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of any refallant to the date of the date of any refallant to the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of the date of

*16

GROUND THREE:

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND THREE:

*17

*18

GROUND FOUR:

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND FOUR:

$$\&\text{12}$$

Rey, 01/14/14

*19

*20

GROUND:

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND:

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*21

*22

WHEREFORE, APPLICANT PRAYS THAT THE COURT GRANT APPLICANT RELIEF TO WHICH HE MAY BE ENTITLED IN THIS PROCEEDING.

VERIFICATION

This application must be verified or it will be dismissed for non-compliance. For verification purposes, an applicant is a person filing the application on his or her own behalf. A petitioner is a person filing the application on behalf of an applicant, for example, an applicant's attomey. An inmate is a person who is in custody.

The inmate applicant must sign either the "Oath Before a Notary Public" before a notary public or the "Inmate's Declaration" without a notary public. If the inmate is represented by a licensed attorney, the attorney may sign the "Oath Before a Notary Public" as petitioner and then complete "Petitioner's Information." A non-inmate applicant must sign the "Oath Before a Notary Public" before a notary public unless he is represented by a licensed attorney, in which case the attorney may sign the verification as petitioner.

A non-inmate non-attomey petitioner must sign the "Oath Before a Notary Public" before a notary public and must also complete "Petitioner's Information." An inmate petitioner must sign either the "Oath Before a Notary Public" before a notary public or the "Inmate's Declaration" without a notary public and must also complete the appropriate "Petitioner's Information."

OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF $$ being duly sworn. under oath says: "I am the applicant / petitioner (circle one) in this action and know the contents of the above application for a writ of habeas corpus and, according to my belief, the facts stated in the application are true."

Signature of Applicant / Petitioner (circle one)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS $$ DAY OF $$ . 20

*23

PETITIONER'S INFORMATION

Petitioner's printed name: $$ State bar number, if applicable: $$ Address: $$

Telephone: $$

Fax: $$

INMATE'S DECLARATION

I, Luctano Vegges Golds $$ , am the applicant / petitioner (circle one) and being presently incarcerated in 7de, Ilarca 9 ist $$ . declare under penalty of perjury that, according to my belief, the facts stated in the above application are true and correct.

Signed on March 24 , 20.16

Lacinwa Vargas Golds Signature of Applicant / Petitioner (circle one)

*24 PETITIONER'S INFORMATION Petitioner's printed name: Luciana Vargas Padilla Address: 1285 km 25th Larey Siss Beaumont, Ls 13305

Telephone: M/A Fax: M/A

Signed on $$ , 20

Luciana Vargas Padilla Signature of Petitioner

*25

Court of Appeals

first Bistrict of Texas

NO. 01-13-00969-CR

LUCIANO VARGAS PADILLA, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appeal from the 149th District Court of Brazoria County. (Tr. Ct. No. 69079).

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on November 1, 2013. After submitting the case on the appellate record and the arguments properly raised by the parties, the Court holds that the trial court's judgment contains no reversible error. Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial court's judgment.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered February 3, 2015.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Brown. Opinion delivered by Justice Higley.

*26 Opinion issued February 3, 2015

In The Court of Appeals For The first Bistrict of Texas

NO. 01-13-00969-CR

LUCIANO VARGAS PADILLA, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 149th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 69079

OPINION

Appellant, Luciano Vargas Padilla, was charged by indictment with illegal investment in cocaine. ^[1] Appellant pleaded not guilty. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 10 years' confinement. In three issues,

*27

Appellant argues (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress, (2) he suffered egregious harm due to the trial court's failure to include a jury instruction concerning evidence corroborating a confidential informant's testimony, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the confidential informant's testimony.

We affirm.

Background

On September 13, 2012, Fernando Renteria spotted a man in a store whom he believed to be a drug dealer. He approached the man, who confirmed being a drug dealer. Renteria informed him that he knew someone nicknamed "Chano," who was interested in buying a kilogram of cocaine. Renteria asked the man to wait to meet Chano. The man agreed.

Unknown to Renteria, the man he was speaking with worked on occasion as a confidential informant with the Brazoria County Sheriff's Office. The informant would, as he did with Renteria, identify himself to others as a drug dealer and agree to sell drugs to people seeking to buy some. Sergeant J. Brawner, of the Brazoria County Sheriff's Office, testified at trial that he had worked with the confidential informant many times before. Sergeant Brawner testified that the confidential informant's information had proven reliable in the past.

*28 The informant waited at the store. Eventually, Appellant and Carlos Bernabe arrived at the store. Appellant introduced himself to the informant as Chano and began negotiating a price for a kilogram of cocaine. Appellant told the informant that, if he was satisfied with the quality of the cocaine, he would buy larger amounts in the future. Appellant and the informant agreed on a price and planned to meet again the next day to exchange the drugs. WAs As

The next morning, the informant contacted Sergeant Brawner and told him about the requested drug sale. The informant met with Sergeant Brawner. He then called Renteria to confirm the plans to meet later that morning. The conversation was recorded and later translated from Spanish to English. The informant translated the conversation to Sergeant Brawner at the time.

Sergeant Brawner and the informant planned that the informant would ask to see the money at the meeting location. The informant would wear a device to record the conversation he had with the others. If the others showed him that they had the money, the informant would drive to a location where the drugs were claimed to be stored with the others following him. If the informant saw the money at the meeting, he would give a signal to Sergeant Brawner. Then Sergeant Brawner would have a uniformed officer pull the car over while they were driving.

Sergeant Brawner searched the confidential informant and his vehicle to make sure he did not have any contraband or large sums of money on him. The

*29 informant then drove to the gas station where he planned to meet Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe. During the drive, he received a call from Renteria telling him that a police patrol car was parked at the gas station. They planned to meet at a nearby Burger King instead. The informant informed Sergeant Brawner of the change of location.

The informant drove to the Burger King. He met Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe and they went inside. During their conversation, Appellant told the informant, "I went early to pick up the material." At trial, Sergeant Brawner testified that it was common for people in the narcotics trafficking trade to speak in code, using words like "material."

After they had eaten, the informant followed Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe to their car. At the car, Bernabe opened the glovebox, where the money was stored. Bernabe told Appellant to hand the money to Renteria. Appellant did, and Renteria showed the money to the informant. While walking back to his truck, the informant gave the signal indicating he had seen the money. The informant then drove away with Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe following him.

After Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe left the Burger King, Sergeant Brawner directed a uniformed officer to stop their car. The stop was not based on any traffic violation and was warrantless. The officer stopped the vehicle and instructed Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe to get out of the vehicle. After

*30

searching the vehicle, the money that had been shown to the informant was found under Appellant's seat.

Motion to Suppress

In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress. Appellant asserts that the officers lacked proper authority to detain him and to arrest him.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court's factual findings for abuse of discretion and review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. Almost total deference should be given to a trial court's determination of historical facts, especially those based on an evaluation of witness credibility or demeanor. Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses' credibility and may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the witnesses' testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Where, as here, a trial judge does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Walter $v$ .

*31

State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We will defer to the trial court's fact findings and not disturb the findings on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion in making a finding not supported by the record. Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

B. Analysis

After Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe left the Burger King, Sergeant Brawner directed Investigator West to stop their car. The stop was not based on any traffic violation and was warrantless. Appellant asserts that the officers lacked proper authority to detain him and to arrest him. The relief that Appellant sought in his motion was the suppression of the money found in the search of the car in which he was riding.

To demonstrate standing to challenge the search of another person's vehicle, the defendant must show that he personally has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle. State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). "A passenger in a vehicle does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle where he fails to assert a possessory interest in the vehicle or the property seized." Trinh v. State, 974 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).

*32 Appellant has claimed no possessory interest in the car in which he was riding or in the money seized. Accordingly, he acknowledges that there is no general expectation of privacy for him to assert. Nevertheless, as Appellant points out, "a mere passenger can challenge the search of the automobile in which he is riding if the search resulted from an infringement (such as an illegal detention) of the passenger's Fourth Amendment rights." Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). It is not enough to show that the passenger's rights were violated. Id. Instead, the passenger must show that the evidence was obtained by "exploitation of that illegality" against the passenger's rights. Id.

One of Appellant's grounds for his motion to suppress was that he was illegally detained. If this is correct, then the evidence obtained as a result of that illegal detention must be suppressed. See id.; Trinh, 974 S.W.2d at 874. Accordingly, we review the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress to determine whether the money found from searching the car was obtained by exploitation of an illegal detention of Appellant. See Lewis, 664 S.W.2d at 348 .

Appellant argues that " $[t]$ he sole reason for the stop was the belief" that probable cause existed "to arrest the occupants of the vehicle for the felony offense of illegal barter, expenditure, or investment." Appellant reasons that "[i]f there

*33 was not probable cause to arrest the men, then the stop of the vehicle for the purpose of arresting them" constituted an illegal detention.

It is true that the officers did not stop the car based on a traffic violation. Instead, they stopped the car based on information that the men were trying to purchase cocaine from the confidential informant. This does not mean that the officers were required to have probable cause to arrest Appellant and the other two men before conducting the stop. Instead, an officer can conduct an investigative detention if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person is violating the law. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Id. "In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain, we look at the totality of the circumstances through an objective lens, disregarding the officer's subjective intent." Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). "[P]assengers in an automobile are subject to temporary investigative detentions in the same manner as pedestrians." Rhodes $v$ . State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "In situations involving the police's use of an informant, we consider the informant's reliability in analyzing the totality of the circumstances." Smith $v$ .

*34 State, 58 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). "A confidential informant can provide the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention so long as additional facts are present to demonstrate the informant's reliability." Id. at 790. In this regard, "the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are highly relevant." State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188-89 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983)).

Sergeant Brawner testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. A confidential informant had contacted Sergeant Brawner, telling him that someone had offered to buy cocaine from him. Sergeant Brawner had worked with the confidential informant many times before. He testified that the confidential informant's information had proven reliable in the past.

The confidential informant provided Sergeant Brawner with information about the informant's first meeting with Appellant and Renteria. Renteria was looking for someone to sell cocaine to Appellant. Appellant was interested in buying one kilogram of cocaine.

Based on this information, Sergeant Brawner and the confidential informant agreed to set up a staged transaction. In the presence of Sergeant Brawner, the confidential informant called Renteria to set the time and location of the

*35 transaction. The conversation was in Spanish. The confidential informant translated the conversation for Sergeant Brawner.

The confidential informant agreed to meet Renteria and the others at a gas station in Manvel, Texas. Sergeant Brawner searched the confidential informant and his vehicle to make sure he did not have any contraband or large sums of money on him. He then equipped the confidential informant with an audio recording device to record the conversation. Sergeant Brawner and the confidential informant planned a signal for the confidential informant to give if he saw the money.

The confidential informant drove to the meeting location. On his way there, the informant talked to Renteria on his cell phone. Renteria told the informant that a police patrol car was in the parking lot. They agreed to meet at a nearby Burger King. The informant notified Sergeant Brawner of the change in location.

At the Burger King, the confidential informant went inside with Renteria, Appellant, and Bernabe. Some time later, they came out and walked to Renteria, Appellant, and Bernabe's car. After they talked, the confidential informant walked to his truck. While walking to his truck, the confidential informant gave the signal that he had seen the money. The confidential informant drove away, leading Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe to the location where the drugs were purported to

*36 be held. During the drive, Sergeant Brawner instructed Investigator West to stop the car in which Appellant was riding.

The confidential informant had been used before by Sergeant Brawner and had provided reliable information in the past. The informant called Renteria with Sergeant Brawner present. In that conversation, the informant and Renteria scheduled a time and place to meet. After the meeting, the informant signaled that he had seen the money intended to buy cocaine. We hold this evidence along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that Appellant and the other occupants of the vehicle were violating the law. See Sailo, 910 S.W.2d at 188-89 (holding informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are highly relevant to inquiry).

Appellant argues that the informant was not reliable because some staged drug buys he had participated in before did not lead to arrests and because he did not meet the informant at the originally planned location. Sergeant Brawner testified that it is common for drug buys not to be completed because the other person never brings the drugs or the money. He explained that this does not mean that the informant was wrong or gave bad information. The trial court was entitled to credit this testimony. See Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281 (holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses' credibility). Similarly, it was the trial court's province to weigh the significance that the meeting place changed due to a police

*37 patrol car being at the original planned location. See Matthews, 431 S.W.3d at 603 (holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances).

Appellant's other ground for suppressing the evidence was that he was illegally arrested. In Lewis, the defendant sought to suppress evidence found in a car in which he was riding based on the claim that his detention lasted too long and, as a result, became illegal. 664 S.W.2d at 349 . The court, assuming that the detention became illegal, rejected the claim that the evidence was obtained by the exploitation of the continued detention. The defendant had been removed from the car before the search took place. Id. at 348-49. "Once the initial legal detention became an illegal one, the [defendant]'s presence was irrelevant to the officer's decision to search. . . . Thus, in no way was her detention necessary to perform the search." Id. at 349 .

The same reasoning applies here for Appellant's claim that his arrest was illegal. Even assuming Appellant's arrest was illegal, the search was conducted and the money was found before Appellant's arrest. Accordingly, the money could not have been obtained by exploitation of Appellant's arrest. Furthermore, even if we assume Appellant's detention turned into an arrest before the search, there is nothing connecting Appellant's detention or arrest to the officers' search of the car. Because the two are unrelated, Appellant's detention and arrest cannot be a basis for suppressing the evidence. See id.

*38

We overrule Appellant's first issue.

Corroboration of Confidential Informant Testimony

In his third issue, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the confidential informant's testimony.

A. Standard of Review &; Applicable Law

Article 38.141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, A defendant may not be convicted of an offense under Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, on the testimony of a person who is not a licensed peace officer or a special investigator but who is acting covertly on behalf of a law enforcement agency or under the color of law enforcement unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.141(a) (Vernon 2005). The corroboration requirement is similar to the corroboration required of an accomplice witness, and the same standard of review applies for each. Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

To measure the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence, we eliminate the accomplice evidence from the record and determine whether the remaining inculpatory evidence tends to connect the defendant to the offense. Id. at 257. In applying this standard, we view the evidence in the light that most favors the jury's verdict. See Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We consider the combined weight of the non-informant evidence, even if that evidence

*39 is entirely circumstantial. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Corroborating evidence that shows only that the offense was committed is not sufficient. Crim. Proc. art. 38.141(b); Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257. Yet, the corroborating evidence does not need to be sufficient by itself to establish that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith v. State, 392 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref'd).

Likewise, the corroborating evidence need not directly link the accused to the offense. Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstances that appear insignificant may constitute sufficient evidence of corroboration. Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 253, 257. Though "mere presence" is insufficient corroboration, evidence that the accused was at or near the scene when or about when it was committed may sufficiently tend to connect the accused to the crime, provided the evidence is "coupled with other suspicious circumstances." Id. at 257 .

Because each case must rest on its own facts, corroboration does not require a set quantum of proof. Id. The single requirement is that "some" non-informant evidence, on which rational jurors could properly rely, tends to connect the accused to the commission of the offense. Id. at 257-58.

*40

B. Analysis

Appellant acknowledged at trial that he was present with Renteria and Bernabe during the meeting at Burger King. He went into the Burger King with Renteria, Bernabe, and the confidential informant. Appellant admitted that his voice was on the recording taken inside the Burger King. ^[2] Appellant acknowledged that he was the person that said, "I went early to pick up the material." Sergeant Brawner testified that it was common for people in the narcotics trafficking trade to speak in code, using words like "material." See Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 259 (considering statements "put it together" and "cooked to customer satisfaction" as part of corroborating evidence).

After they left the Burger King, the informant followed Appellant, Renteria, and Bernabe to their car. Appellant admitted that, at the car, he took the bundle of money out of the glove box and gave it to Renteria, who then showed it to the informant. The bundle was wrapped in plastic and taped. It totaled $\$28,500$ in cash, nearly the entire amount they were going to pay for cocaine. After Appellant was stopped, the money was found beneath Appellant's seat.

*41

The evidence shows then, that Appellant was present during the meeting with the informant. Appellant referred to "material" during a conversation with the informant. He handled the money so it could be shown to the informant. And the money was under his seat after he was stopped. We hold that suspicious circumstances concerning Appellant's presence tends to connect Appellant to the crime. See id. at 257. We overrule Appellant's third issue.

Jury Instruction on Confidential Informant

In his second issue, Appellant argues he suffered egregious harm due to the trial court's failure to include a jury instruction concerning evidence corroborating a confidential informant's testimony.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing jury-charge error, we first determine if error actually exists in the jury charge. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 180, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). If we find error, we then determine whether it harmed the appellant. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743 .

The degree of harm requiring reversal depends upon whether an objection was raised to the error at trial. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). If appellant did not make a proper objection at trial, appellant "will obtain a reversal only if the error was so egregiously harmful that he has not had a

*42

fair and impartial trial." See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

B. Analysis

As we addressed in Appellant's third issue, a defendant cannot be convicted based on the testimony of a confidential informant unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant to the crime. CrIM. Proc. art. 38.141(a). Failing to instruct the jury on this requirement is error. Simmons v. State, 205 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

Next, we consider harm. Appellant acknowledges that there was no objection to the failure to include the confidential-informant-corroboration instruction. Accordingly, we review the record for egregious harm. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. "Under the 'egregious harm standard,' the omission of a corroborating-evidence instruction may be rendered harmless if other evidence than the testimony of the accomplice witness or informant does exist that fulfills the purpose of the instruction." Simmons, 205 S.W.3d at 77. "[T]he omission of an [informant] witness instruction is generally harmless unless the corroborating ... evidence is 'so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive.'" Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

*43

As we held in Appellant's third issue, there is sufficient corroborating evidence to support the confidential informant's testimony. For the same reasons stated in the third issue, we do not find the corroborating evidence so unconvincing that it renders the State's overall case clearly and significantly less persuasive. See id. We overrule Appellant's second issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Laura Carter Higley Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Brown. Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

*44 at the Valero gas station parking lot located at 17514 SH 6, Manvel, Brazoria County, Texas. Sgt. Brawner advised Your Affiant that CI # 408 had negotiated the sell of one kilogram of cocaine with two males known to the CI as Fernando and Chano. Your Affiant and Sgt. Brawner met with the CI at a predetermined location. While meeting with the CI, the CI made a recorded phone call to Fernando who agreed to meet with the CI to purchase one kilogram of cocaine for $\$28,000.00$ (twenty eight thousand dollars). The CI was and the CI's vehicle were searched and found to be void of any contraband, and was provided with an audio recording device. Your Affiant and Sgt. Brawner followed the CI to the Valero parking lot to meet Fernando and Chano. While on the way to the meet location the CI contacted Sgt. Brawner who was advised that the purchasers were now in the Burger King Parking lot located across the street from the Valero on SH 6 Manvel. A short time later Your Affiant then observed the CI pull into the Burger King Parking Lot and park. Your Affiant learned from Sgt. Brawner who was conducting surveillance in the Burger King Parking lot-that the CI had walked inside Burger King. A short time later Sgt. Brawner observed the CI exit from inside Burger King and walk with 3 Hispanic males to a bluish green 2011 Honda CRV bearing TXLP DK3H056. Upon the CI walking away from the aforementioned CRV the CI signaled to the surveillance team that the negotiated currency was present in the CRV. As the CI departed the Burger King the CI was followed by the 3 suspects in the Honda CRV. Your Affiant, Sgt. Brawner and members of the Pearland Police Dept. Narcotics Unit followed the CI and the Honda CRV as they traveled to SH 288 southbound from SH 6. Investigator West was notified to conduct a traffic stop on the Honda CRV by Sgt. Brawner. Investigator West initiated a traffic stop on the Honda CRV at SH 288 south and County Road 56. Your Affiant was later notified by West that he had identified the occupants of the CRV as Fernando Rentería DOB 01/03/1982 rear seat passenger; Luciano Padilla DOB 06/19/1965 front seat passenger; and Juan Carlos Bernabe-Martinez DOB 01/16/1976 as the driver. Said individuals were detained and transported to the Brazoria County Sheriffs Office. Investigator Hoskins arrived at the location of the stop and assisted Investigator West with the search of the vehicle.

Your Affiant met with the CI and learned that the CI had met with the three aforementioned individuals in the Burger King. During the meet the CI confirmed with the three suspects that they intended to purchase one kilogram of cocaine. The CI further stated that in an earlier conversation with Renteria that Renteria told-the CI that he was going to charge Padilla $\$1500.00$ dollars for the cocaine as a brokerage tec which would be in addition to the agreed upon $\$28,000.00$ . The CI further stated that the suspects then went to their vehicle where the CI was speaking to Renteria and Padilla, Bernabe-Martinez at the Honda CRV. BernabeMartinez opened the glove compartment in the Honda CRV and told Padilla to show the CI the money. Padilla then showed the CI the single bundle of U.S. currency. The CI further stated at that time the CI told the suspects to follow him to travel to get the cocaine. Your Affiant received a signed sworn statement from the CI.

Upon searching the vehicle, Investigator Hoskins told Your Affiant that he found located underneath the passenger seat a clear plastic bag wrapped with gray duct tape containing bulk US currency. Your Affiant counted the U.S. Currency and found that the aforementioned bundle totaled $\$28,500.00$ . Further BernabeMartinez had $\$1308.00$ for a grand total of $29,808.00$ .

Your Affiant found as a result of this investigation Fernando Renteria, Luciano Padilla, and Juan Carlos Bernabe-Martinez were in possession of said monies, which was to be used in the commission of a felony to wit: Illegal Investment/ Expenditure which is against the peace and dignity of the State.+

*45

NOTES

1 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.126(a)(3), .102(3)(D), .115(a), (f) (Vernon 2010).

2 Appellant admitted that his voice was on the recording, but he denied that the recording was from inside the Burger King. Instead, he claimed it was a recording of a telephone conversation. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we must conclude that the recording took place inside the Burger King. See Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding record is viewed in light most favorable to verdict).