Case Information
*0 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 2/26/2015 2:05:46 PM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 06-14-00222-CR SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 2/26/2015 2:05:46 PM DEBBIE AUTREY CLERK
No. 06-14-00222-CR IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS TEXARKANA
TAMMY KAY TAYLOR, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appealed in Cause No. 1423993 8 th Judicial District Court of Hopkins County, Texas APPELLEE’S BRIEF *2 By:/s/ Nicholas C. Harrison Nicholas C. Harrison Assistant District Attorney State Bar No 24062768 P.O. Box 882
Sulphur Springs, Texas 75483 (903) 885-0641 *3 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW 5
I. The trial court did not err in admitting an extraneous offense. 5
II. Any error in admitting the extraneous offense was harmless. 8
III. The trial court did not make a Hardesty inference finding. 9
IV. Even if the trial court made such a finding, it would not be error. 11
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) ........................................... 5
Higginbotham v. State, 356 S.W.3d 584 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 2011) .................... 7
Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) ......................................... 8
Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) ........................................... 9
Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) .......................................... 9
Pardee v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6823 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 2012) ..........11
Jones v. State, 899 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.App. - Tyler 1995) ..........................................11
Rules
Texas Penal Code 31.03(c)(1); .................................................................................. 6
Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b); ................................................................................ 7
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b); ............................................................. 8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT During the bench trial, the court sitting as fact finder did not err in admitting
testimony concerning an extraneous offense, since it was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Even if it was error to admit the extraneous offense testimony,
the error was harmless. The trial court did not make a Hardesty inference finding,
but only considered the State’s arguments along with the evidence. Had the trial
court made such a finding, it would not have been error anyway.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES Applicant presents two issues for review: (1) Whether it was harmful error for the
trial court to admit testimony of an extraneous offense and (2) Whether the trial
court committed harmful error by making a “Hardesty inference” finding.
STANDARD OF REVIEW Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
I. During the bench trial, the court sitting as fact finder did not err in admitting testimony concerning an extraneous offense, since it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
During its case-in-chief, the State admitted testimony pursuant to Texas Penal Code 31.03(c)(1). This provides that “evidence that the actor has previously
participated in recent transactions other than, but similar to, that which the
prosecution is based is admissible for the purpose of showing knowledge or intent
and the issues of knowledge or intent are raised by the actor’s plea of not guilty.”
Specifically, the State called as a witness Mr. Rupinderjit Singh, the Appellant’s former employer. (R.R. Vol. III, pg. 182-191). Mr. Singh testified that
he owned a Family Mart convenience store in Hopkins County, Texas, and he
hired Appellant as a cashier before promoting her to store manager. Appellant
worked for him during August 2013, and she was the only person besides Mr.
Singh with access to his office. Mr. Singh testified that Appellant knew that he
would be out of town on August 27, 2013, and he had been gone for four or five
days before that date. On August 27, at approximately 4 a.m. Appellant entered
Mr. Singh’s office and stole approximately $4000 in cash. She then failed to report
for her usual morning shift and stopped taking Mr. Singh’s phone calls. At no point
prior to the theft had Appellant failed to return Mr. Singh’s calls.
The State acknowledges that Mr. Singh was not physically present in the store during Appellant’s theft, as of course was her plan. The admissibility of Mr.
Singh’s testimony is based on a theft statute provision which operates much like
Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b): the prior act is not admissible to prove character,
but to prove intent and modus operandi. In both cases, Appellant became employed
by U.S. citizens of South Asian descent: Mr. Singh in one case and Mr. and Mrs.
Patel in another case. In both cases, Appellant worked herself into a position of
trust and access. In both cases, Appellant waited until her employer was away for
an extended period of time. In both cases, Appellant then committed a theft. And in
both cases, Appellant suddenly shut off all communication with her former
employers.
Appellant cites Higginbotham v. State, 356 S.W.3d 584 (Texarkana 2011, pet. Ref’d). In that case, a witness testified to an extraneous offense committed by
the defendant. Unlike this case, appellant in Higginbotham objected at the time of
trial on the basis that the State had not proven the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Additionally, the Court described the witness’s statements as conclusory
and inconsistent. In this case, Appellant did not object at the time of the testimony.
(R.R. Vol. III, pg. 182). Mr. Singh’s testimony was clear, unequivocal, and it
comprehensively addressed each element of the offense of theft of property.
The trial court, as fact finder, could have reasonably found that the State proved this extraneous offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant complains
that the trial court did not make an express fact finding on the theft from Mr.
Singh. (Appellant’s Brief at 8). No such finding is required under Texas law, and
Appellant cites no authority in support of that argument.
II. Even if it was error to admit the extraneous offense testimony, the error was harmless.
Even though the Court found the admission of the extraneous offense to be error in Higginbotham, it was determined to be harmless. Id at 592. Error in
admitting evidence concerning extraneous offenses is reviewed under the standard
for non-constitutional error requiring an appellate court to disregard a non-
constitutional error that does not affect a criminal defendant’s substantial rights.
TEX.R.APP. 44.2(b). Reversible error has not occurred if the appellate court, after
examining the record as a whole, “has a fair assurance that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d, 410.
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed: “In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was adversely affected by the error, the appellate court should consider everything in the record, including
any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the
nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error and
how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case. The
reviewing court might also consider the jury instruction given by the trial judge,
the State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing arguments, and even voir
dire, if material to appellant’s claim.” Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862.
(Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
In this case, the court acted as fact finder, and thus all the concerns associated with misleading a jury are alleviated. Notably, Mr. Singh’s testimony
consisted of 9 pages of the record out of 153 pages of the State’s case-in-chief and
out of a 221 page record. (R.R. Vol. III pgs. 182-191). At no point during the
State’s closing argument did it even mention the extraneous offense. In light of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt, the admission of Mr. Singh’s testimony, if error,
was harmless.
III. The trial court did not make a Hardesty inference finding, but only considered the State’s arguments along with the evidence.
The Hardesty inference is a legal device which may be utilized by the State during theft prosecutions. Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983).
Once the elements of the inference are established, a fact finder may infer from
those facts a defendant’s guilt of theft. The inference is not a presumption, and it
may or may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. If an actor is found in
possession of recently stolen property and offers no reasonable explanation for his
or her possession at the time, a fact finder may infer that the actor stole it.
Appellant complains that the trial court erred by making a Hardesty inference finding, and that the State failed to lay a proper predicate for the
inference. The State acknowledges that it requested a Hardesty inference finding
from the trial court, however, the trial court declined to make such a finding.
Below is an excerpt from R.R. Vol. III, pgs. 191-192.
“MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, State has no further witnesses, no further exhibit evidence. We would – at this time, if we could take up the issue of the
Hardesty inference? (State rests).
THE COURT: You’re excused, Mr. Singh.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
THE COURT: Did you provide this same –both the case – the Hardesty case and the section from the Texas Practice Guide – Texas Practice Series regarding
the Hardesty inference to Mr. Ferguson?
MR. HARRISON: I did, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, you correct me if I’m wrong, but would this not just be part of your closing arguments?
MR. HARRISON: Well, I believe it’s a legal device. I know that there’s no jury here. It’s not a presumption.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. HARRISON: But it is – it’s an inference that the Court can find – THE COURT: Sure.
MR. HARRISON: -- which I think would help our case, but we could certainly just argue. That’s true.
THE COURT: What I’m going to do is just kind of understand that that’s going to be part of the State’s argument in support of their burden of proof. And so
the State has rested their case in chief. Mr. Ferguson?”
IV. Had the trial court made such a finding, it would not have been error anyway.
Even if the trial court had made a finding that the State laid a sufficient predicate to avail itself of the Hardesty inference, such a finding would not have
been error. Appellant cites Pardee v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6823, (Tex.
App. – Texarkana 2012), which states “no inference of guilt can be raised where
police found the stolen property in a place where others have an equal right and
facility of access.”
To lay the predicate for the Hardesty inference, the State had to present evidence that Appellant was found in possession of recently stolen property and
offered no reasonable explanation for her possession at the time. Mrs. Wanda
Henderson testified for the State. (R.R. Vol. III, pgs. 120-153). She stated that
Appellant and Appellant’s husband arrived at Henderson’s place of residence to
unload luggage and personal property. Appellant and her husband used a pickup
truck and the process took two days.
Mrs. Henderson testified that she observed Appellant and her husband carrying multiple, “nice” looking suitcases. (R.R. Vol. III, pg. 127). Mrs.
Henderson asked Appellant where they got the suitcases, and Appellant said she
got them from Goodwill for $1.50 each. In court, Mrs. Henderson viewed
photographs of stolen property seized from the residence and identified the
suitcases in the photographs as the same ones Appellant and her husband were
carrying. (State’s Exhibits 2-7). The Victim, Mr. Jitendra Patel, earlier viewed the
same photographs and identified the suitcases as being the very same which were
stolen from him. (R.R. Vol. III pgs. 49-54).
The trial court, as fact finder, could have reasonably found that Appellant, either individually or under the law of parties with her husband, was in possession
of recently stolen suitcases and that when she was asked about it by Mrs.
Henderson she gave an unreasonable explanation in the form of her $1.50
Goodwill story. Appellant’s argument that Mr. Ron Hanson and Mrs. Wanda
Henderson had an equal right of access to the room where the stolen property was
eventually stored by Appellant misses the point. Mrs. Henderson testified that she
saw Appellant and her husband with the stolen property physically in their hands
as they moved it into the house. Joint possession of stolen property by multiple
defendants is not a bar to the Hardesty inference. Jones v. State, 899 S.W.2d 25.
(Tex. App. – Tyler 1995). In Jones, the court distinguishes between a case in which
the stolen property was found, not on the accused’s person, but in a remote
location –a common attic – to which others might have had access. In Jones,
however, the stolen property was found with him, in plain sight, though others
were present.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF The State requests that this Court AFFIRM Appellant’s conviction by the trial
court.
By:/s/ Nicholas C. Harrison Nicholas C. Harrison Assistant District Attorney State Bar No 24062768 P.O. Box 882
Sulphur Springs, Texas 75483 (903) 885-0641 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument was forwarded to counsel for Appellant, Wade Forsman, on this the 26 th
day of February, 2015.
By:/s/ Nicholas C. Harrison Nicholas C. Harrison Assistant District Attorney CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT I certify that this document contains 1,829 words according to the counting tool in the program used to generate this document.
By:/s/ Nicholas C. Harrison Nicholas C. Harrison Assistant District Attorney