Case Information

*1 IN THE TEKHS COURT OF CRIM NML. MERERIT IS 100K1211-83-6 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS EXPLAATE THUMAN UWYNE FIOREN BERZUS (13, 15.20 PETIDIONER'S MIPPAAL OW N OTECE OF MIPPAAL AND MME KEMMING HUO GVEJECTION TO OENIM OF 10CK1211-83-6 Y3Y LON NDECOX TROML TUMME VDRLATION OF T.R.C. P.I.E. a SEE. BTHUNED P. 25 S, KROSSBAL V. KHZMU 2E 3 U3d 233.238-29 (TEX. MIPPETL KOH LIMONT 8000). CITIN IN KEE KEEKES AK 236 3403d 4600.411 (TEX. MIPP EAMMTS 2001) COMES NGO PRO SE PETIDIONER TO HONE THE COURT TO US EWALLY CONSTRUCE HIS PRO SE PLEAKING, HIMMES V. KENNEE 464 us 519.320 (572) PETIDIONER GOSTCTS TO THE COURT FRO DT' LAMC CLEXKS TURNING A KELING EYE TO THE OUE PROCESS HNO NECESS TO COURS VEDLATIONS GELING CONDUCED YBY GITUEST. ON COUNTY TROML TUMME LONNDE HNO WHEIT COURT. OUE TO THE ACTS OF GUYESSONS HNO CONVOLT SIGN, HY THE LAMC CLEXKS HNO COURT, MIPPAULING OF LONNDE CAK HIS USE OF GFFICE HNO EXSERVEDN IN PERCINAURITY OIS KEGMANEZING T.R.C. P. IE a KEGUSAL PROCESONES.

*2 THIS COURT IS UNEUL MUNHRE THMT THIS JUDGES DROPERS IN LOCALIAL-83-4, LOCALIAL-83-5 RECELVE 4 - 2015, AND LOCALIAL-83-6 ORIGGES AND UOID ACTITONSAL tIMEY FILED HIS RECUSAL MOTION'S LIPH HIS HUROGAS CORRUS? AND THE TROML JUDGE (HUROGAS COURT) FALLED TO RULE ON THESE MOTION'S TO RECUSE, SEE, ORIGGES AND, ASSE, EXHIBIT AT AMACHED THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT A TROML JUDGE, WHEN EXESENTED LIPH A RECUSAL MOTION, REGUMENTSS OF THE PROCEDURES SMFRECIPHLY OF THE MOTION, HAS ONLYTHE OPTIO TO ACT IN ONE OF TWO WAYS ILO RECLASE LIPHSELF, OR REFER TO THE EXE- SIGING JUDGE, IF THE TROML JUDGE REPASO TO COMPLY LIPH THE STRUCTURES PROVIDED IN RULE IS a ALACITON THRONASY THE JUDGE IS SUSSEQUENT TO SUCH LIGUATION AND YOID, Id. 233, CITING THEE AREAT. THIS COURT HUO LAM CUEKKS IS WELL, MUNHRE THMT THIS JUDGES MRECIPHERY EACH- DAL OF MY LOCALIAL-83-5, LOCALIAL-83-4 LOCALIAL-83-5, LOCALIAL-83-6, HERE UOID AND THIS COURT WHITE CHEOED HAY EACH OFFER THE COURT / CUEKKS SEEN THAT my RECUSAL MOTIONS UMS NOT HETED UHON

*3 SEX. AH. HY 238; CITING. TEX. COME OWN. CONDUC. CHRON 2, REVERTIED IN TEX. COUR. COME ANN. III. 2, SUPPLI G. HAY 15 (UERADISE) AS WE LATEO IN OUR 1995 ORINEON RE. GARRONS THE INSTANT CASE, IF A TREAT COUR FIRLS TO CAMPLY LADM THE STRUCTURES PRAUDOED IN MALE I83; HU ACTINS THKE YOY THE JUGGK SUSEQUENTTO SUCH VO- TATLON HRE UOIO, OROSSOAL 9U 3UAD 833 GALVESTON COUNTY TREAT (HMOEUS) RENHES HRE UOIO. Ed. 833. SEE, KOZUCK U KMIZE, 883 SUAD 100, CIX. HRE LUCOLIATION, TREAT JUGGES 100 NOT ENZY. FREEDOM TO JENOPE THE LIAU. THIS IS UHAT THIS COURT HARRON. OF THE HMOEUS TREAT, COURT TO 100 IS JENOPE 18 a. SEE, EWARITE SINTEUR, 394 SUAD 518 CIX. CRIM, HRE 2011, REVANNING CHEE OUR TO 180 VIBILATION: Id. 518, COURT HELP RECUSM. PROCERSONS HAPLY TO HMOEUS COURT COREUS PROCERSONS. SEE, EHIDOT A 2, HITTCHED SEX. 446 100K1211-83-3, SEX. EWARITE HOSS 388 SUL 2 d 120 (TEX CRIM HRE 2014), HITTCHED CITING NDX. CODS, SEX. 10CK1211-83-3-4 PETITEDNER PRESENTED UOID JUGGMENT IN Ed. HAY- U. 01 SEX. COURT MOLS.

*4 MOLKING N1, THAT PEDTENWE FUT ISSUE IN 01-11-00822CK PAPER ISSUE N2, AND IDEALIZES 3-3-4 TO OWTHER LEEY AS THIS COURT HAS HELP IN 2014 SUPPM EXPORTE HOSS. 3EE, EXPORTE AS, HGFRN SUGMETED AS DIRKCT EVIDENCE KNW3UNCE COURT AS HOSS, EXPORTE COURT, 589 SUZd 130, 13 (N.CR.ME.1979) H1SO CITED IN PROSE PAPER. THIS COURT IS EXTAS KEGUCOFED TOTAKE JURICIAR NIFICE OF EXPORTE COURT EXPORTE HOSS. KNOWLIN U. KNOWLIN, 145 SUZd 145, 150 (N. ME. 2014) 2EE, INKK, UIDKELEED U POCGET, 846 SUZd 120, 322 (TEK. ME. 1979) H2O2TH 137 (393), 14 PAPRYS DUE PROCES KELFIS HKE UTAUTED UHAN HE DOES NOT KEGEVE MOODUITE NIFICE OF HEXPORTE OR TREM SECTING, LOREZ U. LOREZ ISI SUZd 121, 122-23 (N. 1988) 1388) N8 FURDW AND PROCENARUR IS a RULE MANUUTED PROCENARIS EXPORTE WE OF EAE PROCES. THIS COURT CAN NOT CONTENUE TO TUWN FURDW EW TO MY WHEE UNCHURULDING- RESONMENT AND HLOW THE TREM COURT TO ISSUE UED PROCES EXTNS IMPROUED BY THIS COURT / CURED. SHRWHELDS 4 APR. 1 / 1988

*5

This Court has previously held that a trial judge, when presented with a recal sal motion, regardless of the "procedural sufficiency" of that motion, has only the option to act in one of two specified ways: to recuse himself, or refer the case to the presiding judge. Greenberg, Bressman, and Fielder, P. Cox, Hilsell, 685. S.W.2d. 694, 386. (Tex App.—Dallas 1984, no writ). We do not hold that this motion is free from scrutiny by some other judge, named in obedience to both rule and statute, but we do hold that the judge named in the motion may not do so without violating his plain duty. By pursuing an option unavailable, through any rule or statute, the court abused its discretion as a matter of the "Greenberg, 685. S.W.2d. at 695.

The Dallas Court reaffirmed this holding in Bourgeois, v. Collier, 359. S.W.2d. 244, 246. (Tex App.—Dallas 1997, no writ), and one of the Houston Courts has also found this holding persuasive. See Jamilah v. Bass, 862. S.W.2d. 201, 203. (Tex App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ). We, too, have recognized the mandatory nature of Rule. 18a. (Tex R.Civ P. 18a. Brosselg. 911. S.W.2d. at 892, and Keat v. Sekata, 139. S.W.2d. 491, 492. (Tex App.—Beaumont 1987, no writ). Consistent with this "mandatory nature" is the recognition that the hilde named in the motion not be permitted to act in one way other than the two options provided for in-the rule. We agree with the Court in Bambert, that the motion may ultimately fail because of some procedural defect, but that decision should be made by some other judge so as to avoid even the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge named in the motion. See Tex Cox, Top Country Canon 2, Reprinted in Tex Cox, Cone Aon, cit. 2, sublit. (2 app.) R. Vernon 1998). As we noted in our 1995 opinion regarding the instant case, if a trial court fails to comply with the strictures provided in Rule 18a, all actions taken by the judge, subsequent to some condition are valid. Brosselg. 911. S.W.2d. at 893. Therefore, the interlocu-

TDC, 440 LAW LIGRARY tory "money" judgment signed by Judge Woods on November 1, 1991, is void. (4) We now address the portion of appellate issue fourteen complaining of inadequate notice of the recusal hearing. The record before us reflects that following the issuance of our opinion in 1995, Judge Woods refused to recuse himself and formally requested that the presiding judge of the administrative district, Judge Olen Underwood, assign a judge to hear the recusal motion. The record next indicates that on December 3, 1997, Judge Underwood faxed notice of the recusal hearing to "all attorneys of record." The December 3, 1997, faxed notice reads as follows:

A hearing on the Motion to Recuse in 43,911 RANZAU V. BROSSEAU, ET AL. in the 253rd D.C. of Liberty, Co. Tx., has been set for Dec. 5, 1997 at 11:00 a.m. Before the Hon. Mark Davidson, Judge, 11th Judicial District * The hearing will be in the 253rd D.C., Liberty County Courthouse Assuming the above fax was received by all parties the same day it was sent, it provided for only two days notice of the hearing. A hearing was held on December 5, 1997, but the record reflects that appellant's trial counsel was not present. Judge Davidson's order, amounting to essentially a default judgment denying appellant's recusal motion, states: "Counsel for Defendant William D. Brosseau, having acknowledged to the Court that he had been notified of the date and time of hearing failed to appear." The record further reflects that on the day of the hearing, December 5, 1997, appellant's trial counsel mailed opposing counsel an instrument entitled, "Defendant's First Motion For Continuance of Recusal Hearing, and/or Motion To Vacate." In said motion, appellant's trial counsel made the following contentions:

Judge Underwood's office attempted to contact the undersigned counsel about the hearing on December 3, 1997, but the undersigned counsel was in Austin appearing before the Supreme Court of

*6

*7

*8

EX PARTE JECIA JAVETTE MOSS. Applicant COURS DE BENHORA: APPEALO NEVERLAND

446 S.W.3d 766, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1761 HISTORY OF ANTI-COM November 4, 2014, Delieymill

Notice: PUBLISH Editorial Information: Prior History ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS COHPUS IN CAUSE NO. 20203 IN THE 86TH DISTRICT COURT FROM KAURMAN COUNTY. Ex parte Moss, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 417 (Tex. Crim. App., Apr. 19, 2014)

FOM APPELLANT: Taryn Davis, Kaufman, TX. FOR STATE: Sue Koroth, Special Prosecutor, Dallas, TX.

Opinion:

Opinion by:

Henry

Opinion

Appicant, Jecie Javelle Moss, pled guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on

deferred-adjudication community supervision for five years on October 4, 2000. Her community supervision was subsequently revoked, and she was sentenced to confinement in a state pententery. She now argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her supervision and adjudicate her guilty because the motion to adjudicate was not timely filed and the capias was not timely issued. We will grant relief.

Facts

The day Applicant's period of community supervision expired-October 3, 2005-the State took a motion to adjudicate and an order directing the district clerk to issue a capies for Applicant's armed directly to the judge, who signed both of them. Applicant's supervision was subsequently revoked, and she was sentenced to twelve years' confinement and a $1,500.00 fine.

On April 5, 2006, at the time of sentencing, the judge notified Applicant that he would allow her to remain at large for twelve days before turning herself in at the Kaufman County Sheriff's Office to carry out her sentence. During that time, Applicant filed a notice of appeal. However, instead of reporting to the Kaufman County Sheriff's Office on April 17, 2008, to its taken into custody and continue the appellate process, she absconded from the jurisdiction. Subsequently, the State asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to dismiss Applicant's appeal, which it did on July 25, 2006. See Moss v. State, No. 05-06-00556-CH, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6470, 2006 WL 2053491 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 25, 2006, no par.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication). Applicant was arrested more than three years later on November 13, 2005

Ex Parte Townsend

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the converging court found that, even if the motion to adjudicate was not timely filed or the capias timely issued, Applicant's claim is procedurally barred because she could have raised her jurisdictional issue on direct appeal had she not absconded from the jurisdiction. We believe the court is referring to this Court's decision in Ex parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), in which this Court held that, when an applicant has an adequate remedy at law, such as the appellate process, but that applicant does not make use of that remedy, the applicant has forfeited his claim, (c. at $01-02$ .

Applicant can make the claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to architecture this Court's shedding on Townsend.

Because Applicant absconded, her direct appeal was dismissed, and, therefore, this application is her first opportunity to assert this challenge. Although the capias eventually issued by the clerk's office was not in the appellate record, the document upon which the Applicant relied (i.e., the copy directing the clerk to issue the capias) was in that record. In addition, Applicant raised her jurisdictional issue in her web application and the capias was, thereafter, included in the web record (by order of this Court). See Ex parte Moss, WR-76,655-03, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 417, 2014 WL 1512955 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2014) (per curiam) (not designated for publication).

However, Applicant's claim is different from the one raised in Townsend, in that she is alleging facts that, if true, would prove that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her supervision. In contrast, the applicant in Townsend ralrmt an improper-stacking claim, which was a non-jurisdictional claim. Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 4680 . The crucial difference between Tewsziang and the instant case is this

Company at: at 81 (citing Ex parte Gardner, WR 5 W.2d 169, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), Ex parte Opere: 883 S.W. 2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Ex parte Opere: 213 S.W. 2d 20887658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)), Tex. Code Cim. Proc. 84, 174(a) (The definition in a criminal prosecution for any offering must waive any rights secured into by law. Must not be remailed by the law) The 20887658 Act of the United States, 174 (ex parte Moss, WR 5 W.2d 169, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181, 181

*9

hold the trial and sentence the defendant, although defendant might later obtain relief in the form of a new trial for a constitutional violation. In contrast, if a defendant confesses and is convicted at trial because he is guilty of the crime committed, but the court lacked subject-matter or personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the judgment of conviction is void. See Mann, 851 S.W.2d at 279 (citing Central, 396 S.W. 2d at 527). This Court's decision in En parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), which was handed down after Townsend, also elucidates the difference between Townsend and the instant case. In Sledge, the applicant did not appeal his conviction, but filed an initial writ application seeking to obtain relief, which was denied. Later, he brought a successive writ application arguing that that trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate him guilty and revoke his defemrel-adjudication community supervision because the capias for his arrest was issued three days after his supervision expired. Id at 136. We dismissed his application because the applicant did not allege a new legal basis or sufficiently new factual basis upon which to justify this Court's consideration of his subsequent writ. Id at 106-07, 111; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11 07. § 4. We rejected the applicant's allegation that he could not have discovered the factual basis for his claim until after he filed his initial postconviction writ application because he could have learned of the factual basis for relief he cited in his subsequent application through the exercise of due diligence. See Sledge, 391 S.W.3d at 106-07 (stating that "it is readily apparent that the applicant could have easily obtained the information before now, just as he did for the purpose of developing his current post-conviction writ application"). And although the applicant did not cite a new legal basis as justification for this Court to consider his subsequent writ application, we did note that a legal basis for relief was available to him at the time he filed his initial writ in the form of a decision from this Court. See Langstow v. State, 800 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 843 S.W. 2 d 34, 35 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that the jurisdiction of a trial court to adjudicate a defendant's guilt is lost if the clerk fails to issue a capias as reggired by law). Thus, not decision in Sledge, equals be at least two principles relevant to this case: 11 Iunidational claims are not a single subject to two is no other subject (unconsistent liability) before is writ. Seldom are close to the claim (egm. but (2) the Legislature can permeably restrict the cognizability of courts to hear jurisdictional claims on habeas (which is why the applicant in Sledge could not raise his claim in a subsequent writ application). See Sledge, 391 S.W.3d at 106-05, 111.

In sum, we hold that Townsend is not applicable to jurisdictional claims raised in an initial writ application because, absent legislation to the contrary (such as the statute discussed in Sledge), we have held that a lack of jurisdiction renders a judgment void and that claims challenging a court's lack of jurisdiction are cognizable in an initial writ application. However, we caution individuals seeking habeas relief in a subsequent writ application that Sledge continues to bar an applicant from obtaining relief on a jurisdictional claim in a subsequent application if the applicant cannot overcome applicable procedural bars. ^[2]

Laches

The State argues that laches should apply to Applicant's claim because she voluntarily absconded from the jurisdiction of the court to avoid serving her sentence. See Es parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). It also asserts that laches should bar our consideration of Applicant's claim because "it is highly unlikely that the trial court or any of its personnel, or the deputy clerks involved, would retain a distinct memory of something as routine and commonplace as file-marking of a document and issuance of a warrant after three or four years." In Perez, this Court revised its approach to laches by abandoning the more permissive federal laches standard in favor of the Texas common-law definition of laches. See Es parte Perez, No. AP-76,600, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1509. "T (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2014). Under the common-law standard, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including the reasons for delay in seeking relief, the missing people or faded memories of people material to the case, loss of evidence and trial records, the State's diminished ability to retry a defendant, and the State's interest in finality. 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1509 at "9. The doctrine of laches does not bar Applicant's claim because the State was not prejudiced by her tardy filing of her writ application. In this case, however, while Applicant admittedly absconded from the jurisdiction and did not file her initial writ application until approximately five years after she was adjudicated guilty and sentenced, no evidence or trial records have been lost. And the State cannot retry Applicant if she prevails on her claim, because the trial court had lost jurisdiction to adjudicate Applicant guilty when her period of community supervision ended. Finally, the State's argument that it was prejudiced by diminished memories and missing people is without merit because the resolution of Applicant's claim turns on documents in the record and this Court's legal analysis. Therefore, after considering the entire record and the totality of the circumstances, we hold that laches does not apply to Applicant's claim because the State was not prejudiced.

Article 42.12, Section 8(h)

We now tum to the merits of Applicant's claims and the reasons for which we filed and set this case for submission.

Whether, when the trial court signs the motion to adjudicate and directs the district clerk to issue capias within the period of community supervision, but the motion is file-stamped by the clerk and the pre-revolution warrant issued after the expiration of the period of community supervision, the trial court retains jurisdiction to proceed to adjudication under Article 42.12, Section 5(h) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.Es parte Mors, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 417, 2014 WL 1512995. at "1.

Before Article 42.12, Section 5(h), was added to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court held that for a trial court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant who was on community supervision, "both the motion to revoke and capias for arrest must be issued prior to the termination of the probationary period." 2 Guillet v. State, 543 S.W. 2 d 650, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see also Prior v. State, 795 S.W. 2 d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (noting that this Court will interpret similar regular community-supervision statutes and deferred-adjudication community-supervision statutes similarity). Riedgues v. State, 684 S.W. 2 d 316, 317 n. 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (per curiam). In 2003, the 78th Legislature notified this Court's holdings with respect to when a trial court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate a defendant on deferred-adjudication guilty beyond the expiration of that defendant's period of supervision in Article 42.12, Section 5(h). Acts of May 31, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. ch. 250, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Lווw 1150, 1156. Article 42.12, Section 5(h) states that,

A court retains jurisdiction to hold a hearing under Subsection (b) and to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, regardless of whether the period of community supervision imposed on the defendant has expired, if before the expiration the attorney representing the state files a motion to proceed with the adjudication and a capias is issued for the arrest of the defendant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 5(h). Thus, the requirement that the capias be issued before the expiration of the supervision period was carried over into the statute. See Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). (Awwine, the Legislature also included in the same statutory provision the requirement that the motion to adjudicate be filed before the expiration of

*10

the defendant's community-supervision period. Id. Because the Legislature codified this Court's judiciatly-fashioned jurisdictional rule with respect to community supervision, we find our interpretations of those requirements before the adoption of Article 42.12, Section 5(h), to be instructive on the jurisdictional questions presented in this case. 3

With respect to the timely issuance of the capias, we held in Langston that "a trial court loses jurisdiction to proceed to adjudicate a defendant's guilt when the district clerk fails to issue a capias before his probationary period expires." Sledge. 391 S.W.3d at 106 (citing Langston, 800 S.W.2d at 554). cf. Coffey v. State, 500 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (rejecting the State's argument that the timely issuance of a capias tolled the term of community supervision such that the later filing of the motion to adjudicate was timely and concluding that the judgment revoking the appellant's community supervision was void). However, we overruled the appellant's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate him guilty because, although his period of community supervision had already expired, the motion to revoke probation was filed and the capias was issued before the expiration of that period. Langston, 800 S.W.2d at 554. We have reached the same conclusion in a number of other cases, and in each case we have emphasized that the filing of the motion to adjudicate and the issuance of the capias are the relevant triggering events under the statute 4

Based on our voluminous and uninterrupted caselaw on this topic, and the Legislature's codification of our judiciatly-fashioned rule without modification, 5 we will continue to interpret Article 42.12, Section 5(h), as we applied it before the statutory provision was adopted by the Legislature. Thus, the relevant time period with respect to the capias requirement remains the time at which the capias is actually issued. We also note that that this conclusion comports with the applicable definition of capies in Chapter 23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which defines a capias as a writ that is "issued by a judge of the court having jurisdiction of a case after commitment or bail and before trial, or by a clerk at the direction of the judge." 5 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 23.01. This result is also consistent with various provisions throughout the Code of Criminal Procedure referencing a clerk issuing a capias. 7

Application

In this case, an order directing the district clerk to issue a capias was attached to the motion to adjudicate that the judge signed and dated.

To the Clerk of Said Court: You are hereby directed to issue a capias, with a copy of this Petition for Reveocation of Community Supervision Sentence and Final Adjudication of Guilt attached thereto, for the arrest of Jecia Javette Moss, to answer the charges of community supervision violation and that upon his (sic) arrest (s)he shall be held without bond pending the hearing thereof. The order was signed by the trial judge on October 3, 2005. Also contained in the writ record is the capias that was issued by the clerk and is styled, "MTR WARRANT." It is directed to any peace officer of the State of Texas to arrest Applicant for "AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (Profession Reveocation)." This capias is dated October 8, 2005. Applicant's community supervision expired on October 3, 2005.

We hold that, because the capias in this case was issued after the expiration of Applicant's period of supervision, the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to proceed to adjudicate Applicant guilty and sentence her. In addition, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to adjudication, Applicant's sentence was discharged. Therefore, we grant Applicant relief. 8 The judgment of conviction in Cause No. 20203 in the 80th District Court is vacated. Council of the Petition of the State of Texas, Department of Criminal Justice, Comemoration, and Justification, Development, Fairance, and Fairance Order of the State of Texas, Department of Criminal Justice, Comemoration, and Justification, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice

*11 Although the word capias is also defined in Chapter 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that definition is not applicable in this case because that definition pertains only to enforcing judgments. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 43.015 (defining capias and capias pin) fine as they are used in Chapter 43). However, the definition of capias from Article 23.01(1) is proper because the capias in question was issued "by a clerk at the direction of the judge," and it was issued to force Applicant to appear in court for a "trial" in the form of a revocation hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 23.01. The judgment revoking Applicant's community supervision was not entered until April 5, 2006, and the capias that issued for her arrest to enforce that judgment of conviction when she failed to turn herself in is governed by Article 43.015(1) defining a capias for purposes of executing a judgment. 7

See, e.g., Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 2 195, 17.16(c), 23.03(a), 23.031, 23.05(d). 8 Because we conclude that the capias did not timely issue, we need not reach the question of whether the motion to adjudicate was timely filed.

*12

OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRININAL APPEALS OF TEXAS F.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

1/28/2015

FLORENCE, THOMAS WAYNE Tr. Cl. No. 10CR1217-83-4 WR-63,775-18 The Court has dismissed without written order this subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 11.07, Sec. 4(a)-(c).

Abel Acosta, Clerk DISTRICT ATTORNEY GALVESTON COUNTY JACK ROADY 60059 TH STREET SUITE 1001 GALVESTON, TX 77551

• DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

*13 Clark/CoLer. R: 101-11-005226 RPP ES3W P3 FNI. R: 1008121-83-3 L0081211-83-4 youre mumer that a bnumets with HRT: In this yectic C6unty and the a bnumets that antown by (s) met in HITY. WRO MPPDDITED BY THE C6URT ON KEYUEST OF THE SHITE TO DO FUNKING / FROF ANO CAN CUSCONS OF HUH ON THESE SHIKE ES3UE ${}^{(s)}$ E KARGUgHT ONT KELMATINg TO my VODD MERE- EST/ CHARGING MPPDDITED NOT C6UMET- ING WORH MRT. 1.23, 45.019 (2)(2)(4)(1) ON 13.03, F11 (MRT.1.23) 15.03(2). THES C6UNTY HORT? HN HITY. HNO DOES NOT HIGH THE SHITE TO HROUT FUNKINGS HNO FROTS/ CON CUSCON OF HUH H3 CHURSION C6UNTY. SO ONCE THESE a dANHN KELtET FHY ENHERME JACKSON (CERMATINO) SO TEX. KRIM. 324-324-95 SUN 1047 CMING, 1.23, 15.03

*14 ON ESSUE (S) THAT THE MOROOR CANC HY ESSUE # 3. STMES E UHS REFEREN- ING TO HN SEAKCH UNKKENT UNKEN E NEVER MHORE SUCH MEXUWENT ON NEOPHERE CONK, USED [A], TO HESUS HUODE GHEANT. ING ESSUE #3. THAN THIS IMPER CI, STMES ON DT' UODE 7-30-13 GAMMON ON ESSUE # 3 THAN H CONGRANT DOES NOT HANE TO COMPly UNK, HAY. 1.23, IS UKING SCE, EXPANTE CONGRE HITHYHEN, SCE, EXPANTE JACKSON, EN. 1. SEE, HAY. 45.018,45.019 (2) (3) (4) (5) SEE, STMES FMES KEGGY MORORES EY THE MOROOR CI. [A, THAT H CONGRANT DOES NOT HANE TO COMPLY UNKH HAY. 1.23, 45.019 (2) (4) (5) (15.05 EXPANTE JACKSON NU. THES CONKH HANEETHYHENY MORORES THE STME, THANI CONKH EIKEYH/ UODE FOND- INGS TO KENY HKE KELLEF HAY. 1107. USKCACT-83-3 # $$ HACK121783-4. UNKN THESE INHNITE OXTHAN KELLEF WITH HITY, E GUESS [A] FUNHIIY GET KELLEF GHEANOUSMANN 4-15-13 SEE, HET SANCESHY MENE 3-13. HIT'S AT 3300 EXPANTE KED SIE 630-1155 AY, 15744. (SONT AN INVASIT 834 HATKEN)