Case Information
*1 PD-0070-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 1/29/2015 9:18:34 AM Accepted 1/29/2015 3:24:42 PM ABEL ACOSTA No. PD-0070-15 CLERK TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
DONALD LYNN RAMSEY, Appellant a/k/a DONALD LYNN RAMSAY
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Appeal from Swisher County
* * * * * STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW * * * * *
LISA C. McMINN
State Prosecuting Attorney
Bar I.D. No. 13803300
STACEY M. GOLDSTEIN Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney Bar I.D. No. 24031632
P.O. Box 13046
Austin, Texas 78711
information@spa.texas.gov
512-463-1660 (Telephone)
512-463-5724 (Fax)
TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 GROUND FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Does an appellate court give proper deference to a jury’s forgery finding of intent to defraud or harm when it fails to consider the totality of the evidence and rational inferences therefrom?
ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9 PRAYER FOR RELIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 APPENDIX (Opinion of the Court of Appeals)
i *3 IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL
* The parties to the trial court’s judgment are the State of Texas and Appellant,
Donald Lynn Ramsey a/k/a Donald Lynn Ramsay.
* The trial Judge was Hon. Edward Lee Self.
* Counsel for the State at trial and before the Court of Appeals was Swisher
County Attorney J. Michael Criswell, 119 South Maxwell, Tulia, Texas 79088. * Counsel for the State before the Court of Criminal Appeals is Stacey M.
Goldstein, Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 13046, Austin, Texas 78711.
* Counsel for Appellant at trial was Tina Davis-Rincones, 109 East 6th Street,
Plainview, Texas 79072. * Counsel for Appellant before the Court of Appeals was Troy Bollinger, 600 Ash
Street, Plainview, Texas 79072.
ii *4 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases
Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 9
Okonkwo v. State , 398 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Ramsey v. State , No. 07-14-00249-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13519 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 17, 2014) (not designated for publication). . . . . . . . . . 2, 4,7 Stuebgen v. State , 547 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Wise v. State , 364 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 n.2
Statute
T EX . P ENAL C ODE § 32.21(b).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
iii
No. PD-0070-15 TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
DONALD LYNN RAMSEY Appellant a/k/a DONALD LYNN RAMSAY,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Appeal from Swisher County
* * * * * STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW * * * * *
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
The State Prosecuting Attorney respectfully urges this Court to grant review. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT The State does not request oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE A jury convicted Appellant of forgery of a check by passing, enhanced because it was committed against an elderly person, and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and assessed a $1,000 fine.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY Over a dissent, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and entered a judgment of acquittal. Ramsey v. State , No. 07-14-00249-CR, 2014 Tex.
App. LEXIS 13519 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 17, 2014) (not designated for publication). The State did not seek rehearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background
Eighty-four-year-old Jimmie Owens and his son Jed owned Owens Motor Machine. 1 RR 131. Appellant worked for the Owens’ for four to five months and lived at the business’s shop. 1 RR 103, 133. Jed typically parked his work-truck inside the shop in the evenings and left it unlocked. 1 RR 134-35. Jed kept the business’s checkbook in an inside pocket on one of the truck’s doors. 1 RR 127, 134. Both Jimmie and Jed were signatories on the account. 1 RR 120, 131, 133-34. Jimmie was listed as “J.E. Owens,” and Jed was listed as “J.J. Owens.” 1 RR 121, 123, 132, 136. Jimmie usually signed checks as “J.E. Owens,” but sometimes signed *7 1 as “Jimmie E. Owens.” 1 RR 123-24, 136. Jimmie always paid Appellant by check
and included the notation “contract labor” on the memo line. 1 RR 125, 127. The Owens had previously given a nearby liquor store permission to cash Appellant’s paychecks. 1 RR 150.
In June 2013, Appellant tendered a $65 check payable to him from the Owens Motor Machine account at the liquor store. Some of the money was used for goods, and the remainder was given to Appellant as change. 1 RR 151-52. The signature on the check read “Jim E. Owens,” and “Contract Labor” was written in the memo line. 1 RR 135; State’s Exhibit 2.
Neither Jimmie nor Jed had signed or issued the check to Appellant. 1 RR 124, 136. Jed testified that Appellant was their only employee in June 2013, as well as the preceding six months. 1 RR 136. He also believed that, with the exception of his father, Appellant was the only other person to have access to his truck. 1 RR 136-38. Jed acknowledged that other people sometimes stopped by the shop but stated that they typically just called him. 1 RR 139-40.
Jimmie also explained that he signed checks with “Jimmie Owens” a long time 1
ago. 1 RR 129.
3
Court of Appeals
A majority of the court of appeals held that the State failed to prove that Appellant intended to defraud or harm because there was no evidence that Appellant knew the check was forged. Ramsey , 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13519, at *6. It required evidence of the number of checks previously written and the name appearing on the signature line before a jury could “logically” infer that Appellant knew whether the signature was fake or genuine. Id . at *7. The majority also concluded that Appellant’s knowledge of the forgery cannot be inferred from the fact that it was not signed “J.E. Owens.” Id . at *6. Jimmie testified that he signed checks using “Jimmie
Owens” and “Jimmie E. Owens.” Id .
The dissent maintained that the evidence circumstantially established Appellant knew the check was forged. Id . at *12-13 (Prible, J., dissenting). When Appellant passed the check noting “Contract Labor” he inferentially represented it was given for services rendered, but the evidence showed that it was not given for services rendered. Id . at *12. Further, Appellant had access to the checkbook and passed it at a place he
knew it would be honored. Id .
GROUND FOR REVIEW Does an appellate court give proper deference to a jury’s forgery finding of intent to defraud or harm when it fails to consider the totality of the evidence and rational inferences therefrom?
ARGUMENT The court of appeals’ consideration of the facts, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, was severely deficient. As a result, it failed to give proper deference to the jury’s determination that Appellant knew the check was forged.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, all of the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the factfinder was justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The factfinder is the sole judge of credibility and weight given to the evidence and is permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from facts when supported by the evidence Id . at 319. When there are conflicting inferences, it must be presumed
that the factfinder resolved them in favor of the verdict. Id . at 326.
The offense of forgery includes the elements of intent to defraud or harm another. T EX . P ENAL C ODE § 32.21(b). Proof of those elements is established by
showing that the actor knew the writing was forged. Okonkwo v. State , 398 S.W.3d 689, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Giving proper deference to the jury’s guilty verdict, the State satisfied its burden to prove that Appellant knew the check was forged because the evidence firmly established that Appellant forged the check.
First, Appellant was the beneficiary. The check was made out to Appellant directly, and there is no evidence that anyone else would be motivated to make him the beneficiary.
Second, Appellant had unlimited access to the checkbook because he lived in the shop where it was kept in an unlocked truck. Additionally, the evidence does not support an alternative perpetrator theory. While other employees had been in Jed’s truck before, Appellant was the Owens’ only employee in the four to six months before the check was passed. 1 RR 139-40. Jed also testified that most people called him instead of stopping by the shop. 1 RR 139-40. And because he stored the truck in the shop overnight, the likelihood that persons who entered the shop during business hours had access to the truck is slight. 1 RR 134-35.
The forged check was close enough to show familiarity but imprecise enough to show it was forged. Having had received checks from Jimmie in the past, Appellant knew the specific manner in which he issued his paychecks. Thus, it included the particular memo-line notation “Contract Labor.” But the use of “Jim E.
Owens” for the signature, a style that was never used by Jimmie when issuing checks, confirms it was not genuine.
Appellant’s choice of venue for cashing the check is also consistent with his forgery scheme. As the court of appeals’ dissent observed, he cashed it at the liquor *11 store because he knew he would not be scrutinized and that it would be honored.
Finally, even if the evidence did not show that Appellant was the forger, the evidence would nonetheless show he knew it was forged. As the dissent observed, Appellant did not actually do any work for the Owens’ to warrant payment, so the “windfall” payment for his labor is inexplicable, as is his acceptance of payment for labor not performed.
Unlike the Court’s 1977 Stuebgen Decision
The majority also erred to conclude that this case is controlled by Stuebgen v.
State , 547 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Ramsey , 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13519, at *4-6. In that case, the appellant was convicted of forgery for passing a check belonging to his employer made payable to him with his employer’s forged signature. Stuebgen , 547 S.W.2d at 31. This Court noted that the employer testified that appellant had been his employee, he normally paid employees by check, he kept the checkbook in his truck, and that three to five of his employees, including the appellant, rode in the truck at the time the check was forged. Id . Finding the evidence insufficient to show that the appellant knew the check was forged, the Court stated:
In the instant case, the record reflects that appellant made no statement from which it could be inferred that he knew the instrument was forged. Appellant was listed as the payee, and appellant did not falsely represent himself. No evidence was introduced to show that anything appearing on the check was in appellant’s handwriting. Although appellant had access to [his employer’s] checkbook, and [his employer] normally paid his *12 employees personally, we do not find that this evidence is sufficient to discharge the State’s burden of showing that appellant acted with intent ‘to defraud or harm’ another.
Id . at 32.
Stuebgen has no application here. First, it is a pre- Jackson v. Virginia -era case.
Therefore, Jackson ’s ground rules about deferring to the jury’s resolution of the facts was not yet established, and the Court did not apply such a standard on its own. In fact, the Stuebgen Court appeared to apply the now-defunct, reasonable alternative 2 hypothesis standard. Under Jackson —as applied today—it is likely that this Court
would reach the opposite conclusion.
Next, even if Stuebgen is regarded as good law, the quantum of evidence in this
case differs significantly from that in Stuebgen . Here, Appellant’s access to the
checkbook was nearly exclusive, as opposed to Stuebgen ’s three to five employees. 3 Thus, there is no reasonable, alternative culprit here. Additionally, the evidence
strongly supports Appellant’s identity as the forger. Here, there is a nexus between Appellant and the check because of the obvious attempt to duplicate the unique manner in which Jimmie issued Appellant’s paychecks.
2 See Wise v. State , 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (recognizing that
the alternative reasonable hypothesis standard is no longer applicable when reviewing legal sufficiency).
And again, the reasonable, alternative culprit theory relied upon in Stuebgen 3
would be an improper application of the sufficiency standard today.
Conclusion
The fact and circumstances surrounding the passing of the check support the finding that Appellant forged it himself and therefore intended to defraud or harm Jimmie Owens. The court of appeals’ decision represents a marked departure from Jackson ’s sufficiency analytical construct, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 326, because it failed to acknowledge the significance of all the facts and logical inferences that support the jury’s verdict. This Court should grant review and reinstate Appellant’s conviction.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the State of Texas prays that the Court of Criminal Appeals grant review and reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted, LISA C. McMINN State Prosecuting Attorney Bar I.D. No.13803300 /s/ STACEY M. GOLDSTEIN Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney Bar I.D. No. 24031632 P.O. Box 13046
Austin, Texas 78711 information@spa.texas.gov 512-463-1660 (Telephone) 512-463-5724 (Fax) *15 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned certifies that according to the WordPerfect word count tool this document contains 1,594 words, exclusive of the items excepted by T EX . R. A PP . P. 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ STACEY M. GOLDSTEIN Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney *16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review has been served on January 29, 2015, via certified electronic service provider to:
Hon. J. Michael Criswell
Swisher County Attorney
119 South Maxwell
Tulia, Texas 79088
swisherca@swisher-tx.org
Hon. Troy Bollinger
600 Ash Street
Plainview, Texas 79072
troy@laneybollinger.com
/s/ STACEY M. GOLDSTEIN Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney *17 APPENDIX *18 DONALD LYNN RAMSEY AKA DONALD LYNN RAMSAY, APPELLANT v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
No. 07-14-00249-CR COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, SEVENTH DISTRICT, AMARILLO 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13519
December 17, 2014, Decided NOTICE: PLEASE CONSULT THE TEXAS RULES Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR CITATION OF 2014) ; accord Stuebgen v. State, 547 S.W.2d 29, 32 UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (stating that "[w]hile the
requisite culpable mental state . . . [for the offense of PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] On Appeal from the 242nd forgery of a writing] is 'intent to defraud or harm,' we District Court, Swisher County, Texas. Trial Court No. B- fail to perceive how such culpable mental state can be 4502-13-07, Honorable Edward Lee Self, Presiding. shown absent proof of knowledge that the instrument is
forged."). And, while intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as words, acts, or conduct, JUDGES: Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. PIRTLE, JJ. Patrick A. Pirtle, Justice. 1995) , intent to defraud cannot be inferred from mere
evidence of possession, passage, or presentment of a OPINION BY: Brian Quinn forged instrument. Johnson v. State, 425 S.W.3d 516,
520 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd) . OPINION
1 The definition of "forge" includes to "alter, MEMORANDUM OPINION make, complete, execute or authenticate any writing so that it purports . . . to be the act of Appellant Donald Lynn Ramsey, aka Donald Lynn another who did not authorize that act . . . ." T EX . Ramsay, appeals his conviction of forgery committed P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(i) (West against an elderly person by contending the evidence is 2011). insufficient to sustain the conviction. We reverse the judgment. According to the evidence here, the $65 check negotiated by appellant was made payable to him and The standard of review is discussed in Brooks v. contained the signature "Jim E. Owens." Listed on the State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) . We refer memorandum line was the phrase "Contract Labor." The the parties to that opinion in lieu of reiterating its content. record contains no evidence illustrating who wrote that information on the item. Nor does it contain evidence Next, the State alleged, via indictment, that appellant "with the intent to defraud or harm another, namely indicating that the handwriting on the instrument was similar [*3] to that of appellant. JIMMIE E. OWENS, an elderly individual 65 years of
age or older, pass[ed] to Janna Parson, a forged writing, knowing such writing to be forged, and such writing had E. OWENS . . . ." The statute upon which the allegation been so executed so it purported to be the act of JIMMIE See T writing with the intent to defraud or harm another. was founded made it an offense for a person to forge a EX NN A ODE C ENAL P . (West 2011). Because an element of the crime charged required proof that the [*2] accused acted with the intent to defraud or harm . § 32.21 (b) another, the "State necessarily had to prove that . . . [the accused] knew that the . . . [item was] forged . . . ." "Contract Labor" on the memorandum line; 4) the two Owens, Jimmie Owens, or J. E. Owens; 2) appellant paid in the past with checks written with the words who is Jimmie Owens and J. J. Owens who is Jed authorized signatories on the account were J. E. Owens worked for him and his son Jed; 3) appellant had been eighty-five years old, signed his checks as Jimmie E. the check in question; 6) Jed did not sign the check or Owens; 5) J. E. did not sign or authorize anyone to sign authorize another to do so; 7) appellant lived in the Other evidence illustrated that 1) J. E. Owens,
Page 2 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13519, *
Owens' shop; 8) the checks were kept in an unlocked to defraud there, it was not enough here. Simply put, truck; 9) appellant had access to the truck; and 10) others there is no evidence of record from which a rational fact who came to the shop had access to the truck as well. finder could infer, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant knew the instrument was forged and, therefore, The record further discloses that Janna Parson owned intended to defraud or harm either Owens. See also the Booger Red Liquor store, which was located a block Crittenden v. State, 671 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex. Crim. and a half from the Owens Motor Machine shop. She App. 1984) (finding no evidence of intent to defraud testified that appellant was a customer and passed that from a record in which the defendant made no statement check on June 11, 2013. Testimony also disclosed that from which it could be inferred that he knew the she had received permission from the Owens to cash instrument was forged, he was listed as the payee and he paychecks for appellant. There is no evidence about did not falsely represent himself, no evidence was whether she recognized the signature on the check as introduced to show that anything on the check was in the genuine. defendant's handwriting, there was no showing of any In [*4] Stuebgen v. State , the defendant cashed a connection between the check stolen from the service station and appellant prior to the time he said he check made payable to him. The name of the account owner appeared on the check, but the owner testified that received it in the mail, and he made no attempt to [*6] flee after his attempt to deposit the check was thwarted). he did not sign the instrument. Additionally, the accused was an employee of the account owner who also happened to keep his checkbook in his truck. And, as here, individuals in addition to the accused had access to the vehicle and no evidence appeared of record indicating that the writing on the instrument was similar to that of the accused. Given these circumstances, our Court of sufficient evidence appeared of record from which a Criminal Appeals was asked to determine whether the accused intended to defraud or harm. In response, the rational jury could infer, beyond reasonable doubt, that . There, the accused represented to the person to whom she passed the check that she obtained the instrument from her employer. Yet, she did not work for the person. 1999, pet. ref'd) State, 5 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] misplaced. [2] . The misrepresentation Id. at 843-45 writing was forged. So, the State's reliance on Oldham is allowed the fact finder to reasonably infer that the Oldham v. We do not have a situation like that in court said: 2 In Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) , another case relied on by the
In the instant case, the record reflects State, the defendant was asked by the cashier that appellant made no statement from where he had obtained the money order he which it could be inferred that he knew the sought to cash, and he replied that he had done instrument was forged. Appellant was some work for a lady and she paid him with it. listed as the payee, and appellant did not Id. at 488 . The utterance was false, and from that falsely represent himself. No evidence was the jury could rationally infer his knowledge of introduced to show that anything the forgery. Id. at 490 . appearing on the check was in appellant's handwriting. Although appellant had Nor does the evidence that J. E. Owens signed the access to Chitwood's checkbook, and checks as "J. E. Owens" constitute proof that appellant Chitwood normally paid his employees knew the check was forged. Again, Owens testified that personally, [*5] we do not find that this he had also signed checks in other ways, such as evidence is sufficient to discharge the "Jimmie Owens" or "Jimmie E. Owens." So, it cannot be State's burden of showing that appellant rationally inferred that appellant knew of the forgery acted with intent "to defraud or harm because the signature line did not contain "J. E. Owens" another." in this instance. Moreover, to accept the State's argument would require us to presume that [*7] appellant knew how Owens signed his checks, but we Stuebgen v. State, 547 S.W.2d at 32 . found no evidence to support that. Appellant did not testify; nor did anyone so testify. Nor does the record We find it difficult to distinguish the material contain a description of the number of checks previously circumstances in Stuebgen from those before us. written to appellant and the particular name appearing Consequently, we find the outcome in Stuebgen on the signature line. It would seem necessary for such controlling here. To the extent that access to the checks to appear of record before one can logically infer that the and passing the check was not enough to establish intent payee somehow knew whether or not the signature on a
Page 3 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13519, *
later instrument was genuine or fake simply by looking at Owens," he did not sign check number [*9] 1313 and he the signature. did not authorize anyone to sign it for him. He further insufficient to establish that appellant 1) knew the instrument was forged or 2) had the requisite intent to defraud or harm. Consequently, we reverse the judgment and render a judgment of acquittal. Based on this record, we find the evidence [3] to Appellant and he did not write the words "contract testified that he did not authorize delivery of the check he did not sign the check or authorize its issuance. The labor" on the instrument. Jed Owens also testified that clerk from the liquor store testified that she had previously been authorized by Jed Owens to cash Appellant's paychecks. Additional testimony established 3 Per Bowen v. State, 374 S.W.3d 427, 431-32 that Appellant had previously been employed by the (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) , we perused the record to Owens and had prior access to the location where the determine if the crime for which appellant was Owens Motor Machine checkbook was stored. tried encompassed a lesser-included offense having evidentiary support. None was found. Omitting the formal parts, the indictment in the instant case charged that Appellant: Brian Quinn Chief Justice "did then and there, with intent to
defraud or harm another, namely Jimmie DISSENT BY: Patrick A. Pirtle E. Owens, an elderly individual 65 years
of age or older, pass to Janna Parson, a DISSENT forged writing, knowing such writing to
be forged, and such writing had been so DISSENTING OPINION executed so it purported to be the act of Crittenden v. State , the majority reverses Appellant's Applying the precedent of Stuebgen v. State and [2] [1] Jimmie E. Owens, who did not authorize the act . . . ." forgery by passing conviction by finding the evidence
insufficient to establish that Appellant knew the
instrument was [*8] a forgery or that he had the requisite A person commits the offense of forgery if he forges an instrument with intent to defraud or harm intent to defraud or harm another. Because I would distinguish the facts of this case from those in Stuebgen and Crittenden , and because I find there is sufficient every element of the offense charged, [*10] another. While it is true that the State must establish the intent to circumstantial evidence to sustain Appellant's conviction, defraud or harm another may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Williams v. I respectfully dissent.
State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) . In Williams the Court of Criminal Appeals found the 1 Stuebgen v. State, 547 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) . evidence was sufficient to discharge the State's burden of showing that the accused acted with intent to defraud 2 Crittenden v. State, 671 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. or harm another when it established he made an Crim. App. 1984) . affirmative statement that he received the money order Although the underlying facts of this case are he was attempting to pass in exchange for work appropriately set out in the majority opinion, I will briefly performed, when other evidence established that the summarize those facts pertinent to my analysis of the instrument had been stolen. evidence. On June 11, 2013, Appellant went to the Booger Red Liquor Store in Tulia, Texas, where he was a 3 The definition of "forge" includes to "alter, regular customer, and cashed a check for $65. The check make, complete, execute or authenticate any was made out to Appellant and was drawn on the account writing so that it purports . . . to be the act of of Owens Motor Machine at Centennial Bank. The another who did not authorize that act . . . ." T EX . account belonged to J.E. Owens and his son, Jed Owens. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(i) (West A customer service representative of the bank testified 2011). The definition also includes to "issue, that the account had two authorized signators, "J.E. transfer, register the transfer of, pass, publish, or Owens" and "J.J. Owens." otherwise utter a writing that is forged within the meaning of Paragraph (A)." Id . at § The check in question, check number 1313, was 32.21(a)(1)(B) . made out to Donald Ramsey and was signed by "Jim E. Owens." The memo section of the check reflected that it The Stuebgen case is distinguishable. In that case was for "contract labor." J.E. Owens testified that the Court found that the element of "intent to defraud or although he has signed checks in the past as "Jimmie E.
Page 4 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13519, *
harm another," found in section 32.21(b) , necessarily I find that the instant case to be more appropriately implicated a culpable mental state that included "knowing governed by the holding in Williams . Here, similar to [the forged instrument] was forged at the time of the Williams and unlike Stuebgen and Crittenden , Appellant passing," an element specifically required [*11] under attempted to pass an instrument that clearly stated that it the former Penal Code. See Articles 996, 979 V ERNON ' S was given for a specific purpose, to-wit: "contract A NN . P ENAL C ODE . Cf . T EX . P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 32.21(b) l a b o r . " (West 2011). Similar to the facts of this case, in Stuebgen Furthermore, the evidence established that he was a the accused passed a check made payable to himself and former employee of the purported maker of the check, purportedly signed by his employer. The Court of had access to a checkbook from their account and passed Criminal Appeals held that since the accused made no the instrument at a location where he knew his statement from which it could be inferred that he knew "paychecks" would be honored. Reviewing the evidence the instrument was forged, the evidence was insufficient in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the to discharge the State's burden of showing he acted with evidence in this case circumstantially establishes that the intent to defraud or harm another. It should be noted, Appellant passed the check under circumstances however, that unlike the record in this case, the record in inferentially representing the check was given for Stuebgen does not reflect the forged instrument contained services rendered. As such, because [*13] the testimony a memo concerning the purpose for which the instrument of J.J. Owens and Jed Owens circumstantially was given. e s t a b l i s h e d
In Crittenden the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that the check was not issued to Appellant for services a forgery conviction because the State failed to show the rendered, I believe a rational and fair-minded juror could accused had knowledge that the instrument was forged. In conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant that case, the accused attempted to open a checking and k n e w savings account by depositing a forged check. When the the instrument was forged when he passed it. bank teller questioned the instrument and called the Accordingly, I would overrule Appellant's sufficiency owner of the account, she was told the check had been issue and affirm the judgment of conviction. See stolen. The police were summoned and the accused Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 explained he thought the check was from his attorney, L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, [*12] representing proceeds from a personal injury case. 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) .
Because there was no showing of any connection Patrick A. Pirtle between the accused and the stolen check, he made no
statements from which it could be inferred that he knew Justice
the check was stolen, and he made no attempt to flee after Do not publish. his attempt to deposit the check was thwarted, the Court
found the evidence was insufficient to show that he had
the intent to defraud or harm another.