Case Information
*0 RECEIVED COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 2/6/2015 ABEL ACOSTA, CLERK *1 WR-82,831-01
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 2/6/2015 3:39:05 AM Accepted 2/6/2015 9:42:33 AM ABEL ACOSTA NO .____________________________ __________________________________________________________________ CLERK
In The TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS __________________________________________________________________
IN RE: LUIS SOLIS-GONZALEZ, RELATOR FROM THE 243RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS Trial Court Cause No. 20120D04103 .
EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
JOSHUA C. SPENCER JOE A. SPENCER, JR.
Attorney for Relator Attorney for Relator
State Bar No. 24067879 State Bar No. 18921800
1009 Montana Ave. 1009 Montana Ave.
El Paso, Texas 79902 El Paso, Texas 79902
Telephone: (915)532-5562 Telephone(915)532-5562
Facsimile: (915)532-7535 Facsimile:(915)532-7535 joe@joespencerlaw.com
joshua@joespencerlaw.com REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT i *2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Identity of Parties and Counsel…………….………………………………..….… iv
Index of Authorities……………………………………………………………….. v
Statement of the Case……………………………………………………………… 1
Statement of Jurisdiction…………………………………………..………………. 2
Issue Presented forRelief………….……………………………….………………. 4
Statement of Facts………………………………………………………………….
Argument…….…………………………………………………………………….. 7
Issue 1: Whether Respondent abused his discretion by ordering
the Defendant to proceed to trial for a capital offense in which the State is seeking the death penalty before the Texas Department of Public Safety performs DNA testing of biological evidence collected as part of the investigation for the offense. …………………………………….……….. 7
A. Mandamus is available to review Respondent’s order pursuant to
Article 38.43(l)………………………………………………… 7 B. Respondent abused his discretion when he disregarded the Texas
Department of Public Safety request to extend the deadline to complete DNA analysis pursuant to Article 38.43(i)…………… 9 C. Speedy Trial does not rebut the presumption that biological materi-
al that the Defendant requests to be tested constitutes biological evidence that is required to be tested under Subsection (i) of Arti- cle 38.43………………………………………………………… 10 D. Respondent’s order to proceed to trial without DNA testing of the
remaining untested biological material in the State’s possession is improper and denies Relator Due Process and Equal Protection un- der Article I, §10, 15, and 19 of the Texas Constitution and 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution…… 12 ii *3 Prayer………………………………………………………………….………….. 13
Verification……………………………………………………………………….. 14
Appendix…………………………………………………………………………. iii
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL Relators certify that the following is a complete list of the parties, the attor- neys, and any other person who has any interest in the outcome of this matter:
PARTIES COUNSEL Luis Solis-Gonzalez, Joe A. Spencer, Jr.
Relator 1009 Montan Ave. El Paso, Texas 79902 Tel: (915) 532-5562 Fax: (915) 532-7535 Attorney For Relator And Joshua C. Spencer 1009 Montana Ave. El Paso, Texas 79902 Tel: (915) 532-5562 Fax: (915) 532-7535 Attorney For Relator The Honorable Luis Aguilar
Respondent
District Attorney Jaime Esparza Denise Butterworth
Office of 34th Judicial District Attorney 500 E. San Antonio
Real Party-In-Interest El Paso, Texas 79901 Tel: (915) 546-2059 Fax: (915) 533-5520 Attorney For Real Party- In-Interest iv *5 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES 1. Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972)……………………… Page 10 2. Cantu v. State,
253W.3d 273, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.2008)……… Page 10 3. De Leon v. Aguilar,
126 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.Crim.App.2004)……..…… Page 7 4. Faulder v. State,
612 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)…..… Page 2 5. Kopeski v. Martin,
629 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. Crim.App.1982)……. Page 2 6. Padilla v. McDaniel,
122 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)…… Page 2 7. Stearnes v. Clinton,
780 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1989)..……… Page 7 8. State ex rel. Curry v. Gray ,
726 S. W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Cr.App.1987)……….. Page 8
9. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine,
330 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)………... Page 3 10. State ex rel. Millsap v. Lozano,
692 S.W.2d 470, 481 (Tex. Crim.App.1985)……. Page 2 11. State ex rel. Vance v. Routt,
571 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Crim.App.1978)…….…… Page 2 12. State ex rel. Watkins v. Creuzot,
352 S.W.3d 493 (Tex.Crim.App.2011)…………. Page 3 v *6 13. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles v. Miller,
590 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim.App.1979)………….. Page 2 14. Thomas v. Stevenson,
561 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim.App.1978)………….. Page 2 STATUTES
1. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. art 38.43………………… Page 7, 9, 11
2. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art 4.04, § 2 (Vernon 2005)…Page 2
3. Tex. Const. art. I, §10, 19……………………………. Page 12
4. United States Const, Amend. 5, 6, and 14………..….. Page 12 vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Underlying Proceeding . Respondent orders DNA testing on all items submit-
ted by the El Paso Police Department containing biological evidence. Tab C .
Twenty-one days later, Respondent orders a deadline for DPS to complete DNA
testing by September 1, 2014. Tab D . The DNA section Supervisor and Technical
Leader from the Texas Department of Public Safety sends a letter to Respondent to
reconsider the deadline requesting for a June 1, 2015 deadline. Tab E . On June
25, 2014, Respondent sends a letter to the attorneys for the Defendant and the State
indicating the pre-trial hearing for July 16, 2014 is to determine Article 38.43 ap-
plicability and the legislative intent balanced with the Speedy Trial rights of the ac-
cused and the State. T ab F . Subsequently, Respondent cancelled the hearing, Tab
H, and sets the pretrial hearing for October 2, 2014. Tab I .
The Respondent. The Respondent is the Honorable Luis Aguilar, presiding judge
of the 243rd District Court of El Paso County, Texas.
Respondent’s actions . On January 9, 2014, one month before Relator is set for pa-
pering the jury, Respondent ordered the applicability of Tex. Code Crim. Pro., Arti-
cle 38.43 “does not mandate that every single piece of evidence seized by law en-
forcement must be forensically analyzed and the evidence that has been submitted
and analyzed so far by DPS is sufficient and constitutes substantial compliance
with the intent of the statute. Tab G . Respondent has ordered Relator to be tried
for a capital offense in which the state is seeking the death penalty before DNA
testing can be completed on the biological material requested by Relator.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked pursuant to Tex. Const, art.
V, § 5(c); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 4.04, § 1 (Vernon 2005); Tex. R. App. P.
72.1; and Tex. R. App. P. 52. See Faulder v. State , 612 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980); see also State ex rel. Millsap v. Lozano , 692 S.W.2d 470, 481
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (citing Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles v. Miller , 590
S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Thomas v. Stevenson , 561 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978); State ex rel Vance v. Routt , 571 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978)); Kopeski v. Martin , 629 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (citing
Thomas v. Stevenson , 561 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).
When a court of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals have concurrent,
original jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of mandamus against the judge of a
district or county court, the petition should be presented first to the court of ap-
peals, unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e);
Padilla v. McDaniel , 122 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Relator is pre-
senting his petition to this Court because this Court has sole jurisdiction over death
penalty appeals in Texas. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 4.04, § 2 (Vernon
2005). Respondent has ordered trial to proceed in a capital death penalty case
without all biological evidence tested by Texas DPS Crime Laboratory for DNA
comparison contrary to the law Relator invokes as definite, unambiguous, and un-
questionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case. Even if this Court had [1]
[1] Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 38.43(i). Before a defendant is tried for a capital of -
fense in which the state is seeking the death penalty, subject to Subsection (j), the state shall
require either the Department of Public Safety through one of its laboratories or a laboratory ac-
credited under Section 411.0205, Government Code, to perform DNA testing , in accordance
with the laboratory's capabilities at the time the testing is performed, on any biological evi-
dence that was collected as part of an investigation of the offense and is in the possession of
the state. The laboratory that performs the DNA testing shall pay for all DNA testing performed
in accordance with this subsection.
concurrent jurisdiction over this petition with a court of appeals, there are com-
pelling reasons to present this petition to this Court. Respondent’s erroneous order
has profoundly important and widespread constitutional implications, and the un-
derlying issues are so fundamental that the petition will inevitably reach this Court.
Consequently, filing in the court of appeals would likely serve only to unduly delay
the final resolution of an important constitutional issue, adding still further delay to
the commencement of defendant’s trial. Furthermore, the courts of appeals are not
accustomed to handling issues arising in death penalty cases, whereas this Court
routinely deals with those issues. Finally, petitions addressing ministerial deci-
sions in death penalty cases are frequently filed initially with this Court, which has
assumed jurisdiction over their resolution. See State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine , 330 S.W.
3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (assuming original jurisdiction over writ of man-
damus and prohibition action arising from pre-trial ruling in capital case); State ex
rel. Watkins v. Creuzot , 352 S.W. 3d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (same); see also
id . at 499 (concluding that “a writ of mandamus or prohibition is an appropriate
vehicle to review the propriety of. . .the trial judge’s order”).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Issue 1: Whether Respondent abused his discretion by ordering the Defendant to
proceed to trial for a capital offense in which the State is seeking the death penalty
before the Texas Department of Public Safety performs DNA testing of biological
evidence collected as part of the investigation for the offense.
A. Mandamus is available to review Respondent’s order pursuant to Arti- cle 38.43(l).
B. Respondent abused his discretion when he disregarded the Texas De- partment of Public Safety request to extend the deadline to complete DNA analysis
pursuant to Article 38.43(i)
C. Speedy trial does not rebut the presumption that biological material that the defendant requests to be tested constitutes biological evidence that is re-
quired to be tested under Subsection (i) of Article 38.43.
D. Respondent’s order to proceed to trial without DNA testing of the re- maining untested biological material in the State’s possession is improper and de-
nies Relator Due Process and Equal Protection under Article I, §10, 15, and 19 of
the Texas Constitution and 5th, 6th, 14th Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Relator is under indictment for capital murder and the State has filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Tab A . Real Parties In Interest requested by
written motion for Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) to test all items
submitted by the El Paso Police Department containing biological evidence for
DNA comparison, pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (T.C.C.P.), Arti-
cle 38.43. Tab B . Respondent grants the motion for DNA testing on April 23,
2014. Tab C. On May 13, 2014, Respondent orders a deadline for DPS to com-
plete DNA testing by September 1, 2014. Tab D . On June 5, 2014, less than a
month after Respondent set the deadline, the DNA section Supervisor and Techni-
cal Leader from the Texas Department of Public Safety sends a letter to Respon-
dent stating a June 1, 2015 deadline gives them approximately 15 months from the
time 158 items of evidence was submitted for analysis and to reconsider the Re-
spondent’s court ordered deadline. Tab E . On June 25, 2014, Respondent writes a
letter to the attorneys for the Defendant and the State indicating the purpose of the
pre-trial hearing for July 16th is to determine Article 38.43 applicability and the
legislative intent balanced with the Speedy Trial rights of the accused and the
State. Tab F . The pretrial hearing was cancelled and rescheduled for October 2,
1014. Tab H and I . During the pretrial hearing, Relator produced photographs for
Respondent to review in camera of 158 items collected by the El Paso Police De-
partment as biological material and requested all biological evidence be tested pur-
suant to Respondent’s April 23rd order and Article 38.43(i).
On January 9, 2014 , Respondent ordered the applicability of T.C.C.P. Article 38.43 “does not mandate that every single piece of evidence seized by law en-
forcement must be forensically analyzed and the evidence that has been submitted
and analyzed so far by DPS is sufficient and constitutes substantial compliance
with the intent of the statute.” Tab G. Respondent has ordered trial to proceed in a
capital death penalty case before requiring Real Parties In Interest to perform re-
quired DNA testing on biological evidence collected as part of the investigation for
the offense mandated under T.C.C.P., Article 38.43(i).
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES ISSUE 1: Whether Respondent abused his discretion by ordering the Defendant
to proceed to trial for a capital offense in which the State is seeking the death
penalty before the Texas Department of Public Safety performs DNA testing of bi-
ological evidence collected as part of the investigation for the offense.
A. Mandamus is available to review Respondent’s order pursuant to Article 38.43(l) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
The traditional test for determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate requires the relator to establish two things. First, he must show that he has no ade-
quate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm. Second, he must show that what
he seeks to compel is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial de-
cision. De Leon v. Aguilar , 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Writ of man-
damus is the exclusive remedy for testing that was not performed as required under
subsection (i) or (j) of Article 38.43. The question to decide in the instant case in [2] -
volves a ministerial act, whether the respondent had the authority to act as he did.
This requirement has often been couched in terms of requiring that the judicial
conduct from which relief is sought be "ministerial" in nature: "Historically, this
Court has stated that to be entitled to the extraordinary relief of mandamus, the re-
lator must establish ... (1) that the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial,
as opposed to discretionary or judicial in nature...." Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d
[2] Tex. Code Crim. Pro. 38.43(l). The defendant's exclusive remedy for testing that was not per -
formed as required under Subsection (i) or (j) is to seek a writ of mandamus from the court of
criminal appeals at any time on or before the date an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
due to be filed in the defendant's case under Section 4(a), Article 11.071. An application for a
writ of mandamus under this subsection does not toll any period of limitations applicable to a
habeas petition under state or federal law. The defendant is entitled to only one application for
a writ of mandamus under this subsection. At any time after the date an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is filed in the defendant's case under Section 4(a), Article 11.071, the defendant
may file one additional motion for forensic testing under Chapter 64.
216, 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1989)(emphasis supplied). In State ex rel. Curry v. Gray,
726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), the court held that: [A] ministerial act is
one which is accomplished without the exercise of judgment or discretion. If there
is any discretion or judicial determination attendant to the act, it is not ministerial
in nature. Nor is a ministerial act implicated if the trial court must weigh conflict-
ing claims or collateral matters which require legal resolution.
Here, Respondent not only acted without reference to the guiding rules and procedures applicable to DNA testing in a capital offense in which the state is seek-
ing the death penalty, Respondent:
(i) ordered a deadline for required DNA testing to the Texas Department of Public Safety not permitted by Article 38.43;
(ii) reviewed no evidence to rebut the presumption that the biological ma- terial that was requested to be tested constituted required testing pursuant to Article
38.43(i); and
(iii) is compelling a Defendant to be tried for a capital offense in which the state is seeking the death penalty before all required DNA testing is performed by
the state, mandated by Article 38.43(i).
The circumstances of this case are such that they effectively extinguished any dis-
cretion Respondent had regarding the State to perform required DNA testing.
Once the Court ordered all items submitted by the El Paso Police Department con-
taining biological evidence for DNA comparison, Tab C , his actions then became
"ministerial" in nature and any deviation by Respondent from the one clearly dic-
tated course of action is a per se abuse of discretion. Thus, mandamus is appropri-
ate.
B. Respondent abused his discretion when he disregarded the Texas De-
partment of Public Safety request to extend the deadline to complete DNA
analysis pursuant to Article 38.43(i)
Although mandamus is extraordinary, no other remedy is adequate when, as here, a trial court fails to adhere to the specific requirements of Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, Article 38.43(i). The statute reads:
Before a defendant is tried for a capital offense in which the state is seeking the death penalty, subject to Subsection (j), the state shall require either the Department of Public Safety through one of its laboratories or a laboratory accredited under Section 411.0205, Government Code, to perform DNA testing , in accordance with the laboratory's capabilities at the time the testing is performed, on any biological evidence that was col- lected as part of an investigation of the offense and is in the possession of the state. The laboratory that performs the DNA testing shall pay for all DNA testing performed in accordance with this subsection. (emphasis added)
The statute does not permit the trial court exercise any judicial discretion or deviate
from the mandate that any biological evidence shall be required testing before a de-
fendant a tried for a capital offense. Furthermore, the Texas Department of Public
Safety gave timely notice to the Respondent that court ordered deadline was im-
practicable. Tab E . It is a clear abuse of discretion for Respondent to exercise an
opinion that the DPS has analyzed sufficient evidence that constitutes substantial
compliance with the intent of the statute and order the case proceed to trial before
DPS has the opportunity to complete DNA testing. Tab G .
C. Speedy Trial does not rebut the presumption that biological mate- rial that the Defendant requests to be tested constitutes biological evidence
that is required to be tested under Subsection (i) of Article 38.43.
Respondent sent a letter on June 25, 2014 to the attorneys, Tab F , indicating the pre-trial hearing for July 16, 2014 is to determine Article 38.43 applicability
and the legislative intent balanced with the Speedy Trial rights of the accused and
the State. Subsequently the pretrial was cancelled, Tab H , and rescheduled for Oc-
tober 2, 2014. Tab I . At the pretrial hearing, Relator produced photographs for
Respondent to review in camera of 158 items collected by the El Paso Police De-
partment as biological material and requested all biological evidence be tested pur-
suant Respondent’s April 23rd order and Article 38.43(i).
The right to a speedy trial cannot be quantified in days or months. Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972). Thus, Texas courts "analyze federal constitution-
al speedy-trial claims 'on an ad hoc basis' by weighing and then balancing the
Barker v. Wingo factors.” Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)). These factors include
the (a) length of the delay, (b) reason for the delay, (c) assertion of the right, and
(d) prejudice to the accused. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280.
In the instant case, DPS has requested for 15 months to complete DNA test- ing of the items submitted to the crime lab. The reason the DNA Section Supervi-
sor and Technical Leader requested for the extension of time was because the de-
partment only has four lab technicians, two of which can only do DNA testing.
Additionally, DPS has gathered a team of lab technicians to expedite the testing to
reduce the length of the delay. Tab E . The reason for the delay is reasonable and
practical in consideration to the amount of biological material that needs to be test
ed, 158 items. Relator/Defendant has waived all speedy trial issues so that proper
DNA testing maybe completed.
Relator/Defendant will not be prejudiced by the amount of time DPS re- quires to complete the DNA testing submitted in the instant case. On the other
hand, Respondent’s erroneous interpretation of Article 38.43 is harmful error and
Relator/Defendant is substantially prejudiced by the trial court’s action. Article
38.43(j) states in relevant part,
If the state and the defendant do not agree on which biological materials qualify as biological evidence, the state or the defen- dant may request the court to hold a hearing to determine the issue. On receipt of a request for a hearing under this subsec- tion, the court shall set a date for the hearing and provide writ- ten notice of the hearing date to the state and the defendant. At the hearing, there is a rebuttable presumption that the biologi- cal material that the defendant requests to be tested constitutes biological evidence that is required to be tested under Subsec- tion (i). This subsection does not in any way prohibit the state from testing biological evidence in the state's possession. (em- phasis added).
On October 2, 2014, the pretrial hearing was heard by Respondent; however, no
evidence was presented by the Real Parties In Interest/State to rebut the presump-
tion that the biological material Relator/Defendant requested to be tested constitut-
ed biological evidence that is required to be tested under subsection (i). (Emphasis
added) The language of the statute is clear and unambiguously mandates Respon-
dent to conduct the ministerial act of allowing the State to comply with Article
38.43(i) as it originally had ordered on April 23, 2014. Tab C .
D. Respondent’s order to proceed to trial without DNA testing of the remaining untested biological material in the State’s possession is improper
and denies Relator Due Process and Equal Protection under Article I, §10, and
19 of the Texas Constitution and 5th, 6th, 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
Under Article I, §19 of the Texas Constitution and the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates that the State shall not deprive life […] except
by the due course of the law of the land. Relator is on trial for his life and Respon-
dent’s actions to expedite the DNA testing and enforcing unreasonable deadlines to
complete DNA testing when the State is seeking the death penalty violates the Re-
lator’s constitutional rights to life. Before Relator/Defendant is tried for a capital
he “shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” See Tex.
Const. Art. I, §10 and 6th Amend U.S. Const.. Respondent has denied Relator’s
opportunity for compulsory process because a defense can arise from DNA testing
of biological evidence obtained during the investigation of the offense. Thus, Re-
spondents order improper and constitutes harmful error.
PRAYER For these reasons, Relator asks that the Court grant a writ of mandamus or- dering Respondent to vacate his January 9, 2015, order proceeding with the lawsuit
and remaining on the trial docket for May 8, 2015 before completing DNA testing
of biological evidence submitted to DPS and in the possession of the State. The
Court should order Respondent to conduct all further proceedings strictly in accor-
dance with the procedures and limitations set forth in Article 38.43 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Respectfully submitted, Joe A. Spencer Attorney and Counselor at Law 1009 Montana Ave.
El Paso, Texas 79902 (915) 532-5562 (915) 532-7535 fax joe@joespencerlaw.com /s/ Joe A. Spencer Joe A. Spencer State Bar No. 18921800 Joshua C. Spencer Attorney and Counselor at Law 1009 Montana Ave.
El Paso, Texas 79902 (915) 532-5562 (915) 532-7535 fax joshua@joespencerlaw.com /s/ Joshua C. Spencer Joshua C. Spencer State Bar No. 24067879 *20 STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE In conformity with Rule 9.4(i)(3), this petition is prepared using a proportionally spaced typeface, and contains 2,999 words in the body of the
petition above the signature block. The word-count information is obtained
from a Macintosh Word Counting Program version 2014.
VERIFICATION I certify that I have reviewed the petition and concluded that every factual statement in the petition is supported by competent evidence included in the ap-
pendix or record.
/s/ Joshua C. Spencer Joshua C. Spencer State Bar No. 24067879 /s/ Joe A. Spencer Joe A. Spencer State Bar No. 18921800
APPENDIX
Relator Solis-Gonzalez submits these documents in support of his petition for
mandamus.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS 1. Indictment, dated on August 28, 2012………………………………… Tab A
2. Motion for DNA testing by the Texas Department of Public Safety,
Crime Laboratory pursuant to T.C.C.P. Article 38.40, dated April 22, 2014…………………………………………………… Tab B 3. Order, dated on April 23, 2014………………………………………... Tab C
4. Order Setting Deadline for Completion of DNA Testing, dated on
May 13, 2014………………………………………………………….. Tab D 5. Texas Department of Public Safety letter, dated on June 5, 2014…….. Tab E
6. Honorable Luis Aguilar letter to Attorneys for State and Defendant,
dated on June 25, 2014……….….……………………………… Tab F 7. Order complained of, dated on January 9, 2015………………… Tab G
8. Order Canceling July 16, 2014 Pretrial Hearing…………………… Tab H
9. Order Setting Pretrial Hearing, dated on September 26, 2014……… Tab I