Case Information

*1 Before P OSNER F LAUM W ILLIAMS , Circuit Judges . W ILLIAMS Circuit Judge.

Defendant Joseph convicted committing attempting commit sepa rate robberies over month period between sentenced months’ imprisonment. On appeal, challenges both conviction sen tence. He claims violated under Sixth Amendment only permitting *2 him waive his right counsel and proceed pro se the eve of trial, but by rescinding the waiver came clear during trial forgo participating most of the trial proceedings. disagree. district permitted Banks only after concluding of both knowing and voluntary. addition, Banks argues commit

ted procedural error sentencing hearing by failing adequately justify sentence, by failing address sev eral principal mitigation arguments, treating federal sentencing guidelines as mandatory. However, we find adequately explained rea sons sentence, addressed principal mitigation arguments, did treat Guidelines mandatory. So we affirm judgment.

I. BACKGROUND charged with two counts bank robbery

two counts attempted bank robbery connection with four separate incidents occurred between August August All four incidents involved use gun, two were particularly violent. On one occasion, pulled one bank employee ground pointed gun him. Afterward, hit another employee over head gun, causing employee turn pale, fall floor, hyperventilate. On another occasion, forced bystander bank gunpoint.

A. Trial Proceedings

Over years elapsed between filing criminal complaint against September com *3 mencement trial in December Much the delay attributable to Banks repeatedly terminating counsel— five separate times in total. The final termination—the only relevant one on appeal—took place on the first day trial.

Shortly before jury selection was to commence, Banks’s counsel informed the court that Banks had “relieved” him, and that Banks intended to “ in propria persona ” (which the counsel understood to mean pro se ). A colloquy between the ensued in which insisted that lacked jurisdiction over him. After asked counsel to stay on in stand capaci ty, colloquy continued. was informed charges against him potential penalties he would face if convicted. He confirmed he intended represent himself trial, noted he had been studying law while custody. He confirmed he understood pro ceeding was serious decision no one had pushed him make, would provide him any advice. ultimately concluded knowingly voluntarily waived counsel, trial continued. participation minimal. He de clined object government’s motions limine strike any jurors, present own witnesses, cross examine government’s witnesses, object any government’s questions, comment jury instructions. Rather, participation often confined stating “cap tive” be “partaking this proceeding.” addition, repeatedly asked (unsuccessfully) excused attending trial, rebuffed judge’s numerous suggestions permit standby *4 represent him. Banks did attempt, however, to make open ‐ ing closing statements, but he failed confine his remarks trial evidence (expected or presented) cut him off. At conclusion trial, jury con ‐ victed him on all counts.

B. Post Trial Proceedings Several days after jury rendered its verdict, Banks es caped from downtown Chicago prison where he be ing held pending sentencing. He cellmate cut a hole cinderblock wall and, using a rope comprised bed sheets dental floss, rappelled stories down build ing’s exterior wall middle night. After two day manhunt, law enforcement apprehended Banks several miles from prison. (The government initially charged Banks escaping federal custody but later dis missed complaint voluntarily.)

Shortly after returned custody, consent ed representation by counsel, who filed on behalf motion for new for acquittal. argued had not knowingly voluntarily waived counsel, should permitted stand by counsel make closing argument him upon terminating closing remarks. The denied motion, concluding clearly demonstrated did want represented required compel attorney representation. emphasized she repeatedly warned focus closing argument admitted evidence before cut him off. *5 ‐

In preparation for sentencing, probation office pre ‐ pared a presentence report (PSR) that calculated a total of ‐ fense level of a criminal history category of VI, and a Guidelines range of to months’ imprisonment. advocating for a ‐ month sentence, Banks argued that criminal history overstated degree harm posed public, and that a shorter sentence warranted due poor ‐ representation and likelihood that harsh prison conditions had endured post ‐ escape continue. The government advocated for month sentence asked take escape ac count. adopted PSR’s offense level criminal history calculations, concluded Guide lines recommended sentence months’ imprisonment life. After hearing arguments testimony both parties, sentenced Banks months’ imprison ment.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, claims erroneous ly concluded knowingly voluntarily waived right counsel before jury selection occurred, should revoked waiver re fused participate trial. argues committed various procedural errors arriv ing explaining sentence. disagree.

A. No Error Allow Represent Himself Both parties here insist we generally review one’s abuse discretion cite cases are accordance. government correctly con cedes, there separate line cases indicating de novo *6 6 No. 14 3461 review is the proper standard. See generally United States v. Clark , 774 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Todd , 424 F.3d 525, 530 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005). need re solve this disagreement, since claims fail under ei ther standard. Waiver Was Knowing and Voluntary Constitution guarantees all defendants the right a criminal trial. Faretta v. California , 422 U.S.

806, (1975). It is equally well established, however, a criminal defendant may waive and he knowingly and voluntarily elects do so. Id. at 834–35. When such a waiver is timely made a competent defendant, trial may deny it. Imani v. Pollard , 3407, WL 3434673, *3 (7th Cir. June 22, 2016).

Waiver is permissible even though defendant “may ultimately conduct own defense detriment.” United Avery 2000). must still “be made aware dangers disadvantages self representation, so record will establish knows what doing choice is made eyes open.” Faretta U.S. (citation internal quota tion marks omitted); see Boultinghouse (instructing courts “engag[e] defendant colloquy”). To determine whether knowing voluntary, we examine record whole consider factors: (1) extent formal inquiry defendant’s de cision; (2) evidence record about whether de fendant understood dangers disadvantages representation; (3) defendant’s background experi ence; (4) context defendant’s decision. *7 Volpentesta 2013) (cita tions omitted). conclude that Banks knowingly and voluntarily

waived counsel. The court’s colloquy with Banks wide ranging and thorough. She inquired legal education, well as familiarity Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure, history of representation, and objection jurisdiction over him. addition, stressed that if proceeded pro se would advise him about how proceed courtroom would follow Federal Rules of Evidence regardless of whether made appropriate objections.

This colloquy adequately apprised dangers proceeding . The government explain charges possible penalties reiterated maximum penalties—80 years prison $1,000,000 fine. She repeatedly told deciding without counsel very serious decision, advised should allow appointed counsel represent him. See Hoskins (upholding waiver where advised defendant “would be far better off being defended trained lawyer be ‘unwise’ defend himself be cause complexity legal issues involved”). context decision further suggests knowing voluntary. fired (at least part) order make sovereign citizen defense lacked jurisdiction over him. “Defendants claiming ‘sovereign citizens’ assert fed eral government illegitimate insist they are subject its *8 8 14 3461 repeatedly observed that “[a] waiver likely knowing voluntary if defendant gave strategic reasons after repeatedly rejecting assistance coun sel.” United States v. England , F.3d 581, (7th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g. , Volpentesta , F.3d at (finding that defendant’s waiver “was a strategic decision he made so that he could pursue case he desired”). Moreover, dis trict clearly informed that, although was denying sovereign citizen argument, he was free ap peal that ruling conclusion case.

Although a legal practitioner, he noted had been engaged in legal study while awaiting familiar with Federal Rules Evidence Criminal Procedure. This alone may demonstrate “appreciated gravity waiver.” Volpentes ta F.3d 677; see id. (concluding defendant’s background supported finding waiver where had graduated high school had taken community col lege classes, had been involved three bench trials bankruptcy connection business, had been defendant an earlier criminal trial). However, all fac tors, taken together, clearly demonstrate both knowing voluntary—a finding himself supported expressly confirming collo quy “decision here without lawyer [was] entirely voluntary,” no one “push[ed]” him decision.

jurisdiction. defense has ‘no conceivable validity American law.’” Jonassen n.2 (quoting Schneider 1990)). *9 No. contends inquiry unnecessary,

since did “clearly unequivocally” invoke representation begin with, but instead merely con veyed desire fire counsel. support, points following discussion outset colloquy with judge:

THE DEFENDANT: Objection, your Honor. I am here. I am appearing propria persona today.

THE COURT: All right. And means you want represent yourself.

THE DEFENDANT: No. I am here propria persona .

* * * *

THE COURT: Are you representing yourself?

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT: Who is representing you?

THE DEFENDANT: My status sui juris . I’m here propria persona today.

But viewed context remainder col loquy, however, it’s clear preoccupied making sovereign citizen defense known court; asking replacement appointed. For example, began asking questions relating knowledge voluntariness immediately after ex change below:

THE COURT: All right. Well, I will tell you what. I un derstand you are relieving Mr. Brindley fice representing you. I am going ask they remain here standby counsel. you are certainly free under Constitution your own. THE DEFENDANT: Exactly. That’s what I so choose your Honor.

10 14 3461 (emphasis added). So district correctly understood was waiving his right to counsel. No Error in Not Rescinding Waiver During Trial argues his refusal to participate in trial proceedings should have prompted to re scind waiver. completely unwilling to participate—he attempted to make opening closing statements. And unwillingness to focus facts those arguments, coupled with general inaction, under scores strategy pressing sovereign citizen view point. fact strategy unwise, without more, irrelevant. See, e.g. , United States v. Berry , F.3d (7th Cir. (“[T]he representation cannot be denied merely because defendant lacks legal knowledge otherwise makes poor advocate.”).

Nor did engage sort obstructionist behav ior warranted rescission Brock , F.3d 1998), Brown F.2d 1986). Although refusal partici pate proceedings, repeated challenges jurisdiction, repeated requests removed courtroom may have delayed proceedings tested patience government, they no way “made it practically impossible [for trial] ceed.” Brock 1080–81 (observing defendant “refused cooperate, even minimally, court,” even after several contempt citations). More importantly, even if actions did warrant rescission—and they did not— judge obligated rescind. See Berry (“The Constitution may allowed block request go alone, but it certainly *11 11 14 3461 didn’t require it.”); accord United States v. Anzaldi , 800 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jonassen , 759 F.3d 653, n.4 (7th Cir. 2014). reliance on Cain v. Peters , F.2d (7th Cir. 1992), is misplaced. As Banks notes, we observed Cain “defendants forfeit representation by remaining silent critical junctures before trial.” Id. 750. What ignores, however, is fact Cain involved de fendant who acquiesced representation by stay ing silent throughout proceedings. doing so, effec tively forfeited any right argue later on was denied represent himself. This aspect Cain does not apply defendants who proceed pro se but decide stra tegic reasons remain silent. Other Arguments Are Meritless attacks waiver decision sev

eral other grounds, all which lack merit. First, suggests should rejected untimely. request was timely, since was made before jury was empaneled. United States v. Johnson , F.3d 665, (7th Cir. 2000). And even if request untimely, does claim required reject it. Nor could he. See Oakey 1988) (concluding “where request proceed pro untimely, may, its discretion deny motion” (emphasis added)); cf. Kosmel (observing “has broad discretion granting mid trial requests se”). contends itself somehow violated due process rights because government *12 3461 forced to present its case subject to an adversarial process (because of Banks’s nonparticipation). poor ‐ representation alone does not amount to due process viola ‐ tion. Egwaoje (rejecting claim pro se defendant’s “readily apparent de ficiency in performance offends not only defend ant’s rights but undermines public confidence in tegrity of judicial proceedings”); cf. Faretta U.S. n.46 (“[A] defendant who elects represent himself cannot thereafter complain quality own defense amounted denial ‘effective assistance counsel.’”).

Lastly, argues district court erred failing acknowledge her authority reject pro se request. However, has cited any case law (and we are aware any) requires expressly reference this authority. Nor does record suggest misunderstood her authority; indeed, believed she obligated approve request, both lengthy colloquy her ultimate knowledge/voluntariness finding been unnecessary. sum, cor rectly permitted represent himself during trial.

B. No Procedural Errors During Sentencing argues procedurally erred determining explaining month sentence. Specifi cally, claims failed address three principal mitigation arguments, failed adequately explain sentence, treated Guidelines mandatory. review de novo whether has commit ted procedural error sentencing. Mar Castano 2012). Procedural error *13 13 14 3461 occurs a “fail[s] calculate (or improperly cal culate[s]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] consider the § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based clearly erroneous facts, fail[s] ade quately explain chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). District courts must “consider a defendant’s principal, nonfrivolous arguments for lenience.” United States v. Martin , 718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. (per curiam). considering such arguments, must demonstrate “has considered parties’ arguments has a reasoned basis exercising [her] own legal deci sionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States , U.S. 338, 356 (2007). A brief explanation often acceptable “where context record make clear reasoning underlying conclusion.” United States v. Schroeder F.3d 746, (7th Cir. 2008). We typically will not find sen tence procedurally unreasonable so long record demonstrates meaningfully considered de fendant’s arguments, “even if implicitly imprecisely.” Diekemper 2010). Sentence Adequately Explained argues failed explain why month sentence necessary. While con cedes explicitly referenced need protect society help “recognize, realistic way, who is,” suggests month sentence proposed may well have satisfied these objectives. find, however, although may discussed § 3553(a) factors checklist fashion—which re quired do, Perez *14 ‐ 2009)—the provided an adequate statement its rea ‐ sons the sentencing hearing.

In concluding that “very substantial” sentence was re ‐ quired, emphasized had en gaged “extremely costly, menacing, dangerous activity.” She discussed violent nature which wielded his weapon, as well as emotional financial trauma his victims suffered wake his robberies. also referenced personal history character istics—in particular, his refusal accept full responsibility for his crimes, his artistic talents, his troubled upbring ing. And touched upon available alternative sentences, as compared government’s proposed year sentence own suggested sentence against retributivist public ‐ safety reasons that, court’s mind, warranted “significant” sentence. sum, court’s analysis reflects “an individualized assessment based on facts presented” allows “meaningful appellate review … promote[s] perception fair sentencing.” Gall U.S. 50. Mitigation Arguments Addressed argues his sentencing hearing, failed address three principal mitiga

tion arguments: (1) “unusually harsh” confinement conditions endured following escape likely continue post sentencing; (2) criminal history cate gory overstated prior criminal conduct; (3) conviction based evidence was never “meaning fully tested,” due poor representation. While response these arguments indirect brief, so deficient constitute procedural error. *15 ‐

The court adequately addressed Banks’s argu ‐ ment regarding confinement conditions. The began acknowledging “may very well true” prison officials “overreacted” Banks’s escape with confine ‐ ment conditions they imposed him. She then observed “trying thwart even simple efforts maintain curity in a federal correctional facility really a step too far,” explicitly referenced balance between “the harm that’s been done victims” “the harm we are now going do defendant in return.”

The also adequately addressed Banks’s ar gument criminal history category overstated ear lier unlawful actions. found Banks’s description of himself as “anti gun” untenable, since used a gun, often violently, in all of robberies. She also rejected notion a “peacemaker,” noting “made havoc this case” “created very serious terror disturbance several banks for several victims.” And she described robberies as “the conduct a vi olent man,” described him generally as “a threat a men ace anybody who might work bank,” discussed escape “as part larger pattern [his] rejection system.” addition, indirectly addressed argument regarding poor representation,

sofar criticized him for “reject[ing] services lawyers … who prepared amply for defense, [and] who, throughout trial, day after day … stepped room.” She noted these attorneys “begged” her closing argument “allow them make closing for [Banks], because they saw an opportunity defense.” *16 Critically, the court disparaged for “cho[osing] to adopt the sovereign citizen defense, which confesses now an act.” When viewing these statements the aggre ‐ gate, it’s clear that the district court found to be unde serving any sympathy deciding to throughout the trial. Guidelines Not Treated as Mandatory

Finally, contends that the court treated the Guidelines mandatory, based on brief colloquy between the probation officer the hearing. After an nouncing the month sentence, the noted the sentence each the counts would run con currently. But doing so would have resulted an nounced sentence, since none counts carried maxi mum exceeded months. probation officer called attention this error, prompting clarify Counts I II would be served consecutively Counts III IV.

This clarification consistent Guidelines. See, e.g. Craig (per curiam) (explaining U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) “tell[s] sentence consecutively when necessary bring total sentence guidelines range”). that, by itself, does demonstrate considered her be bound Guidelines. explained Supreme Court declared Guidelines be advi sory, “it expected many (perhaps most) sentences continue reflect results obtained through an application Guidelines.” Mykytiuk 2005). ignores several facts indicate believed herself unbound—she *17 entertained argument below Guidelines sen tence imposed month sentence before discussing whether what extent counts run concur rently consecutively. So has failed establish committed any procedural errors.

III. CONCLUSION A FFIRM judgment.