Considering all the allegations, and giving full intendment and legal effect thereto, it is believed the court correctly sustained the demurrer to the petition. When W. L. Hill conveyed the land to La Roe and Parker and surrendered possession to them, he parted with the right of redemption. Harris v. Masterson,
And the petition does not allege that Richard Lloyd agreed, after paying the rent on the notes, to surrender the possession of the land to W. L. Hill or back to Scott Woodward. No arrangement was described or alleged to be agreed to, by intendment or in legal effect, constituting Richard Lloyd like as a mortgagee in possession. The possession of Richard Lloyd was his own, as vendor, and not the possession of Hill or Woodward, and W. L. Hill had no legal or contractual right of possession, even though there had been default in payment of the interest due; and W. L. Hill's agreement that Richard Lloyd could have possession conferred no right in Richard Lloyd. The subsequent taking of the deed from Scott Woodward by the executor of Richard Lloyd invaded no right nor created any equity in W. L. Hill. It was not alleged that such conveyance was by agreement for the use and benefit of W. L. Hill, or that W. L. Hill advanced any consideration therefor. The conveyance operated, in the absence, as here, of any consideration moving from W. L. Hill, to be a rescission of the sale, passing the land back to Richard Lloyd and closing all equity of redemption of Scott Woodward and extinguishing the indebtedness of W. L. to Richard Lloyd. W. L. Hill could not have objected to nor revoked the conveyance. A resulting trust could not be predicated in the allegations. And the filing of the agreed suit did not operate to change the status of the parties, by intendment or in legal effect. The suit was for the purpose merely of clearing the title. There was no renunciation of title by the executor of Richard Lloyd.
The judgment is affirmed.
