Office of the Attorney General — State of Texas John Cornyn The Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. Smith County Criminal District Attorney Smith County Courthouse Tyler, Texas 75702
Re: Whether a committee appointed by a commissioners court to recommend the selection of an architect is subject to the Open Meetings Act (RQ-0063)
Dear Mr. Skeen:
You have requested our opinion as to whether a committee appointed by a commissioners court to recommend the selection of an architect is subject to the Open Meetings Act. Under the circumstances you describe, we conclude that it is. Section
(a) A governmental entity may not select a provider of professional services or a group or association of providers or award a contract for the services on the basis of competitive bids submitted for the contract or for the services, but shall make the selection and award:
(1) on the basis of demonstrated competence and qualifications to perform the services; and
(2) for a fair and reasonable price.
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §
You indicate that, pursuant to section 2254.003, the Commissioners Court of Smith County appointed an "Evaluation Committee" composed of the county judge, one commissioner, the county auditor, the county purchasing agent, the county engineer, the county director of maintenance, and three members of a citizens' task force. The function of the Committee is to receive written information from interested architectural firms, "evaluate written documents, listen to presentations, research previous work history and then rank them as to the most qualified. The recommendation presented to the [commissioners] court . . . is not in any form binding [on] the court." Letter from Nancy F. Braswell, Smith County Auditor, to Honorable John Cornyn, Attorney General 2 (May 4, 1999) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Braswell letter of 5/4/99]. After the court has "determined the `most qualified,' then the same committee would begin negotiations with that firm, and then the negotiated price [will] be considered by [the] commissioners court." Id. You ask whether the presence of the county judge and one commissioner on the Evaluation Committee violates any open meeting requirement.
The Open Meetings Act, chapter 551 of the Government Code, defines "governmental body" to include, on the state level, "a board, commission, department, committee, or agency within the executive or legislative branch of state government that is directed by one or more elected or appointed members," Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §
There are five members of the commissioners court in Smith County — four commissioners and the county judge. The Evaluation Committee thus consists of less than a quorum of the commissioners court. An entity appointed by a governmental body but containing less than a quorum of members of that governmental body may be subject to the Open Meetings Act, either because it falls within a definition of the term "governmental body" or as a subcommittee of a governmental body. In Attorney General Opinion
But not every body that includes less than a quorum of a governmental body is subject to the Act. In Attorney General Opinion
The Evaluation Committee, which contains less than a quorum of the commissioners court, is not itself a "commissioners court" for purposes of section 551.001(3)(B) of the statute. Nor is it obvious that it may properly be classified as "a deliberative body that has rulemaking or quasi-judicial power and that is classified as a department, agency, or political subdivision of a county" within the meaning of section 551.001(3)(D). Thus we consider whether the Evaluation Committee is subject to the Open Meetings Act based on its membership, which includes two members of the commissioners court.
In our view, the initial work of the Evaluation Committee falls within the ambit of Attorney General Opinion
The negotiation process, however, which begins after the commissioners court has selected the "most qualified" firm, raises different concerns. In Finlan v. City of Dallas,
Likewise, in the situation you pose, the Evaluation Committee is appointed by the commissioners court to conduct negotiations with private parties regarding the expenditure of public funds. Unlike the ranking of architectural firms in the initial stage of the process, from which the commissioners court is at liberty to select the firm that the Evaluation Committee ranked in last place, the result of the negotiating process leaves no room for the commissioners' input: the court must either adopt or reject the contract negotiated by the Evaluation Committee. If the county judge and the commissioner who serve on the Committee agree on the terms negotiated, only one more vote would be needed from the remaining commissioners to adopt the privately-negotiated terms. These circumstances, we believe, render the Committee's work more than advisory and suggest that the commissioners court is more likely to act as a rubber-stamp.
The information you have supplied indicates that "[i]t would be difficult or impossible for the commissioners court to negotiate fees in open court." See Braswell letter of 5/4/99 supra, at 2. Although, contrary to the court in Finlan, we have no reason to believe that the appointment of the Evaluation Committee "was designed to circumvent the Act," neither this office nor any Texas court has recognized that the "difficulty" or "impossibility" of conducting business in public is a valid reason for exempting a governmental body from the command of the Open Meetings Act. To the contrary, the provisions of the Act are to be liberally construed in favor of open government. See Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Board ofTrustees, Austin Indep. Sch. Dist.,
Although we have in our analysis considered the two distinct tasks of the Committee, we do not believe that the Committee's work can be effectively bifurcated for purposes of its compliance with the Open Meetings Act. It would be anomalous to conclude that an identical group of individuals, created by the same appointing power to perform two distinct tasks that nevertheless form a coherent whole, is a "governmental body" at one moment but not the next. If one of its functions renders it a "governmental body" for purposes of the Open Meetings Act, it must be so in all its endeavors. In our opinion, therefore, under the terms of the order of the Commissioners Court of Smith County dated April 12, 1999, appointing an Evaluation Committee, and under the terms of the Request for Qualifications dated March 17, 1999, the Evaluation Committee is a "governmental body" subject to chapter 551 of the Government Code, the Open Meetings Act.
You also ask whether the Evaluation Committee would be a "governmental body" under the Open Meetings Act if the county judge and commissioner are "removed from the committee." Although the question is close, we believe that the exclusion of those individuals would place the Committee more squarely in the category of a strictly "advisory" body, and thus remove it from the designation of "governmental body." The absence of any member of the commissioners court on the Evaluation Committee will necessarily require the court to consider afresh the negotiated contract, without the risk that two members will have already made up their minds. We therefore conclude that, if, under the circumstances you have described, the county judge and commissioner are excluded from the Evaluation Committee, the Committee is more clearly identifiable as an advisory body only. As was said in Attorney General Opinion
Yours very truly,
JOHN CORNYN Attorney General of Texas
ANDY TAYLOR First Assistant Attorney General
CLARK KENT ERVIN Deputy Attorney General — General Counsel
ELIZABETH ROBINSON Chair, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Rick Gilpin Assistant Attorney General
