The Honorable Jana Duty Williamson County Attorney Williamson County Justice Center, Second Floor 405 Martin Luther King Box 7 Georgetown, Texas 78626
Re: County payment to vendors under the Low-Income Vehicle Repair Assistance, Retrofit, and Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Program, and reimbursement to a county from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (RQ-0646-GA)
Dear Ms. Duty:
On behalf of the Williamson County Auditor, you ask about county payment and reimbursement of such payment under the Low-Income Vehicle Repair Assistance, Retrofit, and Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Program (LIRAP) established under chapter 382 of the Health and Safety Code.1 You inform us that the LIRAP provides a method to assist low-income persons whose vehicles cannot meet emission standards. Request Letter,supra note 1, at 1. Under this program, you inform us, an eligible person takes such a vehicle to a participating dealer that repairs or replaces the vehicle. See id. The dealer is entitled to receive certain payments for the repair or replacement from a county participating in the program, and the county is subsequently, as you describe it, "reimbursed" for that payment by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (the "TCEQ"). See id. In 2007, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill 12, which among other changes to the LIRAP, reduced the time period within which a county must make the dealer payment from thirty days to five days. Seeid. at 1-2. You believe that "the five-day payment provision is in conflict with long-standing Texas law that make[s] it a core duty of the county commissioners court, treasurer, and auditor to review and approve all county expenditures." Id. at 2. Thus, you ask:
(1) Can a county make disbursements to vendors under the state [LIRAP] before such expenditures have been approved by the county's commissioners court, treasurer, and auditor?
(2) If the answer to #1 is "No," is the [TCEQ] prohibited from reimbursing a county for expenditures under LIRAP when the *Page 2 required review makes a payment within five business days impossible?
Id. at 1.
I. Legal Background
SectionSection 382.210, at issue here, provides for "Implementation Guidelines and Requirements" for the LIRAP. See id. § 382.210 (caption). In relevant part, Senate Bill 12 added subsection (d), which provides as follows:
A participating county shall provide an electronic means for distributing vehicle repair or replacement funds once all program criteria have been met with regard to the repair or replacement. The county shall ensure that funds are transferred to a participating dealer under this section not later than five business days after the date the county receives proof of the sale and any required administrative documents from the participating dealer.
Id. § 382.210(d) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (emphasis added); Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch.
You generally contend that it is impossible,4 as a practical matter, for a county to comply with the section 382.210(d) five-day time constraint for transfer of funds. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2-3. You explain that a commissioners court in Texas does not meet every business day; it generally meets in a regular session only monthly and in special sessions only weekly. Id. at 3. You also note that a commissioners court may act on a matter only in an open session after giving seventy-two hours prior notice of the matter under the Open Meetings Act. Id.5 Finally, you assert, the county's commissioners court, treasurer, and auditor each have a nondelegable duty to review and approve such an expenditure before it may be paid, and the section 382.210(d) five-day payment requirement, as a practical matter, conflicts with these established duties. See id. at 2-3. Your questions specifically relate to this last contention. See id. at 1.
II. Analysis
A. Disbursement ApprovalsYou first ask whether a county is authorized to disburse funds to participating dealers6 under LIRAP before such expenditures have been approved by the county's auditor, commissioners court, and treasurer. Seeid. at 1. *Page 4
We look at the relevant statutes addressing the duties of the county auditor, the commissioners court, and the county treasurer in disbursing county funds and approving expenditures. Local Government Code section 113.064 provides that in a county with an auditor, "[a] claim, bill, or account may not be allowed or paid until it has been examined and approved by the auditor." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 113.064(a) (Vernon 2008). And "[e]ach claim, bill, and account against the county must be filed in sufficient time for the auditor to examine and approve it beforethe meeting of the commissioners court." Id. (emphasis added). A county auditor may not "delegate to another legal entity or office [the auditor's] responsibility to examine and approve, if appropriate, a claim." Crider v. Cox,
Additionally, section
Finally, section
Texas courts have held that the statutory provisions regarding the commissioners court and the county auditor require them to separately examine and determine whether to approve each claim against county funds. See Crider,
Chapters 113 and 115 of the Local Government Code do not except county payments to the LIRAP participating dealers from the established procedures requiring the county auditor and the commissioners court to separately examine and approve each claim against the county before county funds are disbursed to pay the claim, and requiring the county treasurer to disburse county funds only for payments approved by the commissioners court and the auditor. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 113.001-.903, 115.001-.901 (Vernon 2008).
Nor does any provision in Health and Safety Code chapter 382 addressing the LIRAP except the participant dealer payments from the established review and approval procedures. We note that section 382.211 (a) authorizes a participating county to appoint one or more local advisory panels to advise the county about the LIRAP, "including the identification of a vehicle make or model with intrinsic value as an existing or future collectible." TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 382.211(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Additionally, section 382.211(b) provides that the "commissioners court may delegate all or part of the administrative and financial matters to one or more local advisory panels established under Subsection (a)." Id. § 382.211(b). It is unclear what the Legislature contemplated a commissioners court would "delegate" under this section to an "advisory committee" established under section 382.211. Compare id, with id. § 382.209(g) (expressly authorizing a participating county to contract with an appropriate entity for services necessary to implement the county's LIRAP). But, whatever section 382.211(b) may contemplate, it does not expressly except payments to participating dealers from a commissioner court's well-established and express duty to review and approve all claims against the county before county funds are disbursed for their payment. And in the absence of clear legislative intent to do so, we do not believe that such an exception may be implied by this office. Moreover, section 382.211 (b) does not alter the county auditor's and treasurer's duties with respect to the dealer payments.
Accordingly, in response to your first question, we conclude that a county is not authorized to disburse funds to participating dealers under the LIRAP before such expenditures have been reviewed and approved by the county's auditor, commissioners court, and treasurer as required by Texas law.
B. Commission Reimbursement
You next ask whether the TCEQ is prohibited from "reimbursing" a county for its payments to participating dealers under the LIRAP when the required reviews and approvals of county expenditures makes it impossible7 to make the dealer payment within five business days.See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. You suggest that "[i]n order to reconcile the amended act with existing law . . . the five-day payment requirement . . . must be construed not as a mandatory requirement but as an aspirational goal. The regulations are expressly supposed to be `guidelines.'" Id. at 4. You do not explain the particular legal basis for the view that the TCEQ may be prohibited from reimbursing a county or for the suggested construction of section 382.210 supporting the contrary view. *Page 6
Before addressing your principal question and argument as we understand them, it is necessary to address two of their premises. First, your question and other statements suggest that the statutory timing requirement is a problem because the TCEQ "reimburses" a county for expenditures the county makes with county funds. See id. at 1, 4.
The express statutory scheme requires the TCEQ to distribute available funds to participating counties. See TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. §
The TCEQ informs us that pursuant to the LIRAP, it distributes the available funds to administer the LIRAP to participating counties in proportion to the number of vehicle inspection stickers issued in the prior year. TCEQ's Brief, supra note 4, at 4. The TCEQ explains: "[T]hesefunds are distributed up-front to the counties, who in turn administer the LIRAP. In that respect Williamson County is not reimbursed forexpenditures under LIRAP, but rather receives [its] proportional share of LIRAP funds in advance to administer the program." Id. (emphasis added).
Second, you suggest that the five-day payment requirement is a "guideline" under section 382.210(a). See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 4. This requirement is not a guideline as we understand you to use the term. See TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. §
We now turn to your question and argument. As we understand it, the legal argument here — for the view that section 382.210(d) does not prohibit TCEQ from reimbursing a county for payments made by the county to participating dealers later than five business days when it is impossible to make the payment within five days — would be that the statute's timing requirement is directory rather than mandatory. *Page 7
When a statutory provision requires an act be performed within a certain time without any words restraining the act's performance after that time or stating the consequences of failure to act within the time specified, the timing provision is generally directory. Helena Chem. Co.v. Wilkins,
We consider the language of section 382.210(d). This subsection provides that a "county shall ensure that funds are transferred . . . not later than five business days after the date the county receives" the dealer documentation. TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. §
When, as here, a statute is silent about the consequences of noncompliance, we must also consider the consequences, in light of the statutory purpose, that result from opposing constructions. See HelenaChem. Co.,
Construing the section 382.210(d) language as mandatorily prohibiting the TCEQ from distributing available funds to a participating county — when a county may be unable, consistent with Texas law, to make the dealer payment within the five-day period — would appear to unreasonably punish a county for acts not within its control. Cf. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
In sum, the statutory silence regarding county payments to participating dealers after five days and the consequences of opposing constructions favor construing the section 382.210(d) language "not later than five business days" to be directory. Accordingly, we conclude that the TCEQ is not prohibited from distributing available funds to a participating county when the legally required reviews and approvals by the county auditor, county commissioners court, and county treasurer make county payments to LIRAP dealers within five days impractical. *Page 9
Very truly yours,
GREG ABBOTT, Attorney General of Texas
KENT C. SULLIVAN, First Assistant Attorney General
ANDREW WEBER, Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
NANCY S. FULLER, Chair, Opinion Committee
SHEELA RAI, Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
The [TCEQ] could interpret "receives" to mean when the county is in a position to take action on the transaction. Therefore, the county receives proof of sale and any required administrative documents on the day the Commissioners Court convenes to take action on the transaction. Under this interpretation, Williamson County should be able to comply with the five day provision in the statute.
Id.
