Barnhill, J.

Tbis appeal presents for determination tbe one question : Is tbe Unemployment Compensation Commission an agency of tbe State and is tbis proceeding in fact a proceeding against tbe State?

Tbe determination of tbis question is not affected by tbe fact that individual officers of tbe Unemployment Compensation Commission are made parties defendant. Their acts in respect to wbicb tbe plaintiff complains were performed and are being performed in their official capacity. If tbe Unemployment Compensation Commission is a State agency, then in essence tbe proceeding is against tbe State. 16 Am. Jur., 331; N. C. v. Temple, 134 U. S., 22; S. v. Steel, 134 U. S., 230; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S., 436; Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, 169 A. (Pa.), 571.

In sec. 2, ch. 1, Public Laws, Extra Session 1936, known as tbe Unemployment Compensation Law, tbe Legislature bas declared that “Eco *499 nomic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment is, therefore, a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the Legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden. . . . The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. . . . The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.” The act then creates the Unemployment Compensation Commission and vests it with authority under the provisions of the act to accomplish the purpose thus declared, which purpose is of public interest and a proper subject matter for legislative action.

Provision is made for the assessment, levy and collection of compulsory contributions by employers as defined in the act. The moneys thus collected are paid into the Treasury of the State and are disbursed by the Treasurer of the State on warrants duly issued by the Auditor upon requisition of the Unemployment Commission, and detailed regulations are provided for the receipt, deposit, use, investment and disbursement of said fund thus created. The members of the Commission are appointed by and are accountable to the Governor and are required to file reports and otherwise account to the State in respect to the discharge of their duties under the law. It is likewise provided that there shall be no vested private right of any kind existing as against the power of the Legislature to amend or repeal the law and “all the rights, privileges or immunities conferred by this act or by acts done pursuant thereto shall exist subject to the power of the Legislature to amend or repeal this act at any time.” It seems to us that the express provisions of the act itself, without further argument, are sufficient to clearly designate the Unemployment Compensation Commission an agency of the State.

The contributions, by whatever name designated, are not voluntary but are compulsory and constitute a tax. Nor does the fact that the Legislature has seen fit to segregate the funds derived from the collection of the contributions assessed in a special fund and for a special purpose alter this conclusion. It, in its discretion, has the power to so segregate and earmark revenues of the State. It has done so in other instances, signally in respect to the gasoline and automobile license tax revenue.

It is axiomatic that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts or in any other without its consent and permission. Except in a limited class of cases the State is immune against any suit unless and until it has expressly consented to such action. Rotan v. State, 195 N. C., 291, *500 141 S. E., 733; Carpenter v. R. R., 184 N. C., 400, 114 S. E., 693; Dredging Co. v. State, 191 N. C., 243, 131 S. E., 665; Moody v. State Prison, 128 N. C., 12; U. S. v. Lee, 106 U. S., 196, 25 R. C. L., 412.

An action against a commission or board created by statute as an agency of the State where the interest or rights of the State are directly affected is in fact an action against the State. Dredging Co. v. State, supra; Carpenter v. R. R., supra; Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, supra.

The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 102, Public Laws 1931, is to provide a speedy and simple method of determining the rights, status and other legal relations under written instruments, statutes, municipal ordinances, contracts or franchises and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity created by doubt as to rights, status or legal relations thereunder. Walker v. Phelps, 202 N. C., 344, 163 S. E., 726; Light Co. v. Iseley, 203 N. C., 811, 167 S. E., 56. Here the plaintiff admits its legal status — that of an employer — under the Unemployment Compensation Law, and it concedes its liability to assessment for contributions under that act. In its final analysis this proceeding is to determine whether certain persons rendering services to the plaintiff under contract are employees within the meaning of the act and whether compensation paid to them is to be taken into consideration in estimating the amount of the contribution or tax due by the plaintiff. This is essentially a question of fact. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to provide a ready means of determining rights, status and other legal relations. These are questions of law. While, in some instances, it may be necessary to hear evidence in order to determine the legal questions presented in a proceeding under this act, proceedings may not be maintained under the act to present issues of fact only.

The plaintiff seeks to have the Court judicially determine whether certain of its special agents operating under contract are employees for the purpose of ascertaining its tax liability. Thus, the amount that the State is entitled to collect from the plaintiff, through the Unemployment Compensation Commission, is directly involved and the State is the real party in interest. It would be directly affected and prejudiced by a judgment favorable to the plaintiff.

While the plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief a judgment favorable to it would have, of necessity, the effect of restraining the defendant from proceeding further in its effort to collect from the plaintiff the contributions which defendants contend are justly due under the act, and it is expressly provided that “no injunction shall be granted by any court or judge to restrain the collection of any tax or contribution or any part thereof levied under the provisions of this act.” Sec. 10, ch. 27, Public Laws 1939. The court may not do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly.

*501 Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute for revision, against collection, or for recovery of taxes assessed or collected, the taxpayer must first exhaust the remedy thus provided before the administrative body, otherwise he cannot be heard by a judicial tribunal to assert its invalidity. Distributing Corp. v. Maxwell, 209 N. C., 47, 182 S. E., 724; Hart v. Comrs., 192 N. C., 161, 134 S. E., 405; Maxwell v. Hinsdale, 207 N. C., 37. He must not only resort to the remedies that the legislature has established but he must do so at the time and in the manner that the statute and proper regulations provide. Mfg. Co. v. Comrs., 196 N. C., 747; Pender County v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 50 E. (2d), 747; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. S. Tax Com. of N. Y., 266 U. S., 265; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S., 41, 82 L. Ed., 638.

The Unemployment Compensation Law provides adequate remedies: (1) when liability is denied in whole or in part by an employer the Commission must have a hearing at which such employer is entitled to be present and to be heard. From an adverse ruling by the Commission such contestant may appeal. Sec. 8 (m), ch. 27, Public Laws 1939. It is not inappropriate to note in this connection that on appeal the cause must be entitled “State of North Carolina on relation of the Unemployment Compensation Commission v.” the employer; (2) the protesting employer may pay the tax and sue for its recovery, thereby presenting its claim of a valid defense against the enforcement of the tax for judicial determination; or (3) if the employer is in default the Commission may proceed to collect by civil action in which the employer may present any valid defense he may have. Sec. 14 (b), ch. 1, Public. Laws, Extra Session 1936.

Incidentally, it is asserted in the answer of the defendants that a hearing has been had as provided under the act and that the tax liability of the plaintiff has been duly adjudicated by the Commission. If this be true, whether such adjudication is res judicata is not now presented for determination.

The Legislature has conferred upon the Unemployment Compensation Commission the right and power to determine the rights, status and liabilities of an employer under the terms of the act. Sec. 8 (m), ch. 27, Public Laws 1939. It would seem, therefore, that by express legislative mandate the Unemployment Compensation Commission is the proper forum for determining the very question the plaintiff here seeks to present. In certain respects the Unemployment Compensation Commission is a judicial tribunal and the Declaratory Judgment Act expressly provides that rights, status and other legal relations may' be determined by the courts within their respective jurisdictions. Sec. 1, ch. 102, Public Laws 1931.

*502 In any event, whether we consider the Unemployment Compensation Commission, in this respect, a judicial or an administrative body, plaintiff must assert its right and seek its remedy in accord with the express provisions of the statute.

For the reasons stated we are of the opinion that the court below properly sustained the demurrer.

Affirmed.