Rodman, J.

1. The deed to Coke of the 26th of June,. 1875, does not profess to convey any salt beyond what the grantor, Skinner, had at Long Beach at that date, which he; says was 1800 bushels. The plaintiff does not claim that- *207 After this deed to Coke the grantor bought about 1600' bushels of salt which he stored in the same warehouse with what he had conveyed to Coke, but in such a way that the-two lots were distinguishable. . W'e have no occasion therefore to consider any questions, which might have arisen if' the two lots had been mingled indist-inguishably. On the-15th of May, 1876, Skinner conveyed to plaintiff (among other things) 1600 bushels of salt, all subject to the prior liens, &c., to Moore and Coke. On this salt Coke had no-prior lien and it passed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was-clearly entitled to recover all the salt of Skinner at Long. Beach, bought and carried there after the 26 th of June, 1875,. and being there on the 15th of May, 1876.

2. As to the fishing materials, not including the salt, Skinner by his deed to Coke of the 26th of June, 1875, conveys “ .his entire fishing material, with all the additions to be made to it for use during the spring of 1876, consisting of,. seine, rope, 3 bateaux, 11 cap stands, 86 stands and all the vats, all the said described materials being at Long Beach.”

By the deed of the 15th of May, 1876, above mentioned, Skinner conveyed to the plaintiff “all the fishing material at Long Beach fishery, consisting of one seine, three boats,, windlasses, fish stands, barrels, about 1600 bushels of salt, and kegs, subject to the prior liens, &c.” The plaintiff claims all the barrels and kegs which were at Long Beach at the date of the deed t© him. As to the other matters conveyed, excepting the salt which has been before considered, the plaintiff makes no claim. The defendant contends, that under the general description, “entire fishing material” the barrels and kegs at Long Beach at the date of the deed to him, (June, 1875), were included and were conveyed to him. The term would certainly include the barrels and kegs, if the grantor had not' defined and limited it, by saying “ consisting of” things in which they are not enumerated. It is a settled rule of construction that an enumera *208 tion of particulars following a general expression, controls it, .and limits it to the particulars enumerated. Expressio unius exclusio altervus.

The phrase “consisting of” particulars, from which the barrels and kegs are omitted, leaves the meaning too clear for doubt. 1

3. The addition in the deed to plaintiff, of the words ■“ subject to the prior liens, &o.,” does not add to the scope ■of the previous grant to the defendant, or include in it any thing not included by its own terms. Certain of the articles ■conveyed to plaintiff had been previously conveyed to defendant, and the words “ subject to prior liens, &c.,” must be understood to refer only to the articles which had been before conveyed, to which the expression is adapted, and not to those which had not been before conveyed, to which it is not applicable.

4. The construction which we put on the grant to Coke, makes it, unnecessary to consider what might be the effect ■of a grant of property not then owned by the grantor, but .which he contemplated buying and did afterwards buy. The words in the grant to Coke, “ with all additions to be made to it, &c.,” are evidently confined to the fishing material, as defined by the grantor. They did not relate to the salt, nor to any articles which were not fishing material as defined by the grantor. There was an additional quantity of salt bought, and also of barrels and kegs, but it does not appear that there was any addition to the articles which the grantor enumerates as fishing materials. If there had been, the question would have been presented as to that.

No question is presented between the plaintiff and Pruden.

PER CüRIAM. Judgment affirmed.