I respectfully dissent from the Amended Opinion and Award entered on May 7, 2003 by the majority, which was filed without the opportunity to dissent. I do not agree with the Amended Opinion and Award for several reasons. First, plaintiff has not presented evidence of pulmonary impairment to support the awards pursuant to §
Both the American Medical Association and the American Thoracic Society suggest that a proper diagnosis of "asbestosis" include restrictive abnormality on pulmonary function studies. The American Thoracic Society suggests a "restrictive pattern of lung impairment with a forced vital capacity below the lower limit of normal" and/or a "diffusing capacity below the lower level of normal." The Diagnosis of Nonmalignant DiseasesRelated to Asbestos, (American Thoracic Society, American Lung Association 1986). Plaintiff, fortunately, has not demonstrated that his exposure to asbestos has caused an impairment to the functioning of his lungs, thus, there is no basis to award for "the loss of or permanent injury" to the lungs. Although plaintiff is not required to establish disability in order to recover under §
In addition, plaintiff has presented his case in full and in his motion for reconsideration did not ask to reopen the record. The evidence now before the Commission does not allow us to infer the facts necessary to apply an estoppel theory. While the Full Commission is the ultimate finder of fact and the Rules of Evidence are not strictly applied, the circumstances of this case do not dictate the relitigation of the merits of the case. There is no allegation of new evidence or improper conduct that could not have been reasonably discovered prior to the original Full Commission February 24, 2003, Opinion and Award. Reopening the evidentiary record under the circumstances is contrary to the principles of judicial economy, fairness, and finality.
Without medical evidence in the record that plaintiff had diagnosable asbestosis while working for defendant and that defendant prevented the State from declaring it a "dusty trade" subject to the mandatory monitoring requirements,1 there is no basis to apply an estoppel theory. There is no evidence, available for review, to suggest that plaintiff exhibited signs of asbestosis when he retired on January 1, 1997, or at any other times while defendant employed him. Rather, to the contrary, plaintiff testified that he did not retire due to breathing problems. Plaintiff retired due to macular degeneration and resulting problems with vision. There is no suggestion in this case that plaintiff's eye problems are associated with asbestos exposures. Plaintiff further testified that he suffered from asthma all his life and that his breathing is "not bad." Further, there is no evidence to show that Weyerhaeuser convinced the State to exclude it from the dusty trades monitoring. The deposition of William Stephenson confirms that Weyerhaeuser acted appropriately in sending films to the State Board of Health and that the actions of Weyerhaeuser did not prevent the Industrial Commission from declaring Weyerhaeuser a dusty trade. Thus, there is no basis to apply the estoppel doctrine under the evidence in this case.
S/_______________ DIANNE C. SELLERS COMMISSIONER
