The principal questions presented on this appeal have been disposed of adversely to the appellants by our decision inRasch v. Nassau Electric Railroad Company (
The difficulty with the judgment of the Appellate Division is that it fails to distinguish between the several parts of the judgment of the Special Term. The unqualified recovery awarded by that judgment, which the plaintiff was entitled to enforce by execution, was less than the sum of $3,000. While as to the award for fee damages, it was entirely optional with the defendants to avail themselves of the privilege awarded by that judgment of paying that sum or of abandoning the operation of their road. Instead of reducing either or both of these awards severally, if the learned Appellate Division thought them excessive, as a condition for the affirmance of the judgment, which that court had the power to do, it has made an award of a single sum for both, which was beyond its power. It may be that the action of the Appellate Division will be of no practical injury to the appellants, as in all probability they will pay any fee damages rather than abandon the operation of their railroad; still, as the point is taken by them on this appeal, they have the right to a judgment in the form prescribed by law.
The judgment of Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to that court for a decision in accordance with the suggestions contained in the Rasch opinion, without costs of this appeal to either party.
GRAY, EDWARD T. BARTLETT, WERNER, WILLARD BARTLETT and HISCOCK, JJ., concur; CHASE, J., absent.
Judgment reversed, etc.
