Barbara Gunther, Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel City of Mount Vernon
You have asked whether a municipality may excise from its contracts the clauses required by sections
General Municipal Law, §
The Supreme Court of the United States in Lefkowitz v Turley,
"Until rewritten so as to comply with constitutional standards, Sections 103-a and 103-b of New York's General Municipal Law and Sections 2601 and 2602 of the New York Public Authorities Law are unconstitutional, and the defendants are enjoined from their further enforcement." (Turley v Lefkowitz,
342 F. Supp. 544 ,549 [WDNY, 1972].)
The defendants included the Governor and the Attorney General. The sections have not been rewritten.
We think that you should excise the clause required by section 103-a. At the very least, the clause is unenforceable. In any event, even if one construes the judgment not to extend to enjoining the insertion of the unenforceable clause in contracts, the failure to insert the clause can hardly be considered malfeasance by a contracting officer. Indeed, an argument can be made that inclusion of the clause, knowing it to be unenforceable, is improper, for a contractor not aware of the Turley case might be misled and sign a waiver of immunity not knowing that if he refused to sign, his contract could not be canceled or that he could not be disqualified from further contracts.
Section
We recognize a difference between these two declarations of unconstitutionality. The Salla case dealt only with the preference given to State residents under a section that also gives a preference to residents of areas within the State. We find this a difference of no significance. Section 222 was declared unconstitutional, not just that part of the section that was litigated. Even if there had been a separability provision in the Labor Law preserving parts of the law notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of other parts — see, for example, section
We conclude that the clauses required by sections
