*1 v. HOLLIS DAVIS. * * * for dollars shall full compensation thousand which * * * him in said services behalf of performed by city, all for in actions for the city all fees would otherwise be responsible;” for I have I am expressed, the reasons which of the that and, opinion to bo not action. city ought charged present J. of June By 26,1851, act entitled “An act relating C. Cushing, 2, city Manchester,” court police provided mentioned, court, in that justice section salary police all him be in full for said city, shall services performed by city fees in actions said or the offi- of all prosecutions prosecuted thereof, for which the said city would otherwise be responsible.” cers the same occurs in the act of en- Substantially provision July Manchester; “An act amendment charter city titled and 19,1867, in the act of June “An act to the police entitled relating Manchester,” same occurs, city substantially, provi- court sion. officein con- appointed February, The plaintiff July, change it till 1874. time no During tinued hold made in this from time particular, except by increasing been I believe, has which, never considered unconstitutional. salary, what color or I cannot see claim possible pretence can I am beyond exist. stipulated salary quite fees services of the court case Man- reasoning unable comprehend I hold v. on this think we not to our- chester Potter point, it. I am cannot bound therefore plaintiff selves opinion recover. do not to add J. I am of same desire opinion, any- Ladd, the case of given by my overruling to the reasons thing as that must be to hold that Potter, far overruled

Manchester the language is not entitled It seems to me here recover. plaintiff to admit of doubt. is too plain of the statute Judgment for defendants. Hollis v. Davis. Aug. 13, 1875. intoxication—Act Liability unlawfully

Injuries 1870—

furnishing spirituous liquors. unlawfully fur- 8 of the of 1870,making person 8 of Act chapter Section therefrom, does for injuries resulting nishing liquor responsible spirituous in becomes a person not whom give party furnished, and who was intoxication produced *2 such an so on previously dependent party, person such in- from unlawfully furnishing liquor, resulting damages toxication. Hillsborough

From Circuit Court. declaration, and was a demurrer the questions There Case. J. thereon were transferred to this court arising by Rand, follows : In a The declaration was as of the case for that plea state,* third Laws of this June session chapter passed of Pamphlet £ 1870, A. D. an act in legislature, amendment of being chapter ninety-nine Statutes, relating spirituous of the General sale of of is, enacted, other of disability liquors,5 among tilings, —in any in of intoxication from the use of unlaw person liquor consequence wliom such fully furnished, any injured on person depend recover, ent from the such unlawfully selling any or person furnishing as all or sustained in of liquor aforesaid, damage consequence loss such case; whereas, in an action on the and on injury, recovered Brookline, of in said day November, 1873, county, 26th A'. D. at the said defendant, not of said town of being-then agent Brookline, and there an of sell appointed liquors according ninety- chapter nine of the Statutes of this an act of the being legisla General £ of did ture said state entitled sale of with spirituous force liquor,5 arms, and wit, then and on the 26th there, November, day 1873, and or aforesaid, criminally Brookline sell furnish unlawfully large wit, two to one Peter quantity, of spirituous liquor Smithwick, quarts, Hollis, that on said aver, in said : and the and county plaintiffs day aforesaid, Hollis, last at said said in year Smithwick, Peter conse so intoxication said Smithwick, fur quence liquor unlawfully said use of defendant, or to him, nished sold said Peter aforesaid, as and he, Smithwick, the said Peter became was disabled this, feet of said Peter Smithwick thereby, wit, the were frozen, November, and the said 26th been and Peter, since said still bis continues to be unable to labor or do and anything * The third section of the is as follows: any intoxication shall any Sec. 3. Whenever in a state of commit person injury individual, any any person property person, other who himself, or servant, any part unlawfully liquor Ms clerk or shall sold or furnished have causing all injured damage such shall be liable to the intoxication, oc- done, in the same form of casioned to be recovered action as such to, parties may joined person intoxicated would be liable and both action; any or either from person, same and in case of death the use of intoxication consequence herein or from the specified, received as aforesaid, any person any shall liquor unlawfully who furnished as manner on injured for means whom recover, dependent, may such selling aforesaid, damage or loss furnishing sustained any such case; action on and to be recovered mar- name, may bring ried woman her and recover such such action own to her own use.” thereby said

maintenance, house, became confined to the —and Peter is otherwise disabled: and the further aver, the 26th D. Peter, day November, Hollis, said A. at said himself, unable and hitherto continues became poor and unable of all support himself, prop- to be erty, destitute poor November, said 26th A. D. at said day Hollis, and on not, had nor had since, Peter Smithwick lias he at the said father mother or grandfather, relatives line of grandmother, him, sufficient to maintain grandchildren, children the the Smithwick, standing while so need relief: said Peter aver, aforesaid, further that on last day year plaintiffs hitherto, the said Peter Smithwick had still continues to have his Hollis, in said town of of which Peter settlement reason the said *3 said of D. Smithwick, day November, 1873, Hollis, on 26th A. at said on town of for his was and still continues said Hollis 26th maintenance, by became, and reason whereof it on said support November, 1873, hitherto, A. D. and of overseers of day of of said Hollis to relieve and maintain the said him, town poor Smithwick, the said and and town Hollis then there were Peter —and law liable for the and of said still maintenance continue Smithwick; aforesaid, and for the reasons said town Peter and and great sup- Hollis have been ata charge expense maintaining A. D. Peter, the said the 26th day November, 1873, porting hitherto, therefor, and have and laid out divers sums of money spent of one hundred and dollars and thirty-three sum amounting : cents, hereto, the items as follows according annexed fifty-seven Willoby Peter, $90.00 of Dr. on Attendance week, $5.00 Board, &c., at 38.57 nursing, per ; time, &c., selectmen 5.00 Providing &c.,by board, physician, doing Peter for life rendered his incapable anything And said said town Hollis are and liable thereby life, of said Peter all which the damage during maintenance the sum of one thousand dollars.” they the said say) plaintiffs (as A. plaintiff. W. Sawyer, Laws, 1870, founded sec. 3. upon Pamphlet This action necessary to entitle five action. things party (1) There are A set forth the declaration. dis- disability. disability That (2)

A &c. That is also forth in intoxication, set ability consequence A of intoxication from consequence (3) declaration. are unlawfully furnished. Those matters also so set forth. use of liquor That is forth Any A set declaration. party dependency. (4) recover from may injured person dependent, whom on which unlawfully furnishing any liquor selling — fur- was intoxication, consequence disables Hollis is was Peter, whom person, nished. HOLLIS o. DAVIS. 77 dependent; and that is set forth in the declaration. Damages. (5) Those have resulted to Hollis in Peter. disability of He became poor, unable to If himself. the overseers of the poor Hollis had wilfully neglected refused relieve maintain Peter, they could have been indicted. admits all facts, The demurrer which are well set forth. Where there is sufficient matter substan- tially alleged entitle the to his the declaration will plaintiff action, be good on a Weeks, demurrer. general Dole v. 4 Mass. 451. This law of 1870 is an amendment of 99 of the General Statutes, chapter relating to the ; sale of and in spirituous liquors construing chapter section 3,1870, the court have reference to the general policy the law of the state at the time this law—1870—was 89 enacted. N. H. 321,195 ; N. ; 107; 27 H. 124; 129 N. H. 305 46 N. H. 1 N. H. N. H. 170. The submit that this intended to em- brace within its objects remedies at bar. just The plaintiffs have shown declaration they much so as party, —as father of Peter have might had he and of been alive sufficient Peter, have maintained at said This living Hollis. stat- ute said to be additional to giving right of chapter action to a town which has been damaged, has sustained loss in con- sequence of such town to furnish being obliged relief to the injured person. The plaintiffs contend cases arise under this statute of 1870, when grandfather, the father or mother or grandmother, children or grandchildren, wife, sufficient ability, or city, may be the whom such injured person dependent, hence the one to the action. bring The statute 1870 uses the word party, which is itself, *4 broad enough, of to include male female, individuals; bodies and as well as corporate and politic, hence there is no to call in aid necessity chapter the on construction of stat- utes. terms, The and, contend, as the spirit, plaintiffs sup- ports the position taken, that town or city the on whom such injured person recover, be dependent may &c. Until the plaintiffs hear from the defendant, the rest plaintiffs their brief the statute itself upon as embracing just such case as this.

¿r. N. for Jr., P. the defendant. Sawyer Sawyer, Dodge, I. If the act provision the of July 2, which this upon ac- tion is constitution, valid founded, can be held under our in any case, it nevertheless does not include the case of municipal corporations like the plaintiff town, where the only injury of is the bur- complained den of a true, It is the act pauper’s support. be construed to might include such if it. corporation, sound We policy required contend that sound policy forbids it. It is clear that the of the law in this general policy state, relation to the relief of is, the that the burden shall poor, be made to fall on town or county where the burden of their municipalities may It is support sustained, without risk of others to reducing pauperism. of this the courts

on this of sound public policy ground —that —that Hampshire 4th New Reports— cases and Dover v. early ever since 158—have refused Hillsborough Deering, MoMurphy, for statute', and child liable making support give parent its terms relief, in need of the construction other when or, clearly parent would admit that the least, would seem to at require, held liable for the support should be charged or child sought The language when it for the being. he the means supply * * in the line is, substance, the relations of that statute liable, &c. shall be children, ability, of sufficient father, &c., &c., father, that the in its terms to forbid the construction There nothing it, had if means to pay should &c., be liable support, such is the Indeed, meaning the time the was needed. support understood; and it is only used, commonly as it would be language that it should be so forbids that sound ground policy public is con- that it risk of pauperism, others to the as interpreted subject such as have the ability liability strued limiting the courts to bear the without risk. burden in this which the Now the of the act question, construction is in direct action, to maintain must claim in order of the law on subject of the contradiction of the recognized case, as set forth in of the theory plaintiffs’ paupers. in- was disabled declaration, Smith wick is, that town to for the plaintiff support, made a toxication, pauper thereby the town a remedy act is to give and that intent of the the legislative him a in thus making pauper. for the which it has sustained aof declaration, pauper is the support That in the as claimed his maintenance for permanently life, involving expense crippled, him reduce defendant borne when that expense words, In other all paupers. to the condition family is, in- legislative construction claimed to sustain support- town from public tent of is to relieve the the act throw the burden upon thus ing pauper, made him should be individual, he and thereby dependent upon though converted into public paupers. are part maintenance paupers, Towns, affairs. It is one of administering public governmental machinery law for the to make provision duties of government administering the needy poor. providing adminis- function, government as a part *5 a performing public to affect towns in not intended affairs. The act its tering public their way duties any to change or relations to paupers, their public was intended to ap- business. in reference to sucli public rights or the rela- and establish and to transactions, regulate only to ply private to respect capacity in their private between different persons tions sold. caused by liquor from intoxication injuries resulting a application. wider of the act requiring in the terms There nothing its limiting its to all are given Tull force effect

HOLLIS v. DAVIS. to it was not application such transactions, by holding private intended to which intoxication, by include a disability consequence disabled was for made a an party injury pauper, town is to have a remedy. There are five the act different cases the third specified section for which a involving action is and all of remedy there them given, such hus- private child, relations as that of personal parent band and other, or, and an wife, to either with a to remedy injury without or on an involving relation, founded to injury with property to remedy the party injured. They are, (1)— another, case of injury, by intoxicated, one to the or property with a remedy to disability such other of the death the case or (2) injury, the person de- with a to remedy any person pendent on him for or disa- means the case of death support; (3) bility de- consequence on intoxication, remedy with a such person to pendent him; the case of death or (4) disability injury received, with on whom remedy injured person dependent; the case of (5) death of intoxication, with a on whom remedy injured person dependent. In the first case, direct to the the rem- injury to whom edy given. In one, each of the four other the direct is to injury the remedy to another, account of be- the relation of dependence them; tween two husband, of the cases being injury the parent, or child, his relation supporting with to the de- dependant, remedy for pendant the loss of such two, support; to "thedepend- ant, with a remedy husband, child, caused parent, damage A thereby. sixth case, embraced could easily have provided after the adding words in- on whom such jured person may be the third dependent,” section, the words become by reason of such dependent amendment injury.” Such would have for the provided case of son hot emancipated on his father, of sufficient the means of because support, himself supporting labor, own but made on him by reason of the But with injury. even we amendment, respectfully submit that the act could not be construed to embrace the plaintiffs’ without an declaration of express such intention above ground that considerations of presented; struction without such would forbid such con- public policy only amendment, declaration. It needed towns, made expressly render the act as a applicable spec- perfect imen fanaticism. Is legislative expected act is to be extended by judicial construction to the case of an a town, one a by making for it to pauper when the is to a given ? subject liability may make whole family paupers II. 1 Law, Grim. The law it the Bishop 329, says, deems —“ of citizens good crimes, of an prosecute especially aggra nature,” vated and that he who his civil suit a crimi prosecutes {< nal must come into court Lord with clean in the words of hands,” or, *6 HOLLIS v. DAVIS. “ must show stands on a fair Kenyon, that he when lie calls ground him;” and the court administer relief to lie adds, “Therefore, ta — felony one who has suffered from a cannot maintain the felon against a civil until has he first in car discharged duty the public on, least, foot a criminal rying without this he would not stand hands. or, setting prosecution,” court, ou a fair with clean ground, In section he states the reason this rule of law to be, that this stimulant to induce men to felons to bring justice the law. This is required by recognized as the reason policy J., 239; by Kichardson, the rule C. in Bank v. 4 N. H. Flanders, Rideout, the same learned case though judge, Peltmgill 6 N. H. 454, he is not that the rule is of says satisfied any practical remembered, use in any country, yet, the legislative policy of this as to the heinousness was not in his rumselling, day what it now Had it been, is. would that learned have failed judge see that, wisdom and of such theory beneficence entitling construction, its legislation to a liberal duty the court the stimulant of the rule of law as one re apply ? This common law rule to the case quired of legislative policy applies felonies, but only for the reason of the nature of those aggravated crimes. When the exalt a misdemeanor into such a legislature grade lieinonsness, of visions, as the sum of all extraordinary felonies” —that pro those of this for its necessary like are deemed suppression —the law' reason of the rule alike that it require be not be to such submit that this action can cases. We applied respectfully arising maintained alleged offence, without an amendment to declaration that the duty public has set on foot performed prosecution punishment offender, his conviction of the offence.

A. W. reply. Sawyer,

I. The question damages, any given whether recoverable and his law, family, under this will make rumseller cannot pauper into to this statute: such be taken consideration construction giving law; transgresses while rumseller before consequences open also, —so, considering question open legislature, law, sale of liquor whether the indiscriminate passage not made and will not make paupers. II. The of Hollis or their selectmen can- suggestion town not with for the civil their permitted proceed until has no force they duty, against have their performed public the fact that this rum was furnished in Bi’ookline, alleged the declaration: of Hollis does not duty selectmen public beyond extend the limits of Hollis. What can be referred public to for Hollis to do Brookline selectmen quite apparent. law, of Hollis under this duty, have their always performed public law Hollis: Hollis rumsellers other violators rumsellers. selectmen have no over Brookline jurisdiction *7 HOLLIS v. DAYIS. fourth in unlimited damages is admitted that this act gives It or of in That is the case death his case cited the defendant brief. received, with a and it bemay suggested dependent;

whom the injured person as to reduce an extent to such that the fact of recovering damages cause for be a may good in such pauperism defendant de- be a act; but, submitted, it cannot or amending repealing if to these Now, damages given plaintiffs are fence to the action. are, they fifth as the submit plaintiffs under the defendant’s it not sound clause, admits in his first were as the defendant also may be to damages recovery is it defence to a policy, ? and his family of the defendant such an extent as to make pauper action, allow to bring of would Hollis The admission the defendant Take first it. cited, if sound required under the fifth case policy A had obtained this act. Suppose case named the defendant under defendant, A, while unlawfully, sold or furnished of this intoxicated, belonging of one of oxen legs had broken and own are town contend, they town : the because plaintiff under this oxen, an action having that that docs not them deprive law; or bailee per- town be trustee personal property, —the town under this sonal and an action accrue to plaintiff property, act. in It that no son New urged, Hamp- bo further suggested than Peter is shire can on his father for be more dependent commenced when on Hollis for That dependency support. dis- rum. Peter then became he intoxicated with the defendant’s got disability, this abled. The on account of resulting and, contend, construction, a fair as the plaintiffs upon in impartial whether terms, whom Peter gives upon dependent, or grandchil- father or mother or children grandmother, grandfather, or of action. dren, ability, city, right sufficient admits, in his learned counsel for the defendant J. Smith, this is founded, that the act argument, might if sound policy to include a municipal corporation, construed law, this that the general policy it. It is claimed required is, burden shall that tbe to the relief of the state, poor, relation fall where the burden of municipalities, made to their on town county others risk of reducing be sustained without the early since the cases courts in this ever and that the pauperism v. ib. 158, N. H. and Dover Deering, McMurphy, and child liable for Hillsborough statute, making parent have refused the give relief, the construction which of the other when need wit, admit, would or, least, its terms would seem to require, held liable for should be sought charged or child parent it, being. for the time means to when supply contended of the act claimed, question, further that the construction in direct contra- action, to maintain order plaintiff vention of the the sup- on the recognized the law subject port paupers. The rela- as follows: statute referred tions of grandfather, mother poor person, the line father grandmother, children shall grandchildren, ability, sufficient If liable to maintain such of relief. when need standing has no wherein of sufficient the town ability, relations such person has a settlement shall be liable for legal support.” Stats., statute, Gen. 74, sec. 8. In to this construction giving court, Colebrookv. rule Stewarstown, 30 N. H. laid down the follows: The the exist- *8 is to be decided with reference to question * * his ing relative, state of If state things. present means, his rela- and in family state of destitution present tives their assist- themselves, to afford the cannot support ance their amount situation his below calls without reducing property to required, with his afford a comfortable labor, is future, he family, thus their comfortable hazarding not to be meaning deemed of sufficient within the ability, person the statute.” To the same effect are Hillsborough Deering Dover v. McMurphy, supra. It will noticed, statute, be that in relation to the pau- ” “ pers, will ability only. that burden of sufficient imposes on relations noticed, also be this suit that, the act upon founded, the must that be qualification, charged be person sought affords sufficient ability, is omitted. The omission of these words n sufficient strong grounds for the that qualification inference ability was not statute, intended to unquestionably, apply. was intended to the sale be in aid of the general prohibiting title; and its are such spirituous Such is its liquors. provisions that, when aid in enforced, they materially must the enforcement seem Statutes. It would provisions ch. 99 of the General that the its say to those who to violate legislature might intended seek use

provisions, like this: “The indiscriminate effect, something of intoxicating prolific source of much of the liquors povei'ty, and crime Its limited suffering, and sale, of the state. certain except shall, forbidden. If one notwith-

proper purposes, therefore any its sale is violate the of the law standing wilfully prohibited, conviction, shall, in that suffer fine or regard, imprisonment. But, violated, inasmuch as has shown that the law is often experience certain, and the not detection and conviction of the we guilty always will, therefore, throw around the citizens of state an additional one who shall dare to violate this law protection, by to every subjecting damages in con- liability may whatever making good happen from sequence the intoxication of the use of any person furnished, that maybe although consequence him- reduced to subjected thereby poverty, self and his family made liable become a thereby public charge their in minds of such a result support.” might, apprehension DA

HOLLIS v. VIS. restraint legislature, considered an additional upon persons who would not law in this If otherwise hesitate to disobey respect. had not liable towns for intended to include persons theJLegislature unlaw- injury fully of intoxication paupers, liquors furnished, it would such a construction have guarded the statute by inserting excluding liability, except language of sufficient ability. “ ”(cid:127) The term to in- enough used in is also broad the statute “ clude that municipal corporation. The act provides ” who shall inbe manner injured person dependent “ recover. Person” is here the word to be for none employed, proper but persons could A on another cor- dependent municipal person. “ poration nor in on a for means dependent support,” “ any other sense. The act next on whom provides such injured person may be recover. If instead of “ “ the word party” had it could person” used, doubtless ex- tended to bodies as well as indi- applied corporate politic, Stats., viduals—Gen. but from the fact the legisla- ture used the word individuals and not person” only where corpora- ations could be dependent, and used the word where an “party” injured person might be on a corporation well municipal individual, as on an term that, there is reason for strong holding party,” to include legislature intended municipal corpora- *9 tions as well as individuals. Before this view of dismissing necessary case, hardly add, that if the question of liability ability depends upon person sought be it charged, would by be a fact to be settled the jury upon the trial. The defendant admits that there five different cases specified third section of act, remedy for which a action is by there given, and all of them involving such relations private as that of personal child, parent husband and an wife, and to either with remedy to the or other, relation, without such founded on an involving injury is also person or with a property, injured. party admitted, if, after on auy the words whom such in- jured may be person section, in the third the words dependent,” may “or become case not by added, reason of had been dependent such a sixth for, embraced in the act would have been so as in- provided clude the case of an sufficient not on his son father of emancipated dependent the means of because supporting himself support, his own by labor, but made on him reason of dependent by the injury: although such amendment the defendant contends that the act could not be construed to case without embrace plaintiffs’ declaration intention, of such express above ground presented; that considerations of would forbid such construction public without such declaration. The first of section 3 part relates to the case solely injury by one intoxicated to or with a person another, remedy property v. HOLLIS DAYIS.

such no to so much of other. As to the construction to be given raised, to the form question raised, none was except the section N. H. action, 614. The remainder Bodge Hughes, fhe fifth cases second, third, fourth, and includes the undoubtedly act mentioned in the defendant’s But it is claimed that brief. does not of a is not at the include the case who person dependent depend- that in order to include a who becomes injury: person ent in depend- of such words or become injury, may in- ent serted, or be reason of such words of like should injury,” import, read, who shall be so the section would “any person in- such manner reason of become dependent, may dependent on jury, such for means of whom such or may be become injured person may dependent, reason sell- of such recover from the injury, ing,” &c. And I think the defendant is the construction right fur- who contends for. If the intended make legislature nishes caused intoxicating such a liable for liquor, person intoxicated liquor, damages happening him if the injury the relation of did not exist the time dependency was caused or but was created reason of such injury, happened, making has failed so. The reason say equally good case; as in the former but the legislation question the latter apply ? is not so enacted whether it so to but legislature apply, used, who shall be in manner language depend- any person —“ ent,” or, “any cannot dependent,”— whom injured person maybe be- to mean who shall become any person construed words, according come of such intoxication. The by reason to their to the time of the injury, common and refer usage, approved Stats., Gen. to time and must be construed. subsequent, used, 2. is to gathered language The intention to a case not embraced cannot be extended construction by judicial legislative within act. If it had been the the fair construction of the after the intent to happening extend the act to eases dependencies would have hardly the framers of the act thereby, caused not misunder- failed to stood. that could language themselves express *10 As within the terms the stated the declaration does come case the the demurrer must be sustained. taken, J. able and very ingen- C. The the position Cushing, “ defendant, that the term which is used ious for the argument party include corporations, this statute as to in the statute does not necessarily municipal of our law so to construe that word it I believe the use make embrace such corporations. party, litigants, is too well established to sense of one of two opposing in the folio It dictionary. defined Johnson’s now is so questioned. be would as it natural to the word to make be as and as so construe easy as I contrary. exclusion of individuals, corporations mean this of the case. therefore accede to view cannot taken, also the offence position unlawfully selling spirituous heinous, our law so that it by ought considered liquor be considered so far a that no action be sus- felony private tained until But I the offender has first been indicted and convicted. believe before aud the rule conviction of the offender requiring prosecution state, and, a civil action has never been held in this as allowing the offence not felony, statute declared be the offender can- not be this entitled to immunity. The statute under which this action is brought substantially, provides, that when intoxicated him any sold to person liquor unlawfully shall do any others, so person property by person injured shall be to a entitled recover his remedy of the so The statute then selling liquor. these proceeds “ words : and in death any case of the either person, as or in injury received herein of in- specified, toxication aforesaid, from the use of furnished person who shall inbe manner on such dependent for means of or any on whom such injured person may be recover.” dependent, may part the statute the -words above quoted relates preceding wholly to the for a by another in state of in- person injured toxication. The of the statute portion quoted above refers entirely its terms to such injured and does not refer to the person, in- on, toxicated. In order make the statute embrace the case declared “ it would be necessary insert after words injured person,” the words or such intoxicated so that it should road, person, any person who shall bein manner such injured such in- dependent person, toxicated I do not think that the court would person, <j-c. be justified statute, into this in its interpolating highly penal character, such important words, reason of of the any intention legislature which might be to be inferable from of the supposed statute. If the rest legislature this, intended it has it. I think not said do not that, by any fair construction statute, of this it terms can be made in this par- ticular to embrace case in the declaration. alleged In the defendant’s is taken, argument position terms is intended at dependent,” statute, who the time or on on the whomthe actually dependent plaintiff, plain- was and that these terms do not actually embrace dependent, tiff cases which intoxicated, or the were injured, depend- ent on themselves, and became on the reason this dependent the injury or : that in intoxication. For instance might Smitliwiek, at the time of the injury, capable supporting him- self, and town; so was not on the or he might, able, have had within the terms of son, obliged, our statute, him, and so not afterwards taken from him. In order to support might make to insert necessary embrace this it would be after words further words dependent,” may afterwards *11 HOLLIS v. DAYIS. I do statute which of the meaning enlargement dependent,—ail I think these reasons

not think to make. For the court demurrer must be allowed. statute, towns the terms, Ladd, J. in very imposes upon The general limits, who their within duty relieving maintaining ch. Stats., Gen. themselves. may be unable poor support in favor a right, sec. 1. correlative implies thus created obligation un- in case become they of all and maintained to be relieved persons, of the rich as in favor able to This exists right themselves. support difference, so far as regards as no well and it makes poor; to necessity by reduced a be whether obligation upon act of or careless wrongful his own another, fault, misconduct or imposed The obligation or misfortune. accident pure in its character as a humane law, general municipal public amount of money

the law for certain raising which imposes schools; right support and the support corresponding mass of rights from the great of a nature distinguished hardly the state: laws the inhabitants conferred simply other upon public and humane laws. The one of good government the benefits thus is, expense, public whether this question right a relation dependence secured to all to establish by law, can be said the matter within fairly between the so as to bring citizen and the allegation is, Laws of 1870. meaning himself, on the very Smithwick and unable to support became poor, defendant; and him the furnished day illegally town before his it aid from the docs not bad received that he appear therefore, hold the order, dec- In caused as there shown. disability, law makes every sufficient, laration must be held pauper the town which rich as one, well as poor, I clearly of 1870. am live, act meaning within the they demurrer ground, so, that, upon this cannot be opinion must sustained. to me, case. seems is as go This far as we need present intent to legislative whether however, that it much doubt admits of 1870, with act of respect towns remedies of the within the include in the act. is to found paupers, liability their charity on public sup- all are sense, In some perhaps, away misfortune fly wings to themselves Riches take port. least reason apprehend who have those overtake poverty of furnishing support them: but the expense calamities that the to one await no want, greater against thus reduced man, who has been of another the property protecting incurred expense than the little more imme- only the benefit Indeed, violence of a mob. all by secured to of benefits mass and direct than the great diate life, liberty, laws for the protection due administration of general under of the statute interpretation correct Whether property. demurrer should shows other ground upon consideration inquire. not now sustained, we need sustained. Demurrer