REQUESTED BY: Senator Ed Schrock Nebraska State Legislature
LB 479, as amended by AM7164 and AM2713, includes a number of changes and additions to Neb. Rev. Stat. §
Section 5 of AM7164, as does § 13 of AM2644 to LB 1065, amends §
In Op. Att'y Gen. No. 04005 (February 6, 2004), we concluded that LB 479, as amended at that time by AM0852, by "alter[ing] the definition of a `new ethanol facility' eligible for ethanol tax credits under §
If, during any month, the amount of money in the Ethanol Production Incentive Cash Fund is not sufficient to reimburse the Highway Trust Fund for credits earned pursuant to section
Our prior opinion, of course, determined that ethanol production agreements entered into between the State and ethanol producers pursuant to §
Further, "'[e]very contract is made with reference to, and subject to, existing law, and every law affecting contracts is read into and becomes a part thereof. This is true between individuals dealing between themselves by contract, express or implied and it is likewise true between individuals and the government.'" Pfeifer v. Abeidinger,
Thus, it appears that neither agreements executed between the State and producers nor current statutes address the timing of transfer of ethanol tax credits. Further, §
"There is no vested right in an existing law which precludes its amendment or repeal, and there is no implied promise on the part of the state to protect its citizens against incidental injury caused by changes in the law." Tom and Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n,
In Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95043 (May 25, 1995), we noted that new statutory language imposing an additional requirement on ethanol producers in order to qualify for tax credits could not be applied to affect preexisting ethanol production credit agreements. We concluded giving retroactive effect to the statute to impose a new requirement on producers which had previously executed agreements with the State would unconstitutionally impair vested contract rights. Id. at 2. Since the amendment expressed no intent to be applied retroactively, we determined it operated only prospectively, and thus did not affect existing agreements. Id. at 3. See also Op. Att'y Gen. No. 96031 (April 12, 1996) (Amendment imposing additional restriction on ethanol producers to qualify for credits interpreted to apply prospectively so as not to impermissibly impair existing ethanol production credit agreements).
Consistent with our prior opinions, the amendments to §
As we concluded in response to your previous question, we see no constitutional impediment to amending the requirements for qualification of a "new ethanol facility" and making those requirements applicable to agreements entered into after the effective date of the act, even if that is prior to the current June 30, 2004 production deadline. Producers, or potential producers, that have not executed agreements pursuant to §
Art.
The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, that is to say:
* * *
Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise whatsoever . . . in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
A legislative act can violate art. III, § 18, if the act (1) creates a totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification, or (2) creates a permanently closed class. Bergan Mercy Health System v. Haven,
"[A] classification which limits the application of the law to a present condition, and leaves no room or opportunity for an increase in the numbers of the class by future growth or development, is special, and a violation of [the special legislation clause]. . . ." City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann,
The issue of whether application of this provision creates an improper closed class depends on whether only an identifiable number of ethanol producers could, in actual probability, meet the fifteen million gallon requirement by October 1, 2004. The mere possibility that more than a predetermined number of producers may satisfy this requirement is not sufficient to avoid a finding that a closed class exists. We are not in a position to assess this potential, as it involves evaluating facts not provided for our analysis. Our advice is limited to stating that this is the legal standard which must be satisfied in order to meet any constitutional challenge to this provision if it is attacked as creating an impermissible closed classification.
Sincerely,
JON BRUNING Attorney General
L. Jay Bartel Assistant Attorney General
Approved:
____________________________ Attorney General
pc: Patrick O'Donnell Clerk of the Legislature
