REQUESTED BY: Dear Senator:
This is in response to your request for an opinion as to the constitutionality of LB 372, as amended. You state that you are particularly concerned about the provisions of the bill which exempt child care from licensing requirements by the Welfare Department in counties whose population is less than 55,000.
LB 372 is to amend section
To put it simply, the effect of the bill is to maintain licensing requirement for day care in the home in Lancaster and Douglas Counties, but to eliminate such requirements elsewhere. Section
"No person shall furnish, or offer to furnish, child care for two or more children from different families without having in full force and effect a written license. . . ."
As a result, a resident of a less populated county could provide services for five children in the home for twelve continuous hours a day without a license, but a resident of Lancaster County could not do so, and would be subject to section
In City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann,
Proponents of LB 372 apparently believe that the parents of a child in outstate counties can more readily determine the character of the operator of the child care business and the condition of the facility from the standpoint of safety than such parents in Lancaster or Douglas Counties. We suggest that such a position is illusory, particularly in cities such as Columbus, Hastings and Grand Island which are all relatively industrialized with the accompanying commuting, mobile populations.
To further emphasize the fact that such classification is suspect, let us compare the situation in the small town in a highly populated county to a relatively large city in a less populated county. A person who wanted to provide day care services for children in Raymond, Nebraska (Lancaster County) (population under 500) would be subject to licensing, yet a person from Grand Island (Hall County) (population 35,000) would be exempt.
For the reasons set out above, it is our opinion that the constitutionality of LB 372 is suspect.
You also ask for our opinion as to whether, if the population distinction is unconstitutional, the severability clause protects the remaining elements of the bill.
The rule is that where invalid portions of a statute are so interwoven with the rest of the act so that the act may not be operative with the void portions eliminated or where it is obvious from an inspection of the act that the invalid portion formed the inducement for the passage of the act, the whole act fails. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann,supra; Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood,
In summary, it is the opinion of this office the LB 372 is suspect for the reason that the population classification is an artificial and baseless classification and this violates the provisions of the Constitution prohibiting local and special legislation.
