Dear Ms. Prewitt:
This is in response to your request for an opinion on the following questions:
Does the county court of a Missouri county of the third class have the authority to close public roads within the county without following the statutory procedures set forth in Chapter 228, RSMo?
Does it have the authority to enter into an agreement not to maintain a public road?
In addition, you inform us:
The county court of Oregon County has agreed with the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, to close a portion of the "Bliss Springs" road in Oregon County. . . . Residents in the area where the road is located are questioning the authority of the county court to close the road.
There are two issues involved. One is whether the road is in deed a public road, which should be decided by the courts. The other issue, on which an opinion is sought, is whether, assuming that a road is public, the county court has the authority to agree to close it to public use without following the procedures outlined in Chapter 228, RSMo. governing vacation of roads. If not, does the court have authority to agree not to maintain a public road?
We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that Bliss Springs Road is a public road.
Vacation or abandonment of a public road can only be accomplished in accordance with statutory procedures. See Sections
Once a road has been established as a public road, the right to use the road vests in the public. Gerst v. Flinn,
Section
Section
In view of the foregoing, we believe a county court must strictly comply with the procedures of Section
Your second question asks whether the county court entrusted with the duty to repair or maintain the public roads may cease to maintain a public road not vacated pursuant to statute or found to be abandoned. Generally, vacation or abandonment of the public road relieves the county of its duty to maintain because title to a vacated or abandoned road reverts to the abutting land owners in fee to the center of the road. State ex rel Reynolds County v.Riden,
Section
CONCLUSION
It is the opinion of this office that the county court of a third-class county must comply with Section
This opinion, which I hereby approve, was drafted by my assistant, Mary Stewart Tansey.
Very truly yours,
JOHN ASHCROFT Attorney General
