Dear Representative Mueller:
This opinion is in response to your question:
Does a county court have authority under the "County Aid Road Trust" constitutional and statutory provisions, to require special road districts, or township road districts in the township organization counties, to furnish matching funds in actual dollars or otherwise in construction or work of any kind on the roads, in order to receive these CART funds under the CART fund program?
We assume that by "County Aid Road Trust" you refer to the apportionment of motor vehicle fuel tax revenues mandated by Article IV, Section 30(a).1, Missouri Constitution (as amended 1979).1 The constitutional provision creates a plan whereby the revenues generated by a tax "upon or measured by fuel used for propelling highway motor vehicles" are apportioned between the counties, cities, and state. The plan may be summarized as follows:
1. Ten percent of the tax proceeds remaining after certain deductions is placed in a special trust fund known as the "County Aid Road Trust Fund." Amounts from this fund are credited to the various counties according to the following formula:
One-half on the ratio that the county road mileage of each county bears to the county road mileage of the entire state as determined by the last available report of the state highways and transportation commission and one-half on the ratio that the rural land valuation of each county bears to the rural land valuation of the entire state as determined by the last available report of the state tax commission, except that county road mileage in incorporated villages, towns or cities and the land valuation in incorporated villages, towns or cities shall be excluded in such determination, except that, if the assessed valuation of rural lands in any county is less than five million dollars, the county shall be treated as having an assessed valuation of five million dollars.
Fifteen percent of the remaining net tax proceeds is allocated to incorporated Missouri cities, towns, and villages having a population of more than 100 inhabitants. All remaining net proceeds are allocated to the state.
2. Those funds credited to each county are required to be used by the county "solely for the construction, reconstruction maintenance, and repairs of roads, bridges and highways." Article
Pursuant to its constitutional prerogative, the General Assembly provided other provisions and restrictions in Section
1. All moneys received by a county from the county aid road trust fund shall be used within the county solely for the construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repairs of roads, bridges and highways as the county court shall direct. The county court shall formulate by written regulations, rules and policies for the use of such funds which shall be kept on file by the county recorder for public inspection. The state [highways and transportation] commission shall have no authority to promulgate rules and regulations concerning the expenditure of such funds and all such rules and regulations heretofore promulgated shall be null and void.
2. The state treasurer by the tenth day of each month shall remit to the county treasurer of each county its allocated share of the county aid road trust fund.
Section
You have informed us that,
Board members of a special road district are told by the presiding judge of the county what repairs will be made on the road supported by the special road district fund and the amount of money the special road district must pay. If they do not wish to comply, they are not recognized for state funds the following year.
For purposes of this opinion only, we assume that the presiding judge of the county is acting pursuant to a plan promulgated by the county, as required by Section
Careful examination of Article
We have examined Chapter 233, RSMo, entitled "Incorporated Road Districts" and find therein no legislative indication, express or implied, that special road districts organized thereunder are entitled to CART funds. Sections
Sections
Under the rule of statutory construction that "the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another," Harrison v.MFA Mutual Insurance Co.,
CONCLUSION
It is the opinion of this office that a county court, pursuant to a plan adopted in accordance with Section
The foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve, was prepared by my assistant, Charles R. Miller.
Yours very truly,
JOHN ASHCROFT Attorney General
enclosures: Op. No. 39 2-6-64, Balkenbush
Op. Ltr. No. 99 3-17-81, Morrison
Op. No. 320 8-21-70, Proffer
