Suit was begun by filing statement of claim in a justice court in Kaw Twp., Jackson County. On change *Page 581 of venue it was taken to the court of another justice of the peace where a trial resulted in judgment for defendants and plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. About eight months after the cause was docketed in the circuit court, defendants filed a motion to affirm the judgment entered in the justice court, on the ground that no statutory written notice of appeal was served upon defendants within ten days before the second term of the circuit court after the appeal was perfected. After said motion to affirm was filed, plaintiff served notice to take depositions upon defendants, though for what purpose said depositions were to be taken does not appear of record. Defendants failed to appear at the time and place mentioned in the subpoenas and notice to take depositions, whereupon plaintiff filed a motion in the assignment division of the circuit court to overrule defendant's motion to affirm the judgment, invoking section 5417, Revised Statutes 1919, which provides that "if a party upon being duly summoned to take his deposition, fail to so appear his pleadings may be rejected or his pending motion overruled on motion of the adverse party." Said motion was sustained by the court on February 14, 1922, and thereafter defendants' motion to affirm the judgment was overruled and such orders were duly entered of record.
Some fourteen months thereafter and on May 8, 1923, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and on May 12th thereafter, plaintiff filed its motion to strike from the file defendants' said motion to dismiss the appeal. On May 12, 1923, the cause was duly assigned to Division No. 6 of the circuit court for the purpose of passing upon defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal and plaintiff's motion to strike from the files. On May 19th evidence was heard upon the issues presented by the said motions and orders were entered overruling plaintiff's motion to strike and sustaining defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal, and judgment was entered accordingly. Motion for a new trial being unsuccessful plaintiff appeals. *Page 582
The main issue in this appeal is whether or not statutory notice of appeal from the justice court was given. Other points are raised in the briefs, but as we view the matter they are merely incidental to the question of notice. The record shows the appeal to the circuit court was not taken on the day judgment was rendered in the justice court and written notice was necessary under the provisions of section 2907, Revised Statutes 1919, wherein it is provided:
"If the appellant shall fail to give such notice at least ten days before the second term of the appellate court, after the appeal is taken, the judgment shall be affirmed or the appeal dismissed at the option of the appellee."
And section 2905 provides: "If the appeal be not allowed on the same day on which the judgment is rendered, the appellant shall serve the appellee, at least ten days before the first day of the term at which the cause is to be determined, with a notice in writing, stating the fact that an appeal has been taken from the judgment therein specified."
Under section 2906 "if the appellant shall fail to give notice of his appeal when such notice is required, the cause shall, at the option of the appellee, be tried at the first term, if he shall enter his appearance on or before the second day thereof, or at his instance, shall be continued as a matter of course until the succeeding term, at the cost of the appellant; but no appeal shall be dismissed for want of such notice. When, however, the appellee enters his appearance and demands trial as provided for by this section and the appellant fails to appear, the judgment on motion of appellee shall be affirmed."
It is insisted by plaintiff that the court, in the first instance, properly sustained plaintiff's motion to overrule defendants' motion to affirm the judgment; and properly overruled defendants' motion to affirm, basing this view primarily upon the provisions of section 5440, Revised Statutes 1919, which provides that any party to *Page 583 a suit pending in any court in this State may obtain the deposition of any witness to be used in such suit, conditionally. There can be no question that this statutory right exists, and we do not understand that defendants deny this right.
It is provided by section 5417 that if a party being summoned refuse to attend and testify, either in court or before any person authorized to take depositions, besides being himself punished as for a contempt, his petition, answer or reply may be rejected, or a motion, if made by himself, overruled, or if made by the adverse party, sustained.
It was held in Ex Parte Munford,
It is urged by defendants that the appeal was not pending for lack of legal notice. This brings us again to the main question at issue, to-wit, the legality of such notice. It is insisted by defendants that the court was without jurisdiction of the parties to entertain and pass upon plaintiff's motion to overrule defendants' motion to affirm. We accept this view as being correct. After the motion to affirm, setting out as the reason therefor that no legal notice of appeal had been given, plaintiff served its notice to take depositions and also had subpoenas served upon defendants and their attorneys, neither of whom appeared for the taking of such depositions. For this reason plaintiff filed its motion to overrule defendants' motion to affirm. This motion to overrule was sustained and the motion to affirm was overruled.
On the face of the record and as a basis for the motion to affirm, the question of notice of appeal was presented. The court is without jurisdiction to proceed with *Page 584
a case when its jurisdiction is dependent upon a condition precedent. [McMenamy v. Stillwell,
It must be concluded, therefore, that before the court could proceed with the consideration of plaintiff's motion to overrule, it must have some evidence that notice of appeal was given. This was the very question raised by defendants' motion to affirm. There was no evidence of this nature before the court.
We think defendants were justified in failing to appear at the taking of depositions as there is no showing of record that such depositions were to be used on consideration of the pending motion to affirm. Had defendants appeared at the taking of the depositions, in response to notice thereof, they would have entered appearance and thereby waived their right to have the judgment affirmed.
In the case of Bates Wright v. Scott Bros.,
As defendants' motion to affirm directly raised the question of notice of appeal, we must hold that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to proceed with the case without evidence on this point; and the record discloses there was no such evidence at that time. [Drake v. Gorrell, supra.] It follows logically that the action of the court in sustaining plaintiff's motion to overrule the motion to affirm was error.
It was held in State ex rel. v. Seehorn,
The ruling in the case of Daugherty v. Perky, 177 S.W. 786, is in point, wherein it is said: "Though jurisdiction of the cause has been lodged in the circuit court, jurisdiction of the person of the appellee must be obtained either by service of the statutory notice, or by his voluntary general appearance in court."
In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that there was a voluntary general appearance of defendants in court. In our view of the law as applied to the situation here presented, defendants were within their rights in filing the motion to dismiss the appeal in the second instance, the former action of the court being a nullity, for want of jurisdiction.
This brings us to the decisive question in the case, to-wit, Was there a legal notice of appeal served on defendants? It is plaintiff's contention that such legal notice was served, while the testimony at the hearing of defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal shows that no *Page 586
attempt was made by plaintiff to serve notice of appeal on defendants save by registered mail. In the case of Dalton v. Railroad,
"The term `personal service' has a fixed and definite meaning in law. It is service by delivering the writ, notice or order to the defendant personally as contradistinguished from other modes of service, and thence does not include service by leaving a copy at the defendant's last known place of abode, or by mailing a copy to him."
The statute contemplates a personal service, i.e. delivery directly to the person notified, and is not satisfied by proof of proper mailing of the notice and receipt thereof through the mail. [Conway v. Campbell,
This ruling disposes of all collateral points raised in plaintiff's brief and argument. The judgment is affirmed. All concur. *Page 587
