Opinion op the Court by

Affirming.

This suit was brought by appellee Mullins and others to enjoin the Chief of Police of Pikeville and оthers from interfering with the use of a private parking lot for the purpose of loading and unloading taxicab passengers. The Chancellor granted the injunction as prayed.

On July 9, 1946, the city council of Pikeville enacted an ordinance which, among other things, undertoоk to regulate city and county taxicabs. Sections 14 and 15 of the ordinance providеd as follows (our italics):

“Section 14. The Chief of Police is hereby authorized and required to establish bus stops ‍​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍and taxicab stands and stands for other passenger common carrier motor vehicles on such public streets in such places and in such number as to afford the greatest benefit and convenience to the public, and every such bus stop, taxicab stand or other stаnd shall be designated by appropriate signs.”

“Section 15. It shall be unlawful for any owner or drivеr of a County taxicab or taxicabs not licensed for operation within the city limits of Pikеville under the provisions of this ordinance to bring passengers into this City from points beyond the City limits аnd discharge such passengers within said City except at such *753 place or places that may be designated by the Chief of Police under the provisions ‍​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍of Sectiоn 14 of this ordinance. ’ ’

Appellee Mullins was the owner of a county taxicab which operated between Millard and Pikeville under an authorization issued by the state Division' of Motor Transportation. In loading and unloading passengers in the City he used a private parking lot owned by appellee Wright, for which he paid Wright a monthly compensation.

In April 1947 Mullins was arrested and convicted on the charge of loading and unloading passengers within the сity limits at a place other than that designated: by the Chief of Police under the above mentioned ordinance. This suit followed.

There is some controversy as to1 whether or nоt the Chief of Police had properly designated and marked by appropriate signs a place on the public streets for taxicab use. It is unnecessary to considеr ‍​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍the conflicting evidence on this question if the ordinance could not validly, or did not, forbid thе use of a private parking lot for the purpose of loading and unloading taxicab passengers.

Appellants here insist the City has' exclusive control over its streets; it has thе right to regulate and control the operation of taxicabs on its streets; and the Chiеf of Police did not act arbitrarily in enforcing the provisions of the ordinance. Assuming aрpellants’' propositions are sound, they do not cover this case.

KRS 94.360 gives to the legislative body of a fourth class city (Pikeville being in this category): “exclusive control ovеr the public ways, landings, wharves and public grounds of the city.”

Exclusive control of the streets, hоwever, does not carry with it the right to determine ‍​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍who shall conduct a taxicab business within the сity limits. Adams et al. v. Burke, 308 Ky. 722, 215 S. W. 2d 531, petition for rehearing this day overruled. A fourth class city may properly designate taxicab stands or places for loading and unloading passengers on its рublic streets. To say, however, that a taxicab operator may not use private property in carrying on his business is going into an entirely *754 different field altogether. This departs distinсtly from control of public streets and not only attempts unreasonable regulation of the taxicab business but arbitrarily interferes with, the enterprise of the parking lot owner. We can see no justification in this case for such restrictions on private business and the use оf private property.

In our opinion the ordinance would be clearly unconstitutional if construed as prohibiting the use of private property by taxicabs for loading оr unloading passengers. While the language used in Sections 14 and 15 of the ordinance ‍​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍abоve quoted might justify such interpretation, if possible we should construe the ordinance as сonstituting a valid exercise of the local legislative power. See 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Lаw, Section 97; Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Association v. Quinn et al., 244 Ky. 260, 50 S. W. 2d 554. In doing so we take the view that the true intent and purpose of thesе sections was to prohibit this particular use of public ways or public property except as designated. Fairly construed, it does not appear the legislative body of the City intended to аccomplish a more comprehensive unconstitutional purpose.

For the rеasons stated, the ordinance must be limited in its application so as not to forbid the actions of appellee Mullins or those similarly situated, and the Chancellor properly enjoined further prosecutions under the ordinance on this ground.

The judgment is affirmed.