*1 reasonable occurred while de- doubt, killing fendant was in the commission of an unlawful act and was result of such unlawful last is similar to the ob- the. jection made to the thirteenth instruction, and for the rea- son in the consideration of that given instruction cannot be sustained. , & n is affirmed. . - T Judgment affirmed.

(No. 19296. City of vs. Appellee, Thor Litchfield, Charles

worth, Appellant. Opinion December filed *2 Dryer & for counsel,) ap- Brown, Poos, (OmER pellant.

George P. for O’Brien, City Attorney, appellee. Mr. this reported opinion: Commissioner Partrow Litchfield, suit in the Appellee, city began court of Thorworth, Charles against appellant, Litchfield to recover a fine for the sale of in vio- lation an ordinance. filed a Appellant spe- cial demurrer to each of the the declaration, five counts of the demurrer was overruled, elected stand his was was demurrer, selected, heard, evidence jury verdict for was motions for a new trial and returned, $175 in arrest of were judgment overruled, en- was tered verdict and an against appellant, appeal been prosecuted this court on the that the con- ground stitutionality of an ordinance a statute is involved.

The title Prohibition is, act “An act to restrict the manufacture, sale, and use transportation, possession intoxicating liquor, uni- aiding thereby establishing formity Federal laws in thereto.” regard Sec- of the act “All cities and provides: villages shall have full ordinances embracing pro- visions this act as are and further to applicable, hibit away, manufacture, giving selling, dispensing, bartering, transporting, delivering, furnishing, possessing, for keeping, purchasing, storing, advertising exposing whatsoever. any purpose No store, sell, nor other authority manufacture, permit liquors otherwise deal prescribe beverages which a or other authority required permit *3 shall within any juris- be issued to place, person, an enacted duly diction of which any city village such acts; act or per- such prohibiting an effect such void the taking mit shall become upon ordinance.” is unconsti- section that

It is insisted 38 conferred by that the for the reason tutional refer- with ordinances to pass section municipalities upon the title than are broader to intoxicating liquor ence article of section in violation act 4 13 section this is the only and that the constitution, to municipalities upon which confers jurisdiction statute liquor, intoxicating with ordinances pass in- is also is unconstitutional if section 38 that it insisted contention of this In valid. support ordinances full power municipalities section gives act as applicable; such provisions embracing rule follow does the delegation that 472

of law that a statute must be in all of its terms complete when it leaves the branch of the legislative government; that the word as used section “prohibit” 38 is broader than the word “restrict” in the title of the act, hence the title; of the act is than body that broader the title is an act to restrict five uses of while section uses, fourteen some of which prohibits cannot be reconciled with and are not synonymous in the used that the last of the sec- expressions title; part which tion, heretofore shall any permit given provides become void effect of an ordinance taking 6, is in conflict with sections hibiting permit, and 8 of the act the right because gives municipalities issued General Attorney void any permit and that this is a dele- druggist, hospital physician, of more than is exer- gation municipality cised itself. of various constitutionality as to the pro

The question before this court act has been visions of the Prohibition held be con and the act has been on occasions several rule urged. as grounds stitutional against the title was to be within of the act the body requiring DeGeovanni, v. in those cases. (People considered Baran, v. id. Jabine, 55; Swierczek 230; People Illi id. 384; State v. Alfano, People in those cases It was held Milauskas, id. 198.) nois v. did of, complained respects the Prohibition the constitution article not violate section subjects expressed in its provisions including as well prohibitive; act is regulatory title; manufacture, laws enact prohibiting the right in and possession transportation *4 is not derived and of a State in the police herent constitu the Federal amendment the from eighteenth constitution; State the from State nor and to liquor intoxicating traffic to prohibit any means reasonably adapted prohibition effective, violated; constitutional rights provided that the constitutional with reference to the title of an act will be construed in favor of the va- liberally of the act, and that in to render lidity order a provision void it must be with the title and must have incongruous no connection with the title. or relation to Where proper declared in title means of general purpose to be intended accomplishing presumed purpose as means necessary thereto, reasonably incidents indicated be included in may adapted purpose act. If fair intendment the have body connection with the title the act is necessary proper to this If the title is objection. constitutional open may number be contained general any as may be, no matter how diverse so long they are not inconsistent with sub- foreign in furtherance of such ject matter, may be considered subject. entirely act is not to Prohibition object use intoxicating transportation

prohibit all circumstances. at at all and under times, all liquor places have been of the act would If had been purpose of the statute is object title. The pro- so stated in the im- liquors beverage, of intoxicating hibit use and even restrict, and to regulate, pose prohibition, means Therefore any certain use for their hibit, purposes. the manu- of restricting reasonably adapted purpose be included may of intoxicating liquor facture, sale, etc., of restricting the means act. One body tois and use sale manufacture, times, certain at places use and sale its certain use in its sale and or to prohibit certain purposes, circumstances under certain times and certain at places, the use of A prohibition all purposes. on its use. a restriction necessarily *5 474 under authority, its the to manu- police power,

facture and use all for any intoxicating liquor pur- and it poses, has the to authorize power municipalities pass ordinances such use. This has ex- prohibiting power isted in for under many years clause municipalities section 1 of article City act. Village Section of this statute confers the same upon municipalities which to that time had under clause prior had legislature for the lim- right ited in manufacture, sale and use of liquor various the same sections Prohibition act and at time authorize its manu- municipalities entirely prohibit all sale and use within the facture, any purposes limits within municipality. provisions Such title of are means of restriction and are does not violate within section police power, necessarily section It article constitution. if the ordinance is not void follows that section valid for the reasons urged. the word first the ordinance defines section of defined the Prohibi- word “still” as

“person” liquor” “intoxicating tion It act. provides phrase defined or to include all shall construed be of sec- by be intoxicating liquor declared to section act. The second of the Prohibition manufacture, sell, that no shall person provides liquor, any intoxicating deliver barter, possess transport, or have in his maintain, have possession nor own, operate, as he be authorized shall in any still, except interest claims act. Appellant of the Prohibition virtue so to do by define the failure of on account except “intoxicating liquor” the term ordinance, entire publish it was statute, impossible statute. required by the ordi- alleged the declaration count of Each in the in a Litch- newspaper was nance published and that field, on the dates sold when unlawfully ordinance was full force and effect. This was an of fact admitted allegation demurrer. Holten, (People 219.) Appellant 259 the does not question incorpo rate in a statute the of another statute ref erence, the reason that all not taken away Federal constitution remain the legislature, but he claims that creatures municipal corporations *6 and have those which are legislature only spe cifically them; that the never granted enact authority to an or granted municipal corporations a statute; dinance reference to the by a where there so, has no inherent do authority is doubt it must be resolved against about municipality. it

In is said: “In Corpus Juris, adoption one ordinance a of another statute ordi nance reference and become of such may by be adopted part a ordi statute or ordinance. Where municipal adopted reference, the stat nance statute by incorporates set out the ordinance ute in its need be entirety of the entered the minutes Section corporation.” upon defines phrase “intoxicating liq the Prohibition act kind specified It sale of liquor is the uor.” confers authority statute The statute prohibited. the sale by to prohibit on municipal corporations mu statute. The by kind of liquor prohibited the statute definition contained bound by nicipality by prohibited the sale of liquor cannot prohibit undertakes only The ordinance statute. A municipal statute. by acts already prohibited

penalize de will not be authority under proper ordinance passed already acts prohibited it prohibits invalid because clared City Schlick, 181; Ill. Decatur v. statute. (City 311.) Co. id. Ice Cream Union v. Chicago ordinance is not only consistent with but is a reiteration of the statute. An ordinance passed by municipal corpora tion in pursuance express legislative will not authority be held invalid the courts unreasonable. being (City v. Chicago Ripley, 466; Ill. Landberg City id. Chicago, 112.) was not invalid be cause it incorporated by statute. insists the last three

Appellant counts of the decla ration are defective because that the sales were allege made him “in violation of the Prohibition act of Illi nois.” of them also Each sales were made alleges in violation of the ordinance. These are not counts based the statute but are section 2 upon based of the ordi upon nance. The “in clause, violation Prohibition act of Illinois,” is not an essential of either of the counts part and may be treated as The first two counts surplusage. make no reference to the statute and are not to this open criticism. One count in a declaration good is sufficient a verdict. support (Jones District, v. Sanitary Olson v. Coal Co. Kelly The common law 502.) rule as modified statute that where an entire is, verdict is based several counts shall not be set or re aside *7 versed on account of any defective count if one or more counts declaration are sufficient to sustain the ver dict. and Alton Railroad Chicago Co. v. Harbur, 180 Ill. v. Nadelhoffer, Shreffler

We find no reversible error, judgment affirmed.

Per Curiam : The foregoing Mr. opinion reported by Commissioner Partlow is as the hereby adopted opinion court, entered in accordance therewith.

Judgment affirmed.