The plaintiff filed an eight count revised complaint alleging various statutory and tort violations arising from said incident. The seventh count of the revised complaint alleged a violation of General Statutes §
The court, Mihalakos, J., granted the motion to strike on CT Page 6114 December 2, 1998, holding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently plead facts to support a CUTPA claim. The plaintiff subsequently filed a Substitute Complaint on December 7, 1998, repleading the seventh count of his complaint.
On January 21, 1999, the defendant filed a motion to strike the seventh count of the substitute complaint along with a supporting memorandum of law. On February 4, 1999, the plaintiff filed a motion in opposition and a memorandum of law in support.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of [a] complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . . [W]e must take as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint and must construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates,
In determining whether certain acts constitute a violation of CUTPA, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has adopted the federal trade commission's criteria: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law or otherwise, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it caused substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)]." (Alterations in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co.,
Here, the plaintiff relies on certain representations made by the defendant at the time of contract formation as the basis for its CUTPA claim. The plaintiff sets forth the following facts in its complaint: "at the time the plaintiff and defendant entered into the contract, the defendant represented to the plaintiff that the defendant would deliver the press and additional equipment to the plaintiff, free of liens and encumbrances." (Emphasis added.) (Substitute Complaint, Count Seven, ¶ 4). The plaintiff contends that the defendant' failure to deliver some of this equipment because of a third party's interest in said equipment constitutes a CUTPA violation.
In the present case, the allegations of fact, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, constitutes nothing more than a breach of contract claim.
The plaintiff has failed to establish aggravating circumstances attendant to the breach to render it subject to CUTPA.
The plaintiff does not allege that at the time of contract formation, the defendant expressly represented that it had title to the equipment and that the equipment was free of liens and encumbrances, nor does the plaintiff allege that the defendant knew or should have known that it would not be able to acquire title to the equipment, or that it did not intend to acquire title to the property in order to effectuate the sale with the plaintiff. In sum, there is no allegation that the defendant knew or should have known that it could not deliver the equipment when it made its representation to that effect.
Here, the defendant represented it would (at some future date) deliver equipment free of encumbrances — that is, comply with a contractual obligation. No case has held that "a CT Page 6116 statement predicative of future conduct-here performance under a contract-somehow becomes a `misrepresentation' for CUTPA purposes simply when the party making the representation cannot deliver on the promise." Designs on Stone, Inc. v. Brennan Construction Co.,Inc., supra,
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike is granted.
Mihalakos, J.
